Published by PLATO, Beograd 1992.
     Translated to English by Dragana Vulicevic




     Ethnic Strife and the Communist Rule
     The CPY as a section  of the Comintern and the realizer of its  concept
in dealing with the ethnic question
     The CPY's ethnic  policy  in its  struggle for power in  the civil  war
(1941-1945)
     Settling accounts with Serbia and the instrumentalization of Kosovo and
Metohia
     Centralism in Yugoslavia and  the role  of the secret  police in Kosovo
and Metohia
     Kosovo and Metohia in the transition from the centralist to the federal
model
     The  epilogue  of the  communist  solution to  the  ethnic question  in
Yugoslavia: the example of Kosovo
     Continuity and discontinuity

     The Age of Ascent
     The Age of Tribulation
     The Age of Migrations
     The Age of Oppression
     The Age of Restoration
     The Age of Communism


     The Serbian Insurrection and Pasha-Outlaws
     Time of Reforms in Turkey
     Pogroms in Metohia
     Population
     Political Action of Serbia
     Restoration of Religious and Cultural Life
     The Economy

     Eastern Crisis and the Serbian-Turkish Wars
     The Albanian League
     Court-Martial in Pristina
     Albanians Under the Sultan's Protection
     Activities of the Serbian Government
     Flaring of Anarchy
     Religious, Educational and Economic Conditions
     The Decline in Population

     Serbia's Diplomatic Actions
     Austria-Hungary and the Expansion of Anarchy
     Failure of Reforms
     Young Turk Regime

     Albanian Incursions into Serbia
     In World War One




     Otoman Vilayets
     Serbia 1804-1913
     Comunist Yugoslavia: Federal Organization
     Settling of Albanian Tribes

     AUTHOR:  Dusan  T. Batakovic (born 1957)  is  one of the  distinguished
Serbian historians. He works in Historical  Institute of Serbian Academy  of
Sciences and Arts as Research  Fellow.  Among dozens of articles  on Serbian
and Balkan history, he had published several  books:  Savremenici o Kosovu i
Metohiji  1852-1912  (Contemporaries   on  Kosovo  and  Metohia  1852-1912),
Belgrade  1988;  Kolubarska  bitka  (Battle  of  Kolubara),  Belgrade  1989;
Decansko pitanje (The Decani Question), Belgrade 1989;  Kosovo i Metohija  u
srpskoj  istoriji (Kosovo and  Metohia  in  Serbian  History), Belgrade 1989
(co-author); Kosovo  i  Metohija  u srpsko-arbanaskim  odnosima (Kosovo  and
Metohia in Serbo-Albanian  Relations), Belgrade 1991; and edited Memoirs  of
Gen. P. Draskic, Belgrade 1990 and Portraits by V. Corovic, Belgrade 1990.
     This book is the collection of his articles on major topics of  history
of Kosovo and Metohia and its recent political consequences.


     Izdavac: Knjizara Plato, Beograd, Cika Ljubina 18-20
     Za izdavaca Branislav Gojkovic
     Urednik Ivan Colovic
     Recenzenti: Prof. dr Radovan Samardzic i dr Milan St. Protic
     Beograd, 1992.
     INDEX 215 THE HISTORY CARDS OF KOSOVO CHRONICLES 219 - 222
     QP- Katalogizacija u publikaciji Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd
     949.711.5 BATAKOVIC, Dusan T.
     [Kosovo Chronicles] The Kosovo Chronicles / Dusan T. Batakovic; prevela
na engleski Dragana Vulicevic.
     -Beograd: Knjizara Plato, 1992 | (Beograd: Vojna stamparija).
     - 218 Str.; 20 cm.
     - (Biblioteka Na tragu)
     Tiraz 1000 - Registar. ISBN86-447-0006-5
     a) Kosovo i Metohija - Istorija 4986380


     The modern history of  Serbia  is  indeed  pregnant  with controversial
questions. Probably the most  complex one  is  the history  of -- Kosovo and
Metohia.  It was  only in the last few years that several  historiographical
works on Kosovo and Metohia had  been  written and published. The pioneer in
this field which  deals with a  particularly important  segment  of Serbia's
past and present is undoubtedly the author of this book.
     This is trully  the first  serious  attempt to cover two  centuries  of
history  of  Kosovo  and  Metohia  and to  present  its  complex  historical
development in its  full.  In a series  of  articles  dealing  with  various
problems of Kosovo and  Metohia  throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the
author  definitely  succeeded  to  make  a  complete picture  of Kosovo  and
Metohia's  troubled  history. It  seems  appropriate, therefore, to name his
book -- The Kosovo Chronicles.
     The diversity of various topics which form the collection  most clearly
shows that the author is the master of  the subject he chose to write about.
Mr. Batakovic presented himself as a mature  historian of the Balkan history
as a whole as much as the sharp analyst of one specific aspect of it.
     One cannot but  to welcome this book.  For two major reasons at  least.
First,  for  its wide-angle approach to  the problem. And  second,  for  its
attempt to avoid typical black and white stereotypes.
     Kosovo  and Metohia undoubtedly  belong  to the corpus  of  the Serbian
history. No question about  that. It was the cradle and the  center  of  the
medieval Serbian state, it was the region  won by the Serbian army  from the
Turks  in the First Balkan War (1912), it was  incorporated  in  the Serbian
state territory and thus had entered into Yugoslavia in  1918.  It was  only
after  the  victory  of  the  Communist  Revolution in  Yugoslavia  that the
question of Kosovo emerged as a  separate  problem outside  and even against
Serbia.  That was the  moment in  which the political position of Kosovo and
Metohia  moved away from  Serbia and became a  problem  of Albanian national
rights in the eyes of very many foreign and Yugoslav observers. That crucial
borderline was rightfully pointed out by the author of this volume.
     From  the standpoint  of form, this  book  represents  a collection  of
articles.  It is  comprised  of two major parts. The  first  entitled, named
History  and  Ideology, treats the problem of Kosovo and Metohia, within the
framework of the Yugoslav unified  state, during the World War Two  and  the
Communist  rule since 1945. The second  Theocracy,  Nationalism, Imperialism
deals with the different aspects of  the 19th  century history of Kosovo and
Metohia until the Yugoslav unification of Yugoslavia.
     The second part of Mr. Batakovic's book covers the period in which this
particular area belonged to  the state territory of  the Ottoman  Empire, in
which the ethnic Serbs were subjects of constant pressures and abuses by the
Ottoman administrators  and,  much more, by ethnic Albanians who, under  the
Turkish protection, conducted  a real terror  over the Serbs. The difference
between the Christian Serbs fighting for their national emancipation against
the oriental Islamic and  oppressive regime of the Ottomans. As the  Ottoman
system crumbled  within  itself, its  peripheral  provinces became  areas of
abuse  rule  of the local population.  The local Albanians, also Muslims for
the  most  part,  found  the  best way  to  suppress the  Serbs  by  putting
themselves in the service of the Turkish  authorities. The author's archival
findings clearly proved what was  really  happening  in  Kosovo and  Metohia
during the 19th century and what were the true origins of ethnic clashes  in
that particular area.
     This   part   of   Mr.  Batakovic's  volume  represents,   in  fact,  a
comprehensive  history  of  Kosovo  and Metohia  during  the  19th  century,
starting from the First Serbian Insurrection against the Turks (1804) to the
First Balkan War  (1912) when, after  the victory of  the Serbian army,  the
region  of Kosovo and Metohia  had  been  incorporated  in  the bulk  of the
Serbian state. It is  essentially a  historical analysis of complex  ethnic,
religious  and  political  relations in  the triangle  Serbs-Turks-Albanians
based on a rather deep archival and documentary research. The author managed
to trace down the  roots of these conflicts,  their nature  and development.
Parallel  to  this, he gave  the historical background for the events  which
occurred in the 20th century, when the problem of Kosovo and Metohia reached
its peak in both, crisis  and international  attention. This segment of book
should  serve as a textbook of Kosovo and Metohia's  history to everyone who
is interested in this particular field.
     Mr. Batakovic's  collection  of articles contains  several  synthetical
pieces written on the subject of  the  history  of Kosovo and  Metohia. This
region of  constant  clashes  needed  to  be defined  in  terms  of  general
categories. In an attempt to discover the real nature of those conflicts the
author searched for the answer to the  following questions: what really lays
in  the  bottom  of  centuries long  clashes  in the  history of Kosovo  and
Metohia,  is  that the conflict  of religions, nations or civilizations? One
will  find the author's answers  both  original and inspiring. Contradictory
problems need  to be thought  about. And that  is exactly what Mr. Batakovic
has done.
     A special attention  should be paid to the article entitled "The Kosovo
And Metohia  Question  - ethnic strife and communist rule". It stands as the
pivotal piece among all  other articles in this book. It is at the same time
the most important and the most  complex attempt to analyze the situation in
Kosovo in Metohia in the last fifty years, since the communists took over in
Yugoslavia.
     This is  the  first  time  in Serbian  and Yugoslav historiography that
someone  tried  to  look  on the Kosovo and  Metohia  question  outside  the
framework of political and ideological clichs. The article of Mr. Batakovic
represents a pioneer work in a noncommunist approach to contemporary history
of Kosovo and Metohia. Trying to see the problem in  the realm  of communist
regime  and  its  policies  in Yugoslavia,  and  in Serbia specifically, the
author found a  whole new  field  of  research and  reasoning.  With  strong
foundations in his knowledge of Kosovo and Metohia's  history,  both distant
and  recent,  Mr.  Batakovic  made a successful  synthesis of Serbo-Albanian
misunderstandings  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia,   finding  a  balance   between
contemporary politics and traditional differences between ethnicities living
in  this region.  His final conclusion  that the  Titoist politics had  been
detrimental   to  the  positive  solution  of  this  serious  problem  seems
persuasive and largely acceptable.
     One should  appreciate the  courage  of  the author  to  tackle such  a
complicated question of history  and politics which touches the very essence
of the  present  day Serbia and Yugoslavia. Mr.  Batakovic's writing  should
contribute in clarifying many problems which had been heavily misinterpreted
in recent years, both in Yugoslavia  and abroad.  Escaping numerous traps of
Marxist historiography and reasoning, the author leads us on the road of new
and  modern  way of thinking about nationalism and  statehood.  By combining
historical  analysis and  archival research  with  original  synthesis,  the
author left us with  a  lot  of  vastly  unknown factography  and even  more
conclusions and assertations which inspire further work and thoughts.
     The author of  this volume  belongs  to the new  generation of  Serbian
historians.  To the generation whose  intellectual and professional maturity
presently  shows itself in full  intensity. It is a general hope  that these
young  people  will  drive Serbia  out of Marxist dogmas  not  only in their
intellectual work but also in everyday politics. The book we  have before us
is one of  those important steps in the direction of modern, non-ideological
view of our past and present.





     In the  20th-century history of the two  southern regions of Serbia  --
Kosovo and Metohia  -- there are two periods that  are clearly  separated by
ideological  borders.  In the  first period (1912-1941),  in the Kingdom  of
Serbia  and  the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ethnic issues were mainly dealt with
in keeping with the civic standards of inter-war Europe, notwithstanding the
suffering  endured during the war and latent political instability. Compared
to ethnic  minorities  in other  countries, the ethnic  Albanian minority in
Kosovo and Metohia, despite its open antagonism towards  the state, was  not
in  an  particularly unfavorable position.  By  Saint-Germain Treaty  (1919)
minorities on Serbian territory within borders of 1913 (including Kosovo and
Metohia), were formally excluded  from international protection  but it  was
not  particularly   used   against   interests   of   ethnic  Albanians   in
Serbia.1
     In the second period, commencing with the war (1941-1945) and concluded
after  the establishment of  communism in Yugoslavia (1945), the question of
Kosovo  and Metohia  was dealt with in  keeping with the Party  leadership's
ideological  stands  regarding  the ethnic question.  Precisely during  this
period  solutions  were  found providing  strong  impetus to the  old ethnic
conflict  between  Serbs  and Albanians, causing  deep  rifts  difficult  to
surmount  today.  Ethnic  tension  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia  thus  offers  a
paradigmatic example  of the  ability  of  the communist  rule to completely
change  the  demographic  picture  of an area by instrumentalizing  existing
ethnic differences.
     Kosovo and Metohia, and entire Yugoslavia for that  matter, depended on
the rule of the communist leadership, which cunningly  used the manipulation
of ethnic differences to consolidate and maintain power. The national policy
of the  Yugoslav communists was an ideological  and national negation of the
establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which the Serbs saw as their own
-  the heir to the  political traditions and democratic institutions  of the
Kingdom  of Serbia.  The  Serbs  posed  the  greatest  threat  for  Yugoslav
communists in number and political  affiliation:  to them,  communism  was a
foreign  ideology  viewed slightingly,  as a  vogue of  the  small-in-number
deluded  youth;  but  recognized during  the  war as the  gravest  threat to
independence and freedom. The communists regarded the Serbs as a nation with
strong   politically  constructive  traditions  and  a  pronounced  national
conscience who, spread through the length and breadth of Yugoslav territory,
had learned to conduct foreign policy on their own, without tangible foreign
support, a nation united by  a single Orthodox Church  -  the bearer  of  an
anti-Soviet mood  in the  country. The Communist Party of  Yugoslavia  (CPY)
drafted its followers among the  Serbs chiefly from  the lower social strata
(especially  patriarchal communities in Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia  and
Vojna  Krajina)  unestablished  in Serbian  state and  political traditions,
people   who  in  the  name   of   idealistic  Yugoslavism  and  proletarian
internationalism rejected Serbian interests and blindly obeyed the orders of
the Titoist leadership.
     The Albanians, a people whose national integration fell a whole century
behind those of the other Balkan  nations, remained  in communist Yugoslavia
against their will, but found a  common  interest with the ruling  communist
party in an anti-Serbian policy via which to achieve  their  national goals.
Time was to pass for the  backward ethnic Albanian milieu to  admit its  new
authorities  and for  the CPY  to  come to terms with representatives of the
ethnic  Albanian minority. The question of Kosovo and Metohia was thus dealt
with in the inter-relation  of three gravity centers of political forces -1.
the CPY leadership as the leading  factor  of might  in the country;  2. the
ethnic Albanian national  movement which had  evident continuity despite the
ideological affiliation of  its  bearers; 3. Serbian  communists who, though
numerically  superior in  the  army, party and  politics,  as  Yugoslavs and
internationalists consistently implemented the Titoist policy. The origin of
this relation  can  be seen in the chronological sequence of developments of
the CPY's  national  policy  under  different  political  and  international
conditions.
     1 R.  Rajovic,  Autonomija Kosova.  Politicko-pravna  studija,  Beograd
1985, pp. 100-105.
     The CPY as a section of the Comintern and the  realizer of its  concept
in dealing with the ethnic question
     There  is evident  continuity in the CPY's  policy in  dealing with the
position  of  ethnic  minorities  which  shows  that,   despite   individual
aberrations due to the position  of communist  Yugoslavia in foreign policy,
basic  political principles, outlined in party  programs  and resolutions in
the inter-war period, were consistently implemented. The CPY coordinated its
program of solutions to the ethnic question in the multi-ethnic  Kingdom  of
Yugoslavia with  the general stands of the Third International  (Comintern),
within the framework  of which it acted as a  separate section, as its  work
was prohibited in the country.
     The  Comintern was an important  lever of  Soviet  foreign policy.  The
Comintern's attitude towards the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was determined by the
Soviet policy  towards  the  "Versailles system"  of  states  created  under
imperialistic peace accords"  after World War  I,  in  which enemies of  the
Bolshevik regime -  Great  Britain  and France  -  were dominant.  The Fifth
Congress of the  Comintern  (1924)  abandoned  the  principle of  a  federal
restructuring  of  states,  created  as a  cordon  sanitaire primarily  as a
defense  against  the "proletariat  revolution" and  a struggle against  the
Soviet  Union,  with   the  explanation  that  "western  imperialists"  were
preparing an  assault on the "first country of socialism". The new political
platform's starting point was to break up the cordon  surrounding the Soviet
Union by  singling out and rendering independent the oppressed nations among
those states in the enemy  camp,  including the Kingdom of Yugoslavia  - the
right of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia to separation was emphasized, and a
special resolution stressed the  need to aid the movements of  the oppressed
nations  for  the  formation  of  their  independent  states  and  "for  the
liberation  of the Albanians". The  policy  of the  Yugoslav authorities had
some  effect  on  the  Comintern's  stand   towards  Yugoslavia:  the  royal
authorities  had failed  to recognize  the  new  Soviet  state and  provided
shelter to  a large  number of  Russian emigrants and White  Guard  military
units in the  20s, including the troops  of  General Vrangel,  while Russian
societies  frequently greeted their  patron,  King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic
(related  to  the  Romanov  dynasty  through  his  sister  Jelena  and   his
Montenegrin aunts), as the new Slavic tsar.
     The  CPY, and the  Comintern, advocated the  stand  that  the  state of
Serbs, Croats  and  Slovenes  was  an  unnatural  creation which  cannot  be
regarded as a homogeneous national state (comprising three tribes which make
up a  nation) with a few  ethnic minorities, but a state  wherein the ruling
class  of one (Serbian) nation  was oppressing the other nations. The thesis
on  a Greater  Serbian bourgeoisie and Greater Serbian hegemony owed much to
the theses of the Austro-Hungarian public opinion prior to and during  World
War I, whereby  the Greater Serbian threat posed  a chief  obstacle  to  the
stabilization of political  conditions in the Balkans. Similar stands,  only
with a more pronounced ideological component, can be found in the  works  of
Austro-Marxists whence such stereotypes were taken and  constructed into the
views  of  the Third International  regarding  the  ethnic  question in  the
Balkans.1
     The  policy  to  break up  Kingdom  of  Yugoslavia  culminated  in  the
decisions  of  the CPY's  Fourth Congress,  held  in Dresden  in  1928.  The
statement that about one-third of the Albanian nation had remained under the
rule of the  Greater  Serbian bourgeoisie, which  was  implementing the same
oppressive regime" against it as in Macedonia, was supplemented by the stand
that its liberation and unification with Albania  can be achieved only  in a
joint  struggle with the CPY.  With regard to this, support was  extended to
the  Kosovo Committee, an organization of  ethnic Albanians from Kosovo  and
Metohia who, aided by the Albanian government and Mussolini, raided Yugoslav
territory  with  the  aim of winning the annexation  of  Kosovo, Metohia and
western  Macedonia  to  Albania. Tens  of thousands  of Serbian colonists  -
chiefly volunteers in  World War  I  and indigent families from  Montenegro,
Vojna Krajina and Dalmatia,  were  sealed by the party press as  servants of
the Greater Serbian policy,  although  the  land they  were allotted was not
taken  from ethnic  Albanians. Similar  stands  were reitered at  the Fourth
National Conference of the CPY held in Ljubljana in 1934, which stressed the
assessment that  the Yugoslav  kingdom  was  nothing  but the "occupation of
Croatia,   Dalmatia,    Slovenia,    Montenegro,   Macedonia,   Kosovo   and
Bosnia-Herzegovina  by Serbian  troops" and that  it was  thus imperative to
execute  the  "persecution  of  Serbian  Chetniks  from  Croatia,  Dalmatia,
Slovenia,  Vojvodina, Bosnia, Montenegro,  Macedonia and Kosovo". Renouncing
these  regions  any Serbian character at all, the  CPY believed  that  these
provinces should be organized as separate federal units within the  frame of
a future communist Yugoslavia. The stand to break up Yugoslavia  was changed
in  1935,  when  the Comintern established  a new course  of struggle of the
"national  front" against  the  danger looming from Nazism  and  Fascism  in
Europe.2  The  CPY  abandoned its decision on  the annexation  of
Kosovo and Metohia to Albania in 1940,  at the Fifth National  Conference in
Zagreb, at a time when Albania had been under Italian occupation for a year,
but  even then,  the  "colonialist methods of the  Serbian bourgeoisie" were
condemned and  the  need for the  creation of a separate republic of  Kosovo
emphasized -  "the ethnic problem can be resolved  by  the forming of a free
labor-peasant  republic  of Kosovo  after  the  Greater  Serbian fascist and
imperialist  regime   is  overthrown".3   By  demonizing  Serbian
domination in  Yugoslavia, Yugoslav communists distinguished  less and  less
the bourgeoisie from the people - thus the idea to form a separate party for
Serbia  was abandoned,  although party organizations for  the other Yugoslav
provinces were formed.  Maintaining  such a  stand, the  CPY  received  Nazi
Germany's attack on Yugoslavia in April, 1941.
     1  K. Cavoski, KPJ i kosovsko pitanje,  in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj
istoriji, Beograd 1988,  pp.  361-381.  Cf documents  in:  Istorijski  arhiv
Komunisticke  partije  Jugoslavije,   Beograd  1949,   vol.  I-II,   passim;
Komunisticka internacionala, Gornji Milanovac 1982, vol. VIII, passim.
     2 K, Cavoski, op. cit., pp. 365-369.
     3 V. Djuretic, Kosovo i Metohija u Jugoslaviji, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, p. 321
     The  CPY's ethnic policy  in its struggle for power  in  the civil  war
(1941-1945)
     The Kosovo and Metohia question was raised again when the flames of war
spread  on  April  6,1941,  throughout Yugoslavia: its  army  was forced  to
unconditional capitulation  11  days later and its territory  divided  among
Hitler's allies.  Owing to their  loyalty to old  allies  France  and  Great
Britain, and for  fomenting a putsch  on March 27, 1941 (thereby practically
canceling  any agreement with  the Axis powers), the Serbs  were punished as
the Third Reich's chief enemy  in the Balkans  by a division of the  Serbian
territories: most  of Kosovo  along  with  Metohia,  western  Macedonia  and
fringing areas of Montenegro were allotted to  Albania, which had been under
Italian occupation for two years. Bulgaria was given a small part of Kosovo,
while its northern parts entered  the composition of Serbia  where a  German
protectorate  was  established.  Under a decree by King  Vittorio Emmanuele,
dated  August 12,  1941, Greater Albania was founded. An  Albanian voluntary
militia numbering 5,000 men - Vulnetari - was set  up in  Kosovo and Metohia
to assist  the Italian forces  in  maintaining order, but  which carried out
surprise attacks on the Serbian population on its own.
     Ethnic  Albanians in  Kosovo and Metohia, who were declared by  Italian
and  communist propagandas as victims of Greater Serbian hegemony, received,
besides  the right  to hoist  their own flag,  the  right to open schools in
their mother tongue. The patriarchal and  tribal ethnic Albanian  society in
Metohia  and  Kosovo,  accustomed  to  extreme  subordination  and  absolute
submission to the local land holders, received the new order wholeheartedly.
The destruction of the Yugoslav state,  which they never  took as their own,
was  received  with  vindictive  ardor.  In  the  first  few  months  of the
occupation, some ten thousand colonist houses were burned in night raids and
their owners and families expelled. Colonist estates were ploughed afresh in
order that every trace of Serbian presence be eradicated and in the event of
their  return,  to  render  difficult the  recognition of their estates. The
destruction of colonist  villages  according to  a  plan  was to  help  show
international  commissions after the war, when  new borders would  be drawn,
that  Serbs  never  lived  there.  An  ethnic Albanian  leader  from Kosovo,
Ferat-bey Draga, said that the "time  has come to  exterminate the Serbs ...
there will be no Serbs under the  Kosovo sun".1 Orthodox churches
were burnt and destroyed  and graveyards desecrated. Ethnic Albanians sought
to eradicate every trace of Serbian presence in these areas. During the war,
some 100,000 colonists and indigenous  Serbs fled for Serbia and  Montenegro
ahead  of Albanian terror, and some  10,000 were  killed.2  Along
with this,  under  a  plan  of the Italian government,  adopted  before  the
occupation  of Yugoslavia,  began an extensive  settlement of Albanians from
Albania  on the estates of the  expelled colonists.  Their number is roughly
estimated at  80,000-100,000;  the  first postwar  estimate put it at  about
75,000.3
     The insurrection against the  occupier in mid-May,  1941, was raised by
Serbian  officers  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Draza  Mihailovic,  who
organized  the  Chetnik  (guerrilla)  movement  throughout  Yugoslavia:  his
troops, organized throughout the country,  were proclaimed by the government
in  exile the Yugoslav  army in  the homeland,  and  he was made general and
minister  of war. Two  weeks after Hitler's  assault  on  the Soviet  Union,
Yugoslav  communists  stirred up  an uprising at Moscow's call, which, under
the  mask of a  people's  liberation struggle, was in fact a movement for  a
revolutionary  shift  of   power.  After  initial  talks  with  Mihailovic's
Chetniks, Tito's Partisans set out on a long and bloody civil  war. Although
there  were  several  collaborationist regimes in  the  country  with strong
military formations, the  Partisans - the military force of the CPY, saw the
Chetniks  as  their  arch-enemy  who  incorporated  the state  and political
continuity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
     In the civil  war that ensued,  Kosovo and Metohia assumed  a secondary
role.  The Chetnik movement,  organized into two  Kosovo corps  (about 1,500
men),  operated  in mountainous regions  on  the  outskirts  of  Kosovo  and
Metohia.  Cooperation  between  the  occupational  Italian  forces  and  the
Albanian  voluntary  gendarmery  left  no  room for their stronger  military
engagement and protection  of the  Serbian  population. The persecuted Serbs
sought  refuge  in occupied Serbia, where they  were  received  first by the
commissariat administration and then a  special refugees  commissariat under
the regime of General Milan Nedic.4
     Metohia, which was settled by primarily Montenegrin colonists, had many
followers  of the  CPY,  though  at the outbreak of the war  its  membership
comprised a mere 270, including some two dozen ethnic Albanians. Even though
the  CPY  condemned in  numerous declarations prior to  the war the  Greater
Serbian policy  of the bourgeoisie and called  during the war on the  ethnic
Albanian population to rise together with the colonists and Serbian  natives
for the creation of a "new, justice society", the response was negligible. A
party leader, Ali Shukria, tried in 1941 to justify  this reaction by saying
that  the mere  name Yugoslavia provoked  unanimous  indignation  among  the
ethnic Albanians. Clashes between Partisan and Chetnik formations on the one
hand  and  the  ethnic Albanian  gendarmery on the other  showed that ethnic
Albanians saw in both of them only Serbs, their age-old enemies.5
     The number of ethnic Albanians mustered in partisan units in Kosovo and
Metohia was  extremely  low, numbering only several dozen. Individual  units
were named after  prominent ethnic Albanian  communists (Zeinel  Aidmi, Emin
Duraku), and then after distinguished  leaders  of the secessionist movement
against Serbia and Yugoslavia  (Bairam Cum); agitations among the population
constantly stressed that after the war, the ethnic Albanians would win their
rights,  labeling the prewar  policy  as  fascist  and maleficent.  However,
winning over  ethnic  Albanians for  the  restoration of Yugoslavia under  a
communist  leadership was  slow, since among the  ethnic Albanian members of
the  CPY  most  had  hoped  that  Kosovo and  Metohia would  remain  in  the
composition of Albania after the war.
     In the Communist Party  of Albania (CPA), which was formed from various
factions on February 8, 1941, under the supervision of Yugoslav  instructors
(Miladin Popovic and Dusan  Mugosa),  were numerous  followers  of a Greater
Albania  under  communist  rule. Albanian communist leader  Enver Hoxha  had
taken the first step towards an accord for the creation of a Greater Albania
after the war with  a short-lasting  agreement reached on  August 2,1943, in
the village of Mukaj with  representatives  of  the Balli  Kombetar, a  very
active organization  in  Kosovo.6  Miladin Popovic held a similar
stand, proposing  that  ethnic Albanians  from  Kosovo and Metohia be placed
under the command of the  Chief Staff of Albania and that Metohia come under
the organization  of  the CPA.7 Such  aspirations attained  their
fullest expression in a declaration issued on January 2, 1944 in the village
of Bunaj (Bujan), in a conference attended  by 49 political  representatives
of the ethnic Albanian and  Yugoslav partisan units  (43 ethnic Albanians, 1
Moslem and 7 Serbs present):
     "Kosovo and Metohia is  an  area mostly inhabited  by ethnic Albanians,
who have always wished to become united with Albania. We, therefore, feel it
our duty to point to the road that is to be followed  by the ethnic Albanian
people in the realization  of their  wishes. The only way for the Kosovo and
Metohia ethnic Albanians to unite with Albania is  through a common struggle
with the other peoples of Yugoslavia against the invader and his lackeys. It
is the only way of  winning freedom, when all the peoples, including  ethnic
Albanians,  will  be  able  to   make   their  options  with  a   right   to
self-determination,  including  secession.  The  guarantee  for  it  is  the
National  Liberation Army  of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Army of
Albania, with which it is closely linked."8
     The  decisions  reached  in  Bunaj,  under which the  name  Metohia was
replaced  by  an  Albanian  term  Rrafshe  Dukadjini,  were  contrary  to  a
declaration by a grand  communist assembly  held  in Jajce in late November,
1943  AVNOJ (the National  Antifascist  Liberation  Council of  Yugoslavia -
NALCY)  at which it was  decided that a new, communist Yugoslavia, headed by
Tito as partisan marshal, be established on a federal principle whereby "all
peoples ... will  be fully free and equal", and the ethnic groups guaranteed
all the rights of an ethnic minority.9 In his instructions to the
communist leaders  in Kosovo  and  Montenegro,  Tito  rejected the decisions
reached in Bunaj,  believing that  they raised issues which  should be dealt
with after the war: he  realized only  too well that his movement would have
lost many followers if he had upheld the demands of the ethnic Albanians, as
he  had proclaimed  in  principle the restoration  of  Yugoslavia within its
prewar  borders.  In  conditions when  the  war  was  not  yet over  and the
establishment of a communist system uncertain, the decision not to touch the
borders of Yugoslavia was the only possible solution.
     The  hostility  of ethnic Albanians  towards Yugoslav partisans did not
wane,  despite efforts  by  party activists to win over fresh adherents. The
membership  of  the  ethnic  Albanian  Balli  Kombetar  increased and  their
national solidarity proved to be stronger  than ideological divisions. After
the capitulation of Italy, the German  occupational  authorities  encouraged
aspirations towards the creation of an ethnic Albania, thus on September 19,
1943, the Second Albanian League was founded on the model of its predecessor
-  the  First Albanian  League (1878), advocating fiercer  clashes  with the
Serbs in Kosovo  and Metohia, and a separate SS-Division Scenderbey was  set
up from the local Albanian forces.
     A delegate  of the partisan Supreme Command, Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo,
sent  in  1943  to  reorganize  the partisan  units  in Kosovo, Metohia  and
Macedonia,  informed of  "powerful  chauvinist  hatred  between  the  ethnic
Albanians  and  Serbs  ... The extent  of the Albanian  chauvinist animosity
towards the Serbs is evident from the fact that one of our [partisan] units,
comprising ethnic Albanians,  was surrounded by 2,000 armed ethnic  Albanian
peasants, and after several hours of fighting the latter recognized that the
unit comprised ethnic Albanians. They dispersed, leaving the Italians in the
lurch".10 Fresh partisan  units, set up in September  and October
1943, operated  outside Kosovo and Metohia, with  not more than  800  men in
five  battalions. The unit was reorganized  in the summer and fall  of 1944,
but the number of ethnic Albanians remained the same.
     A large-scale revolt of the Balli Kombetar followers and Albanian units
mustered into partisan formations (November-December, 1944), which broke out
after  the retreat of the  German  troops and the establishment of communist
rule  (the liberation  of  Kosovo  was  assisted  at Tito's  request by  two
brigades of  ethnic Albanian partisans) was  thus not unexpected. The revolt
was  crushed  when additional troops were brought in,  and military rule was
set  up in Kosovo and Metohia from February  to May, 1945.  A leading ethnic
Albanian communist from Kosovo maintained contact  with  the outlaws. He was
soon  discovered, but  A. Rankovic,  Tito's  closest  associate at the time,
assessed  that his execution  would  stir  up  a  fresh revolt,  thus he was
appointed   minister   in  the  Serbian   governament.11  Initial
concessions heralding a lenient attitude  towards ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
and  Metohia   were  made   immediately   after  the  new  authorities  were
established: the settlement of at  least 75,000 colonists  from  Albania was
tacitly  legalized, and a special decree  issued on March 16,  1945, forbade
about 60,000 Serbs  settled in the  inter-war period from returning to their
estates.12
     The conflict between the  CPY and the  ethnic Albanians during  the war
was of ideological and state character. The  CPY could not allow the fascist
forces  in Kosovo to create  a Greater Albania  and thus  disrupt the  state
integrality of  the  newly established  communist  Yugoslavia.  Most  ethnic
Albanians continued to support the  Balli Kombetar and  its solution  to the
ethnic  question.  Albanian communists  on  both  sides had hoped  that  the
triumph of communism would bring quicker unification to all Albanians into a
single  state; thus communist Yugoslavia was regarded as the continuation of
the Kingdom.
     1  H.  Bajrami,  Izvestaj  Konstantina Plavsica  Tasi Dinicu,  ministru
unutrasnjih poslova u  Nedicevoj  vladi oktobra 1943, o kosovsko-mitrovackom
srezu, Godisnjak arhiva Kosova XIV-XV (1978-1979), p. 313
     2  S.  Milosevic,  Izbeglice  i  preseljenici na  teritoriji  okupirane
Jugoslavije 1941-1945, Beograd 1981, p.56-104.
     3 V. Djuretic, op. cit., p. 323-325
     4  Documents  published in R. V.  Petrovic, Zavera protiv Srba, Beograd
1990, pp. 137-175, 353-358.
     5  Dj.  Slijepcevic,  Srpsko-arbanaski odnosi kroz vekove  sa  posebnim
osvrtom na novije vreme, Himelstir 19832, pp. 307-336, 3437-455.
     6 The  agreement  with the CPA was  short-lived and  the Balli Kombetar
(set up  in 1942)  entered  into cooperation  with  the  German occupational
forces after the capitulation of Italy (1943)
     7   Zbornik  dokumenata   i  podataka  o   narodnooslobodilackom   ratu
jugoslovenskih naroda, vol. VII, t. 1, Belgrade 1952, pp. 338-339.
     8  A. N.  Dragnich  and  S.  Todorovich,  The Saga of Kosovo.  Focus on
Serbian-Albanian Relations, Boulder Colorado 1984, pp. 143.
     9 Prvo i drugo zasedanje AVNOJ-a, Beograd 1953, pp. 227-228.
     10 Zbornik dokumenata, vol. X, t. 2, p. 153.
     11 S. Djakovic, Sukobi na Kosovu, Beograd 1986, pp. 227-228.
     12 V. Djuretic, op. cit. p.
     Settling accounts with Serbia and the instrumentalization of Kosovo and
Metohia
     However, the ethnic Albanians, both nationalists and communists, failed
to properly assess the CPY's intentions. The question of Kosovo  and Metohia
was an important point of support in the CPY's plan to square  accounts with
Serbia. The squaring of accounts, outlined  in party programs,  could  start
only  with the achievement  of  full  communist domination. Serbia's conduct
during the war provided additional strength to the party's stands: a country
with  bourgeois  traditions  and  small  peasant  landholders,   devoted  to
politically constructive institutions and  the dynasty, leaned  towards  the
Chetnik movement  of  Draza Mihailovic. After failing in Serbia in 1941, the
small-in-number  communists transferred  the  weight  of their operations to
Bosnia, Herzegovina,  Montenegro  and  the  Military Frontier  (Krajina)  in
Croatia, where the entire Serbian population rose against large-scale terror
wrought  by the  Ustashas (the  authorities of  fascist Croatia).  Cunningly
manipulating  the indigent Serbian hilly  population  who, void of developed
state and political traditions, cherished a devotion  to the cult of "mother
Russia"  and patriarchal egalitarianism, the communists managed - by calling
on the  authority of Moscow  - to win over  many of them who  had fallen  in
numerous Chetnik formations after the capitulation of Italy.
     The communists won the  bloody civil war, in which ethnic and religious
divisions were the chief instigators of massacres, owing to crucial aid from
the  Soviet troops which,  in agreement with Tito, crossed  over to Yugoslav
territory in the fall of 1944, and  helped bring the communists to power and
defeat the Yugoslav army  in  the homeland - the Chetnik  movement of  Draza
Mihailovic. The  first  to be punished then was Serbia:  its bourgeoisie and
peasants were exterminated in the "second stage  of the revolution", i.e. in
the  "squaring  of  accounts  with the  class  enemy" -without  trial and by
summary procedure, while  its youth -  conscripted into partisan  units, was
decimated at the Sremski  Front when it was forced to continually  storm the
well-fortified  German  positions  without sufficient weaponry  and military
training. With the destruction of its potential classes for resistance - the
bourgeoisie, the wealthy peasant  layer  and  the town youth - Serbia's back
was  broken:  most  of  its  bourgeoisie  and  intelligentsia  were   abroad
(officers,  politicians  and diplomats),  while  those  who remained in  the
country  were permanently  marginated.  The  raison d'etre  of the communist
Yugoslavia  was  a  carefully  set  balance of power among  the peoples  and
minorities of Yugoslavia over a potential  threat from Serbian predominance.
The importance which the communist authorities attached to the political and
ethnic affirmation of the  ethnic Albanian minority could not be  understood
if viewed otherwise.
     The numerous Serbs in the party, army and police  of Tito's regime were
carefully selected by the criterion of blind obedience and complete devotion
to the leader, and by their readiness to fully subject Serbian interests  to
the  interests of the  CPY. Most  of  them, through  a negative selection of
cadres,  were  recruited  from   patriarchal  Serbian  milieus  in  Croatia,
Herzegovina and Montenegro or lower classes in Serbia, as lacking commitment
to the national  and state traditions of Serbia. Their major task during the
entire period of Tito's reign was to fight against "Serbian  nationalism and
chauvinism"  which,  considering  the  Serbs  were the  predominant  nation,
constituted the gravest  threat to the regime.  These Serbs thus mercilessly
destroyed everything even  resembling  the  traditions  of  the  Kingdom  of
Yugoslavia  and  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia.  They  were  forerunners  in  the
persecution  of dignitaries  and the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox  Church.
Under  such circumstances, the communist authorities in Yugoslavia were able
to  deal with  the ethnic  question  in  keeping with their  designs without
fearing for their rule.
     The predominance of Serbs  in the military units of the new authorities
demanded, for the sake of  precaution, that  the question  of  the status of
Kosovo and Metohia be  brought up  prudently,  as the party  there  - due to
stubborn ethnic-Albanian resistance -  had no other followers but Serbs  and
Montenegrins (i.e.  Serbs who accepted the CPY's ideological precept on  the
existence  of  a separate Montenegrin nation). The decision  that Kosovo and
Metohia  be annexed to Serbia  was made after the abolition of military rule
on  July  10,1945, perhaps  under  the  influence of  a  large-scale  ethnic
Albanian resistance  towards  the new authorities.  There  is evidence  that
owing to mistakes  made  in the ethnic Albanian  uprising in December, 1944,
the Regional Committee of  Kosovo and Metohia  was  replaced after the First
Congress  of the CP of Serbia in  May  1945, and  placed  under  the  direct
subordination of the headquarters in Belgrade, though  the decision was soon
repealed after a protest voiced by the ethnic Albanian communists. Under the
1946  Constitution,  the  Autonomous  Region  of  Kosovo-Metohia within  the
composition  of  Serbia was  established,  though the  communists of  Kosovo
worked directly under  the instructions of the state  leadership. Fearing an
outbreak  of fresh revolts,  the CPY ordered  that the  officials  in Kosovo
suppress  the  followers  of  a  unification with Albania. Enver  Hoxha  was
dissatisfied  with  the  attitude of  Miladin Popovic, a CPY  instructor  in
Albania who, upon returning to Kosovo, reneged on his promise that after the
war Kosovo  and Metohia would be annexed to Albania. He  was assassinated by
followers  of the  Balli Kombetar in  March, 1945,  and the assassin  -  who
committed  suicide  immediately upon executing  the task  - had with  him  a
standard with the inscription "Kosovo united with Albania".1
     The  reasons  for deep discontent  were not ideological but national in
nature:  in  the  new,  communist  Yugoslavia,  their  aspirations  for  the
annexation  of  Kosovo,  Metohia  and  western  Macedonia  to  Albania  were
betrayed.  Nevertheless,  international  political  ambitions  called for  a
special  relationship  towards  the  ethnic  Albanian  population:  the  CPY
displayed  an open  intent to establish  domination in  Albania. Beyond that
aspiration lay plans for a Balkan federation. Tito  nurtured grandiose plans
- to set up a three-member Balkan federation with support from the Bulgarian
leader Georgi  Dimitrov, wherein Albania would be one of the  three  federal
units, with the possibility of Greece entering, if  the communist guerrillas
should win there.
     Though not always a  reliable memoirist,  Enver Hoxha  claimed  that in
summer, 1946, Tito had accepted  in  principle his  proposal  for Kosovo and
Metohia  to be annexed to Albania, with the qualification  that the time was
not  yet ripe, "as the Serbs would not understand us" and  that,  within the
context of the plan for a  Balkan federation, Tito had said, "We have agreed
on the creation of a Balkan federation. The new  Yugoslavia can  serve as an
example and experience towards that aim. I am referring to this since we are
discussing Kosovo. With the creation of a Balkan federation, the question of
Kosovo's   annexation  to  Albania  would  be  easily  resolved  within  its
framework."2 The  fact that plans for  the  ceding  of Kosovo and
Metohia  to  Albania  truly  existed  is evident  from  the  report of talks
conducted  in  Moscow,  1947,  between E. Kardelj, Tito's chief  advisor for
constitutional  and  ideological  questions,  and  Stalin,  when  the former
explicitly   stated   that   once   the   Yugoslav-Albanian   community  was
consolidated,  Kosovo  would be ceded  to Albania.3 Owing to  the
plans for a Balkan federation and fears that a revolution might break out in
Albania - that power may  be seized by a  faction inclined towards  life  in
union with Yugoslavia,  the  settlement  of  Albanian  immigrants in Kosovo,
Metohia and  western  Macedonia was not stopped after relations  were broken
off  with the CPA, thus an additional 40,000 Albanians established permanent
residence there from 1948-1956.4
     Tito abandoned the idea of a  Balkan federation because Stalin objected
to it. The Information Bureau of the Cominform adopted a resolution in July,
1948, which marked a radical break with the  Soviet Union and its satellites
and the  commencement  of  Tito's  independent course,  tightly  girdled  by
pro-Soviet  regimes.  The  centralization   of   power  in  Yugoslavia   was
conditional  on  the threat  of  a Soviet invasion, thus support  was sought
again  among  Serbian   communist  cadres.  When  the  threat  of  a  Soviet
intervention  was waning, Tito set out on an extensive reconstruction of the
country's  social  and  state  organization,  wherein  the strengthening  of
federal units  (the autonomy  of Kosovo and  Metohia was enlarged  under the
1963 Constitution) was vital in order for him to maintain power.
     In  order to  comprehend Tito's  political  stands on a solution to the
ethnic questions in the  Balkans and Yugoslavia, it is important to learn of
his   basic  ideological  and   national  commitments.   Shaped  during  the
Austro-Hungarian period, he viewed the  Serbian issue with the  typical bias
of  the Austro-Hungarian  press on the Greater Serbian threat, which  was in
the interwar period  supplemented by Croatia's view  of the struggle against
Greater  Serbian  hegemony.  As  far  as  Tito  was  concerned,  "Versailles
Yugoslavia was born in Corfu,  London  and Paris... the most typical country
of  national  oppression  in Europe"  in  which  the  "Croats, Slovenes  and
Montenegrins  were subordinate, and the  Macedonians,  Albanians and  others
enslaved  and without  any  rights".5  He  spoke  of  the  prewar
authorities disparagingly,  "A  handful  of petty  hegemonic  Greater Serbs,
headed by  a king, ruled Yugoslavia for 22 years  in their greed for wealth,
setting  up  a  regime of  gendarmes and prisons,  a  regime  of social  and
national  enslavement".6 The  federalization  of  Yugoslavia,  in
which  only  Serbia  had  two provinces  (Vojvodina and  Kosovo and Metohia)
showed that the breaking up  of Serbian territory was the ultimate objective
of  Yugoslavia's communist leadership, inner Serbia  (without the provinces)
was  slightly bigger  than the Serbia set up by Hitler's  Germany  after its
occupation of  Yugoslavia. The CPY provided the state  and ideological bases
for  the  creation of new  nations (first the  Montenegrin  nation  from  an
ethnically  pure  Serbian  population, the  Macedonian nation -  where  some
200,000 Serbs in  western and northern Macedonia  were forcibly assimilated,
and  the  Moslem nation  - on  a religious basis  - from  a  mainly  Serbian
population,  who  declared  themselves  as  Serbs in the first  few censuses
conducted  after  the  war),  in  order  to  lay  the  foundations  for  the
constitution  of Kosovo and  Metohia  into another  Albanian  state  in  the
Balkans  as   the  final  decision  to   the  constitutional   decisions  of
1974.7
     Ideologically shaped as a supporter of the Comintern, Tito remained all
his life a  victim  to the stand that Yugoslavia could  survive  only if the
threat  of  the Greater  Serbian  hegemony in the new social  and  communist
system was decisively and  forever dispelled.  His fierce  struggle with the
Chetniks, the defenders  of the old regime who advocated a reorganization of
Yugoslavia wherein a large federal Serbian unit would be created, could only
further consolidate his commitments. The model of Austria-Hungary, which was
bound together  by the Habsburg dynasty,  and strong suspicions of the Serbs
as the disorderly factor in the Balkans, were transplanted in a new shape to
Yugoslavia, where the state was based on a  communist regime. An observation
by a British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, on the occasion of  Tito's death in
1980, that the "last Habsburg" had  passed  away, has proved far-sighted and
historiographically justified.
     1 Ibid.
     2 E. Hoxha, Titistt:  Shnime  historike,  Tirane 1982, p. 260-261. In
the book Shminet mbi Kinen, Tiran 1981, Hoxha gave a different  version of
Tito's reply: the Greater Serbian reaction could not comprehend a demand for
the  annexation of Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia to Albania"  (Zri i
popullit,  17.  05.  1981.  The official interpreter  of  these talks  Josip
Gjerdja  claimed that there was talk of a Balkan federation, in which Greece
would be included in the event of the victory of the communist movement, but
said  that the annexation of  Kosovo to  Albania  was not discussed. (Danas,
March 3,1987)
     3 V.  Djuretic, Kosovo u  Jugoslaviji,  pp.; Further  documentation in:
Kosovo. Past and Present. Belgrade 1989, passim.
     4 Cf. P.  Zivancevic, Emigranti.  Naseljavanje  Kosova  i  Metohije  iz
Albanije, Beograd 1989, passim.
     5 J. B. Tito, Nacionalno pitanje u svetlosti NOB, Zagreb 1945, p. 5.
     6 J. B. Tito, Temelji demokratije novog tipa, Beograd 1948, p. 28.
     7  S.  K.  Pavlowitch,  The  Improbable  Survivor.  Yugoslavia and  its
Problems,  London  1988, pp. 34-47. Cf.  N. Beloff,  Tito's  Flawed  Legacy,
London 1980; K. Cavoski, Tito - tehnologija vlasti, Beograd 1990.
     Centralism  in Yugoslavia and  the  role of the secret police in Kosovo
and Metohia
     In  the  centralist  stage of  communist  Yugoslavia  (1945-1966),  for
purposes of  consolidating and maintaining power, the new regime implemented
a particular policy of internal  repression which was  stepped up after ties
with Moscow were broken in 1948. The structure of the  CPY remained the same
as well as its policy in dealing with the ethnic question.  The  affirmation
of the Albanian  minority group remained a major task of the party in Kosovo
and   Metohia.   A.  Rankovic  informed  in  1949,  that  there  were   many
discrepancies and  mistakes  in  the party's work, though he  set  out  that
"ethnic  Albanians in the Autonomous  Region of Kosovo-Metohia, who had been
oppressed in the old Yugoslavia,  have now been completely guaranteed a free
political and cultural life  and development  and  an equal participation in
all  the bodies  of  the  popular  authorities. After  the liberation,  they
acquired their first primary schools  - 453 primary schools, 29 high schools
and 3 advanced schools. Studying from textbooks in their native tongue, some
64,000 ethnic Albanian children have so far  received an education and about
106,000  ethnic  Albanian adults in Kosovo and Metohia  have learned to read
and write".1
     The international  political threat, ideological  disintegration within
the country  and the infiltration of demolition teams stepped up the work of
the State  Security Service (SSS), which  supervised  ideological  orthodoxy
throughout the country, including Kosovo and Metohia. Fearing the enemies of
socialism,  the secret  police  brutally settled  accounts with  ideological
adversaries among the  Serbs, Croats and Slovenes alike. The large number of
Serbs  who declared themselves  for  the  1948  Informburo  Resolution (they
upheld Stalin's call to  overthrow Tito's regime) were convicted to years in
prison in  the  island  of Goli Otok (the Yugoslav GULAG),  which  serves to
prove   that  the  SSS,  headed  by  Aleksandar  Rankovic,  operated  as  an
ideological police and not a service that advanced from Serbian positions as
might be deduced by the number of Serbian cadres in it: until 1966, Serbs in
the  state security comprised 58.3% of the cadres, 60.8%  in the militia and
23.5%  in the total population; Montenegrins made up  28.3% of the cadres in
the security service, 7.9% in  the militia and 3.9% of the total population;
ethnic Albanians comprised 13.3% in the state security, 31.3% in the militia
and  64.9%  in  the total  population.2 Absolute  loyalty to  the
security  service, Tito and the party leadership  was  never questioned, and
its chief Rankovic remained loyal to Tito even after his replacement in 1966
(contemporaries testified that Rankovic believed a mistake had been made and
that the  great leader would realize this one day; he awaited rehabilitation
his entire life).
     In  Kosovo and Metohia and the neighboring areas,  the secret police on
several  occasions  discovered  that  ethnic Albanian officials  were making
contact  with  the leadership of communist  Albania,  but  they  were  never
arrested or convicted because the party leadership believed this would repel
the  small-in-number  ethnic Albanian  communists from  the  CPY.  Thus,  as
generally  proposed by  Rankovic,  instead of being put to trial, they  were
awarded ministerial posts  in  the Serbian or federal government: from these
posts contact with Albania was impossible and  the  precious ethnic Albanian
cadres remained intact. The SSS in Kosovo and Metohia persecuted remnants of
Ballist  formations and infiltrated agents from  Albania for  years,  not as
Albanians  but dangerous ideological enemies who  were working  in team with
Enver Hoxha's Albania and  the headquarters in Moscow. The armed  resistance
of outlaws and their aides proved that large quantities of war material were
in private  possession,  thus an extensive  operation for the collection  of
these weapons  was  carried out in winter  1955/56.  Both  Serbs and  ethnic
Albanians suffered equally, though larger quantities of  weaponry were found
with the ethnic Albanians. The fact that the persecution was not carried out
on  a  national  basis (the SSS did not implement it in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia  and  Montenegro) is  evident  from numerous  complaints  lodged  by
dignitaries of  the Serbian Orthodox Church about the abuses  of  the secret
police. The SSS kept arresting and  harassing Serbian monks and priests, and
with its knowledge a monumental Orthodox church was demolished in  Djakovica
in 1950, in  order that a monument to the partisans of  Kosovo be erected in
its place.
     Since the SSS operatives in Kosovo were recruited mainly from the ranks
of  Serbs  and Montenegrins,  special care  was taken  to  include a certain
number of  ethnic Albanians in every operative unit, and wherever they  were
in the minority, ethnic Albanian cadres were  entrusted with the  management
of  these  units. At  the Prizren Trial  (1956), agents of a spy  demolition
team, linked with the  emigrants and secret Albanian police (Sigurimi), were
forbidden from revealing  the high-ranking ethnic Albanians from  Kosovo and
Metohia  who were  involved in the organization  of  these  teams,  although
conclusive evidence had been unearthed.3
     The freezing of ethnic strife  in  the centralist period was the effect
of  the purely  ideological character of the  SSS as the  system's defender.
Therefore,  no large-scale  demographic  or political changes took place  in
Kosovo and  Metohia.  The birth-rate remained  high with both the Serbs  and
ethnic   Albanians.  The  ethnic  Albanian  milieu  took  advantage  of  the
20-year-long respite to entrust the leadership of  its national movement, in
keeping  with  the  new  circumstances,  to  the  ethnic  Albanian communist
power-holders rather  than to  organizations of  fascist inclination. It  is
important to  note that the character of  the still backward ethnic Albanian
community essentially remained the same: its adjustment to communism was not
reflected  in social  stratification but in a  new  patron of their national
interests.
     1 A. Rankovic, Izabrani govori i clanci, Beograd 1951, pp. 184-185.
     2 Intervju, 04. 09. 1978. Cf. Kosovski cvor. Dresiti ili seci? Izvestaj
nezavisne komisije, Beograd 1990, pp. 18-19.
     3 V. Djuretic, Der politisch-historische Hintergrund Der Tragœdie
der  Serben  aus  Kosovo  und  Metohija  in der  periode  nach  dem  Zweiten
Weltkrieg, in: Kosovska bitka  1389. godine i njene posledice, Beograd 1991,
pp. 413-433; Cf. Lj. Bulatovic, Prizrenski proces, Beograd 1988.
     Kosovo and Metohia in the transition from the centralist to the federal
model
     The  inter-party squaring of accounts, which ended with the replacement
of A. Rankovic and  his associates  at the Fourth Plenum  held in the Brioni
islands (1966), marked a fresh consolidation of Tito's personal power  which
had been threatened  by the  omnipotent State Security  Service. Tito purged
the  SSS of cadres  loyal  to Rankovic and  initiated the  country's further
decentralization.  By  rousing  national differences  and strengthening  the
federal  authority of each republic, Tito reestablished his sacrosanct rule.
In those  aspirations,  ethnic Albanian communists  from  Kosovo emerged  as
important allies,  blazing the trail with their  criticism of the abuses  of
the secret police. The assembly of Kosmet reached the decision that owing to
the  SSS's  manipulation with the  conclusive evidence  against high-ranking
ethnic  Albanian officials  (the so called Djakovica  Group,  lead by  Fadil
Hoxha and Xhavid Nimani, made up of communists from Kosovo and Albania which
in the postwar development lead the party's organization in Kosovo) all acts
pertaining to the  Prizren Trial be destroyed; the proceedings were stopped,
and an emigrant from Albania was appointed chief of police in Kosovo.
     In discussions  on the constitutional  changes, stress was laid  on the
enlargement of the  autonomy of Kosovo:  the demands of the  ethnic Albanian
communists ranged more  or  less  openly  from  the demand for the status of
republic  to the  right  to  sovereignty and  self-determination,  including
secession.  Kosovo  was not granted  the status  of a  separate federal unit
owing to the balance of forces in the party, but  the Albanian minority  was
granted extensive concessions: the name Metohia was removed from the name of
the  province  owing  to  its  Serbo-Orthodox  connotation, and  the  ethnic
Albanians were allowed to freely hoist  their flag; the province's  autonomy
was considerably enlarged under the 1968 and 1971 constitutional amendments,
while  most  of  the  federal  funds  for  development  went  to  Kosovo and
Metohia.1
     The  new  political  course  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia  emboldened   the
nationalists and advocates  of  a unification  with  Albania.  The  fall  of
Rankovic was interpreted as the defeat of the Greater Serbian  forces within
the party.  The demonstrations of the  ethnic  Albanian students in Pristina
and  several  other towns in late November, 1968, in which  Greater Albanian
slogans were  heard,  were hushed up in public, though they heralded a  more
aggressive stand of the ethnic Albanian movement in Kosovo and Metohia. Only
two high-ranking officials in the  Serbian party, the writer  Dobrica  Cosic
and  the  historian  Jovan  Marjanovic,  had  the  courage  to warn  of  the
increasing ethnic Albanian nationalism. Cosic openly warned:
     "We  can no longer ignore the  extent  to which the conviction  of  the
strained relations between  ethnic Albanians and Serbs has spread in Serbia,
the threat felt by  the Serbs and  Montenegrins, the  pressures to move out,
the systematic  removal of Serbs and Montenegrins  from  high positions, the
aspirations of  experts to leave Kosovo, the unequal treatment in courts and
disregard   for   the    law   and   bribery   in   the   name   of   ethnic
affiliation".2  Both  critics  of  the situation  in  Kosovo were
severely reprehended  by both Serbian  and ethnic Albanian  communists,  and
they were replaced from their positions. This was the  first case where,  in
keeping with the new ethnic policy and the decentralization of the communist
party, Albanian  nationalism and Greater Albanian claims  were  deliberately
neglected owing to continual pressure on Serbia, in  keeping with the stands
of a  necessary balance  between  the federal  units in  Yugoslavia. The new
concept of  a decentralized state demanded a change in relations within  the
party. Control  could no longer be exerted over Serbia through a centralized
ideological police but out-voting and  pressure  within  the party's Central
Committee.  The  role  of Kosovo  was  of particular importance  since, as a
militant ethnic group  in the territory of  Serbia, it could be  effectively
used as a means of  state and party pressure on Serbia. Precisely for  these
reasons  further changes in the  state  organization strove to  transfer the
model  of the  federalization of  Yugoslavia onto Serbia - thus the  Serbian
party was federalized. The framework of relations, established in Serbia and
Yugoslavia under  the 1968 and 1971 amendments, testifies to the need of the
highest  priest of Yugoslav politics  for the strongest  and most consistent
political milieu in Yugoslavia - Serbia  - to be controlled, by manipulating
the  deep-rooted fears  inherited from  the Austro-Hungarian  and  inter-war
periods,  and  the  young  and  violent  ethnic  Albanian movement  from the
professed Greater  Serbian threat. Threats of  the professed Greater Serbian
danger were a suitable excuse for turning the  official federal units of the
then centralized Yugoslavia  into  national  and  state  feuds  between  the
communist power-wielders.
     The ethnic  Albanian population in Kosovo,  demographically continually
increasing  (from  1961-1971,  it  rose  by  42%  compared  to  the  Serbian
population which increased by 0.7%, the Montenegrin population which dropped
by 16% and  the  ethnic Turkish one  which  fell  by  53%)  despite  evident
advancement in terms of education  and culture which lead to romantic pathos
and an uncritical approach in the interpretation of history and culture, was
still a backward peasant milieu  where  the  local  dignitaries were  obeyed
without  question.  The  national  and political interests of  the  Albanian
minority coincided with the interests of the party for the first time. Their
alliance was particularly strengthened by an ideological threat  imperilling
Tito,  i.e. the new  reform-oriented communist  leadership in  Serbia  which
introduced certain western standards in the economy, endeavored to establish
control throughout  the republic and to bring the cadre-ruled party  down to
the  masses. The  new  organization of  political  rule in the  country  was
conducive to the  liberalization of the  economy,  thus  decision-making was
gradually shifted from the party  to the  economy. The loss of financial and
economic  power according to  the Serbian  model jeopardized  the  communist
party's power  throughout Yugoslavia. A follower of the Marxist and Leninist
concept  of a  party,  Tito saw his  position  shaken  by  the  re-organized
inter-party  relations,  a  danger perhaps  greater  than  even  the  police
omnipotence  during the period of centralist  rule. By instigating  constant
sources  of instability - national tensions  in Yugoslavia - Tito strove  to
prove  the  unfeasibility  of  Serbia's new  political  course. Tito saw the
ethnic Albanians in  Kosovo  and Metohia  and the nationalist  leadership in
Croatia  as  dealing  the  hardest  blows  in  the  destruction of  the  new
ideological adversaries - the "liberals" in Serbia.
     By  instigating  nationalist movements in  the country,  Tito strove to
create conditions in  which he would again emerge as the supreme arbiter  in
internal conflicts.  His support to the Croatian leadership had  as its goal
to create a counter-weight to the Serbian leadership. The long-term conflict
between the Serbs and  the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was used as additional
pressure on Serbia.  Fearing Serbia's  economic supremacy, a  coalition  was
created between the  leaderships  of  Kosovo  and  Croatia, and the Croatian
press wrote about  a secret emigration of  ethnic Albanians to  Turkey (from
1953-1956 the emigrants were mainly ethnic Turks while the number  of ethnic
Albanians was negligible). By replacing the Serbian and Croatian leaderships
(for the sake of "symmetry") with  men  who owed their power  solely  to his
grace, Tito again became the indisputable master of the country. In the plan
to re-establish a protectorate over Serbia, the lifetime dictator decisively
upheld the ethnic Albanian communists in  Kosovo and Metohia. Relations with
Albania  (which  was openly  hostile towards  Yugoslavia  since 1948),  were
normalized at the request of Yugoslavia in 1971. One-way cooperation between
Kosovo and Albania  was established,  which,  due  to  the language barrier,
remained  confined  to  the southern Serbian province.  Some  240 university
professors and  teachers from  Albania,  then the  last hard-core  Stalinist
ideological  bastion, indundated  the  University  in  Pristina (founded  in
1970), and  scientific and educational institutions  opened by  the Yugoslav
state  in order to speed  up  the  cultural  emancipation  of  the  Albanian
minority. However, cooperation with Albania was used most for the purpose of
ideological indoctrination  - among the professors  from Albania  were  many
Albanian   secret  service  agents,  and  textbooks   imported  from  Tirana
propagated  the "Greater  Albania" idea, condemned "Titoistic  revisionism",
instigating 19th-century  national romanticism but only  in  the ideological
prism of Enver Hoxha's "Marxism-Leninism". A warning to the local leadership
by  Hasan  Kaleshi,  a  reputable  Orientalist  from  Pristina, that leading
historians in Kosovo were "obviously falsifying history" and had a "directly
negative effect  on young historians, the detrimental  consequences of which
may  not  be  apparent today,  but will  in the future become  more and more
evident", was interpreted as "national treason".3
     The  confederal  Constitution of  1974  legalized the transformation of
Kosovo's autonomy (initiated by the 1968 and 1971 constitutional amendments)
into  virtually  an independent  state  directly  linked  to the  federation
without any ties with Serbia. Consequently, this  rounded  off Tito's vision
of  national  equality  with  careful  supervision  over  Serbia  and  Serbs
throughout   Yugoslavia.  Turning  Yugoslavia  into  a   confederal  country
according to Tito's  model,  whereby the  republican  borders  had become  a
framework for  the creation  of homogeneous  national  states, rendered  the
Serbs  a culturally  isolated and politically  unprotected  minority  group,
especially  in  Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The loose  community of  six
republics and  two provinces was held  together only by Tito's authoritarian
rule.
     The new leadership in inner Serbia, entirely dependent on Tito, watched
silently Kosovo's  growing political independence. The atmosphere of neglect
and yielding to the environment's lowest  instincts  completely  neutralized
economic trends  in Serbia,  while  a  small  group  of  opposition-oriented
intellectuals in  Belgrade, which,  owing to its  cosmopolitan  nature, Tito
regarded  as the "hotbed  of  hostility",  tried to bring up  taboos such as
political  relations and  national  strife.  Critical  remarks on  the draft
Constitution of 1974 arrived from Belgrade, particularly from the Faculty of
Law, indicating  that such an  order  would  reduce Serbia to  a subordinate
position and be  a  source for fresh national conflicts. The critics of  the
draft were  severely reprimanded and then  either discharged,  convicted  or
isolated. The ideologists of  Titoism,  Croatian  and Slovenian  communists,
carefully watched every  move in science and culture, never failing to point
out any ideological deviations in Belgrade.4
     Comprehensive  and  systematic  Albanization  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia,
bolstered  by  the  top, gained  fresh  impetus: the University in  Pristina
enrolled  an ever increasing  number  of students in order to produce cadres
capable  of  replacing Serbian  officials in  the administration, judiciary,
schools  and science,  while the  federation's funds for the  development of
Kosovo  were increasing by geometric progression: since the early 70's, some
70% of all  the federation's funds for underdeveloped regions were allocated
to Kosovo (most of the funds were provided by inner Serbia),  attaining  the
figure of around a million dollars a day in the early 80's.  A vast  part of
foreign credits  were  also  targeted towards Kosovo. The  hastily  educated
cadres  proved incapable and inexpert  in  managing the  economy, while  the
local  political  bureaucracy  strove  to  redirect  a  large  part  of  the
federation's  money  to  finance megalomaniac projects that  were  to openly
display  the ethnic  Albanians' national domination  in Kosovo and  Metohia.
Demographic explosion  - the  highest  birth  rate  in  Europe  (an  average
6.9-member  family)  plus  30  students  per 1,000  citizens,  rendered  all
financial  measures  insufficient.   Kosovo  remained  a  primarily  peasant
environment where society was organized on the  basis of  tribal traditions,
strongly  influenced  by the Islamic concept  of society.  Chiefly agrarian,
with large families, the ethnic Albanian community craved land. The conflict
with the  Serbs had social besides national causes: hunger  for land for the
ever growing peasant  population. Another feature of the Albanian milieu was
the large percentage of young people educated at faculties of the humanities
where they  were  directly indoctrinated with the national romantic  rapture
orchestrated from Tirana. A large number of  students and academic citizens,
most of them without a chance of finding a job, were, owing to  the language
barrier, bound to Kosovo, and thus transposed their personal discontent into
national frustration. The low level of education among the intelligentsia in
Kosovo and  Metohia  had  created a  particular  sort of  semi-intellectuals
capable  of taking in only a limited  number  of  ideas, restricted  by  the
national horizon and  ideological model of Albania, an  extremely uncritical
provenance. The  growing number of ethnic Albanian peasants acquired land by
persecuting Serbs with the authorities' blessing,  and the  disproportionate
number of semi-intellectuals saw themselves in the persecution  of  Serbs as
executors of the mission - national unification of all Albanians.
     As a community relentless to itself (blood feuds were still  above than
the law),  ethnic Albanians attacked  the  Serbs with specific brutality. By
taking  over all bodies  of  authority,  the  Albanian  minority began their
planned  suppression  accompanied  by  various  forms  of psychological  and
physical  pressures. State coercion  became  hard to  bear  as the state had
become  Albanian. Outvoting  the  Albanian  language in  official  use,  the
creation  of  typically  state institutions, such  as a national library and
academy of  sciences, along with the judiciary, police  and  administration,
showed that a  surrogate national state had been created  in which the Serbs
felt as the persecuted ethnic minority without  any protection  from Serbia.
Tens of thousands of emigrants sought refuge in Serbia proper; even peasants
were  forced to  emigrate,  selling  off  their lands  to  ethnic  Albanians
(usually for  next to nothing), while  the authorities settled the abandoned
lands with many-membered emigrant families from Albania.
     Serbian  communists  in whose hands  was  the fate of the republic made
feeble and pathetic  attempts  in  the  late  70's  to  improve  within  the
framework of the existing system the position of Serbs in Kosovo. The nature
of their rule, which emanated from the capricious benevolence  of Tito,  and
the  limited  personal traits  of Serbia's leading  communists,  resulted in
their aspirations going  no further  than  inter-party  red-tape memorandums
(1977). Unable and unwilling  to bring  the convenient  stagnation of Serbia
under their  rule, the  Serbian  communists  reduced their concern for their
fellow citizens  in Kosovo and Metohia to sporadic disputes with ideological
like-minded  person  from  other  republics, believing  that, being  in  the
minority in such discourses, incapacitated any further action.
     1 M. Misovic, Ko je trazio republiku Kosovo, Beograd 1987, passim. 24
     2 Ibid., pp. 120-121
     3 Ibid, pp. 150-78-93.
     4 R. Stojanovic, Jugoslavija, nacije i politika, Beograd 1988.
     The  epilogue  of  the communist solution  to  the ethnic  question  in
Yugoslavia: the example of Kosovo
     Until  Tito's death  (1980),  the varying  balance of  the  nationality
contrasts  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia  was  maintained  mainly  owing  to  the
inviolability  of his power.  Fresh large-scale demonstrations a year  after
Tito's death, when it was  assessed  that  conditions for winning a republic
(which  by  the  Leninist  formula  has  the  right  to  self-determination,
including secession),  revealed  the substance of the national  movement  in
Kosovo: the annexation  of Kosovo  to  Albania: cheers for Enver Hoxha,  the
return to the Marxism and Leninism of the Albanian type, the creation of the
"Socialist   Republic  of   Kosovo".  Dozens  of   secret   ethnic  Albanian
organizations for the liberation of Kosovo and its unification with Albania,
composed chiefly  of  students, were  ideologically linked to  the Stalinist
regime of Enver Hoxha.1 The extent  to which the  ethnic Albanian
intelligentsia in Kosovo  and  Metohia owed  its  views about  the  world to
dogmatic Marxism  imported from Tirana became  apparent. It  attained absurd
limits in  the theory  of "Albanianism" as the sole national religion (Enver
Hoxha  forbade  the work of all religious communities in 1966)  which sought
its  roots in  the remote past - in the need to show that  Albanians are  of
Illyrian descent and thus  the  oldest and  only "indigenous" people  in the
Balkans - therefore natives, compared to  the  Slavs  who  were settlers and
intruders  on Albanian soil. Thus a  cabinet  and scientific question on the
origin  of  the  Albanians  was  reduced to  a powerful  means  of  national
homogenization 2
     After  bloody clashes  between demonstrators and the police in the 1981
uprising,  the  Federal  authorities  condemned  the  entire movement  using
typically communist vocabulary -, counter  revolutionary The usual procedure
of  replacing  the  leadership, making ideological purges and  adopting  new
programs  produced  no  tangible  results  3  The  demonstrations
continued in waves, many young  people suffered in  clashes with the police,
but  the  balance  of forces in  Kosovo  remained the same the emigration of
Serbs, of which the press wrote more freely did not stop, instead, it gained
fresh impetus, and delegations of Serbs in quest of protection paid frequent
visits to the federal parliament The party and state leaderships promised to
provide  protection  when  the  delegations  lodged  complaints  of  abuses,
physical  persecution,   usurpation  of   estates,  language  and   national
discrimination before court, rape on a national basis and the desecration of
graves, but failed to undertake efficient steps
     Discontent in Serbia and among Serbs elsewhere in Yugoslavia in creased
particularly  after support was extended  to  the  Kosovo leadership  by the
Croatian, Slovenian  and  some Bosnian  communists  Tito  s successors  (the
collective presidency) were insignificant politicians loyal  to  the  narrow
interests  of  their  federal  units  Incapable of coping  with  the  subtle
frisking of the national and  Yugoslav, and surprised by the ethnic Albanian
uprising in  Kosovo  and Metohia, they failed to further conceal the essence
of  the problem  and undertake  decisive steps  in Kosovo  fear  from the re
emergence  of Serbian nationalism  and  chauvinism , displayed through  open
support  offered  to the  ethnic Albanian national movement  in  Kosovo  and
Metohia, revealed the main cause of the whole dispute the inequality of  the
Serbian nation  in  the Yugoslav federation Despite official  condemnations,
the  support offered  by  the  Slovenian,  Croatian and  Moslem part  of the
Bosnian leadership to the Albanian minority in Kosovo could not be concealed
for long  the  skillfully concealed inequality  of  the  Serbian  people  in
confederal  Yugoslavia  became an  issue on  which the state and ideological
foundations  of  Tito's  Yugoslavia  began  to  crumble  As a  reaction, the
national integration  of Serbs, halted in 1918  and  checked  in  1945, rose
again in the mid-80's into a widespread national movement demanding that the
1974 Constitution be changed, as the people did not wish to reconcile to the
tacit  support  extended  by  the  federal  party   bodies  and   republican
leaderships to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo 4
     The  blockade  of  the  system  in  Yugoslavia did not  allow  for  the
intervention of the leadership of Serbia in the federation thus a subversion
was  carried out within the Serbian  communist  party  (1988),  in  which  a
dogmatic trend assessed that by  playing the card of wounded national  pride
and obvious discrimination, it  would win power and maintain it  by changing
the  1974   Constitution   The   Kosovo   frustration   of   Serbs,   wisely
instrumentalized in conflicts of  the local political oligarchy  in  Serbia,
soon  became  the  legitimation  of  the  new  authorities lead  by Slobodan
Milosevic  The  pressure on Serbia  from  all  the  federal  and  republican
institutions was so  strong that the  new  leader was  greeted as a savior a
mythical hero who would retrieve  equality in  Yugoslavia for the  Serbs and
bring again Kosovo  and Metohia, by hook or by  crook, under the sovereignty
of Serbia  The demonization  of the new  authorities in Serbia,  accused  of
"Bolshevism",  "Great  Serbianism",  Stalinism  and  of  having  aspirations
towards  hegemony in  the media of  all the other communist leader ships  in
Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia and Slovenia  was so great and deafening
that it decisively affected the homogenization of  the Serbian people around
the new power holders
     The  raising  of  the  Serbian  question in  Yugoslavia had  the entire
country seething, which soon proved  to exceed ideological  differences  and
shades in the  interpretation of Tito's way ', disputes between advocates of
socialism with  a  human face '  and  adherents  of the  dogmatic  line  The
ideological   screen  suddenly  collapsed,   forbidden  political   subjects
inundated the press,  reexaminations of the  interpretations of contemporary
history began, justifications of the existing organization, showing that the
national  question was being opened anew on which  depended the survival  of
the country's present political, ideological and state organization
     Serbia  found itself in  a paradoxical  situation, to have its national
interests  saved by  the communist  party -  the chief  culprit  of  all its
troubles The  process of the growth  of  the communist leadership  into  the
patron of  the mother nation's national interests had been implemented under
Tito's rule since the late 60's by all  the  leaderships except  the Serbian
one When, because of the conflicts in Kosovo and Metohia, this took place in
Serbia, processes instigated by the detante, Perestroika and Glasnost, which
heralded  the advent of the post-communist epoch,  were already under way in
Europe. What had not been possible during Tito's reign was being implemented
by Serbian communists seven years since his death:  in  the still  communist
Southeastern  and Eastern Europe,  political wills  and national aspirations
could only be expressed through the  communist party. Communism emerged as a
protector of the national  interests  of the Serbs at a  time when, ahead of
growing democratic  processes  in  the entire international public,  it must
have appeared  anachronous. Thanks to the  dangerous  identification of  the
people and leadership, Serbia, due to measures implemented by the communists
in their protection of the endangered national and human rights of Serbs and
the  state  territory  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia, was  soon  branded  in  the
international public  opinion  as a  state  of  undemocratic  and aggressive
communist repression.
     The  situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate. Clashes between  the
police and ethnic Albanian secessionists  did  not stop, while the  province
institutions, from  the police  and  judiciary, to finances and the economy,
were  still  controlled by  the  local ethnic  Albanian  bureaucracy  which,
supported  by the  other  Yugoslav national-communist  lites  (particularly
Slovenian  and  Croatian),  resisted  the  demands  of  "inner Serbia".  The
measures undertaken by the new Serbian authorities in Kosovo again proved to
be a  neocommunist delusion on the possibility of an ideological partnership
to  overcome  the existing national conflicts, and  that police and economic
measures  can  stop  a  strong national  movement in  which  all ideological
differences  began to disappear.  The former Marxists and Leninists of Enver
Hoxha's  type began to adapt to the new political trends  in the Eastern and
Southeastern European  countries which were paved by  the Soviet Perestroika
and  Glasnost, endeavoring to win  the sympathies  of the foreign  public by
advocating reforms in  socialism and presenting the nationalist conflict  in
the  light  of  a  struggle  for  human rights.  Every  new  ethnic Albanian
leadership, appointed with approval from Belgrade, proved unfit  to curb and
disinclined to condemn the  nationalist  movement of its people. Subversions
in Serbia's northern Vojvodina province and in Montenegro, which returned to
its Serbian  identity, were directly  provoked  by the  Kosovo  and  Metohia
question, and the new balance of political forces in the party helped Serbia
retrieve its  say in the  matter  concerning its provinces. The congruity of
these events nearing  the 600th anniversary of the battle  of Kosovo (1989),
the Serbs' main  national  holiday,  consolidated  the authority of the  new
leadership  in Serbia  in which  the people, unaccustomed to differences  in
political opinion, gave  priority to the  saving of national territory. With
the disintegration of  the Titoist order in Yugoslavia fresh uprisings broke
out  in  Kosovo and  Metohia followed  by  bloody clashes  with the  police,
strikes and diversions which, after  an attempt by the communist assembly in
Kosovo, in which ethnic
     Albanians  predominated, resulted  in the  abolition  of  the state  of
Kosovo and the  introduction of a state of emergency, after the proclamation
of the Albanian state of Kosovo in during 1990.
     The failure  of the  Serbian communists in late  eighties to comprehend
the  extent  of  the international repercussions  of the  ethnic  strife  in
Yugoslavia, and  pretentious in the worst Titoistic manner, incapacitated an
active communication of Serbia with the centers  of  political and  economic
power  in  the  world.  Due  to  a  negative  view  of  "Serbia's  Bolshevik
repression", the aggressive and Orientally brutal ethnic  Albanian  national
movement in Kosovo and Metohia was able to present its goals as an authentic
and pacific movement of an unusually  numerous ethnic minority (it  accounts
for  15-20%  of  Serbia's  population) which  is  striving  to  realize  its
legitimate human and social rights.  However, open support  extended  to the
Democratic Alliance of  Kosovo  (a party which  rallies  ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo) by the  new communist leader of Albania, Ramiz Aliu (both before and
after  the  first  democratic  elections  in  Albania),   with  considerable
participation by  agents of the  Albanian secret  service  Sigurimi  in  the
organization of strikes and armed  conflicts (some  200-400 Albanian  agents
were  infiltrated  into Yugoslavia in  1990  alone), clearly reveals  that a
centuries-long ethnic, national and inter-state conflict cannot be justified
by  ideological differences or a  human rights  struggle.  The fact that the
ethnic Albanian question in Kosovo and Metohia is not in reality an issue of
ideological differences and human  rights is  evident  from  the  stands  of
Serbian  opposition  parties which  are waging  a  bitter struggle with  the
former  communists  and  present  socialists for the  democratization of the
country. They are all willing to negotiate with the leadership of the ethnic
Albanian national movement about all controversial issues except the one  on
which the ethnic Albanian side insists: the change of the  state  borders of
Serbia  and  Yugoslavia.5  The ethnic  Albanians' refusal to take
part in  the December 1990 multi-party  elections and  be  registered in the
regular  Yugoslav  census (April  1991)  shows  the  unwillingness of  their
leadership to find a democratic solution.
     1 S. Hasani, Kosovo. Istine i zablude, Zagreb 1985, p, 175
     2 Cf Albanians and their territories Tirana 1985
     3 Sta i kako dalje na Kosovu. Dalja drustveno politicka aktivnost SSRNJ
u realizaciji politicke platforme  za akciju SKJ  u  razvoju socijalistickog
samoupravljana, bratstva i jedinstva i zajednistva na  Kosovu Beograd  1985,
Cf documents on Serbian complaints in Noc oporih reci. Kompletan stenogram o
svemu  sto  se govorilo na  zboru u Kosovu Polju u  noci  izmedju 24.  i 25.
aprila 1987. Specijalno izdanje Borba, maj 1987.
     4  K. Magnusson The Serbian  Reaction Kosovo  and  Ethnic  Mobilization
Among the Serbs Nordic Journal of Soviet  & East European Studies vol. 4
3 (1987) pp. 3  30, A Dragnich, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia The  Omen of
the  Upsurge of Serbian Nationalism in East European Quarterly vol. XXIII No
2 (1989) pp. 183 198, Cf A. Jeftic, Od Kosova do Jadovna Beograd 1988; idem,
Stradanja  Srba  na Kosovu  i  Metohiji od  1941 do 1990,  Pristina 1990;  R
Stojanovic, Ziveti s  genocidom, Hronika kosovskog bescasca, Beograd 1989; A
Djilas (ed.), Srpsko pitanje, Beograd 1991
     5 Demokratija, 3. 08. 1990.

     Ethnic  intolerance  between  the  Albanians  and  Serbs,  deepened  by
centuries of  confrontation,  was  expressed through  religious  intolerance
(Albanians as  Moslems  and  Serbs as Christians  in  the  Ottoman  Empire),
acquiring  at the turn  of  the 20th  century vague  contours of a  national
conflict.  Unequal  degrees  of  national  integration  provoked  additional
tensions in the old conflict: while the Serbs conceived the renewal of their
state in  the  1804 national revolution, and  gained  independence  in  1878
(Serbia  and Montenegro), the Albanians were  the last in Europe to begin an
organized  national  movement  in  1878 through  a  small in number national
elite,  but even then with deep  social and religious differences which were
not surmounted,  not even after  the  proclamation of the  Albanian state in
1912, nor in the interwar  period.  The national integration  of the  Serbs,
though  incomplete,  stopped in 1918  with  the creation of  the  Kingdom of
Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes, in which the  majority of Serbs lived in  one
state  and conceded  their national  ideology  to  institutions  of Yugoslav
character.  Discontinuity  in  the  development  of  the   Serbian  national
movement, deepened  during the 1941-1945 war,  turned under  communist  rule
into  a  50-year-old  vacuum whose  effects  on  the  protection of  primary
national  interests proved almost fatal. The Albanian  national  integration
had continuity, as opposed to  the Serbian  one. The young,  aggressive  and
expansive  national  movement,  closed  within  itself, developed without  a
standstill, regardless of  whether  it was  lead  by feudal lords,  outlaws,
foreign  patrons,  Albanian  or  Yugoslav  communists.  In a  society  which
harmoniously accepted both in Albania and Yugoslavia the  ideological monism
of  xenophobic  isolation  which  suited its internal tribal structure and a
certain  intolerance that  was racial  as well  as ethnic.  After  receiving
political  asylum  in  France,  the  Albanian writer  Ismail Kadare  pithily
explained the nature of the  internal resistance of the Albanian society  to
all  ideological challenges. "Communism has not  really  penetrated into the
depths  of  Albanian  society. The Albanians  are, as it were, racists: they
consider those  who do not share their moral customs  amoral, as the classic
Greeks considered  other peoples Barbarians. This racism  probably  played a
role  in  the  Albanian  resistance  to  socialism."1  From  this
perspective, the  depth of the conflict  and the mutual misunderstanding  of
Serbs and  Albanians is shown in brighter light. However, it is important to
note that in this centuries-old conflict to which their seems no end, in the
second half of the 20th century Albanians  in Kosovo and Metohia won crucial
support from Yugoslav communists to the detriment of Serbs.
     1 Ismail Kadare Interview in Le Monde, 26. 10. 1990. 34


     KOSOVO AND METOHIA
     A HISTORICAL SURVEY
     In the thousand year long-history of Serbs, Kosovo and Metohia were for
many  centuries  the  state  center  and  chief  religious  stronghold,  the
heartland of  their culture and springwell of its historical traditions. For
a people who lived longer under foreign rule than in their own state, Kosovo
and Metohia are the  foundations on which  national  and state identity were
preserved in times of tribulation and founded in times of freedom .
     The   Serbian  national   ideology  which  emerged  out   of   Kosovo's
tribulations  and Kosovo's suffering (wherein the 1389 St. Vitus Day  Battle
in Kosovo polje  occupies the  central place), are the pillars of that grand
edifice that constitutes the Serbian national pantheon. When it is said that
without  Kosovo there can be no Serbia  or Serbian nation, it's not only the
revived 19th  century national romanticism: that implies  more than just the
territory  which is covered  with  telling  monuments  of  its  culture  and
civilization, more  than  just a  feeling of  hard  won  national  and state
independence: Kosovo and Metohia  are considered the key to  the identity of
the Serbs. It is  no wonder, then, that the  many turning-points in  Serbian
history took place  in the and around Kosovo  and Metohia. When the Serbs on
other  Balkan lands fought to preserve their religious freedoms and national
rights,  their banners bore as their beacon the  Kosovo idea embodied in the
Kosovo covenant  which was  woven  into folk legend and upheld  in uprisings
against alien domination. The Kosovo covenant - the choice of freedom in the
celestial empire  instead of humiliation and slavery in the temporal world -
although  irrational  as  a  collective  consciousness,  is  still  the  one
permanent connective tissue  that  imbues  the  Serbs with  the  feeling  of
national entity and lends meaning to its join efforts.1
     1  Cf. D.  Slijepcevic,  Srpsko-arbanaski  odnosi kroz vekove  posebnim
osvrtom  na novije vreme, (Himelstir 1983); D. Bogdanovic,  Knjiga o Kosovu,
Beograd 1985; Zaduzbine Kosova, (Prizren-Beograd  1987); Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, (Beograd 1989);German translation: Kosovo und Metochien in
der  serbishen Geschichte, (Lausanne  1989);  Kosovo. Proslost i sadasnjost,
Beograd 1989 English translation: Kosovo. Past and present, (Belgrade 1989).
R.  Mihaljcic,  The Battle of Kosovo in History  and in  Popular  Tradition,
(Belgrade 1989).

     Kosovo and Metohia, land lying in the heart of the Balkans where viutal
trade  routes had crossed since  ancient times, was settled by  Slav  tribes
between the 7th and 10th  centuries. The Serbian medieval state, which under
the Nemanjic  dynasty  (12th to 14th century) grew into a major power in the
Balkan peninsula, developed  in the nearby mountain regions,  in Raska (with
Bosnia) and  in  Duklja (later Zeta and then Montenegro). The center  of the
Nemanjic slate moved to Kosovo and  Metohia after the fall of Constantinople
(1204). At its peak, in  the early the  14th century, these  lands  were the
richest  and  the most densely  populated areas,  as well as state  and  its
cultural and administrative centers.1
     In his wars  with Byzantium,  Stefan Nemanja conquered various parts of
what  is  today Kosovo, and his successors,  Stefan the First  Crown (became
king in 1217),  expanded his  state by including Prizren. The  entire Kosovo
and  Metohia region became a permanent  part  of the  Serbian state  by  the
beginning of the 13th century. Soon after becoming autocephalous (1219), the
Serbian Orthodox Church moved  its seat to Metohia.  The heirs of the  first
archbishop  Saint Sava (prince Rastko  Nemanjic)  built  several  additional
temples around the  Church of  the Holy Apostles, lying the  ground for what
was  to  become  the  Patriarchate  of  Pec.  The  founding  of  a  separate
bishophoric  (1220)  near  Pec was  indicative  of  the  region's  political
importance growing along with religious influence. With the  proclamation of
the empire,  the patriarchal throne was  permanently established at  the Pec
monastery in 1346. Serbia's rulers alotted the fertile valleys between  Pec,
Prizren,  Mitrovica  and  Pristina   and   nearby   areas  to  churches  and
monasteries, and the whole region eventually acquired the name Metohia, from
the Greek metoch which mean an estate owned by the church.
     Studded with more churches and monasteries than any other Serbian land,
Kosovo  and  Metohia  became the spiritual nucleus of  Serbs. Lying  at  the
crossroads  of  the main Balkan routes  connecting  the surrounding  Serbian
lands of Raska, Bosnia, Zeta and the Scutari littoral with the Macedonia and
the  Morava  region,  Kosovo and  Metohia were, geographically speaking, the
ideal place for  a state and cultural center. Girfled by mountain gorges and
comparatively  safe from outside attacks, Kosovo and Metohia were not chosen
by chance as the site for  building religious centers, church mausoleums and
palaces.  The  rich  holdings of  Decant  monastery  provided  and  economic
underpinning  for the  wealth of spiritual activities  in  the area. Learned
monks  and religious dignitaries  assembled in  large  monastic  communities
(which  were  well  provided  for  by  the rich feudal  holdings),  strongly
influenced the  spiritual shaping of the nation, especially in strengthening
local cults and fostering the Orthodox doctrine.
     In the monasteries of Metohia and Kosovo, old theological  and literary
writings were transcribed and new ones  penned, including the lives of local
saints, from ordinary monks and priors to the archbishops and rulers  of the
house  of Nemanjic. The libraries and scriptoria were  stocked with the best
liturgical and theoretical  writings from all  over Byzantine  commonwealth,
especially with  various codes from  the  monasteries  of  Mounth Athos with
which close ties were established.  The  architecture  of  the  churches and
monasteries developed  and the artistic value of their frescoes increased as
Serbian medieval culture flourished, and by the end of  the 13th century new
ideas  applied in architecture  and  in  the technique  of  fresco  painting
surpassed  the  traditional  Byzantine  models.  With  time,  especially  in
centuries to come, the people came to believe that Kosovo was the  center of
Serbian  Orthodoxy   and  the  most  resistant  stronghold  of  the  Serbian
nation.2
     The most important buildings to be endowed by the  last Nemanjices were
erected  in  Kosovo and  Metohia,  where  their courts  which  became  their
capitals were  situated.  From King  Milutin  to  emperor Uros,  court  life
evolved in the royal residences in southern Kosovo and Prizren. There rulers
summoned the landed gentry,  received foreign legates  and issued  charters.
The court of Svrcin stood on the banks of Lake Sazlia, and it was there that
Stefan  Dusan  was crowned king in 1331. On the opposite side was the palace
in Pauni, where King Milutin often dwelled. The court in Nerodimlje  was the
favourite  residence of King Stefan Decanski, and  it was at  the palace  in
Stimlje that emperor Uros issued  his charters. Oral  tradition,  especially
epic  poems, usually  mention  Prizren  as emperor  Dusan's capital, for  he
frequently sojourned there when he was still king.3
     Among dozens of churches and monasteries erected in medieval Kosovo and
Metohia by rulers, ecclesiastical dignitaries and the local nobility, Decani
outside of Pec,  built  by  Stefan Uros  III  Decanski, stands out  for  its
monumental size and  artistic beauty. King  Milutin left behind  the largest
number of endowments in Kosovo, one of  the  finest  of  which  is Gracanica
monastery  (1321)  near  Pristina,  certainly  the  most beautiful  medieval
monument in the Balkans. The monasteries  of Banjska dear Zvecan (early 14th
century) and  Our Lady of  Ljeviska in  Prizren  (1307), although devastated
during Ottoman rule,  are eloquent examples  of  the wealth and power of the
Serbian state at the start of the 14th  century. Also of artistic importance
is the complex of churches in Juxtaposition to the Patriarchate of  Pec. The
biggest of the  royal endowments,  the  Church  of  the Holy Archangels near
Prizren, erected  by Tsar Stefan  Dusan in  the  Bistrica  River Canyon, was
destroyed in the 16th century.4
     Founding  chapter  whereby  Serbian rulers  granted  large  estates  to
monasteries offer a reliable demographic picture of the area. Fertile plains
were largely  owned by  the large monasteries, from Chilandar in Mount Athos
to Decant  in Metohia. The data given in the charters show that  during  the
period  of  the  political rise of Serbian  state,  the population gradually
moved from  the  mountain plateau  in  the west and  north southward to  the
fertile valleys of Metohia and Kosovo. The census of monastic estates evince
both a rise in the population and appreciable economic progress. The estates
of the  Banjska  monastery numbered  83  villages,  and  those of  the  Holy
Archangels numbered 77.5
     Especially  noteworthy  is the 1330 Decani Charter,  with its  detailed
list  of  households  and  of  chartered villages. The Decant estate  was an
extensive  area which  encompassed  parts  of  what  is  today  northwestern
Albania. Historical analysis and onomastic  research reveal  that only three
of the  89  settlements were mentioned as being  Albanian. Out  of the 2,166
farming  homesteads  and  2,666  houses  in  cattle-grazing  land,  44  were
registrated  as Albanian (1,8%). More recent  research indicates that  apart
from the Slav, i.e. Serbian population  in Kosovo and Metohia, the remaining
population of non-Slav origin did not account for more than 2%  of the total
population in the 14th century.6
     The  growing political power, territorial expansion and economic wealth
of the  Serbian  state  had  a major impact  on  ethnic processes.  Northern
Albania  up  to the Mati River was a part of the Serbian Kingdom, but it was
not until  the  conquest of  Tsar  Dusan  that the  entire Albania (with the
exception of Durazzo) entered the Serbian Empire. Fourteenth century records
mention  mobile  Albanian  mobile cattle  sheds  on mountain slopes  in  the
imminent  vicinity  of Metohia, and sources in  the  first half of  the 15th
century note their  presence (albeit in  smaller  number)  in  the  flatland
farming settlements.
     Stefan Dusan's Empire stretched  from the Danube to the Peloponnese and
from  Bulgaria  to  the  Albanian  littoral.  After his  death  it  began to
disintegrate into areas  controlled  by powerful regional lords. Kosovo  and
parts of  Metohia came  under  the  rule of  King  Vukasin Mrnjavcevic,  the
co-ruler of  the last Nemanjic,  Tsar  Uros.  The earliest  clashes with the
Turks, who  edged their way into Europe  at the  start  of the 14th century,
were noted during the reign of Stefan Dusan.  The 1371 battle of the Marica,
near Crnomen in which Turkish troops rode rougshod over the huge army of the
Mrnjavcevic brothers, the feudal lords of Macedonia, Kosovo  and neighboring
regions,  heralded  the decisive  Turkish  invasion  of Serbian  lands. King
Vukasin's successor King Marko (the legendary hero of folk poems, Kralyevich
Marko) recognized the supreme authority of the sultan and as vasal took part
in his campaigns against neighboring Christian states. The Turkish onslaught
is  remembered as the apocalypse of the Serbian people,  and this  tradition
was cherished  during the long period of Ottoman rule.  During the Battle of
the Marica, a monk wrote that "the worst of  all  times" had come, when "the
living envied the dead".7
     Unaware of the danger that were looming over their  lands, the regional
lords  tried  to take  advantage  of  the new  situation  and  enlarge their
holdings. On the eve of the battle  of Kosovo,  the northern parts of Kosovo
where in possession  of  Prince  Lazar  Hrebeljanovic,  and parts of Metohia
belonged to  his brother-in-law Vuk Brankovic. By quelling the resistance of
the  local landed  gentry,  Prince  Lazar  eventually  emerged as  the  most
powerful  regional lord and came to dominate the lands of  Moravian  Serbia.
Tvrtko I Kotromanic, King of Bosnia, Prince Lazar's closest ally, aspired to
the political legacy of the saintly dynasty as descendant  of the Nemanjices
and by  being  crowned with  the "dual crown" of  Bosnia and Serbia over St.
Sava grave in monastery Mileseva.8
     The  expected clash with the  Turks took place in Kosovo polje, outside
of Pristina,  on  St.  Vitus  day, June 15 (28), 1389. The  troops of Prince
Lazar, Vuk Brankovic and King Tvrtko I, confronted the army of Emir Murad I,
which  included his Christian vassals. Both Prince Lazar and emir Murad were
killed in the head-on collision between the two armies (approximately 30,000
troops on  both  sides).  Contemporaries were  especially impressed  by  the
tidings that twelve  Serbian knights  (most  probably led  by legendary hero
Milos Obilic) broke through the tight Turkish ranks and killed  the  emir in
his tent.9
     Military-wise  no  real  victor  emerged  from  the  battle.   Tvrtko's
emissaries told the courts  of Europe  that the  Christian army had defeated
the  infidels, although Prince Lazar's successors, exhausted by  their heavy
losses, immediately  sought peace  and conceded to became vassals to the new
sultan.  Vuk  Brankovic, unjustly remembered  in epic tradition as a traitor
who slipped  away  from the battle field, resisted them until  1392, when he
was forced to become their vassal. The Turks took Brankovic's lands and gave
them to a more loyal  vassal, Prince Stefan  Lazarevic, son  of Prince Lazar
thereby  creating a rift between their  heirs. After the battle of Angora in
1402,  Prince Stefan took  advantage of the chaos  in  the Ottoman state. In
Constantinople he received the title  of  despot, and  upon returning  home,
having defeated Brankovic's relatives he took control over the  lands of his
father.  Despite frequent  internal conflicts and his  vassal obligations to
the  Turks   and  Hungarians,   despot  Stefan  revived   and   economically
consolidated  the Serbian  state,  the  center of which was gradually moving
northward. Under his rule Novo Brdo in Kosovo  became the economic center of
Serbia where in he issued a Law of Mines in 1412.10
     Stefan appointed  as his successor his nephew despot Djuradj Brankovic,
whose rule was marked by fresh conflicts and  finally the fall of Kosovo and
Metohia to the Turks. The  campaign  of the  Christian army led by Hungarian
nobleman Janos  Hunyadi ended in 1448 in heavy defeat in a clash  with Murad
II's forces, again in Kosovo Polje. This was the last concertive attempt  in
the Middle Ages to rout the Turks out of this part of Europe.11
     After  the  Fall  of Constantinople  (1453), Mehmed  II  the  Conqueror
advanced  onto Despotate  of Serbia.  For some time voivode Nikola Skobaljic
offered valiant  resistance  in  Kosovo, but after a  series of  consecutive
campaigns  and lengthy sieges in 1455,  the economic center of Serbia,  Novo
Brdo  fell. The Turks then  proceeded  to conquer other towns in Kosovo  and
Metohia four years  before the entire Serbian  Despotate  collapsed with the
fall  of  new  capital  Smederevo.  Turkish  onslaught, marked  by  frequent
military  raids,  the  plunder  and  devastation  of   entire  regions,  the
destruction of monasteries  and  churches,  gradually narrowed down  Serbian
state territories,  triggering off  a large-scale  migration northwards,  to
regions  beyond reach to the  conquerors. The biggest migration  took  place
from 1480-1481, when a large part of the population of northern Serbia moved
to Hungary and Transylvania, to  bordering region along the Sava and  Danube
rivers,  where the descendants of  the fleeing despots of Smederevo resisted
the Turks for several decades to come.12
     1 For a  more  complete  picture of  Kosovo and Metohia's medieval past
see: D. Kojic-Kovacevic,  Kosovo od sredine  XII  do sredine  XV  veka,  in:
Kosovo nekad i sad (Kosova  dikur  e  sot), (Beograd 1973), pp.  109-128; S.
Cirkovic, Kosovo i Metohija u srednjem veku, in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj
istoriji, pp. 21-45 (with earlier bibliography)
     2 R. Samardzic,  Kosovo  i Metohija: uspon i propadanje srpskog naroda,
in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 6-10; D. Bogdanovic, Rukopisno
nasledje Kosova  in: Zbornik okruglog  stola o  naucnom istrazivanju Kosova,
Serbian Academy of  Arts and Sciences, Naucni skupovi,  vol.  XLII, Belgrade
1988,  pp. 73-80. For  more  details  see: Istorija  srpskog naroda,  vol. I
(Belgrade 1981).
     3 S.  Cirkovic, Vladarski  dvorci  oko jezera  na  Kosovu, in:  Zbornik
Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti, 20 (1984), pp. 72-77.
     4 V. S. Jovanovic, Arheoloska istrazivanja srednjovekovnih spomenika  i
nalazista  na  Kosovu, in:  Zbomik  okruglog stola  o  naucnom  istrazivanju
Kosova, pp. 17-66.
     5 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga  o  Kosovu,  pp. 34-39;  Zaduzbine  Kosova, pp.
313-358.
     6  D.  Bogdanovic,  Knjiga o  Kosovu, pp. 39-41; S. Cirkovic, Kosovo  i
Metohija  u srednjem  veku, pp.  34-36. More details  in: B. Ferjancic,  Les
Albanais dans les  sources byzantines, in: Iliri i Albanci,  Serbian Academy
of  Sciences  and  Arts,  Naucni  skupovi  vol.  XXXDC (Belgrade  1988), pp.
303-322; S. Cirkovic, Les Albanais   la lumiere des sources historiques des
Slaves du Sud, ill: Iliri i Albanci, pp. 341-359.
     7  D.  Bogdanovic,  Knjiga  o  Kosovu,  pp.  75.  More  details in:  R.
Mihaljcic, Kraj Srpskog Carstva, Boj na Kosovu II, (Belgrade 1989).
     8 S. Cirkovic, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske drzave, (Beograd 1964),
pp. 133-140.
     9 S. Cirkovic, Kosovo i Metohija u srednjem veku, pp. 39-41.
     10 M. Purkovic, Knez i despot Stefan Lazarevic, (Beograd 1978).
     11 Ibid.  More details:  R.  Mihaljcic,  Lazar Hrebeljanovic. Istorija,
kult, predanje, Boj na Kosovu II, (Belgrade 1989).
     12 Istorija srpskog  naroda, vol. II (Beograd  1982),  pp. 260-265;  D.
Bogdanovic, op. cit. p. 72.


     For the Serbs as Christians, their loss of state independence and  fall
to the Ottoman Empire's kind of theocratic state, was a terrible misfortune.
With  the advent of the Turks  and establishment of their rule, the lands of
Serbs were forcibly  excluded from the circle of progressive European states
wherein they occupied a  prominent  place precisely  owing to the  Byzantine
civilisation, which was enhanced by local qualities and strong influences of
the  neighboring  Mediterranean  states. Being Christians,  the Serbs became
second-class citizens in Islamic state. Apart from religious discrimination,
which was evident in all spheres of everyday life, this status of rayah also
implied social dependence,  as most of the  Serbs were landless peasants who
paid the prescribed feudal taxes. Of the many dues paid in money,  labor and
kind,  the hardest for the Serbs was having their children taken as  tribute
under a law that had the healthy  boys,  taken from their parents, converted
to Islam and trained to serve in the janissary corps of the Turkish army.
     An analyse of the  earliest  Turkish censuses, defters,  shows that the
ethnic picture of Kosovo and Metohia did not alter much during the  14th and
15th  centuries. The small-in-number Turkish population consisted largely of
people  from  the  administration  and   military  that  were  essential  in
maintaining order,  whereas Christians continued to predominate in the rural
areas. Kosovo and parts of Metohia  were registrated in 1455  under the name
Vilayeti Vlk,  after Vuk  Brankovic who  once  ruled over  them. Some 75,000
inhabitants  lived in  590 registrated  villages.  An onomastic  analysis of
approximately 8,500 personal names shows that Slav  and Christian names were
heavily predominant.1
     Along with the  Decani Charter, the register  of  the  Brankovic region
shows  a   clear  division  between  old-Serbian  and  old-ethnic   Albanian
onomastics,  allowing  one to say,  with some  certainty  which  registrated
settlement  was  Serbian,  and  which ethnically mixed. Ethnic  designations
(ethnic Albanian,  Bulgarian, Armenian,  Greek)  appeared repeatedly next to
the  names of settlers in  the region. More thorough  onomastic research has
shown  that from  the mid-14th  to  the 15th centuries, individual  Albanian
settlements appeared  on  the fringes of Metohia, in-between  what had until
then  been a density of  Serbian  villages.  This  was  probably  due to the
devastation  wrought by Turks  who  destroyed  the old  landed estates, thus
allowing  for  the mobile among  the population,  including  ethnic Albanian
cattlemen, to settle on the abandoned  land and establish their settlements,
which were neither big nor heavily populated.2
     A  summary  census  of  the  houses  and   religious  affiliations   of
inhabitants in the Vucitrn district (sanjak), which encompassed the one-time
Brankovic lands, was drawn in 1487, showed that the ethnic situation had not
altered much.  Christian households  predominated  (totalling 16,729, out of
which 412  were  in Pristina and Vucitrn): there were 117 Muslim  households
(94 in Pristina and 83 in  rural  areas).  A  comprehensive  census  of  the
Scutari district offers the following picture:  in Pec  (Ipek) there were 33
Muslim and 121 Christian households, while  in  Suho Grlo, also in  Metohia,
Christians alone lived in 131  households. The  number of Christians (6,124)
versus  Muslim (55)  homes in the rural areas  shows that  1%  of the entire
population  bowed to the faith of the  conqueror.  An analysis of the  names
shows that  those of Slav origin predominated among the Christians. In  Pec,
68% of the population bore Slav names, in the Suho Grlo region 52%, in Donja
Klina region 50% and around monastery of Decani 64%.
     Ethnic  Albanian settlements where  people had characteristic names did
not appear until one reached areas  outside the  borders  of  what is  today
Metohia, i.e. west of Djakovica. According to Turkish sources, in the period
from 1520 to 1535 only 700 of the total  number  of 19,614 households in the
Vucitrn district were Muslim (about 3,5%), and 359 (2%)in Prizren district.
     In  regions extending  beyond  the geographic  borders  of  Kosovo  and
Metohia, in the Scutari and  Dukagjin districts, Muslims accounted for  4,6%
of the  population. According to an analysis  of  the names in the  Dukagjin
district's census, ethnic Albanian settlements did not predominate until one
reached regions south  of Djakovica,  and the ethnic  picture  in  the  16th
century   in   Prizren  and  the  neighboring   areas   remained   basically
unchanged.3
     A  look at  the religious affiliation of  the  urban population shows a
rise  in the Turkish and local  Islamized  population.  In Prizren, Kosovo's
biggest  city,  Muslims  accounted  for 56% of the households,  of which the
Islamized population accounted for 21%. The  ratio was  similar in Pristina,
where out of the  54% Muslim population 16%  were converts.  Pec also had  a
Muslim majority (90%), as did Vucitrn  (72%). The Christians compromised the
majority of the population in the mining centers  of Novo Brdo (62%), Trepca
(77%),  Donja  Trepca  and  Belasica  (85%).  Among  the  Christians  was  a
smattering of Catholics. The Christian names were largely from the calendar,
and to  a lesser extent Slav  (Voja, Dabiziv, Cvetko, Mladen,  Stojko),  and
there  were  some that  were typically  ethnic  Albanian  (Prend, Don,  Din,
Zoti).4
     After the fall of Serbia in 1459,  the Pec Patriarchate soon  ceased to
work and the Serbian eparchies came  under  the jurisdiction of the Hellenic
Ochrid Archbishophoric. In the first decade following Turkish conquest, many
large  endowments and wealthier churches were pillaged  and destroyed, while
some turned into mosques. The Our Lady of Ljeviska Cathedral  in Prizren was
probably converted into a mosque right immediately following the conquest of
the town; Banjska,  one  of the grandest monasteries dating from  the age of
King Milutin, suffered the same fate. The Church of the Holy Archangels near
Prizren, Stefan Dusan's  chief endowment was turned into ruins.  Most of the
monasteries and churches  were left unrenewed  after being  devastated,  and
many village churches were abandoned. Many were not restored until after the
liberation of Kosovo and Metohia in 1912. Archeological findings  have shown
that some  1,300 monasteries,  churches and other  monuments  existed in the
Kosovo and Metohia area. The magnitude of the havoc wrought can be seen from
the earliest Turkish censuses: In the 15th and 16th centuries there were ten
to  fourteen  active  places  of  Christian  worship.  At  first  the  great
monasteries like  Decani and  Gracanica, were  exempt from destruction,  but
their  wealthy estates were reduced to a handfull  of  surrounding villages.
The privileges granted the monastic brotherhoods by the sultans obliged them
to perform the service of falconry as well.5
     The restoration of the Pec Patriarchate in 1557 (thanks to Mehmed-pasha
Sokolovic,  a  Serb by  origin,  at the time the third vizier at the  Porte)
marked  a  major  turn and helped revive  the spiritual life  of  the Serbs,
especially in Kosovo and Metohia. Mehmed-pasha Sokolovic (Turkish:
     Sokollu) enthroned  his relative Makarije  Sokolovic on the patriarchal
throne.  Like  the  great reform  movements  in  16th  century  Europe,  the
restoration of the Serbian  Orthodox  Church meant the rediscovery  of  lost
spiritual strongholds. Thanks to the Patriarchate,  Kosovo and Metohia  were
for the next two centuries again the  spiritual  and political center of the
Serbs.  On   an   area  vaster   than  the   Nemanjic  empire,  high-ranking
ecclesiastical dignitaries revived old and created new eparchies endeavoring
to reinforce the  Orthodox faith which  had been  undermined  by  influences
alien (particularly by Islamic Bekteshi order of dervishes) to its authentic
teachings.
     Based  on  the  tradition  of  the  medieval  Serbian  state,  the  Pec
Patriarchate revived  old and  established  new cults  of  the  holy rulers,
archbishops,  martyrs and  warriors, lending life to  the Nemanjic heritage.
The  feeling  of  religious  and ethnic  solidarity was  enhanced  by  joint
deliberation  at church assemblies attended  by the higher and lower clergy,
village  chiefs and  hajduk  leaders,  and by  stepping  up a  morale on the
traditions  of  Saint  Sava but  suited  to  the  new conditions and  strong
patriarchal customs  renewed  after  the  Turkish conquest  in  the  village
communities.
     The  spiritual rebirth was  reflected in  the  restoration  of deserted
churches and monasteries: some twenty new churches were built  in Kosovo and
Metohia alone, inclusive of printing  houses (the  most important one was at
Gracanica):   many  old  and  abandoned   churches  were  redecorated   with
frescoes.6
     Serbian  patriarchs and  bishops gradually  took  over the role of  the
one-time rulers,  endeavoring with assistance from the neighboring Christian
states of Habsburg Empire and the Venetian Republic, to incite the people to
rebel.  Plans  for overthrowing the Turks and re-establishing an independent
Serbian  state sprang throughout the  lands from the Adriatic to the Danube.
The  patriarchs of Pec, often learned men and able politicians, were usually
the  ones  who  initiated  and  coordinated  efforts  at  launching  popular
uprisings when the right moment came. Patriarch Jovan failed to instigate  a
major rebellion against  the  Turks,  seeking the  alliance of  the European
Christian  powers  assembled around Pope Clement  VII. Patriarch  Jovan  was
assassinated  in Constantinople  in 1614. Patriarch  Gavrilo Rajic lived the
same  fate in  1659  after going  to Russia  to  seek help in  instigating a
revolt.
     The least auspicious conditions for an uprising were actually in Kosovo
and  Metohia itself. In the  fertile plains, the  non-Muslim masses  labored
under the yoke of the  local  Turkish administrators, continually threatened
by marauding  tribes from the Albanian highlands.  The crisis  that overcome
the Ottoman Empire in the late 16th century  further aggrovated the position
of the Serbs in Kosovo, Metohia and neighboring regions. Rebellions fomented
by  cattle-raising  tribes  in  Albania  and  Montenegro,  and the  punitive
expeditions sent to deal with them turned  Kosovo and  Metohia into a bloody
terrain where Albanian tribes, kept clashing with  detachments of  the local
authorities,  plundered  Christian  villages  along  the  way.  Hardened  by
constant clashes with the Turks, Montenegro gradually picked up the torch of
defending Serbian Orthodoxy; meanwhile, in northern Albania, particularly in
Malesia, a reverse  process  was under way.  Under steady  pressure from the
Turkish authorities, the Islamization  of ethnic Albanian tribes became more
widespread  and  the process assumed broader  proportions  when antagonistic
strivings  grew within the  Ottoman Empire in the late 17th  and  early 18th
century.7
     It  is not  until the end of the 17th  century that the colonization of
Albanian  tribes  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia  can be established.  Reports  by
contemporary  Catholic  visitators  show that the ethnic border  between the
Serbs and Albanians still followed the  old dividing  lines of the Black and
White Drim rivers. All reports on Kosovo and Metohia regard them as being in
Serbia: for the Catholic visitators, Prizren was still its capital  city. In
Albania, the first wave of  Islamization  swept  the feudal strata and urban
population.  Special tax and  political  alleviations encouraged  the  rural
population to convert  to Islam in larger  number. Instead of being  part of
the oppressed  non-Muslim masses, the converts became a privileged class  of
Ottoman society, with free access to the highest  positions in the state. In
Kosovo and Metohia,  where they  moved to avoid heavy taxes, Catholic tribes
of Malesia  converted to Islam. Conversion to Islam in  a  strongly Orthodox
environment rendered them  the desired privileges (the property of  Orthodox
and of  the  Catholics) and saved them from  melting  with  Serbian Orthodox
population. It was only  with the  process of  Islamization that  the ethnic
Albanian    colonisation    of    lands    inhabited    by   Serbs    became
expansive.8
     The  ethnic  picture  of Kosovo did  not radically  change in the first
centuries  of Ottoman  rule.  Islamization encompassed  part  of  a  Serbian
population, although  the  first generations at least, converted  as a  mere
formality, to avoid heavy financial burdens and constant political pressure.
Conversion constituted the basis of Ottoman policy in the Balkans but it was
les successfull in  Kosovo and Metohia, regions with the strongest religious
traditions, than  in other Christian areas.  The Turks'  strong  reaction to
rebellions  throughout  the  Serbian lands and  to the revival of Orthodoxy,
embodied in the cult of  Saint Sava,  the founder of the independent Serbian
church, ended in setting fire to the Mileseva monastery the burial place  of
the  first  Serbian saint.  The Turks  burned  his wonder working relics  in
Belgrade in 1594, during a great uprising  of Serbs in southern  Banat. This
triggered  off fresh  waves of Islamization accompanied by  severe reprisals
and the thwarting of any sign of rebellion.
     Apart  from  Islamization,  Kosovo  and  Metohia  became  the target of
proselytizing Catholic missionaries at the  end  of 17th century, especially
after the creation of the Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide (1622). The
ultimate aim of  the Roman Catholic propaganda  was to converts the Orthodox
to Graeco-Catholicism  as the initial phase in completely converting them to
the  Catholic faith. The appeals of patriarchs  of Pec to the Roman popes to
help the liberatory  aspirations  of the Serbs  were met with the  condition
that  they  renounce  the Orthodox faith. In spreading  the Catholicism, the
missionaries  of  the  Roman  Curia  had  the  support   of   local  Turkish
authorities;  a considerable number  of  the missionaries  were of  Albanian
origin.  Consequently, the propagators of  Catholic proselytism persisted in
inciting Catholic and Muslim  Albanians  against the Serbs, whose loyalty to
Orthodoxy  and  their  medieval traditions  was  the  main obstacle  to  the
spreading of  the Catholic faith in the central and southern regions of  the
Balkans.9
     Catholic propaganda  attempts  at  separating the  high clergy  of  the
Serbian  Orthodox Church from the people  prompted  the Pec Patriarchate  to
revive old and create a new cults with even greater vigor. In 1642 Patriarch
Pajsije,  who was born in Janjevo, Kosovo, wrote The Service and The Life of
the last Nemanjic,  the Holy Tsar Uros, imbuing old literary  forms with new
content reflecting the contemporary moment. By introducing  popular  legends
(which  gradually took shape),into classical  hagiography Patriarch  Pajsije
strove  to establish a  new cult of  saints which  would  have  a beneficial
impact on his compatriots in preserving their faith.
     Parallel  with  the Orthodox  Church  national policy in  traditionally
patriarchal  societies, popular  tales  gradually  matured  into  oral  epic
chronicles.  Nurtured   through  epic  poetry,  which  was   sung   to   the
accompaniment of the gusle, epic tales glorified national heroes  and ruler,
cultivating  the  spirit  of  non-subjugation and  cherishing  the  hope  in
liberation from  the Turkish yoke. Folk poems about the battle of Kosovo and
its  heroes,  about  the tragic fate of the last Nemanjices, the  heroism of
Prince  Lazar and his knight Milos Obilic, and, especially, about  Kraljevic
Marko  (King Marko  Mrnjavcevic) as  the faultless and  dauntless  legendary
knight who was always defeating Turks and saving  Serbs, were an  expression
not only of the tragic sense of life in which Turkish rule  was a synonymous
to evil, but a particular moral code that in time  crystalized into a common
attitude towards life, defined in the first centuries  of Ottoman rule.  The
Serbian nation's Kosovo covenant is embodied in the choice  which, according
to legend, was made by Prince Lazar on  the eve of the battle of Kosovo. The
choice of freedom in the kingdom  of heaven instead of  humiliation  in  the
kingdom of  earth  constituted  the Serbian nation's  spiritual  stronghold.
Prince Lazar's refusal  to  resign to injustice and  slavery, raised to  the
level of biblical  drama,  determined his unquenchable thirst  for  freedom.
Together  with  the  cult  of   Saint   Sava,   which  grew  into  a  common
civilisational framework in everyday life, the  Kosovo  idea which, in time,
gained universal  meaning.  With its  wise policy  the Patriarchate  of  Pec
carefully built epic  legend  into  the  hagiography of  old and new Serbian
saints, glorifying their works in frescoes and icons.10
     1  O. Zirojevic, Prvi  vekovi tudjinske vlasti, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, pp. 47-113 (with earlier bibliography).
     2 Ibid
     3 M.  Pesikan, Zetsko-raska imena na  pocetku  turskog  doba,  II,  in:
Onomatoloski prilozi, vol. IV (1983), pp. 218-243; 0.  Zirojevic;, op. cit.,
pp. 90-92.
     4. O. Zirojevic, op. cit., pp. 92-94.
     5 Ibid, pp. 94-96.
     6  R. Samardzic, Mehmed-pasa Sokolovic, (Beograd  1975); Idem, Ideje za
srpsku istoriju,  (Beograd  1989), pp.  125-128; Dj.  Slijepcevic,  Istorija
Srpske pravoslavne crkve, I, Dusseldorf 1878, pp. 328-321.
     7 R. Trickovic, U susret najtezim iskusenjima, in: Kosovo i Metohija  u
srpskoj istoriji, pp. 119-126.
     8 J. Radonic, Rimska kurija i juznoslovenske zemlje od XVI do XIX veka,
(Beograd 1950)
     9 J. Radonic, op. cit., pp.,  8-11; Further documentation in: M. Jacov,
Spisi Tajnog vatikanskog arhiva XVI-XL veka, (Beograd 1983)
     10 R. Samardzic, Usmena narodna hronika (Novi Sad 1978).

     The Serbs stepped again onto the historical scene  in  the years of the
European  wars that  swept the continent from  the forests of Ireland to the
walls of Constantinople in the late 17th century. The Turks finally withdrew
from Hungary and Transylvania when their Ottoman hordes  were routed outside
Vienna in 1683. The disintegration of Ottoman rule in the southwest limbered
up  the  Serbs, arousing in  them hope  that the moment was ripe  for  joint
effort to break  Turkish dominion in  the Balkans. The neighboring Christian
powers  (Austria and Venice) were  the only possible allies. The  arrival of
the Austrian army in Serbia after the fall of Belgrade in  1688 prompted the
Serbs  to join it. Thanks to the support of Serbian insurgents, the imperial
troops  penetrated  deep  into Serbia and in  1689 conquered  Nis: a special
Serbian   militia  was  formed  as  a   separate   corps   of  the  imperial
troops.1
     After  setting fire  to Skoplje (Uskub),  which was raging with plague,
the  commander  of  Austrian troops  Ennea Silviae  Piccolomini  withdrew to
Prizren where he was  greeted by 20,000 Serbian insurgents, and with whom he
reached  an  accord  on  fighting  the  Turks  with  joint  forces.  Shortly
afterwards, Piccollomini  died of the plague, and his successors  failed  to
prevent their troops from marauding the surrounding regions. Disappointed by
the conduct of the  Christian troops  from  which they had expected decisive
support,  the  Serbian  insurgents  abandoned the agreed alliance. Patriarch
Arsenije III Crnojevic tried  in  vain to arrive at a new agreement with the
Austrian  generals.  The  restorer  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  Grand  Vizier
Mustafa-Pasha Koporilli, an Albanian  by  origin, took advantage of the lull
in  military operations, mustered Crimean Tatars and Islamized Albanians and
mounted a  major  campaign.  Despite assurances of  help,  Catholic Albanian
tribes deserted  the  Austrian army on  the  eve of the  decisive  clash  at
Kacanik in  Kosovo, on  January  1690.  The  Serbian militia,  resisting the
Sultan's  superior  hordes,  retreated  to  the   west  and   north  of  the
country.2
     Turkish retaliation,  in which the Serbian  infidels  were  raided  and
viciously  massacred lasted a  three full months. The towns of Prizren, Pec,
Pristina, Vucitrn and Mitrovica were hit the worst, and Serbs from Novo Brdo
retreated from the Tatar saber. Fleeing from the brutal reprisal, the people
of Kosovo and the neighboring areas moved northwards with Patriarch Arsenije
III. The decision to end the massacre  and declare an amnesty came  belately
as much of the  population had already fled for safer  areas, moving towards
the  Sava  River and  Belgrade. Other  parts of  Serbia were also targets of
ghastly reprisals. In  the Belgrade pashalik alone, the number  of taxpayers
dropped  eightfold. Grand old  monasteries were looted from Pec Patriarchate
to  Gracanica, and  the Albanian tribe Gashi pillaged the Decani  monastery,
killing the prior and seizing the monastery's best estates.
     At the invitation of emperor Leopold I, Patriarch Arsenije III led part
of the high clergy and a sizeable part of the refugees (tens of thousands of
people) to the Habsburg Empire to the territory of southern Hungary,  having
received  assurances that the Serbs would there be granted special political
and  religious status.  Many Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia followed him. The
new  churches built along  the  Danube they named  after those  left in  old
homeland.
     The Great 1690 Migration  was a important turning point in the  history
of  the Serbs. In  Kosovo and Metohia alone,  towns  and  some villages were
abandoned to the last inhabitant.  The population  was also decimated by the
plague,   whatever   remained  after  the  Turkish   troops.   The  physical
extermination along with the mass exodus,  the burning of grand  monasteries
and their rich  treasuries and libraries,  the death and  murder of a  large
number of  monks and clergy  wreaked havoc in these regions. The position of
the  Pec Patriarchate was badly shaken; its  highest  clergy  went  with the
people to Austria, and  the confusion wrought by  the Great Migration had  a
major influence on its abolition (1766).3
     The hardest consequence of the Great Migration was demographic upheaval
it caused,  because  once  the  Serbs  withdraw  from  Kosovo  and  Metohia,
Islamized Albanian tribes  from  the northern highlands started settling the
area  in greater  number,  mostly by force, in the decade following the 1690
Great Migration of  Serbs,  ethnic Albanian  tribes (given  their incredible
powers of reproduction) was posing a grave threat to the biological survival
of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia. Colonies set  up by the ethnic Albanians
in  Kosovo,  Metohia and  the neighboring areas  provoked  a  fresh  Serbian
migration toward the north, encouraged the process of conversion  and  upset
the centuries-old  ethnic  balance in  those areas. Supported (depending  on
circumstances) by the Turks  and the  Roman Curia, ethnic Albanians, abyding
by their tribal customs and hajduk insubordination to the law, in the coming
centuries turned  the entire region  of  Kosovo  and Metohia  into  a bloody
battleground, marked by tribal and feudal anarchy. The  period following the
Great  Migration of Serbia  marked the  commencement  of  three centuries of
ethnic Albanian genocide against Serbs in their native land.
     The  century after the Great Migration saw a fresh exodus  of the Serbs
from Kosovo and  Metohia,  and a growing influence of  ethnic  Albanians  on
political  circumstances.  Ethnic Albanians used  the  support they received
from the Turkish army  in  fighting Serbian insurgents  to seize the ravaged
land and abandoned  mining  centers in Kosovo  and  Metohia and  to enter in
large  numbers  the  Ottoman  administration  and military.  More  and  more
Catholic ethnic-Albanians converted to Islam, thereby acquiring the right to
retain the estates they had seized and to apply the might-is-right principle
in their dealings with the non-Muslim Serbs. The  authorities encouraged and
assisted  the settlement of the newly Islamized ethnic-Albanian  tribes from
the mountains to the fertile lands devastated by war. The dissipation of the
Turkish administrative system encouraged the ethnic-Albanian colonisation of
Kosovo and Metohia, since with the arrival of more of their fellow tribesmen
and  compatriots,  the local  pashas  and  beys (most  of  whom  were ethnic
Albanian)  acquired  strong  tribal armies which in times of trouble  helped
them hold  on to their position  and illegally pass on their power to  their
descendents. The missionaries of  the Roman Curia did not  heed  to preserve
the small  ethnic Albanian Catholic population,  but endeavoured instead  to
inflict  as  much  harm  as  possible  on  the   Pec  Patriarchate  and  its
dignitaries,  and, with  the  help  of  bribable  pashas, to  undermine  the
cohesive power of Serbian Orthodoxy in these areas.4
     The  next  war  between  Austria  and  Turkey  (1716-1718)  marked  the
beginning of  a fresh  persecution in Kosovo and  Metohia.  Austrian troops,
backed  by  Serbian volunteers, reached the Western Morava  River where they
established a new  frontier. Ethnic Albanians collectively guaranteed to the
Porte the safety  of the  regions in the immediate vicinity of  Austria, and
were in return exempted from the  heaviest taxes. Towards the end of the war
(1717), a  major Serbian uprising broke out in Vucitrn and its surroundings:
it was brutally crushed and the troops sent to allay the rayah and launch an
investigation, perpetrated fresh atrocities. Excessive dues, robbery and the
threat  of extermination put before  the Kosovo Serbs the  choices of either
converting to Islam or  finding a powerful master  who would protect them if
they  accepted the  status of serfs.  Many opted for  a third solution: they
moved to surrounding regions where life was more tolerable.5
     The following war between Austria and Turkey (1737-1739) ended with the
routing of  the  imperial  troops from Serbian  territory.  The  border  was
reestablished at the Sava and  Danube rivers, and Serbs  set out  on another
migration. Patriarch Arsenije  IV  Jovanovic, along with  the  religious and
national  leaders of Pec, drew up  a  plan for cooperation with the Austrian
forces,  and contacted their commanders. A  large-scale uprisings  broke out
again in Kosovo and Metohia, engaging some 10.000 Serbs. They were joined by
Montenegrin tribes,  and  Austrian envoys  even stirred up  the Kliments,  a
Catholic tribe from northern Albania. A Serbian  militia  was formed  again,
but the Austrian troops and insurgenta were forced to retreat in the face of
superior Turkish  power: reprisals ensued, bringing death to  the insurgents
and  their  families.  Serbs  withdrew  from  the mining settlements  around
Janjevo,  Pristina, Novo Brdo and  Kopaonik. In order  to keep the remaining
populace  on  the  land,  the Turks declared  an amnesty. After  the fall of
Belgrade, Arsenije IV moved to  Austria. The number of refugees from Serbia,
including  Kosovo  and Metohia,  along with some  Kliments  has  yet  to  be
accurately  determined, as people were moving  on all sides  and the process
lasted for  several months.  The considerably reduced number of taxpayers in
Kosovo and Metohia and in other parts of Serbia points to a strong migratory
wave.6
     Unrest  in  the Ottoman  empire  helped spread  anarchy  in Kosovo  and
Metohia  and  rest of  Serbia.  Raids,  murder,  rape  against  the  unarmed
population  was largely committed by ethnic  Albanian outlaws, who  were now
numerically superior in many regions. Outlaw bands held  controll over roads
during  Turkey's war  with  Russia  (1768-1774),  when  lawlessness  reigned
throughout  Serbia. Ethnic Albanian outlaws looted and fleeced other regions
as  well,  which  sent  local  Muslims  complaining  to  the  Porte  seeking
protection.
     During  the last Austro-Turkish  war  (1788-1791);  a sweeping  popular
movement again took shape in northern Serbia. Because of the imperial forces
swift retreat, the movement did not encompass the  southern parts of Serbia:
Kosovo, Metohia and present-day  northern  Macedonia. The  peace  treaty  of
Sistovo  (1791)  envisaged a  general amnesty  for the Serbs, but the ethnic
Albanians,  as  outlaws  or soldiers  in  the detachments  of  local pashas,
continued unhindered to assault the unprotected Serbian population. The wave
of religious intolerance towards Orthodox population, which acquired greater
proportion owing to the hostilities with Russia at the  end of 18th century,
effected  the forced  conversion  to Islam  of  a  larger number  of Serbian
families. The abolition of  the Pec Patriarchate (1766), whose  see and rich
estates  were  continually sought  after by local ethnic Albanian pashas and
beys, prompted  the  final wave  of  extensive Islamization  in  Kosovo  and
Metohia.7
     Those who suffered the most during these centuries of utter lawlessness
were  the  Serbs, unreliable subjects who would rise  every  time  the Turks
would  wage  war  against one of  the  neighboring Great  Powers, and  whose
patriarchs  led  the people  to enemy  land. Although  initially  on a small
scale,  the Islamization  of Serbs in  Kosovo  and Metohia began  before the
penetration of ethnic Albanians.  More  widespread conversion to  Islam took
place  in  the  17th  and  the first  half of 18th  centuries,  when  ethnic
Albanians  began  to  wield  more  influence  on  political events  in these
regions. Many Serbs accepted Islamization as  a necessary  evil, waiting for
the moment when they  could revert to the faith of their ancestors, but most
of them  never lived to see that day. The first few generations of Islamized
Serbs preserved their  language  and observed their old  customs (especially
slava -  the family patron saint day, and the  Easter holiday).  But several
generations  later,  owing to  a strong  ethnic  Albanian environment,  they
gradually  began adopting  the Albanian dress  to safety, and outside  their
narrow  family circle they spoke the Albanian language. Thus came into being
a  special  kind  of  social  mimicry  which  enabled  converts to  survive.
Albanization  began only when  Islamized  Serbs, who were  void of  national
feeling, married girls from  ethnic  Albanian tribal community.  For a  long
time Orthodox Serbs called their Albanized compatriots  Arnautasi, until the
memory  of their  Serbian origin waned  completely,  though old  customs and
legends  about  their ancestors were  passed on from  one  generation to the
next.8
     For a  long  time  the  Arnautasi felt  neither like Turks  nor  ethnic
Albanians, because their customs and traditions set them apart, and yet they
did not  feel like Serbs  either, who considered Orthodoxy to be their prime
national trait. Many Arnautasi retained their old surnames until the turn of
the  last century. In Drenica the  Arnautasi bore  such  surnames as  Dokic,
Velic,  Marusic, Zonic, Racic,  Gecic, which unquestionably indicated  their
Serbian  origin. The situation was similar in Pec and its surroundings where
many Islamized  and  Albanized  Serbs  carries typically  Serbian  surnames:
Stepanovic, Bojkovic,  Dekic, Lekic,  Stojkovic, etc.  The eastern  parts of
Kosovo and Metohia, with their compact Serbian settlements, were the last to
undergo Islamization. The earliest Islamization in Upper Morava and Izmornik
is pinpointed as taking place in  the first decades of the 18th century, and
the latest  in 1870s. Toponyms  in  many ethnic Albanian villages  in Kosovo
show that Serbs had lived  there the preceding centuries, and in some places
Orthodox  cemeteries  were  shielded against desecrators by ethnic Albanians
themselves, because  they knew that  the graves  of their own  ancestors lay
there.9
     In the late 18th century,  all the people of  Gora, the mountain region
near Prizren were converted  to Islam. However they succeeded in  preserving
their  language  and  avoiding Albanization. There were  also some  cases of
conversion of Serbs to Islam in the  second half of 19th century, especially
during  the Crimean  War,  again  to  save their lives,  honor and property,
though far  more pronounced at the time was the process of emigration, since
families, sometimes even  entire  villages,  fled to Serbia  or  Montenegro.
Extensive  anthropogeographic  research  indicates  that  about 30%  of  the
present-day ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia  is  of Serbian
origin.10
     1  N.  Samardzic,  Savremena  strana  stampa   o  Velikoj  seobi  Srba,
Istorijski Casopis,  vol. XXXII (1985),  pp.  79-103;  R. Trickovic,  Velika
seoba  Srba  1690. godine, in:  Kosovo  i  Metohija u srpskoj istoriji,  pp.
127-141.
     2 N. Samardzic, op. cit., pp. 136-139.
     3 R. Trickovic, Ustanci,  seobe  i stradanja u XVIII veku, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 149-169
     4 Ibid
     5 Ibid
     6 Ibid
     7 Ibid
     8 J. Cvijic, La peninsule balkanique. Geographic humaine, (Paris 1918),
pp. 343-355.
     9 A. Urosevic, Kosovo, (Beograd 1965); D. Slijepcevic, Srpsko-arbanaski
odnosi kroz vekove, pp. 95-127.
     10  J.  Cvijic, Osnove za  geografiju  i  geologiju Makedonije  i Stare
Srbije, I-III, (Beograd 1906-1911).

     The series of long-scale Christian  national movements  in the Balkans,
triggered  off by 1804 Serbian revolution, decided more than in the  earlier
centuries,  the  fate  of Serbs and made ethnic Albanians (about 70% of whom
were Muslims) the main guardians of Turkish order in the  European provinces
of Ottoman  Empire.  At  a  time when the  Eastern question was  again being
raised, particularly in the final quarter  of  19th  and the first decade of
20th century, Islamic Albanians were the chief instrument of Turkey's policy
in  crushing  the  liberation movements  of  other Balkan  states. After the
congress of Berlin (1878) an Albanian  national movement flared up, and both
the Sultan  and Austria-Hungary,  a  power  whose  occupation of Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  heralded  its   further  expansion   deep   into  the  Balkans,
endeavored,  with  varying  degrees  of  success,  to  instrumentalize  this
movement. While the Porte used the ethnic Albanians as Islam's shock cutting
edge   against  Christians  in  the  frontier  regions  towards  Serbia  and
Montenegro,  particularly  in   Kosovo,  Metohia  and   the  nearby   areas,
Austria-Hungary's design was to use  the Albanians national movement against
the  liberatory aspirations of the two Serbian states that were impeding the
German  Drang nach Osten. In a  rift  between  two  only seemingly  contrary
strivings,  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  although independent since  1878, were
powerless (at least until the Balkan wars  1912-1913) without the support of
Russia or other Great  Power  to  effect  the position  of their compatriots
within the borders of Ottoman Empire.1
     During  the Serbian revolution,  which  ended  with the creation of the
autonomous Principality of Serbia  within the  Ottoman empire (1830), Kosovo
and  Metohia  acquired special  political  importance. The hereditary ethnic
Albanian  pashas, who had until then been mostly  renegades from the central
authorities  in Constantinople, feared  that the  flames of  rebellion might
spread to regions they controlled thus they became champions for the defense
the integrity of the Turkish Empire  and  leaders of many military campaigns
against the Serbian insurgents, at the  core of the  Serbian revolution  was
the Kosovo covenant,  embodied in the "revenge of Kosovo", a fresh, decisive
battle  against  the  Turkish invaders in the field of Kosovo. In  1806  the
insurgents were  preparing, like Prince Lazar  in his  day,  to come  out in
Kosovo and  weigh  their forces against the Turks,  However,  detachments of
Serbian insurgents reached only the fringes of northern Kosovo. Metohia, Old
Raska (Sandzak), Kosovo and northern  Macedonia remained outside the borders
of the Serbian principality. In order to  highlight  their importance in the
national and  political  ideologies of  the renewed Serbian state, they were
given  a new  collective  name. It was not by  chance  that  Vuk  Stefanovic
Karadzic, the father of modern Serbian literacy, named the  central lands of
the Nemanjic state - Old Serbia.2
     Fearing  the renewed Serbian state, Kosovo pashas engaged  in  ruthless
persecution in an effort to reduce number of  Serbs living in their spacious
holdings. The French travel writer F.C.H.L Pouqueville was  astounded by the
utter  anarchy  and ferocity of the  local pashas  towards  the  Christians.
Jashar-pasha Gjinolli of Prishtina was  one of the worst, destroying several
churches in Kosovo, seizing monastic lands and killing monks. In just a  few
years  of  sweeping terror,  he evicted more than  seventy Serbian  villages
between  Vucitrn  and Gnjilane, dividing up the seized land  among the local
Islamized  population and mountain folk that had settled there from northern
Albania. The fertile plains of Kosovo became desolate meadows as the Malisor
highlanders, unused to farming knew not to cultivate.
     The revolt of the ethnic Albanian pashas against the reforms introduced
by  the  sultans  and  fierce clashes  with  regular Turkish  troops  in the
thirties and forties  of the 19th century, emphasized  the anarchy in Kosovo
and Metohia,  causing fresh  suffering  among  the  Serbs  and  the  further
devastation  of   the  ancient  monasteries.  Since   neither   Serbian  nor
Montenegro,  two  semi-independent  Serbian  states,  were  able to give any
significant help  to the gravely endangered people, Serbian leaders form the
Pristina  and  Vucitrn  regions  turned  to  the  Russian  tsar  in  seeking
protection from their  oppressors.  They set  out  that they were forced  to
choose between  converting to Islam or  fleeing for Serbia as the  violence,
especially killings,  the persecution of  monks,  the  raping of  women  and
minors, had  exceeded  all  bounds.  Pogroms marked  the  decades  to  come,
especially  in  period  of   the  Crimean  War  (1853-1856)  when  anti-Slav
sentiments reached their  peak in the ottoman empire:  ethnic Albanians  and
the  Cherkeses, whom the Turks had  resettled in  Kosovo, joined the Ottoman
troops in persecuting Orthodox Serbs.
     The  brotherhood  of  Decani  and the  Pec  Patriarchate turned  to the
authorities of Serbia for protection.  Pointing to the  widespread  violence
and increasing banditry, and to  more frequent  and  persisted  attempts  by
Catholic missionaires to compel the impoverished and spiritually discouraged
monk  communities to concede to union. Prior  Serafim Ristic of Decani loged
complaints with  both the sultan and Russian tsar and in his book Plac Stare
Srbije (Zemun  1864) he penned hundreds of examples of violence  perpetrated
by  the   ethnic   Albanians   and  Turks  against  the  Serbs,  naming  the
perpetrators, victims and type of crime. In  Metohia  alone he recorded over
one hundred cases  in  which the Turkish  authorities, police  and judiciary
tolerated and  abetted robbery, bribery, murder,  arson, the desecration  of
churches, the seizure of property  and  livestock, the  rape  of  women  and
children, and the harassment of monks and priests. Both ethnic Albanians and
Turks  viewed assaults  against  Serbs  as acts pleasing to Allah  acts that
punishing infidels  for not believing in true God: kidnapping and Islamizing
girls were a way for true Muslims to approach Allah. Ethnic Albanian outlaws
(kayaks) became heroes  among  their  fellow-tribesmen  for fulfilling their
religious obligations  in the right way and spreading  the militant glory of
their clan and tribe.
     Eloquent testimonies to the scope of  the violence against the Serbs in
Kosovo and Metohia, ranging from blackmail and  robbery to rape  and murder,
come from  many foreign  travel-writers,  from A. F.  Hilferding  to  G.  M.
McKenzie - A. P. Irby. The Russian consul  in Prizren observed  that  ethnic
Albanians were settling the Prizren district underhidered  and were  trying,
with the Turks,  to eradicate Christians from Kosovo and Metohia. Throughout
the  19th  century  there was  no public safety on the roads of Metohia  and
Kosovo.  One could travel the roads which were  controlled  by tribal bands,
only with strong armed escort. The  Serbian peasant had no protection in the
field where he could be assaulted and robbed by an outlaw  or bandit, and if
he tried to resist,  he could be killed  without the  perpetrator  having to
face  charges for  the crime.  Serbs,  as non-Muslims,  were not entitled to
carry arms. Those who possessed and used arms in self-defence afterwards had
to  run  for  their life. Only the luckiest managed to reach the  Serbian or
Montenegrin  border  and  find  permanent  refuge  there. They were  usually
followed by large  families called family cooperatives (zadruga), comprising
as many as 30-50 members, which were unable to defend themselves against the
numerous relatives of the ethnic Albanian seeking vengeance for his death in
a conflict with an elder of their clan.
     Economic pressure, especially the forced reducing  of free  peasants to
serf, was  fostered by ethnic Albanian feudal lords with  a view to creating
large  land-holdings. In  the upheavals  of  war (1859,  1863)  the  Turkish
authorities tried to  restrict enterprising Serbian  merchants and craftsmen
who flourished in Pristina, Pec and  Prizren, setting ablaze entire quarters
where  they  worked  and had their shops. But it  was  the hardest  in rural
areas, because ethnic Albanians, bond together by tight communities of blood
brotherhoods or in tribes, and relatively socially homogeneous, were able to
support  their   fellow  tribesman  without  too  much  effort,   simply  by
terrorizing Serbs  and seizing their property and livestock.  Suppression in
driving of the  Serbian peasantry, space  was made  for their relatives from
northern Albania to move in,  whereby  increased  their  own prestige  among
other  tribes. Unused to life  in  the plains and  to  hard  field-work, the
settled ethnic Albanians preferred looting to farming.
     Despite  the hardships,  the Serbs  in Kosovo  and Metohia assembled in
religious-school  communes  which financed the  opening  of schools  and the
education of children,  collected donations for the restoration of  churches
and  monasteries  and,  when possible, tried  to  improve relations with the
Turkish authorities.  In  addition to  monastic  schools, the first  Serbian
secular  schools  started opening in Kosovo  from  mid-1830s, and in  1871 a
Seminary (Bogoslovija) opened in Prizren.  Unable to  help politically,  the
Serbia  systematically aided  churches and  schools from the 1840s  onwards,
sending teachers and encouraging the best students to  continue  with  their
studies.  The Prizren  seminary the hub  of  activity  on national  affairs,
educated  teachers  and  priests  for  all the  Serbian lands under  Turkish
dominion, and unbeknownst to  authorities, established contact  on a regular
basis  with the government  in Belgrade,  wherefrom it  received  means  and
instructions for political action.
     Ethnic  circumstances in  Kosovo and Metohia  in the early 19th century
can be reconstructed on the basis of data obtained from the books written by
foreign  travel  writers  and  ethnographers who  journeyed  across European
Turkey. Joseph Miller's studies  show that in  late 1830s, 56,200 Christians
and  80,150 Muslims lived in Metohia; 11,740 of  the Muslims were  Islamized
Serbs, and 2,700 of the Christians  were  Catholic Albanians. However, clear
picture of the ethnic structure during this  period cannot be obtained until
one takes into account the  fact that from 1815 to  1837 some  320 families,
numbering ten to 30  members each, fled  Kosovo and Metohia ahead  of ethnic
Albanian  violence. According to Hilferding's  figures,  Pec numbered  4,000
Muslim  and 800  Christian families,  Pristina  numbered  1,200 Muslim,  900
Orthodox and 100 Catholic families with a population of 12,000.3
     Russian  consul  Yastrebov  recorded  (for  a  1867-1874  period)   the
following figures for  226 villages in Metohia: 4,646 Muslim ethnic Albanian
homes,  1,861 Orthodox and 3,740 Islamized Serbs  and 142 homes  of Catholic
Albanians.  Despite  the massive departure  of  the  population for  Serbia,
available data show that until  Eastern crisis (1875-1878), Serbs formed the
largest  ethnic  group in  Kosovo and Metohia, largely owing to a high birth
rate.
     The biggest demographics upheaval in Kosovo and Metohia occurred during
the Eastern crisis, especially during the 1876-1878 Serbo-Turkish wars, when
the  question  of Old Serbia  started being  internationalized. The  Ottoman
empire  lost  a good deal of  territory  in its wars with Russia, Serbia and
Montenegro, and  Austria-Hungary occupied  Bosnia and  Herzegovina.  In  the
second war with  the Turks, Serbian troops liberated parts of  Kosovo: their
advance  guard reached Pristina via Gnjilane  and at the Gracanica monastery
held a memorial  service  for the medieval heroes of Kosovo battle...  After
Russia  and Turkey  called a truce,  Serbian troops  were forced to withdraw
from  Kosovo. Serbian delegations  from  Old Serbia  sent  petitions to  the
Serbian Prince, the Russian tsar and participants of the Congress of Berlin,
requesting that these lands merge  with Serbia.  Approximately 30,000 ethnic
Albanians retreated from  the liberated areas (partly under duress), seeking
refuge  in Kosovo  and  in Metohia,  while tens of thousands  of Serbs  fled
Kosovo  and Metohia for  Serbia ahead  of unleashed  bashibozouks, irregular
auxiliaries of Ottoman troops.4
     On the eve of the Congress of  Berlin in the summer  of  1878, when the
great powers  were deciding on  the fate of the Balkan nations, the Albanian
League  was formed in  Prizren, on the periphery of  ethnic Albanian  living
space.  The  League  called for  the preservation  of  Ottoman Empire in its
entirety  within  the  prewar boundaries and for the creation of  autonomous
Albanian vilayet out of the vilayets of  Kosovo, Scutari, Janina and Monster
(Bitolj),  regions  where  ethnic Albanians  accounted  for  44% of  overall
population. The territorial aspirations of the Albanian movement  as defined
in  1878, became part of all subsequent  national  programs. The new  sultan
Abdulhamid II (1878-1909) supported the League's pro-Ottoman and pro-Islamic
attitude. Breaking with the reformatory policy of  his  predecessors, sultan
adopted pan-Islamism as the ruling principle  of his reign. Unsatisfied with
the decisions taken at the Congress, the League  put up an  armed opposition
to concession  of  regions  of  Plav  and  Gusinje to  Montenegro,  and  its
detachments committed countless acts of  violence  against the Serbs,  whose
very existence posed a  permanent threat to Albanian  national interests. In
1881,  Turkey  employed force  to crush the  League,  whose radical wing was
striving towards an independent  Albanian state to show that it was  capable
of implementing  the  adopted reforms. Notwithstanding, under  the system of
Turkish rule in the Balkans, ethnic  Albanians continued to occupy the  most
prominent seats in the decades to come.
     The  ethnic Albanians' religious  and ethnic intolerance  of  the Serbs
took on a  new, political  tone.  The strategic objective  of their national
policy was  to systematically  edge the  Serbs  out of  these  regions.  The
sultan's policy of forming a chain of  ethnic Albanian settlements to secure
a  new border towards Serbia  and  to let ethnic  Albanians, as advocates of
Islam, crush all  unrest  by  Serbs and other  Christians  in  the  Empire's
European provinces, turned Kosovo and Metohia into a bloody battle-ground in
which  the persecution of the  Serbian populace  assumed  almost apocalyptic
proportions.  From  1876 to 1883, approximately 1,500  Serbian families fled
Kosovo and Metohia for Serbia ahead of Albanian violence.5
     Surrounded by his influential guard of ethnic Albanians, the Abdulhamid
II became  increasingly lenient  toward Islamized  Albanian tribes who  used
force  in  quelling  Christian  movements: they  were exempt  from providing
recruits, paying the most  of the  regular taxes  and  allowed  at times  to
refuse  the  orders  of local authorities.  This lenient  policy towards the
ethnic Albanians  and  tolerance  for  the  violence  committed  against the
Serbian population created a feeling  of superiority  in the lower strata of
Albanian  society. The knowledge that no matter what the offense  they would
not  be  held  responsible, encouraged  ethnic Albanians  to ignore all  the
lesser  authorities. Social stratification  resulted on increasing number of
renegades who lived solely off banditry or as outlaws. The policy of failing
to punish ethnic Albanians led to total anarchy which, escaping all control,
increasingly worried  the authorities  in Constantinople.  Anarchy  received
fresh impetus at the end of the 19th century when Austria-Hungary, seeking a
way to expand towards the  Bay  of Salonika, encouraged ethnic Albanians  to
clash with  the Serbs and disobey the  local authorities. Ruling  circles in
Vienna saw the ethnic Albanians as a permanent wedge between the two Serbian
states  and,  with the  collapse  of  the  system of Turkish rule,  a bridge
enabling the Dual Monarchy to extend in the Vardar valley. Thus,  Kosovo and
Metohia  became the hub of great  power  confrontation for  supremacy in the
Balkans.
     The only protection for the Serbs  in Kosovo and Metohia until  the end
of 1880s came from Russian diplomats, Russia  being the traditional guardian
of  the Orthodox and Slav population  in the Ottoman  Empire Russia's waning
influence in the Balkans following the Congress of Berlin had an unfavorable
impact  on  the Serbs in Turkey. Owing  to  Milan  and Alexander Obrenovic's
Austrophile policy, Serbia lost valuable Russian support at the Porte in its
efforts to  protect Serbian  population In Kosovo  and  Metohia, Serbs  were
regarded  as a  rebellious,  treasonous element, every move  they  made  was
carefully  watched and any  signs of  rebellion were ruthlessly  punished. A
military tribunal was  established in Pristina  in 1882  which  in  its five
years of work sent hundreds of national leaders to prison.
     The  persistent efforts of  Serbian officials to reach  agreement  with
ethnic Albanian tribal  chiefs in Kosovo and Metohia, and thus help curb the
anarchy failed to stem the tide of  violence. Belgrade officials did not get
a  true picture of the  persecutions until a Serbian consulate was opened in
Pristina in 1889, five centuries after a battle  in Kosovo.  The  government
was informed that ethnic Albanians were systematically mounting attacks on a
isolated Serbian villages and driving people  to  eriction  with  treats and
murders:  "Go  to Serbia -you can't survive here!". The assassination of the
first Serbian Consul in the streets of Pristina revealed the depth of ethnic
Albanian  intolerance.  Until  1905,  not a  single  Serbian  diplomat  from
Pristina could visit the  town  of  Pec  or tour  Metohia, the hotbed of the
anarchy. Consuls in Pristina (who  included the well-known writers Branislav
Nusic and  Milan  M. Rakic) wrote,  aside  to their regular reports, indepth
descriptions  of  the  situation  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia.  Serbia's   sole
diplomatic  success  was  the  election  of  a  Serbian  candidate  as   the
Raska-Prizren  Metropolitan  in 1896,  following  a  series  of anti-Serbian
orientated Greek Bishops who had been enthroned in Prizren since 1830.
     Outright campaigns of terror were mounted after a Greaco-Turkish war in
1897, when it  appeared that  the Serbs would  suffer  the same fate as  the
Armenians in Asia Minor whom the Kurds had wiped out with blessing from  the
sultan.  Serbian  diplomats  launched  a  campaign  at  the  Porte  for  the
protection of their compatriots,  submitting extensive documentation on four
hundred  crimes of murder, blackmail, theft, rape, seizure of land, arson of
churches.  They  demanded  that  energetic  measures  be  taken  against the
perpetrators   and  that  the  investigation  be  carried  out  by  a  joint
Serbo-Turkish  committee.  But, without the support  of  Russia,  the  whole
effort  came   to  naught.  The  prime  minister  of  Serbia  observed  with
resignation that 60,000 people had fled Old Serbia for  Serbia in the period
from 1880 to 1889. In Belgrade, a Blue Book  was printed for the  1899 Peace
Conference  in  the  Hague, containing  diplomatic correspondence on acts of
violence committed by ethnic Albanians in Old Serbia, but Austria-58
     Hungary prevented  Serbian diplomats from raising  the  question before
the  international  public.  In  the  ensuing years  the  Serbian government
attempted to secretly supply Serbs  in  Kosovo with arms.  The first  larger
caches  of guns were  discovered, and 190l  saw another  pogrom  in  Ibarski
Kolasin  (northern  Kosovo),  which  ended   only   when  Russian  diplomats
intervened.6
     The  widespread  anarchy reached a  critical point  in  1902  when  the
Serbian  government  with the support of Montenegrin  diplomacy again raised
the  issue of the protection of the Serbs in Turkey, demanding that  the law
be applied equally to all subjects of Empire, and that an end be put  to the
policy of indulging ethnic Albanians, that they be disarmed and that Turkish
garrisons  be  reinforced  in  areas  with  a mixed  Serbian-ethnic Albanian
population.  Russia,  and then  France, supported Serbia's demands.  The two
most  interested  parties,  Austria-Hungary  and Russia, agreed in  1897  to
maintain  the status  quo in the Balkans, although they  initiated a  reform
plan to rearrange Turkey's European provinces. Fearing for their privileges,
ethnic Albanians launched  a  major  uprising in 1903;  it  began  with  new
assaults  against  Serbs  and  ended  with the  assassination of  the  newly
appointed Russian consul in Mitrovica, accepted as a  protector of the Serbs
in Kosovo.
     The  1903 restoration of  democracy in Serbia under  new King  Petar  I
Karadjordjevic marked an end to  Austrophile policy and  the turning towards
Russia. In response, Austria-Hungary stepped up its propaganda efforts among
ethnic  Albanians. At the  request of the  Dual Monarchy, Kosovo and Metohia
were  exempt from the Great Powers Reform action (1903-1908).  A new wave of
persecution ensued:  in 1904,108 people fled for Serbia  from  Kosovo alone.
Out  of  146 different cases of violence,  46  ended  in murder; a group  of
ethnic  Albanians  raped  a  seven-year-old  girl.  In  1905,  out  of   281
registrated  cases  of violence, 65 were murders, and  at just  one wedding,
ethnic Albanians killed nine wedding guests.7
     The Young Turk revolution in 1908, which ended the "Age of  Oppression"
(as Turkish historiography refers to the reign of Abdulhamid II), brought no
changes in  relations between ethnic Albanians  and Serbs. The Serbs'  first
political organization was created under  the  auspices  of the  Young  Turk
regime,  but  the  ethnic  Albanian  revolt  against  the  new  authorities'
pan-Turkish  policy triggered off a  fresh wave  of violence. In  the second
half  of  1911 alone, Old  Serbia registrated 128 cases of theft, 35 acts of
arson,  41 instances  of banditry, 53 cases of  extortion, 30  instances  of
blackmail, 19 cases of intimidation, 35 murders,  37  attempted  murders, 58
armed  attacks on  property, 27  fights  and cases of abuse,  13 attempts at
Islamization, and  18  cases of  the  infliction  of serious  bodily injury.
Approximately  400,000  people  fled  Old Serbia  (Kosovo,  Metohia,  Raska,
northern  and  northwest Macedonia) for Serbia ahead of ethnic  Albanian and
Turkish violence, and about 150,000 people fled Kosovo  and Metohia, a third
of  the overall Serbian population in  these  parts. Despite the persecution
and the steady outflow of people. Serbs still accounted for almost half  the
population  in Kosovo  and  Metohia in  1912.  According to  Jovan  Cvijic's
findings,  published in 1911,  there were 14,048 Serbian homes in Kosovo, 3,
826 in Pec and  its environs, and  2,400 Serbian homes  with roughly 200,000
inhabitants in the Prizren region. Comparing this statistics dating from the
middle of the century, when there were approximately 400,000 Serbs living in
Kosovo  and Metohia, Cvijic's estimate that by 1912  about  150,000 refugees
had fled to Serbia seems quite acceptable.8
     The  Serbian  and  Montenegrin governments  aided the  ethnic  Albanian
rebels  against Young Turks  up to a point: they took in refugees  and  gave
them arms with a view to undermining Turkish rule in the Balkans, dispelling
Austro-Hungarian influence on their leaders and curbing the violence against
Serbs. But it was all in vain as intolerance for the Serbs ran  deep  in all
Albanian  national  movements.   Serbia,  Montenegro,  Bulgaria  and  Greece
realized that the issue of Christian survival in  Turkey had to  be resolved
by arms. Since Turkey refused to guarantee the Christians the same rights it
had promised the ethnic Albanian insurgents, the Balkan allies  declared war
in the fall of 1912.
     1 D.  T. Batakovic, Od srpske revolucije  do  istocne krize: 1804-1878,
in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 172-208.
     2 D. T.  Batakovic  (ed.), Savremenici o Kosovu  i Metohiji  1852-1912,
(Beograd 1988), Forward, pp. XVII-XXXVII.
     3 Ibid
     4 D. T. Batakovic, Ulazak u sferu evropskog interesovanja, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 216-231.
     5 V. Bovan, Jastrebov u Prizrenu, (Pristina 1984), pp. 180-185.
     6  Documents  diplomatoques.  Correspondence  concernant  les actes  de
violence  et de  brigandage des  Albanias dans la Vielle  Serbie (Vilayet de
Kosovo) 1898-1899, (Belgrade MDCCCXCIX), pp. 1-145
     7 List of violence, in. Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 672-697.
     8  D. T. Batakovic, Anarhija i  genocid u  Staroj  Srbiji, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 271-280.

     Serbia  and Montenegro, states whose national ideologies  were based on
the  Kosovo  covenant,  welcomed  the  war  as a  chance  to  fulfill  their
centuries-old desire to avenge Kosovo. Volunteers from all the Serbian lands
rushed to join the army. Carried by the feeling  that they were fulfilling a
historic  mission, Serbian troops set out  for  Kosovo. Attempts to  isolate
ethnic Albanians from the war actions failed: the leaders of their  movement
had  decided  to defend  their Ottoman homeland  in arms.  The Serbian army,
together with Montenegrin, liberated Kosovo without much fight,  and its 3rd
army stopped in  Gracanica to  hold a commemoration for the heroes  of  1389
Kosovo battle. Montenegrin troops marched into Pec,  Decani and  met Serbian
troops in Djakovica. Leaders of the ethnic Albanian movement fled to Albania
where an  independent state  had  been pro-clamed under  the auspices of the
Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. Seeking  an outlet to the  Adriatic sea in order
to save themselves from the over-tightening grip of Austria-Hungary, Serbian
troops  entered  norther  Albanian  ports,  but under the  decisions of  the
Conference  of  Ambassadors  in  London  (1912-1913),  they were  forced  to
withdraw. Austria-Hungary struggled to  win  as  big  an  Albanian state  as
possible  to  counter-balance Serbia  and  Montenegro, but both  delegations
stressed  that  under  no conditions  would  they  agree  to let  Kosovo and
Metohia, as holy lands of  Serbs, remain  outside their  borders.  Raids  on
Serbian  territory by armed  Albanian  detachments  in  1913,  protected  by
Turkish  and  Austro-Hungarian  services, were  aimed  at  destabilizing the
administration in  the newly  liberated regions, heralding Austria-Hungary's
imminent  setting of accounts  with Serbia, the chief obstacle to the German
Drang nach Osten.
     World War  I  hindered  not  only  the  stabilization  of  the  Serbian
administration in  Kosovo and Montenegrin  in Metohia, but also the creation
of  a  union between  the two  Serbian  states.  Austria-Hungary helped  the
revanchist aspirations of fugitive ethnic Albanian leaders and fanned  plans
for the creation of  a  Greater  Albania inclusive of  Kosovo,  Metohia  and
western  Macedonia. Organized by  Austro-Hungarian  military and  diplomatic
services, detachments  comprising ethnic Albanian refugees  from Kosovo  and
Macedonia  were formed in Albania (where civil war was  raging), with a view
to provoking  an  uprising in Kosovo and  opening an  another  front  toward
Serbia. In  the summer  of 1914,  the Serbian government helped  Essad-Pasha
Topfani, a  supporter  of the Balkan  cooperation and the Entente powers, to
assume power in Albania and with him signed a treaty on military cooperation
and one on  a real union. In the summer of 1915, following the letter of the
treaty,  the Serbian army  intervened in  Albania to  protect  Essad-pasha's
regime and crush  an uprising by  supporters of the Triple Alliance. After a
joint Austro-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian offensive against Serbia in the
fall of 1915.  The initial  plan had  been to  put up decisive resistance in
Kosovo, but the view  that it was better to reach  the allied forces  on the
Albanian coast prevailed. Owing to hunger, disease, a bad winter and clashes
with Albanian tribes  in areas not controlled by Essad-Pasha,  approximately
70,000 of the  220,000 soldiers died in  Albania, and  only  a third  (about
60,000)  of   the   200,000   civilian  refugees   made   it  to  Corfu  and
Bizerte.1
     After penetrating the Salonika front in the  fall  of  1918, the allied
troops  liberated  Kosovo and  Metohia and turned over power to the  Serbian
administration.  There were sporadic revolts,  especially after the founding
of  the Kosovo  Committee  in  Albania which called  men  to fight  for  the
creation of a Greater Albania. Serbian troops occupied Albanian border areas
and tried to put in power Essad-Pasha, who was at the allied camp in Athens.
     Italy,  having  assumed  the  role  of  Albania's protector  after  the
collapse  of  Austria-Hungary,  became  the  chief  opponent  of  the  newly
proclaimed Yugoslav-state.  Owing to  a  dispute over  supremacy  along  the
Adriatic littoral,  Italy set up a puppet regime in Albania, encouraged  its
aspirations in Kosovo,  Metohia  and northwestern Macedonia, with the aim of
turning Albania  into  a  foothold for  its  advance and expansion into  the
Balkans.
     At the Peace Conference in Paris,  the Yugoslav  delegation upheld  the
stand  that Albania  should  be  an independent state  within the borders of
1913, but in the event such a solution was rejected, it demanded territorial
compensation from the Drim River  to Scutari. After strong external pressure
and internal upheaval, the question  of  Albania's independence was resolved
at the Conference  of the Great Powers ambassadors in 1921,  and  the border
with the Kingdom of  Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was  finally drawn  in 1926.
Kosovo emigrants in  Albania worked to expand the movement  for the creation
of  a  Greater Albania. Guerilla detachments were infiltrated  into Yugoslav
territory and, clashing  with  Yugoslav  troops  and  the authorities,  they
created an unsafe border area which had to be placed under a special regime.
The  involvement of  Yugoslav  diplomacy in  internal  tribal, religious and
political struggles in Albania was aimed  at edging out  a foreign influence
and helping  to establish a regime that would sever the continual subversive
activities.
     Owing  to  new  political   factors  within  the  Yugoslavia   and  new
international  circumstances, the  creation of Kingdom of Serbs,  Croats and
Slovenes  (which  in  1931  became  Kingdom  of  Yugoslavia), lent  a  fresh
dimension  to Serbo-Albanian relations  in Kosovo  and Metohia, and to state
relations between Yugoslavia and Albania (although they had been  defined by
the  inherited  ethnic  strife).  The  Albanian question once again became a
means  of political  pressure on the new state, especially  against Serbs as
its  driving  force.  With fascism  and Nazism  emerging,  revanshist states
defeated  in  World  War  I,  unsatisfied  with  the  set  borders  and  the
distribution  of political power, rallying around Italy, tried to  undermine
the foundations of Yugoslavia in its most vulnerable spots - Kosovo, Metohia
and Macedonia, lands where burden of five centuries of Ottoman  rule  opened
the deepest civilisational chasms.2
     The new  state had the difficult  task of severing feudal  relations in
Kosovo, Metohia  and Macedonia, of  carrying out  the agrarian reform and of
populating the area. The settlement of  Serbs from  the  passive  regions of
Montenegro, Bosnia and Vojna  Krajina in  Croatia, was meant to  bring about
the  desirable ethnic balance in the sensitive border region. The first step
in  pulling  these  regions out of their centuries-old  backwardness was the
abolition of the feudal system in 1919, when an end was  put to  serfdom and
the serfs were declared owners of the lands they tilled. For the first time,
native Serbs and many poor ethnic Albanian families obtained their own land.
Colonization  began  in 1920  without being adequately  prepared,  thus  the
earliest  settlers  were  on  their own, and  the  authorities in charge  of
carrying out the task took advantage of rough edges of  the reform to engage
in various forms of abuse. After the first  decade, the  agrarian reform and
colonization proved to suffer from major shortcomings, which were hardest on
the  settlers themselves. In principle, taking land away from private owners
for the  purpose of settlement was forbidden, though small lots of land were
thus obtained for the purpose of reallocating holdings, and the owners  were
alloted land elsewhere. The pseudo-ownership rights of some ethnic Albanians
who could  not prove their ownership of the land  they had been using  after
its real owners had  left, created some confusion. Initially, settlers  were
mostly alloted untitled land, pastures, clearings, barren or abandoned land,
forests  and, to a lesser extent, lands of fugitive outlaws.  Only 5% of the
total amount of land  was arable. During the two waves of colonisation, from
1922-1929 and from 1933-1938, 10,877 families, some 60,000 people settled on
120,672 hectares of land (about 15, 3% of the land). Another 99,327 hectares
planned  for  settlement  were not alloted. For  the incoming settlers,  330
settlements and  villages  were built with  12,689 houses, 46 schools and 32
churches.3
     The kacak (renegade,  outlaw)  movement, which posed  a growe threat to
personal safety of  settlers living in  border areas during the 1920's was a
major obstacle to efforts at stabilizing the  political situation. The kacak
movement, a  remaining from  the  Turkish times, was  mostly  coordinated by
ethnic Albanian emigrants from Kosovo,  as a movement for the unification of
Kosovo  and Metohia with  Albania.  Operating separately  were  a  number of
outlaw bands which  plundered the remote  and poorly protected border areas,
evading  taxes   and  military  service.  The  border  military  authorities
responded  to  the  perpetual  assaults  and  murders  of  local  officials,
gendarmes,  priests  and  teachers, to  the looting  of and setting fire  to
isolated Serbian  estates, by driving out the perpetrators,  using artillery
in the worst of  cases.  The  estates  of  the  most  dangerous outlaws were
confiscated  and the homes of their accomplices set  afire as a warning. The
1921 amnesty for  all crimes excepting murder produced only partial results:
the  outlaws surrended  just before  winter, but were back in the forests by
spring. From 1918 to  1923,478 kacaks surrendered, 23  were  captured and 52
killed. Most of those (231) who were captured or who  surrendered were  sent
to military commands (they evaded regular military service), 195 were turned
over to the courts, and 75 were acquitted. The kacak movement began tapering
off  in  1923  when on  of the more  liberal governments issued a  decree on
amnesty inclusive of more  serious  crimes. The amnesty  and  good relations
with Albania helped bring an end to the kacak movement.4
     The ethnic  Albanian and  Turkish population in Kosovo and Metohia were
reluctant to  reconcile with living in  a  European-organized  state  where,
instead of the  status of the absolutely  privileged class they  had enjoyed
during the Turkish  rule, they  acquired only  civil  equality with what had
previously been the infidel masses. In 1919 the leading ethnic Albanian beys
from Kosovo,  Metohia  and  northwestern  Macedonia  founded  the  Dzemijet,
political party  which in 1921 had 12 seats in  Parliament and 14  two years
later. The Dzemijet was  banned in 1925 because  of its ties with kacaks and
the government in Tirana, but in continued to operate clandestinely. Besa, a
secret  student organization  financed  by Tirana and  then by  the  Italian
legation  in Belgrade,  propagated the annexation of  Kosovo  and Metohia to
Albania. Because of their support to the kacaks and  ties with Kosovo migr
circles, ethnic Albanians  were regarded with suspicion  in Yugoslavia, as a
subversive element ready  to revolt at a given opportunity and annex certain
regions to Albania. Under  the Constitution, ethnic Albanians, as a national
minority,  were  guaranteed the  use of their  mother  tongue  in elementary
schools, but  everything  was reduced to education in religious schools. The
Yugoslav government wished to resolve the rights of minorities reciprocally,
with the Serbian minority in Albania being allowed to open  its  own schools
and  the  question of  the  Orthodox eparchy in Albania being  resolved, but
agreement was  never reached. Not even the  leading beys from the  Dzemijet,
who looked out solely for their own privileges,  raised the question of  the
schooling for their compatriots. They were satisfied with  religious schools
for ethnic Albanian youth. Out of 37,685 pupils in 252 compulsory schools in
1940/1941,  11,  876  ethnic  Albanian   pupils  attended  classes   in  the
Serbo-Croatian language.5
     Discontent with the new state among the ethnic Albanian  masses stepped
up emigration to Turkey, in whose Muslim environment they felt at home. Many
openly admitted that they could not bear being  ruled over by members of the
former  infidel masses,  Serbs, whom they pejoratively  called  Ski (Slavs).
Emigration started right after  the Balkan wars  and  many refugees  who had
fled to Albania to avoid conflicts with the  authorities, returned  to their
homes  after  the war and the quelling  of kacak operations. By the  1930's,
thousands of ethnic Albanian  and Turkish families  had voluntarily moved to
Turkey,  and in 1938,  after lenghtly negotiations, the Yugoslav and Turkish
governments prepared a convention on the emigration of  some 200,000 Muslims
(ethnic Albanians and Turks)  from  Kosovo-Metohia and Macedonia to  Turkey.
Because the Turkish government  abandoned the  agreement and a lack of funds
to dispatch the emigrants, the convention  was  never implemented. According
to official figures, from  1927  to  1939,  the number  of  ethnic  Albanian
emigrants  in Turkey  numbered  19,279, and 4,322 in Albania. In  comparison
with  the 30,000  Serbs, Creates  and  Slovenes who  emigrated  annually for
economic  reasons to the  United  States and  other  transoceanic countries,
migrations from  far more backward regions to Turkey and Albania  were not a
remarkable phenomenon.6
     Population   census  covering  the  inter-war  period  shows  no  major
emigration of ethnic Albanians. According to the 1921 census there were 439,
657 ethnic  Albanians in the  Kingdom  of Yugoslavia (accounting for 3,67 of
the country's total population), 15,000 less than prior to the liberation in
1912, and they lived  in Kosovo, Metohia and  in Macedonia. The 1931  census
gives following  figures: 505,259  ethnic  Albanians  (3,62%  of  the  total
population),  lived  in three administrative  units  (banovina):  in  Zetska
banovina 150,062  (16%),  in Moravska  banovina 48,300 (3,36%), in Vardarska
banovina 302,901  (19,24 %).  Figures from  the 1939  census  show  that the
non-Slav  population  (ethnic  Albanians,  Turks,  Gypsies,  etc.)  numbered
422,828 people, or 65,6%, the native Slav population accounted for 25,2% and
the settlers (mostly Serbs) for 9,2% .7
     After the  Yugoslav army  capitulated  in the  April  war  of 1941, the
Kingdom  of Yugoslavia was  torn  asunder: Serbia came under  direct  German
occupation,  and its individual parts divided among the allies  of the Third
Reich. During the  April war, armed groups of  ethnic Albanians attacked the
army, unarmed settlers and native  Serbs. Because  of the  Trepca mines, the
district of Kosovska Mitrovica  remained under German occupation,  while the
eastern parts of Kosovo where given to Bulgaria, and on August 12, 1941, the
rest of Kosovo  along with Macedonia and  parts of  Montenegro and Macedonia
were annexed  to  Greater  Albania under Italian protectorship.  Almost  all
settlers houses  were  set  afire within just a few  days, their  owners and
families  killed  or  forced to  leave  for Montenegro  and  Serbia.  Forced
migration is believed to have encompassed some 100,000 Serbs from Kosovo and
Metohia. From 1941 to 1944,  ethnic Albanians serving the Italian and German
occupation authorities killed  some 10,000 Serbs; the  worst  of suffer were
Serbs  in Pec  and Vitomirica where  ethnic Albanian  volunteers  formations
wrought  terror: before executing their victims they gouged out  their eyes,
sliced off their ears and  severed  other  parts  of their bodies. Dozens of
Orthodox churches were destroyed,  set afire and  looted, priests  and monks
were arrested and killed and many Orthodox cemeteries desecrated. Divided up
into several police  and  paramilitary  formations, ethnic Albanians were in
the forefront  of  the  massacres, and  the German  command  was  forced  to
intervene to  stop them. Ethnic Albanians used various forms of intimidation
in  an effort  to  drive away  the remaining  Serbs from  Kosovo.  After the
collapse  of  Italy  in   1943,  Kosovo   and   Metohia  came  under  German
administration,  which supported  the Greater Albanian ideology  of national
leadership, helping the forming of the Second Albanian League at the  and of
1943. The  21st SS  "Scanderbey" division was formed out of ethnic  Albanian
volunteers  in the  spring  of  1944. The  Balli Kombelar,  Greater Albanian
organization,  took the  lead  in ethnically  purging  Kosovo,  warning  the
Serbian population to move out of Kosovo and Metohia before it was too late.
The  last  migratory   wave  was   registrated   in   the  first  months  of
1944.8
     Civil  war  in  Yugoslavia  (1941-1945)  raged  in  Kosovo between  the
Chetniks, regular  royalist  forces,  led  by general Dragoljub  Mihailovic,
which operated mainly in northern parts of Kosovo, and partisan units of the
Communist Party of  Yugoslavia  (CPY)  led by  Josip  Broz Tito. Both armies
dashed  with  the occupational troops and ethnic Albanian formation. The CPY
condemned  the  "the Serbian bourgeoisie's policy" in inter-war period, thus
there  were a few  hundred ethnic Albanians in the partisan detachments. The
policy of winning over ethnic  Albanians and aid provided by CPY instructors
in the  forming and developing of Communist Party in Albania did not produce
the   expected  results.  Moreover,   representatives  of   ethnic  Albanian
communists from Yugoslavia and Albania  meeting at a conference in Bunaj (on
Albanian   territory),  January  1-2,1944,   adopted  a  resolution  on  the
annexation of Kosovo and Metohia to  Albania after  the  end of the war. The
common ethnic Albanians saw both  the partisans and Chetniks as Serbs, their
age-old enemies.9
     1  D T Batakovic, Oslobodjenje Kosova i Metohije, in: Kosovo i Metohija
u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 249-280
     2 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 178-182.
     3 V. Djuretic, Kosovo i Metohija u Jugoslaviji, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj  istoriji, pp.  95-106; N.  Gacesa,  Naseljavanje  Kosova i Metohije
posle Prvog svetskog rata, in:  Kosovo. Proslost i sadasnjost, pp. 95-106;M.
Obradovic,  Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu  (1918-1941),  Pristina
1981.
     4  B.  Gligorijevic, Fatalna  jednostranost. Povodom  knjige B. Horvata
"Kosovsko pitanje", Istorija XX veka, 1-2 (1988), pp. 179-193.
     5  R. Rajovic, Autonomija Kosova.  Istorijsko-pravna  studija, (Beograd
1985), pp.
     6 B. Gligorijevic, op. cit., pp. 185-192
     7 Ibid, pp. 187-191.
     8 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp.  199-210; V. Djuretic,  op  cit.,
pp.  311-318; A.  Jeftic,  Hronika  stradanja  Srba  na  Kosovu  i  Metohiji
(1941-1989), in Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 405-414.
     9 V. Djuretic, op. cit., pp. 320-325

     With  the  arrival of  Soviet  troops  in Yugoslavia,  partisan  units,
well-armed and their ranks freshly  recruited, liberated Kosovo  and Metohia
in the late fall of 1944, and established  their rule. Local ethnic Albanian
communists were  entrusted with setting up  power,  and thousands of  ethnic
Albanians were drafted and sent to the front (two mutinies occurred in Vrsac
and Bar).  Few  weeks after the  establishment of communist rule major armed
revolt broke out among the newly mobilized ethnic Albanian units unsatisfied
with the solution that Kosovo will remain within the  borders of Yugoslavia.
For the quelling of ethnic Albanian revolt troops had to be  brought in from
other  areas and  in  February  1945 military rule was imposed in Kosovo and
Metohia.
     By decree of  the  new communist authorities (March 16, 1945),  Serbian
and Montenegrin settlers who  had  been  expelled during the war were banned
from returning  to their abandoned estates as they were considered exponents
of  the  inter-war "Greater Serbian hegemonistic policy" On the  other hand,
international circumstances and particularly  close  ties with the communist
leadership in Albania, prompted Tito to take a lenient attitude  towards the
ethnic Albanian minority: ethnic Albanians settled in Kosovo by the Italians
and Germans during the  war were not expelled; on  the contrary, the  border
was open  to new  immigrants from Albania until 1948. The precise  number of
ethnic  Albanians  who settled  in Kosovo during  and after the war  is  yet
unknown: estimates range from 15,000 to 300,000, but the first figures after
the war were from 70,000-75,000. Compared with the 100,000 Serbs who had bee
forcibly moved out and forbidden to return after the war, these figures show
that acceptance  of the situation created under the occupation created major
disturbance in the ethnic structure of Kosovo and Metohia.1
     The  evolution  of Kosovo  and Metohia political  status  in  communist
Yugoslavia  cannot be comprehended  without some  knowledge  about the CPY's
national  policy in  the inter-war  period.  As a section of  the  Communist
International (Comintern),  the  CPY worked after World War I to destroy the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a "Versailles creation" in which  "Greater  Serbian
hegemony"  oppressed  the other  nations  in  the state. Following  Moscow's
instructions,  the  CPY  adopted  the  stand   in   1924  that  Yugoslavia's
non-Serbian  nations should be allowed to create their own separate national
states and that minorities should be  allowed  to  join their parent states:
Albania,  Hungary  and  Bulgaria. The policy  of destroying the  "Versailles
system" in Europe, as an instrument of imperialist powers -Great Britain and
France, was to be completed  in the case of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the
breaking up of the Serbian lands.
     When the  Comintern  changed its political course in 1935,  deciding to
preserve  the  Yugoslav  community with  the  a  view  to grouping  together
anti-fascist forces, the CPY changed its course too, leaving the question of
settlement of  position  and  status of the  minorities for  a  later  date.
Contrary to the  prewar  thesis that a  strong  Serbia  guaranteed a  strong
Yugoslavia, the communists upheld the view that the only way to  establish a
stable state was  by  federalizing Yugoslavia and  breaking the supremacy of
the Serbs. In its proclamations to the people of Kosovo and Metohia, the CPY
blamed the Serbian bourgeoisie  for  the mistreatment and persecution of the
ethnic  Albanian  population,  thus indirectly shifting  the blame from  the
ruling  structures  of  the  Kingdom  of Yugoslavia  to the  entire  Serbian
nation.2
     Communist rule was thus established in 1945 with such stands  regarding
the  national question. After a strong ethnic  Albanian revolt in the winter
of 1944/1945, representatives of the new authorities voted in July 1945 that
Kosovo  and Metohia remain  within Serbia. In September  that same  year,  a
separate autonomous region called Kosmet was formed, and in northern Serbia,
the  autonomous  province of Vojvodina. This solution set the precedent only
in  Serbia:  the borders  of other  Yugoslav  republics were drawn  so as to
remedy as  much as possible the "injustices" done  in  the inter-war period,
although  their ethnic  structures gave cause  for  creation  of  autonomous
units. The policy  of pacifying Serbia and  the  Serbs as a hegemonic nation
was  implemented by the CPY  leadership, headed by Josip Broz Tito, with the
slogan "brotherhood and unity" of  all Yugoslav nations, Serbian communists,
imbued  with  Yugoslavism  and  the proletarian  internationalism,  followed
Tito's political  conceptions to the last without realizing its far-reaching
effects.3
     The extent to which Serbian lands  were of the disposal of Yugoslavia's
communist leadership is evident  from conceptions about the internal borders
in  the projected  Balkan federation of communist countries. In negotiations
with the  leader of the  Albanian communists, Enver Hoxha,  Tito promised to
concede Kosovo  and Metohia to Albania if it entered  the Balkan federation.
After  Yugoslavia broke with Stalin  and  Cominform  in 1948, Enver  Hoxha's
Albania  became a dangerous center  of propaganda  and subversive activities
against  regime  in Yugoslavia, ultimately aimed at annexing Kosovo, Metohia
and parts of Macedonia to Albania, where "Albanianism", embodied in the idea
of  creating a Greater Ethnic  Albania,  entered  the  foundation  of  state
ideology.4
     Established  under  the 1946  Constitution,  the autonomy of Kosovo and
Metohia  was considerably  by  the 1963 Constitution,  and after inter-party
strife and fall  of Tito's deputy  and chief of the State Security  Service,
party strife and  fall of Tito's  deputy  and  chief of the  State  Security
Service, Aleksandar Rankovic (1966), accused in Kosovo and Metohia of taking
a  discriminatory  attitude  towards  ethnic  Albanians,  the  purging  on a
large-scale of Serbian cadres  in  high  offices  in the  administration and
police  started.  They  were  accused   by  ethnic  Albanian  communists  of
persecution and abuse of innocent people, particularly in drives of Security
Service to confiscate weapons, although Serbs suffered from the persecutions
just as much as ethnic  Albanians. The Serbian Orthodox church suffered most
of all. Church  lands came  under  the  blow  of agrarian reforms,  monastic
property  was confiscated, priests and monks were arrested and convicted and
in  1950 in Djakovica, one of the  biggest churches in Metohia was destroyed
in order that a monument for Kosovo partisan be erected.5
     Mass demonstrations by ethnic Albanians (mostly students) in Kosovo and
Metohia  in  November   1968  (under  the  slogan  "Down  With  The  Serbian
Oppressors"), showed that  the struggle against abuses by the state security
bodies was  turning  into a revanchist policy towards Serbs and Serbia,  and
that at its roots lax the idea of a Greater Albania. The demonstrations were
staged  during  a major political  upheaval over the  reorganization  of the
Yugoslav federation, changes resulting from the 1974  Constitution, when the
federal status of Kosovo and  Metohia (renamed the Province of Kosovo, since
Metohia had a Serbian and Orthodox connotations) was legally sanctioned as a
constitutive  element of  the  Yugoslav  state. The  autonomous province  of
Kosovo, a  political community with many elements of statehood (it  was even
granted the right to a Constitution), and only formally dependent on Serbia,
served the plans of secessionists who wanted to drive the Serbian population
out of these regions and  create an  ethnically  pure  Kosovo. The policy of
ethnically purging a territory  is  racist, and the means  to effect it  are
always violent.6
     The  normalization  of Yugoslavia's relations with Albania in 1971  and
the  free exchange  of  ideas,  teachers and  school  books  encouraged  the
Albanization  of Kosovo and Metohia. In less than a decade, Kosovo's leaders
managed to impose the  ethnic Albanian language as the  official language in
the   province   and  impose,  though  the   system's   legal  institutions,
discriminatory  attitude  to  the Serbian  population.  The  extent  of  the
discrimination  was  most  evident when the so-called  principle  of  ethnic
representation was applied: job hiring and enrolment at higher institutes of
learning were  done according to the size of the  population.  For instance,
out of five  job vacancies only  one Serb  could be hired, regardless of the
applicant's qualifications and  abilities. The same principle was applied at
the University: only one out of every five registrated students could  be  a
Serb. The 1981 population census showed a drastic decline in the Serbian and
Montenegrin  population, but also in the  Turkish,  Gypsy and Islamized Slav
minorities in Kosovo and Metohia. While Serbs were leaving their native land
for northern Serbia, many members of non-Slav minorities were pressured into
declaring themselves  as  ethnic  Albanians.  Along  with growing  number of
emigrants  from  Albania, this substantially  increased  the total number of
ethnic  Albanians  in  the Province  and  their representation  in the local
administration, schooling and culture.
     The  majority  of  Serbs  (with  the  exception of  the  thin layer  of
high-ranking officials) were subjected to various forms of pressure, ranging
from being  deprived of employment and promotion, to threats  and blackmail;
in  villages,  as  in the last  century of Ottoman rule, by the usurping  of
property, physical  assault,  the setting  of  fire to houses and  harvests,
stealing livestock, attacks and  rape of women and children, murder at one's
doorstep.  The local administration  gave  out  lands abandoned by resettled
Serbs to  emigrants from Albania, and many lots were illegally taken over by
neighboring  ethnic  Albanian families. Since all administrative power, from
the judiciary to the  police, was in hands of ethnic Albanians,  they passed
verdicts   in   favor    of   their   compatriots   whenever   deciding   on
inter-nationality  disputes.  The  injured Serbian  parties  had no  one  to
complain   to  because  the  Republic  of  Serbia  did  not  have   judicial
jurisdiction over Kosovo, and when they wrote to the federal  bodies,  their
appeals  remained  unanswered.  Dignitaries of the  Serbian Orthodox  Church
were,  from  1945 onwards, the  most persistent in lodging complaints to the
highest  state  bodies  aboud  the  stepped-up  physical  and  psychological
pressures  suffered  by  Serbs,  citing  hundreds  of  examples,   from  the
desecration of  graves  to the raping  of  nuns, but their petitions had  no
impact.
     The  attacks culminated with the March  1981 attempt to set fire in the
Pec Patriarchate, when the large living quarters burned  down, together with
the  furniture  and  library. The arsonists were never  discovered  and  the
investigating authorities kept claiming that the fire had broken out because
of  a  breakdown in  the electrical installations.  The handful  of  Serbian
communist  officials who did speak out  against Kosovo's  overt Albanization
during the  1968-1981 period were dismissed from their posts on  charges  of
being chauvinists  and  hegemonists.  The Serbs  who  collaborated with  the
ethnic Albanian communist leadership in the Province were rewarded with high
posts in the federal bodies.7
     The Albanization of Kosovo and Metohia  was especially bolstered by the
Province's unhindered communication with Albania, from where professors came
to  the  Pristina  University in the seventies,  spreading Greater  Albanian
propaganda. With the import of textbooks  from  Tirana, whole generations of
young  Albanians  were  raised in the spirit of Greater  Albanianism  and in
hatred  for  Serbia and  Yugoslavia. Political  officials  and scholars from
Tirana moved  freely about Kosovo, spreading sentiments and calling  for the
creation of  a  large  ethnic Albania. Huge sums of  money  allocated by the
Yugoslav  federation for Kosovo's economic growth (Serbia's  was the biggest
share) were  spent on  building  large  state  institutions  for  the  local
bureaucracy  which  tried  to  set up national  institutions as  swiftly  as
possible: the Academy of Science of  Kosovo, the University, institutes  for
Albanian language, history and folklore, museums, the  theater,  television,
radio,  newspaper and publishing  houses.  Paradoxically the  Yugoslav state
financed the secessionist movement in Kosovo and Metohia itself.
     Assessing  that, with  the death  of  Josip Broz Tito  (May  1980), the
Yugoslav  state  was  on The  verge of  collapse, Kosovo's  ethnic Albanians
staged large-scale demonstrations in March and April 1981, with the blessing
of  the Province's authorities, glorifying  the  regime of Enver  Hoxha  and
demanding that  Kosovo be declared  a republic,  since,  under  the Yugoslav
Constitution, only republics have the right to secede. The establishment  of
Kosovo  as  a  republic  would  denote  a  transitional  phase  toward  full
independence and then unification with Albania.8
     Ethnic Albanian national and political dominance  in Kosovo and Metohia
was enhanced by a large demographic explosion, as  their number tripled from
about  480,000 in  1948 to  1,227,000  in  1981.  Meanwhile, from the  early
sixties  onwards,  the  number  of  Serbs  in  Kosovo and  Metohia  steadily
declined.  According  to  official  figures,  92,  197  Serbs  and  20,  424
Montenegrins (Serbs from Montenegro)  moved to Serbia and other regions from
1961  to  1980. After the secessionist revolt of  ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
and Metohia in the spring of  1981, another  38,000 Serbs  and  Montenegrins
moved out under duress. Their emigration has still not been stemmed.
     The injuriousness of the policy  of narrowing Serbia's  sovereignty and
deliberately neutralizing Serbs in  communist Yugoslavia is best illustrated
in the case of  Kosovo and  Metohia, where the  Serbs,  although formally in
their own state (Republic  of  Serbia) were forcibly  reduced to  a minority
with limited civil and national rights.  Thanks to the organized  actions of
the Province's  local administration, which had backing from federal bodies,
the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia were forced in many cases to leave, owing to
the atmosphere  of unsafety, fear and  persecution. After almost a decade of
waiting in  vain  for the federal Yugoslav bodies  to  stop Kosovo's further
Albanization  and  halt  the  exodus from Kosovo  and Metohia, a large-scale
Serbian movement  erupted, aided  by  the  ecclesiastical  circles  and  the
Belgrade  liberal intelligentsia, demanding that  the  1974  Constitution be
changed and  Kosovo returned to  Serbian  sovereignty.  The movement,  which
spread to  encompass Serbs from all  over Yugoslavia,  regardless  of  their
ideological  convictions, emerged  (afterwards carefully manipulated  by new
leadership  in Serbia),  prior to the  600th  anniversary of  the  Battle of
Kosovo (1989), heralding, not only symbolically, the  return to  the eternal
foothold of Serbian national entity - the Kosovo covenant.
     1 V. Djuretic, op. cit., pp. 326-335.
     2 K. Cavoski, Komunisticka partija  Jugoslavije i kosovsko pitanje, in:
Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 361-375.
     3 K. Cavoski, Uspostavljanje i razvoj kosovske autonomije, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 379-383
     4  V. Djuretic, Kosovo  i  Metohija u Jugoslaviji,  pp.  329-333;  More
details in: B. Tonnes, Sonderfall Albanien -  Enver Hoxhas "Einiger Weg" und
die historischen Ursprung seiner ideologic, Munchen 1980.
     5 V. Djuretic, op. cit., pp. 334-341.
     6    Large   documentation   in:   R.   Rajovic,   Autonomija   Kosova.
Istorijsko-pravna studija, Beograd 1985
     7  Kosovo. Proslost i sadasnjost,  pp.  151-257.  Cf.  J.  Reuter,  Die
Albaner in Jugoslawien, Munchen  1982, pp.  43-101;  S. K.  Pavlowitch,  The
Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988, London 1988, pp.
78-93.
     8 M Misovic, Ko je trazio republiku Kosovo 1945-1985, Beograd 1987.




     At the  beginning of the 19th century,  the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia
lived under extremely unfavorable circumstances.  Toward the end of the 18th
century,  the  general  position  of  Christian  subjects  in  the  European
provinces  of   the  Ottoman  Empire  was  becoming  worse   with  authority
deteriorating in the Turkish administration.  A country in which affiliation
to Islam  marked the foundation of state ideology, Christians were  citizens
of  a  lower  order.  The   empire  was  overcome  by  refeudalization.  The
timar-sipahi  system  was  turning  into  the  chiflik-sahibi  system,  thus
affecting mostly Christian  farmers.  Arrogation of  peasant  land  and  the
imposition of additional taxes were carried out by force. The destruction of
free peasant estates, thus constraining farmers  to  the position of  tenant
farmers  (chiflik farmers), the evacuation of  entire villages and  forceful
Islamization made life insufferable for the Christian people of the Balkans.
Uprisings and movements at the beginning of the century announced a struggle
for the restoration of national states on the Balkan Peninsula.1
     The unique religious, ethnic and political character had made life more
difficult for  the  Serbs  in  Kosovo and  Metohia than  in  other  European
provinces  of  the Ottoman  Empire. Aside  to the misfortune common  to  all
Christians of the European parts of the empire (religious intolerance, legal
and  economic  unprotectedness) was an  arduous  struggle  for physical  and
national survival. The Serbs  of Kosovo and Metohia had intercepted the path
leading to the biological expansion of the powerful Albanian populace living
in neighboring  regions or  admixed  with  the  Serbs. The Albanians were an
ethnic  element  with strong  tribal organization  only consolidated through
Islam. Sloping the grey  mountains  circumscribing Kosovo and Metohia on the
south, armed  Albanian  herdsmen  descended  to  the plains  of  Kosovo  and
Metohia, routing native Serbian inhabitants to make space for the settlement
of  their  fellow  tribesmen.  Albanian  settlements sprouted in  Kosovo and
Metohia like freely growing weeds. Wedging themselves like pegs into compact
Serbian  settlements, the armed ethnic  Albanians imposed  upon the  unarmed
Serbs an unequal struggle over the land.
     On the plane of political determination, ethnic Albanians were the most
conservative  element  on  the  Peninsula,  loyal  to the shenat. Headed  by
illiterate and xenophobic  tribal  chiefs (krenas) and feudal lords, without
true  national awareness,  the  Albanian highlander  was  doubly  intolerant
toward the Orthodox  Serbian. As  Islamic believers and representatives of a
privileged  class  in the  state,  they  defined  themselves  to  the  Serbs
confessionally, calling  them infidels (djaurs), thus underscoring religious
intolerance and social inequality. Certain racial intolerance was older than
Islamization. ethnic Albanians of all confessions living in regions composed
of an intermingled populace, called the Slavic inhabitants derogatorily Ski,
thus emphasizing an ethnic distinction and their superiority.
     In the mid-17th century, when Muslim ethnic Albanians more often occupy
the highest positions in  Constantinople, the rise of their fellow tribesmen
to  the high military and administrative  hierarchy  of  the  Ottoman  state
began. Their influence on the policies of the Porte was wielded  through the
sultan's personal guard comprised mostly of  select ethnic  Albanians.  From
the second half of the 19th century until the beginning of the 20th century,
mostly during  the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II  (1878-1909),  they largely
attained eminent positions in the army and administration.
     Surrounded by  companies of their  fellow tribesmen,  at times when the
authority exercised by the central  government was sinking, Albanian Muslims
became autocratic,  hereditary feudal lords, and often sinewy outlaws of the
Turkish authorities. During the Napoleonic wars, the rule of independent and
semi-independent  pashas  marked the political circumstances in the  Ottoman
Empire: beginning  with the Belgrade  pashalik, where  power  was usurped by
four  dahis,  proceeding  through  Vidine  and  Janina,  where  Osman  Pasha
Pasvanoglu and the  famous  All Pasha Tepellena ruled, ending with Syria and
Egypt; provincial governors rose to independent and insubordinate rulers.
     The feudal  lords of Kosovo and Metohia ruled completely independent of
the  central  government. Following  long  struggles  for dominion  in  some
regions, several notable  families  that  gave  hereditary  regents  to  the
provinces distinguished themselves. In Pristina and Gnjilane the Dime family
ruled  until  the  end  of  the 18th  century,  in  the  Prizren  sanjak the
Rotulovices, originally from Ljuma, and in Pec the powerful Mahmudbegovices,
lords  of  Metohia  from  mid-18th  century. The ethnic  Albanians of Muslim
faith, under  the  leadership  of  feudal lords  or  outlawed regents,  were
considered  followers  of  the  old regime  founded  on the sheriat law  and
liberal tribal  privileges. Their rule was  tolerated  because  they secured
Ottoman  legitimacy  in  regions  densely  populated  by  Christian  Serbian
inhabitants.2
     Independent  pashas were  also carriers of  a  proselyte policy  in the
central countries  of  the  former  Nemanjic  state.  A  surge of  religious
intolerance,  especially  from  the end  of  the  18th  century, tossed  the
systematic persecution  of Christians throughout  the  Ottoman Empire.  When
they grew to heavy pogroms, a large part of the  already thinned  and deeply
inflamed  populace in Kosovo and Metohia adopted  Islam  to  save their bare
existence  and  family hearths. At  the  end of  the 18th  century  and  the
beginning of the 19th  century almost all the  Orthodox  Serbs from Gora,  a
zhupa near Prizren, were compelled to convert to Islam.3
     Even  though  the Serbs always regarded  conversion as  a temporary and
inevitable evil, the second and third generations were  already taking wives
from Muslim Albanian families. Thus Islamization became permanent. Among the
descendants who entered Albanian clans through marriage alliances, accepting
the  language and gradually  becoming Albanized,  old family  names were  an
admonition  of the Serbian past,  a  token to the glory  of  the cross.  The
ethnic Albanians, as the Orthodox Serbs referred to them, became in time the
most extreme tyrants.4
     1 The following works  provide a  synthetical  survey  on the  life  of
Serbian  people in Kosovo  and Metohia in the 19th and the beginning of  the
20th century:
     Kosovo nekad  i sad  (Kosova dikur e sot), chapter:  Kosovo pod turskom
vlascu, (H, Kalesi), Beograd 1973, pp. 145-176; Istorija srpskog naroda V/1,
Beograd  1981, pp. 14-16,  133-148 (N. Rakocevic, Dj. Mikic); D. Bogdanovic,
Knjiga o  Kosovu,  Beograd 1983, pp. 126-195; D. Mikic,  Drustveno-politicki
razvoj  kosovskih Srba u  XIX veku, Glasnik  Muzeja Kosova, XIII-XIV (1984),
pp.  231-260.  Most  informative  on the first half  of  the  century  is  a
monography by  V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u  Osmanskom Carstvu od
Jedrenskog mira 1829  do Pariskog kongresa 1856  godine,  Beograd  1971;  On
economy  see Dj. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba u XIX i
pocetkom XX veka, od cifcijstva do bankarstva, Beograd  1988; on territorial
organization in the administrative apparatus see H. Kalesi - H-J. Kornrumpf,
Prizrenski vilajet, Perparimi, 1 (1967), pp. 71-124.
     2 Istorija srpskog naroda, V/1,  A. Urosevic, Etnicki procesi na Kosovu
tokom turske vladavine, Beograd 1987.
     3 M. Lutovac, Gora  i Opolje, Antropogeografska istrazivanja, Naselja i
poreklo stanovnistva, 35 (1955), pp. 230-279.
     4 J.  Cvijic, Osnove  za  geografiju  i  geologiju Makedonije  i  Stare
Srbije, III, Beograd 1911, pp. 1162-1166; Todor  P. Stankovic, Putne beleske
po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1898, Beograd 1910, pp. 111-140.

     The attempts of Sultan  Selim  III (1789-1807)  to change and modernize
the administrative  system of  the  Ottoman  Empire  with  reforms  ended in
failure.  Resistance to the reforms was exceptionally strong  throughout the
empire. Reform plans to improve the position of Christians turned the
     Albanian feudal lords and tribal chiefs of Kosovo  against the Orthodox
Serbs - chiflik farmers on their large sipahiliks. Efforts undertaken by the
Sublime Porte to  win over  support from Albanian  lords in  Kosovo  against
outlawed  provincial  regents  had  no  apparent  effect.  Albanian  pashas,
availing themselves of a favorable opportunity to  greater  gain by imposing
new   taxes   upon    the   rayah,    took   no   heed   to    orders   from
Constantinople.1
     The Serbian Insurrection against the  dahis in the Belgrade pashalik in
1804, under the leadership of Karadjordje (Black George), moved the Serbs in
all  regions of the Ottoman Empire. Beginning  as  an  uprising against  the
dahis,  the insurrection  soon  grew into  the first  national revolution of
Balkan Christians, opening the perspectives  of a total national liberation.
At that moment, the Serbs in Kosovo and  Metohia, remote from  the  Belgrade
pashalik, unarmed  and without immediate contact with the leadership  of the
insurrection, had no opportunity to rise and join the insurgents. The feudal
lords  of Kosovo used the beginning  of the  Serbian national  revolution to
consolidate  and expand  their power. The Porte needed their assistance both
to curbe the rebelling forces and  as a warrant against  any moves the Serbs
might make in regions under their control.
     Chronic  lawlessness,  perpetual  danger  from  possible  incursions of
Albanian outlaws, religious intolerance and the  unbearable clench of feudal
lords all created  an impenetrable  wall separating the Serbs  of Kosovo and
Metohia from rebelling Serbia. Hardly any testimony remains  from individual
participants  of  the  Serbian  national   revolution.  Nevertheless,   some
documentation was preserved from the boldest among  them, whose affairs took
them  to  Belgrade  and  the  bordering  Austrian  regions,  and  who  found
themselves in the center of events.2
     An  important  role in  preparations  for the  rebellion  was played by
Andrija,  a  wealthy  merchant  from  Prizren  (father  of  Sima  Andrejevic
Igumanov,  a  renown  Serbian  benefactor and  founder  of  the Seminary  in
Prizren), who had extensive business ties  in Belgrade, Pest and  Vienna. On
the eve of the uprising against the dahis, he secretly transported gunpowder
from Zemun to Belgrade. When the uprising began, Andrija continued to supply
the rebellious companies with  arms  and  ammunition. Two of his  four sons,
Kraguj  and Petar, fought  in the insurgent  lines with several other  Serbs
from Prizren, until the fall of the insurrection in 1813.3
     Beside Andrija, the most prominent Serbian from Prizren to take part in
the First  Serbian  Insurrection  was  Anta Colak  Simonovic,  who  moved to
Belgrade when he was a young man, and  dealt  in furs.  On  the eve  of  the
insurrection,  the  Belgrade dahis  ordered several loads  of guns from him.
Colak Anta obtained the arms in Prizren, but on  his return  he  handed them
over to Karadjordje at Topola. When  the surrounding Turkish  provinces rose
together with  Sumadija  (regions between  the  Drina  and Tara rivers,  the
tribal  regions  of Drobnjak,  Moraca and Albanian  Kliments) in  1805,  the
number of volunteers joining Karadjordje's troops from  Kosovo, Metohia, Old
Raska and other regions increased.
     From the beginning of the  uprising, void  (supreme leader) Karadjordje
aimed to  raise  in arms, beside  the  Belgrade pashalik, as  many lands  of
Serbia  as possible. From 1806, the  insurgent army penetrated toward  Stari
Vlah,  Bosnia  and  Macedonia.  The  following  year  the insurgents reached
Kursumlija, and in 1809, using  their alliance with Russia, then at war with
Turkey, the  insurgent companies extended to Sjenica, Nova Varos, Prijepolje
and  Bijelo  Polje.  According to the estimates of a  French travel  writer,
Henri Pouqueville,  who passed  through Kosovo in 1807, areas around Banjska
were encompassed  by the insurrection,  while Gerasim, the  bishop of Sabac,
left  testimony on the  area  of upper Ibar, on the space between  Josanica,
Kopaonik  and Vucitrn,  where battles were  waged with  aid  from the  local
Serbian populace.  Historian Stojan  Novakovic even believed that the  whole
region was  under  Serbian  control until the fall  of  the Insurrection  in
1813.4
     Karadjordje's endeavor  to  establish contact with  Montenegrin  tribes
through the Sjenica instigated a considerable number of Serbs from Kosovo to
join the insurgent forces  and caused  fermentation among the Serbs  of  the
northwestern  parts  of  Kosovo.  In  the  Ibarski  Kolasin,  a  wooded  and
impassable area, inhabited mostly  by Serbians, a movement was formed to aid
Karadjordje's campaign at the  Sjenica. However, the Turks discovered  their
intentions and captured the most famous  leaders of  Kolasin, banishing them
to exile in Egypt.5
     Karadjordje's  victorious campaign toward  Montenegro  and  Kosovo  was
severed by the defeat  of Serbian insurgents at  the battle of Kamenica near
Nis, in  1809. The  army  at the southwest of  Serbia was  forced to retreat
north; the endeavor to  expand the  uprising to Montenegro and the  northern
regions of Kosovo came to an end.
     The  victories of the Serbian  troops during the  first years of waging
seriously imperilled the feudal privileges and estates of Albanian pashas in
Metohia and Kosovo, where  the rayah  was mostly Serbian. When the  flame of
the uprising spread to the surrounding countries, commotion arose even among
Albanian leaders in north Albania. The Belgrade dahis and representatives of
the Turkish government in Serbia, of whom a considerable number were  ethnic
Albanians, strove since 1804  to win over Albanian pashas in the neighboring
regions for the struggle against a common enemy.
     Turkish  forces  engaged  to wage Serbian troops  on  the  southern and
southwestern  battlefield were composed mainly of ethnic  Albanians lead  by
pashas and tribal chiefs. In 1806, the bashibazouk (irregular) troops of the
pashas  of  Scutari,  Leskovac,  Vranje, Pristina,  Djakovica,  Prizren  and
Skoplje, a force numbering 33,800 men,  assembled at the Morava, at  a front
toward  the Serbs.  Many of them  fought Serbian insurgents in the  years to
follow. The Turkish army, composed of ethnic Albanians, checked the Serbs at
Prijepolje  and Nova  Varos. In the  battles at the  Sjenica and Suvodol  in
1809,  the  decisive  role  in defeating  the  Serbs  was played  by  troops
belonging to the pashas of  Scutari  and Pec. In battles waged at Rozaj, the
pasha od Djakovica was defeated.  Muktar Pasha, son of the most  influential
independent  Albanian feudal lord, Ali  Pasha  Tepellena of  Janina,  fought
against the  Serbs at Deligrad. Battling together with Albanian feudal lords
against the Serbs were influential tribal chiefs - krenas. At the  battle of
Kamenica  alone four standard bearers of  one  clan were  killed at Drenica.
Mehmed Pasha Rotulovic and  his army took part at the battle of Kamenica and
returned  to  Prizren with  loads  of spoil and  Serbian  slaves -women  and
children.6
     The hereditary  pashas  of  Kosovo, Metohia  and north  Albania  were a
constant  threat  to  Karadjordje  and  his successor  Knez  (Prince)  Milos
Obrenovic. When possibilities for resuming the struggle were discussed prior
to the 1813 fall  of  the Serbian Insurrection,  Karadjordje  counted on the
possibility of  all  ethnic Albanians being dispatched to  Serbia.  He  thus
entreated Prince-Bishop Petar I of Montenegro to execute a  demonstration on
the Albanian  border to compel  their neighbors to remain on  their  land. A
similar  entreaty  was  again  sent by  prince Milos to the  Metropolitan of
Cetinje in 1821, for fear that the uprising in Greece might be followed by a
Turkish preventive incursion on Serbia.
     The number of armed men under  the command of Albanian pashas displayed
the dimensions of their military capabilities, as well as deep fear  [or the
possibility of the insurrection expanding to their regions. The victories of
the  insurgents caused the exertion  of great pressure  upon  the subjugated
Serbian  populace  under  Albanian  lords. Lord  Malic Pasha Dzinic  of  the
Pristina region, moved Serbian chiflik farmers from  the  northern  areas of
Lab, and  settled ethnic Albanians to secure the boundaries of his territory
from incursions of  insurgent Serbian  companies. Passing  in  1807  through
Pristina,  estimating  around 1,500 homes in  it,  Henri  Pouqueville noted:
"From  its  narrow  and muddy streets, poor trade,  wretched  people and the
bloodthirsty rule  of Malic Pasha, who then  commanded, a  distinct  aura of
terror and  woe  emanated. It did not seem appropriate to pay a visit to the
Albanian, a sworn mortal enemy of the Christians".7
     Anarchy created through the rule of independent pashas was favorable to
the  raiding  parties  of Albanian  outlaws. They  attacked  passengers  and
merchant  caravans  from  their  hideouts,  plundered  and  blackmailed  the
Christian rayah, assaulted and  dishonored  their wives  and  daughters.  In
Gnjilane, Pouqueville saw  passengers raided by outlaws and learnt that some
merchants were killed just  at  the  entrance to the town. As  a  result, at
orders  given  by  pashas,  entire  forests  were burnt  in  spaces  between
Pristina,   Gnjilane,   Novo   Brdo   and   Kumanovo,   where   the  outlaws
hid.8
     The position  of  the  Serbs in  Kosovo and Metohia did not change even
when comparative peace prevailed in  Serbia. Kosovo was  governed  by Jashar
Pasha, nephew of Malic Pasha, inviolable lord of the  Pristina sanjak during
the  second and third  decades of the  19th  century. He was engraved in the
memory  of the people on account of his merciless persecution of  the Serbs,
the destruction of their  free  estates, confiscation of church and monastic
lands, and,  above all,  for demolishing Serbian villages. For  less than  a
decade,  Jashar  Pasha  succeeded in  destroying or  evacuating  32  Serbian
villages  in the  Pristina nahi,  22 in  the  Vucitrn nahi, and  another  25
settlements  in other  parts  of Kosovo. Jashar  Pasha  distributed a  large
amount of the seized lands among newcome Albanian settlers and local Muslims
of Serbian origin, while also appropriating some himself. The newcome ethnic
Albanians,  mainly herdsmen,  had no experience  in farming  so  the fertile
plains of Kosovo soon became neglected pastures.9
     Faced with the  terror of  the  Pristina pasha,  the Serbs  fled to the
nearby sanjaks of Vranje  or  Leskovac,  or crossed over to Serbia under the
wing  of  knez  Milos.  Similar  examples  where  deliberate  change  in the
demographic picture of certain Turkish provinces were carried out existed in
southern  Albania and northwestern  Greece, where the  brutal  Ali  Pasha of
Janina  mercilessly   destroyed  Christian  villages,   forcefully  executed
Islamization  and reduced farmers  to  tenant,  chiflik  farmers. During the
twenties of  the 19th  century (1821-1825), armies  of feudal lords  utterly
devastated  vast lands  from Moreja to  Epirus and  Thessaly while  fighting
Greek insurgents.10
     The reform action of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839),  the introduction of
a  regular army and  abolition of the Janissary Corps (1826) infuriated  the
independent pashas in Metohia and Kosovo. Intentions to grant certain rights
to the Christians inflamed the  hatred of Muslim  ethnic Albanians. Anarchy,
marking a  period of  unlimited power  for independent  pashas, suited  many
outlaws. "During the reigns  of these  pashas,  any Muhammedan could, if  he
desired,  murder  any Serb without due consequence, only if he sought refuge
under a mosque or tekke. In those  days, Prizren, Kosovo, Pec, Djakovica and
Scutari were governed by harshest oppression."11
     To  survive,  the Serbs turned  to collective  mimicry.  The  men  wore
Albanian clothes,  and  the women veiled  their faces. Jashar Pasha attacked
Serbian  churches, especially  the  Gracanica  monastery  and the  Samodreza
church. He demolished four Serbian churches (in Batus, Skulanovac, Rujan and
Slovinja and  the Lipljan church parvis) and built a bridge from their stone
over  the Sitnica river  near  Lipljan. The clergy  also  bore the brunt  of
independent pashas. In 1820, two monks from the Decani monastery were hanged
in Novi Pazar, and one in Pristina.12
     As soon as imminent danger from the expansion of  the Serbian, and then
Greek insurrection was past, rivalry  among Albanian lords for dominion over
the  surrounding territories revived. The Serbs  were the  greatest victims:
they were compelled  to receive them  for overnight  stay, supply  food  and
provide field trains for the armies of warring provincial  regents. In these
campaigns, requisition, imposition  of additional  taxes  and the looting of
Christian villages, through which the army passed, was  habitual. At the end
of the conflict, the Christians would be overwhelmed by both the rage of the
defeated and the plunder of the victorious.
     In March 1827, a  small provincial war began, when regent  of  Scutari,
Mustafa Pasha Bushatli (the so-called Shkodra  Pasha), ventured to subjugate
Numan Pasha of Pec. The clash spread when the regents of neighboring regions
were hauled into it,  being  troubled,  like Jashar Pasha, by  insubordinate
tribes in their own regions.13
     The  need  for  fresh  forces  was  imposed by  the  Russo-Turkish  war
(1828-1829),  in  which the  sultan's  troops on  the  battleground  of  the
Bulgarian Danube Basin, were faced with great temptations. The Porte granted
Mustafa Pasha of Scutari dominion over Scutari, Elbasan, Debar and Dukadjin,
expecting him, in return, to muster and dispatch a large army  to the Danube
front. Meanwhile, Prince Milos  acquired  through money  and sage advice,  a
considerable  number  of admirers  among north Albanian  tribal chiefs,  and
strove to dissuade the  powerful Scutari pasha from  sending 60,000 warriors
to assist  the  sultan's army. The Prince  warned him  that  the reforms  of
Mahmud  II  were directed  mainly  against hereditary  pashas.  However, the
belligerent  disposition  of his fellow tribesmen compelled Mustafa Pasha to
dispatch his army to  the Russian front, but instead of 60,000, he sent only
2,000  warriors. The  powerful  Scutari pasha was then able to establish his
rule in Metohia.14
     The  Peace Treaty of Edime,  signed in 1829, under conditions extremely
unfavorable  for  the  Ottoman  Empire,  deepened  its internal crisis.  The
Christian  populace,  the uprisings of  which,  owing  to Russia's  support,
developed into  movements for  national  liberation, was  faced  with  novel
temptations.  In  Kosovo and  Metohia,  where conflicts  between  provincial
regents  were frequent, and autocracy toward the  Christians was acquiring a
more  immediate physical  and fiscal pressure, anarchy  was widely expanding
its dimensions.
     The news that  Prince Milos intended  to establish  the borders  of his
recently  recognized  Principality  (Knezevina) in  1830,  according  to the
decrees of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812, disturbed the pashas and beys
of six nahis,  formerly under  Karadjordje's rule.  Jashar Pasha of Pristina
secured  the borders of  his regions from the territorial pretensions of the
Serbian Prince  by compelling the  evacuation of  Serbs through  terror.  He
settled ethnic Albanians from Malissia, Metohia and the vicinity of  Scutari
in their place.15
     When the imminent danger of new wars was past, Mahmud II was determined
to intercept the obstinacy and disloyalty of hereditary pashas. The educated
Sultan particularly disliked Albanian chiefs, followers of  the conservative
Islamic order, who hindered the realization of his aspirations to end feudal
anarchy and create a modern,  centralized state. His reforms anticipated the
abolition of  all  feudal and tribal autonomies, the formation of  a regular
army,  introduction  of  military  duties,  equation  of  tax  payments  and
improvement in the position of Christians.
     Strongest objection to the reforms came from  Bosnia, Albania,  Metohia
and Kosovo. The ethnic Albanians saw in these reforms a most serious  threat
to their privileges. The Porte counted on  their objection beforehand, since
they could easily turn  against  Turkish authorities armed  to the full. The
most  difficult part was compelling them to join the regular army. Thus  the
most important reform task for the ethnic Albanians  was  crushing the power
of numerous  independent pashas who would not recognize central  government,
and  by  refusing  to acknowledge modern  judiciary,  remained loyal to  the
common law according to the Law of Leka Dukagjinit.
     Albanian  leaders  were  not  only  against the introduction  of  novel
reforms  but requested of  the  Porte to  recognize  all  their benefits and
tribal independence: "The new army  was introduced to destroy the old feudal
one. The regular  army  and the prohibition to carry arms - aimed to destroy
Albanian  condottieres   enabling  ethnic  Albanians  to  attain  privileged
positions  in Turkey  - since, like  military castes, they had  a free  hand
concerning  the Christian tribes they brutally exploited without bearing any
legal  consequences.  Thus,  the  reform  deeply  cleaved   Albanian  tribal
relations [...]".16
     The Albanian  pashas objected  to the orders of the Porte  to surrender
their arms. In  1831, a large assembly of Albanian leaders, ulems and tribal
chiefs in Scutari, rejected the Sultan's decrees as contrary to Islamic law,
determined to defend  the existing system by force. Mustafa Pasha refused to
obey the sultan's order to receive a  garrison of  a regular army in Scutari
and to submit  territories granted him during the  war for governing over to
the grand vizier.  He  was supported by  independent pashas in Prizren, Pec,
Djakovica, Pristina, Debar, Vranje,  Tetovo, Skoplje  and  Leskovac, who had
every  reason to be worried about their positions  if the reforms were to be
implemented.  Mustafa Pasha, the last Bushatii, found  new allies in  Bosnia
where the beys decidedly opposed the introduction of reforms.
     The empire was so endangered that Grand Vizier Mahmud Reshid Pasha lead
his army against the ethnic Albanians in person. A  large number of Albanian
leaders from south Albania were killed upon  encountering  him at Bitolj  in
1830. At orders from the Porte, the grand vizier introduced "many beneficial
decrees" in Pristina  and Vucitrn in summer 1832, thus improving the up till
then  insufferable  position of  the  Serbian Christian  rayah  in  villages
throughout Kosovo.
     In  1835-1836,  after  crushing  the  power  of  insubordinate  Bosnian
captains,  the Turkish army finally eliminated the independent pashas of Old
Serbia  - Mahmud  Pasha Rotulovic  of Prizren, Arslan Pasha of Pec, Seifudin
Pasha of  Djakovica,  and  finally the heirs  to  the  Pristina Dinices,  by
warring rebellious tribes in mid and south Albania, on whose side the feudal
lords  of Pec, Debar and Djakovica fought. The law  on the  timar system was
abrogated. The administration was entrusted to army commanders, and measures
were  implemented to  centralize  the administration  and  tax  system.  The
sanjaks  of Scutari, Prizren and Pec were under the  control of  the Rumehan
vilayet seated  at  Bitolj.  The  established  regime was  considerably more
endurable  for the  Serbian  rayah  than  the  brutal  reign  of independent
pashas.17
     1 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki  razvoj  kosovskih Srba  u XIX veku, p.
231.
     2 D. Mikic, Oslobodilacka aktivnost  kosovskih  Srba u svetlosti srpske
revolucije   1804-1813,    Obelezja,   11   (1981),   pp.    39-46;   idem.,
Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp. 231-232.
     3 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki  razvoj kosovskih Srba u  XIX veku,  p.
232.
     4 St. Novakovic, Manastir Banjska u srpskoj istoriji, Beograd 1892, pp.
35-41; A. Popovic, Ustanak u gornjem Ibru i  Kopaoniku 1806-1813, Godisnjica
Nikole Cupica, 27 1908), p. 229.
     5 Several years hence only few people of Kolasin returned from exile in
Egypt.  M. Lutovac, Ibarski  Kolasin,  Naselja i  poreklo  stanovnistva,  34
(1958), pp. 8-10.
     6  Albanians of Catholic and Orthodox faith fought against  the Turkish
authorities at  the time.  The Catholic Albanian  tribe Kliment  fought with
Montenegrin tribes Kuci,  Piper and Bjelopavlici  against vizier of Scutari,
Ibrahim Pasha in 1805. South, the  Toskas - Orthodox Albanians,  fought with
the  Greeks  and  Tzintzars  against  Ali  Pasha  of Janina.  See D.  Mikic,
Drustveno-politicki razvoj  kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, 234; I. Dermaku, Neki
aspekti  saradnje  Srbije  i  Albanaca u  borbi protiv turskog feudalizma od
1804-1868. godine Glasnik Muzeja Kosova, XI (1971-1972), pp. 236-238.
     7 S.  Novakovic,  Iz  godine  1807.  srpske  istorije,  Iz  belezaka  s
putovanja H. Pukvilja kroz Bosnu i Staru Srbiju, Godisnjica Nikole Cupica, 2
(1878), p. 275.
     8 Ibid., pp. 276-277.
     9 V.  Stojancevic,  Juznoslovenski  narodi  u  Osmanskom  Carstvu,  pp.
115-117.
     10 V. Stojancevic, Drzava  i drustveno obnovljenje  Srbije (1815-1839),
Beograd 1986, pp. 38.
     11 Savremenici  o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912,  fed. D. T.  Batakovic),
Beograd 1988,300.
     12 V. R. Petkovic - D. Boskovic, Visoki Decani,  I, Beograd 1941,p. 16;
J. Popovic, Zivot Srba na Kosovu 1812-1912, Beograd 1987, p. 220.
     13  V.  Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi  u  Osmanskom  Carstvu,  pp.
45-46.
     14 Mustafa Pasha's army  included 150  Montenegrins from the  Vasojevic
tribe, headed by voivode Sima Lakic (ibid., pp. 46-47.)
     15 V.  Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, pp.  46,
332.
     16  D.  M. Pavlovic, Pokret u Bosni i Albaniji protivu reforama Mahmuda
II, Beograd 1913, pp. 73-74.
     17 Ibid.,  pp. 80-89; V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom
Carstvu, pp. 117-128.

     The successor to Mahmud II,  Sultan Abdul Mejid  (1839-1861) issued, in
1839,  the  famous Hattisherif of Gulhane that  was to become some sort of a
"charter of freedom" for subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Christians were
officially equated  with  the Muslims.  The imperial letter  warranted their
lives, protection, honor and  property. It anticipated the introduction to a
regular  military  obligation,  centralization   of  government  and  fiscal
reorganization, as well as the Europeanization of judiciary and education.
     In  Kosovo, Metohia  and  Albania, however,  the Tanzimat  reforms were
never  effected to the  full. At  the beginning of the  reforms, the  mainly
Serbian  populace was left without its self-governing  community, previously
renewed by the firmans of erstwhile sultans, but it benefited  from the calm
by renewing devastated fields. The reforms brought  the revival  of business
for the merchants and  handicraftsmen  in towns  throughout  Kosovo, and the
right to erect churches and  schools. The comparatively quiet  years brought
some relief to the Serbs, but not for long.
     Discontent growing in Bosnia and Rumelia due to the reforms, encroached
Kosovo and Albania. The ethnic Albanians would not concede to centralization
and the abolition of their feudal and tribal privileges. In 1839, the ethnic
Albanians of Prizren rebelled, routing the local sanjak-bey.
     The aggravated position of Serbs  in  Turkey incited a great  Christian
insurrection  in  the  Nis  sanjak  in   spring,  1841.   The  insurrection,
preparations of which were known in Belgrade, spread  to southern Serbia and
western Bulgaria.  Kosovo  and  Metohia did not have the conditions to  rise
although  some  preparations were made in  the  Prizren, Djakovica  and  Pec
regions. The insurrection  was  brutally  suppressed  by  Albanian  Muslims.
Representatives of  Great Powers, especially Russia and France, surprised at
the dimensions of violence,  requested  from  the Porte  information  on the
position of Serbs in rebelling regions.1
     Again fermentation  swarmed over Kosovo in 1843  with the collection of
taxes and regular  military recruits. The  Albanian insurrection against the
Turkish authorities began in 1844, broke out  in Pristina and soon spread to
Prizren, Djakovica, Skoplje and Tetovo. It was  seated at Skoplje and headed
by  Dervish  Tzara. At  the  beginning, the  insurgents overmastered part of
Kosovo,  occupied Skoplje,  Tetovo,  Pristina, Veles  and  the  vicinity  of
Bitolj.  The  Turkish army managed  to suppress  the insurrection  in summer
1844, after several severe clashes.
     During  the  insurrection, the  Serbs were  cleaved  between the ethnic
Albanians and  Turkish  troops, like they had been so  many times before. In
Vranje, the rebels roasted  Serbian youths  on  fire only because they  took
part in the  construction  of a new church. After driving out  the state tax
collector (muhasil) in Pristina, 1841, the  ethnic Albanians  exacted  taxes
from  the  Serbs  by employing weapons,  even  though  they  were explicitly
forbidden to do so under the  firman. In the  vicinity of Pec, according  to
the testimony of Gedeon Josif Jurisic, a monk from the Decani monastery, the
highlanders  of  Malissia were  public outlaws. Supported  by local district
chiefs   (zabits),  they   wreaked   terror  upon  the  Serbs  without   any
disturbance.2
     In a complaint  lodged  to  the French consul at  Belgrade, sent  by 19
leaders of the  Pristina and Vucitrn kaza in the name of  the  Serbs,  seven
points include many examples of suffering  due  to Albanian violence.  In  a
petition  to  the Russian Tzar Nicholas I,  official  protector of  Orthodox
inhabitants  in the  Ottoman Empire,  the Serbs of Prizren entreated, at the
end of 1844, for protection against innumerable oppressions: "Allow not, you
most Honored liberator,  for  heaven's sake, allow not us paupers and people
to  become Turkized, and flee to  lands unknown! Our children were Turkized,
our  wives  and  daughters  dishonored,  raped; our brothers gunned down  in
uncountable  numbers,  treading on  our  law  [faith],  and dishonoring  our
priests, pulling them by their beards. Fleecing us immeasurably, each in his
own manner; the pasha fleeces, the  bey fleeces, and the sipahi,  the master
and sub-pasha, the qadi and oppressors - all fleece!"3
     Devastation and murder did not bypass the monasteries Visoki Decani and
the Pec Patriarchate, where Albanian outlaws murdered several monks.
     1 Istorija srpskog naroda, V/1, pp. 241-243.
     2 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 6-7.
     3 Zaduzbine  Kosova,  Prizren - Beograd, 1987,  pp.  612-613; D. Mikic,
Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, pp. 21.


     The fifties of the 19th centuries passed in the dispersion  of anarchy,
while  the  sixties marked new Albanian revolts in  the  political  scene of
Kosovo  and Metohia,  with new Serbian suffering. When  Serbia endeavored to
prepare a widespread uprising of Balkan Christians against the Turks, Kosovo
and  Metohia  were totally out of reach  to Serbian  national and  political
propaganda. The control of Muslim  ethnic Albanians over Serbian inhabitants
excluded any possible  cooperation  with Serbia. Periodical Albanian revolts
against the new measures of the Porte in the Pristina region in 1855, in the
area  of Djakovica 1866,  in  the  Prizren,  Pec  and  Djakovica  region  in
1866-1867, again  in Pec in 1869, and  operations carried out by the Ottoman
army  against them,  resulted in heavy  pogroms  of  the  Serbian  populace.
1
     After the  Crimean  War  (1853-1856),  anti-Orthodox  and  anti-Serbian
feelings in the southwestern parts of the Ottoman Empire culminated;
     Serbian  pogroms  attained wider dimensions. Albanization of the Serbs,
stimulated  by  independent  pashas during  the first  decades  of  the 19th
century,  reached their  peak during the Crimean War.  The Albanian language
was  then  accepted  in  many  Islamized  Serbian villages.  The  Cherkezes,
colonized then in Kosovo,  surpassed  in the devastations and murders of the
Christian populace.
     The  monastic fraternities of  Visoki  Decani and  the Pec Patriarchate
lodged a complaint  to the Serbian government and church  dignitaries of the
Principality of Serbia, warning them of  the  dimensions of violence and the
frequency of banditry.  The monks of Decani entreated the Serbian government
in  1856 to somehow intermediate with  the Turkish authorities to put an end
to  the  violence.  Archimandrite  Hadji Serafim Ristic of Decani  entreated
Prince Milos in 1859 to aid the monastery and intercede to the Porte for the
protection  of the Decani laura. He  warned  that  "since the last war until
today we are more concerned with armed defense from the perpetual attacks of
ethnic Albanians and Turks, and the  papists [French Catholic missionaries],
luring us by various wiles."2
     Attestations of Serbian origin evincing the position of Christian Serbs
in Metohia and Kosovo exhibit detailed portrayals of the horrifying pogroms.
Attempts to draw attentions to  the arduous sufferings of the Serbs with the
sultan and the government of the Serbian Principality, the Russian court and
the European public were particularly expressed by the learned Archimandrite
Hadji Serafim Ristic, prior of the Visoki Decani monastery.
     When  Grand  Vizier  Kirbizli  Mehmed  Pasha  called  on  the  European
provinces  of  the  empire  in  1860,  establishing order  by punishing  the
insubordinate Christians at the borders, Hadji  Serafim, together with local
Serbian  leaders,  submitted  to him people's  complaints in Pristina. Their
hopes  that  the vizier's visit would  wield  influence in curbing  Albanian
anarchy  dispersed: the grand vizier saw the Christians only as  rebels  and
malcontents.3
     The Prior of Decani, however, did not abate in  his attempts to help he
people. His petitions to  Sultan Abdulaziz,  Russian Tzar Alexander  II  and
Serbian Prince Mihailo contained lists of countless brutalities committed by
ethnic  Albanians upon the Serbian  populace in  Metohia. In  the  book Plac
Stare Srbija  (Wails of Old Serbia, Zemun 1864) -  which he dedicated to the
British  pastor  William  Denton -  aiming  to demonstrate "that evil  deeds
committed  by the Turks upon  the rayah had gone one step  too  far", Ristic
submitted a complaint to the sultan from 1860, in  which he included several
hundred examples of  violence committed by ethnic Albanians over the Serbs -
fires, plunders, murders, blackmail, fleecing, confiscation  of property and
cattle-raiding,  raping of  women  and  children,  destroying  churches  and
abusing priests and monks - naming the doers and victims.
     Addressing the sultan, the  Archimandrite of Decani entreated that  his
quiet complaint "against brutal Albanian oppressors" be  heard, for if  they
were not  stopped, the Serbs would be  compelled to leave  their fatherlands
wherever  the sultan ordered: "Pec and the Pec nahi  indescribably  scourged
day after day, with increasing evils on  the part of ethnic Albanians,  with
no errors committed, God only knows why, afore the eyes of Your councils and
pashas wailing upon their bitter destiny in bondage.'4
     Russian diplomat and historian AF. Hilferding, while sojourning Metohia
in  1858,   penned  numerous   examples  of   oppression  upon  the  Serbian
inhabitants.  He  remarked that  there were  few parishioners  in the Gorioc
monastery, "all poor men horribly oppressed by the ethnic Albanians". He was
convinced that Serbian Christians in Pec  endured  insults and injuries from
the unbridled and hot-tempered ethnic Albanians every day, and that measures
undertaken by  the township chief (mudir)  "who strives to bridle and punish
the  Albanian obstinacy" had no effect, since his  small in number policemen
(zaptijas) were drafted from Albanian lines:  "What could  one  man with the
best of intentions do against  an armed mass  ignorant of  law and judgment,
habituated to unlimited obstinacy and tyranny, in other  words, as the local
saying goes, one that fears God a bit, the Emperor not at all'."5
     Almost  exact  observations on the position of Serbs in Old Serbia were
noted  by two  Englishwomen,  Miss  Irby and Miss MacKenzie, in their famous
traveling  account  of  the  Slavic  countries  of  European  Turkey.  Their
description  on  the  position  of  ethnic  Albanians  in  Pec reads:  Their
indifference  to authority and  the  importance of the Porte  is as harsh as
their  insolence and cruelty  against  the Christians.  A  Turkish  mudir in
Vucitrn complained to the two  ladies that  with a dozen  zaptijas there was
little he  could accomplish against the self-will of ethnic Albanians: there
are 200 Christian houses and 400-500 Muslim ones, so the ethnic Albanians do
as they  please.  They seize from the Christians whatever and whenever  they
desire; so many times they would walk into a man's store, require some goods
and  then leave  by simply saying they  would  pay  another time,  and often
without  saying as  much. Even worse  in the affair is  their wholly savage,
stupid and unrestrained living that retains the entire society to a state of
barbarism  and  since  the  Christians receive no help against them  and  no
education from Constantinople, they thus turn to Serbia for everything -  to
the Serbia of the past, inspiring themselves to enthusiasm by  its memories,
and to the Principality for hope, advice and enlightenment.6
     Official  reports  of  Yevgeny  Timayev,  the first  Russian consul  to
Prizren  -  representative  of  the  power  that  had  been  the traditional
protector of Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman Empire - complete  the picture
of the situation in  Metohia and  the dimensions of suffering endured by the
Serbian  population  in the second half of the sixties.  At the end of 1866,
Timayev reported on the severity of violences  inflicted by ethnic Albanians
of  the Pec nahi. Devastating  about a dozen Serbian villages, they murdered
the male progeny and assaulted the women,  and even desecrated the graves of
their forefathers. In  Pec, as cited by Timayev, government  representatives
aided  the  ethnic Albanians  in their maltreatment  of Serbian  Christians:
"They  receive  letters from  Pec  informing me that crimes committed by the
ethnic Albanians  are countless, that the  destruction of the  Christians is
immeasurable  and  unexpressible, while the  local Turkish  authorities give
assurance  of  peace,  stating  that  nothing  unusual  is  happening. These
assurances cannot  be trusted,  by  no  means,  because I  have irreprovable
evidence   of   an   irregular    and    disquieting    situation   in   the
country."7
     Parallel  to  the  extent  of  oppression,  observed  Timayev, was  the
forceful colonization  of ethnic  Albanians  to  Old Serbia:  "The  Albanian
people  overmastering more  and  more  of  the  lands they settle,  and will
perhaps  soon  play  a role in  the destiny of  Europe, notwithstanding  the
current illiterate and  almost savage condition of the majority.  [...] Mass
Albanian settlings of the Prizren sanjak meet with no obstacles. The Turkish
government, it  seems, would be very happy if there  were no more Christians
in the province, there is no way the Christians could withstand the Albanian
deluge, since here they are small in number and very disunited [Orthodox and
Catholics]. In normal  circumstances one  might  say that upon one Christian
come  at  least  six  Muslims ethnic  Albanians,  except in the western  and
southern  outskirts  of  the Prizren  sanjak."8  Reports  of  the
Russian  consul show  that the position  of Orthodox Serbs did not differ in
regions to the other side of Mount Sara, in Tetovo, Debar, Ohrid, Prilep and
the vicinity of Bitolj (Monastir).
     The pogroms of the Serbs in Metohia resulted in the dissipation  of the
Serbian  population.  Villages  were  most  often  the  targets  of  violent
inflictions.  According  to  a  research  carried out  by  Ivan  Stepanovich
Yastrebov, between 1855 and 1860, twenty Serbian villages in the vicinity of
Decani contained 165 houses, whereas their number in 1870 diminished to only
50 Serbian homes.9
     At  the beginning of the 70's, until the opening of the Eastern  crisis
and the  Serbian-Ottoman wars, the position of  Serbian inhabitants did  not
alter  drastically.  Even  though there were  no  large  Albanian moves  nor
Turkish  campaigns,  the  Christian Serbs  were confronted with high  taxes,
unpaid labor (kuluk), attacks and  blackmail. The  main targets were usually
Serbian girls  seized by ethnic Albanians who then forced them accept Islam.
Religious intolerance and thirst for  land and property were causes for much
blackmail, conflagration  estates and cattle raids. The custom of the ethnic
Albanians was first to warn the Serbian family  the property of which was to
be arrogated, by leaving  a bullet on  the hearthrug. The choice was limited
to evacuating the entire family, or, in case of resistance,  killing the men
and kidnapping or Islamizing the girls.10
     1 Kosovo nekad i sad, 154; A. Lainovic,  Prizrenski  pasaluk  polovinom
XIX veka na osnovu izvestaja francuskih konzula u Skadru, Kosovo,  3 (1974),
pp. 3-7.
     2 Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 613.
     3 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic,  Srpski  narod  i  turske  reforme  (1852-1862),
Bratstvo, XV (1921), pp. 187-188.
     4  Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912,  pp. 20-21. The plea sent
to  the Russian  tzar in  1859, to  help the Decani brotherhood published in
Decanski spomenici, Beograd 1864; ibid., pp. 423-426.
     5 A. F. Giljferding, Putovanje po  Hercegovini, Bosni i  Staroj Srbiji,
Sarajevo 1972, pp. 154-155,165.
     6  Putovanje  po  slovenskim  zemljama  Turske  u  Evropi  by  G.  Mjur
Makenzijeve and A. P. Irbijeve, Beograd 1868, pp. 188, 210.
     7 M. Seliscev, Slavianskoe naselenie v Albanii, Sofia 1931, pp. 7-10.
     8 Ibid., pp. 43-46; D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 134-136.
     9  I. Jastrebov, Stara Serbia i Albanija, Spomenik SKA, XLI, 36 (1904),
pp. 86.
     10 V. Stojancevic, Prvo oslobodjenje Kosova  od strane srpske  vojske u
ratu 1877-1878, in: Srbija u zavrsnoj fazi velike istocne krize (1877-1878),
Beograd,  1980,  pp.   461-462.   J.  Muller,  Albanien,  Rumelien  und  die
Osterreichisch-montenegrinische  Granze,  Frag  1944;  A.  Ivic,  Rumelijski
vilajet u godini 1838, Prilozi za knjizevnost,  jezik,  istoriju  i folklor,
XIII, 1-2 (1933), pp. 117-126.  An elaborate analysis of data provided by V.
Stojancevic, Etnicke, konfesionalne i demografske prilike u Metohiji 1830-ih
godina, Zbornik okruglog  stola o naucnom istrazivanju Kosova, Beograd 1988,
pp. 99-114.

     More detailed information concerning  the  number, ethnic and religious
affiliation of the inhabitants of Kosovo  and Metohia  is contained in lists
dating from  the  thirties of  the 19th  century.1 The  traveling
account  of  Joseph  Muller, based  on official  Turkish data  and  personal
inquiries,  and a  detailed  roll  of the Rumelian  vilayet in 1838 from the
Kriegsarchiv  in  Vienna  provide  a  precise demographic  and  confessional
picture  of  the  population  in  Kosovo  and  Metohia:2  



     District  
     Muslims  
     Christians  
     Total  
 

     Prizren  
     49,000  
     29,000  
     78,000  
 

     Pec  
     34,000  
     31,000  
     65,000  
 

     Djakovica  
     31,000  
     21,000  
     52,000  
 

     According to Muller, in Pec, 12,000 inhabitants  lived in 2,400 houses,
of which 130 were Orthodox and 20 Catholic. The Slavs comprised the majority
of  the  population,  62  families  were   Turkish,  100   Albanian  and  28
Tzintzar.3  Almost  identical data on  the  populace  in  Pec  is
provided by the list of the War Archives in Vienna.4
     Djakovica, according  to Muller, had 21,050 inhabitants: 18,000 Muslim,
450  Catholic, 2,600 Orthodox.  Among  them 17,000 were Albanian, 3,800 were
Slavic (Serbian), 180 were Turkish, and a few Tzintzar houses.5
     In Prizren, as noted in the same source, 24,950  people inhabited 6,000
houses. Among  them 4,000 were  Muslim,  2,150 Catholic and 18,000 Orthodox.
According to Muller's estimate, Serbs  comprised 4/5, ethnic  Albanians 1/6,
Tzintzars 1/12 and Turks 1/60 with the military company.6
     Thus,  the ethnic composition, considering  many among  the Muslims  in
Metohia were  of  Serbian origin  and spoke the Serbian language,  and  that
among the Christians few were  Albanian Catholics,  the ethnic picture based
on Muller's research would look like the following: 
 

      
     All town-dwelling Serbs  
     All town-dwelling ethnic Albanians  
 

      
     Catholics  
     Muslims  
     Catholics  
     Muslims  
 

     Pec  
     510  
     10,540  
     100  
     400  
 

     Djakovica  
     2,600  
     1,200  
     450  
     16,500  
 

     Prizren  
     16,800  
     -  
     2,150  
     4,000  
 

     All:  
     19,900  
     11,740  
     2,700  
     20,950  
 

     Total  
     Serbs: 31,650  
     ethnic Albanian: 23,650  
 

     Based upon Muller's data, V. Stojancevic calculated the total number of
village dwellers in three Metohian districts:7 
 

     district  
     Muslims  
     Christians  
 

     Pec  
     22,750  
     30,250  
 

     Djakovica  
     13,000  
     17,950  
 

     Prizren  
     44,400  
     8,050  
 

     Total:  
     80,150  
     56,250  
 

     The cited  data  exhibits  that  in  Metohia,  despite being  the  most
endangered from violence, devastation and  blackmail, the  Serbian  populace
composed the  most  numerous  ethnic group  at the end of the  1830's.  Even
though no precise  data exists on the then demographic situation in  Kosovo,
considering  subsequent  rolls,  one  could  suppose  that  the relationship
between the Serbian and Albanian population was at least close to the ethnic
disposition in Metohia.
     A more  complete picture of the demographic disposition in Metohia  and
Kosovo in the first decades of the  19th century could  be attained  only if
the aforesaid data was compared with available information on the evacuation
of  Serbs from  Kosovo and  Metohia, from Prince  Milos.  In  keeping with a
preserved incomplete  documentation of Serbian origin, 180 families moved to
Serbia from the Prizren, Pristina, Pec and Scutari pashalik, and another 160
from the northern  regions of Kosovo,  all  in the period between 1815-1837.
Most  of  them  were farmers;  following  were  handicraftsmen  and  several
merchants. Keeping in mind the sizes of families, particularly the  extended
family  groups  in Metohia  (10-30 persons),  the number of Serbs fleeing to
Serbia was considerable.8
     The total number of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia during  the first  half
of  the  19th  century  is   hard  to  determine.  Turkish  annual  censuses
(sal-namas)  were  generally  unreliable,  since the real  number  of family
members  was concealed due to  taxes,  and the Muslims especially refused to
have their wives and female children listed.
     Information also varies  in the  traveling accounts of  contemporaries,
foreigners mostly. The data is mainly comprised of  the inhabitants of towns
and surrounding areas. A somewhat more voluminous and reliable source is the
traveling  account  of  Russian  diplomat and scientist  A.  F.  Hilferding.
Conforming  to  his data  and  estimates,  there  were 4,000  Muslim and 800
Christian  families in Pec  in  1858;  in  Podrima  3,000  Albanian and  300
Orthodox  families; in  Orahovac 50  Albanian and 100 Serbian  homes; in the
Sredska zhupa 200 Albanian and 300 Serbian families; in the
     Prizren Podgora more than 1,000 Albanian Muslims, 20 Albanian Catholics
and around 300 Orthodox  homes;  in  Pristina  1,500  homes with around 1200
Muslim and 300 Orthodox inhabitants, in  Vucitrn 250 Muslim and 150 Orthodox
houses.  Furthermore, Hilferding  noted 3,000  Muslim,  900 Orthodox and 100
Catholic families with 12,000 inhabitants.9
     The relativity of data provided by  the travel writers  is demonstrated
by the statistics of Austrian consul Johan Georg von Hahn (1863), who relied
on  official information when  he cited that Prizren contained 11,540 houses
with  46,000 inhabitants, of whom 8,400  were Muslim, 3,000 Orthodox and 140
Catholic. The salnama of 1874 noted 3,687 homes in Prizren  whereas data  of
the  then Russian consul, Ivan Stepanovich Yastrebov, in  reference  to  the
same year, recorded 4,089 houses.10
     Yastrebov was the most reliable researcher; he  spoke Albanian, Turkish
and Serbian well, and as consul to Prizren had the opportunity to personally
check on  official documents  and determine the exact  results. Between 1867
and 1874 Yastrebov provided information regarding Serbs and ethnic Albanians
in  Metohia,  classifying  them in  relation  to the traditional territorial
division  between  Albanian tribes  and religious  affiliation:11

 

     bairak  
     villages  
     Albanians  
     Serbs  
     Serbs  
     Albanians  
 

     Mala Hoca  
     24  
     827  
     284  
     -  
     30  
 

     Poluzje  
     28  
     434  
     4  
     223  
     22  
 

     Suva Reka  
     42  
     691  
     294  
     -  
     45  
 

     Ostrozub  
     33  
     1,052  
     5  
     -  
     45  
 

     Sredska  
     32  
     502  
     488  
     900  
     -  
 

     Opolje  
     21  
     985  
     -  
     -  
     -  
 

     Gora  
     31  
     -  
     -  
     2,167  
     -  
 

     Sirinic  
     15  
     157  
     786  
     -  
     -  
 

     Total  
     226  
     4,646  
     1,861  
     3,740  
     142  
 

     All  this data  exhibits  that, notwithstanding  the emigration  of the
Serbian populace to Serbia, Islamization and Albanization, still in progress
(excluding only Gora), the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia  still  comprised the
largest ethnic group.
     1 J. Muller, Albanien, Rumelien und die Osterreichisch-montenegrinische
Granze,  Frag 1944; A. Ivic,  Rumelijski  vilajet u godini  1838, Prilozi za
knjizevnost, jezik, istoriju  i  folklor, XIII, 1-2 (1933),  pp. 117-126. An
elaborate  analysis  of   data   provided   by  V.   Stojancevic,   Etnicke,
konfesionalne  i demografske  prilike  u  Metohiji  1830-ih godina,  Zbornik
okruglog stola o naucnom istrazivanju Kosova, Beograd 1988, pp. 99-114.
     2 J. Muller, op. cit,. p. 12; V.  Stojancevic, Etnicke, konfesionalne i
demografske prilike, p. 102.
     3 J. Muller, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
     4 A. Ivic, op. cit., pp. 122.
     5 J. Muller, op.  cit., pp. 77-78; same data stated by the Kriegsarchiv
in Vienna (A. Ivic, op. cit., p. 122).
     6 J. Muller, op. cit., pp. 82-83; A. Ivic, op. cit., p. 122.
     7 V.  Stojancevic, Etnicke, konfesionalne  i  demografske  prilike, pp.
104-104.
     8 V.  Stojancevic, Drzava i  drustvo obnovljene Srbije (1815-1839), pp.
45-63.
     9 A. F. Giljferding, op. cit, pp. 157,183,193, 214.
     10 J. G.  Hahn, Putovanje  kroz porecinu Drina i Vardara, Beograd 1876,
pp. 127-128; I. Jastrebov, op. cit., p. 40.
     11  I. Jastrebov, op. cit., pp.  52-91; V.  Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski
narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, p. 331.

     From the Middle Ages, until the First Serbian Insurrection of 1804, the
lands comprising Serbia were considered to range from Belgrade to Veles, and
from  Kladovo  to the  plateau of  Malissia. However,  the  creation  of  an
insurgent state in north Serbia (1804-1813), brought  on  a new apprehension
of  its  frontiers.  Ever since  the downfall  of  the  Insurrection,  Milos
Obrenovic  strove,  with  patience,   perseverance  and  cunning  diplomatic
actions, to create an autonomous principality of the subjugated pashalik (of
which the  foundations  for  restoring  the Serbian  state  were  laid under
Karadjordje), within the boundaries of the Bucharest treaty (1812), giving a
new name to  those Serbian regions  remaining beyond its range. Vuk Karadzic
united all spacious lands south  and southwest of Milos's  Serbia, close  to
the courses  of  the Drina and  Lim rivers, and the river basin of the Juzna
Morava (regions that were  seats of the Nemanjic state), under a common name
- Old Serbia.1
     The growing political independence  of Serbia,  that by 1833 formed  an
autonomous  Principality  under  Turkish   sovereignty,   territorially  and
politically, revived the hopes of Serbs in Metohia and Kosovo. French travel
writer Ami Boue remarked that the Serbs in Metohia, even though oppressed by
all sorts  of  brutalities, looked  upon Prince Milos as their  messiah  who
would one  day  liberate  them of  the  harsh  bondage of  Turkish rule. The
Principality of Serbia, during the first reign of Prince Milos  (1830-1839),
became an attractive  place for all  Serbs  who lived in lands under Turkish
domain.2
     Prince  Milos never  disregarded the severe destiny of Serbs in Kosovo.
Even  during  the reigns of  independent  pashas,  he  undertook  efforts to
mitigate  the  position  of his  compatriots through ties with the Rotulovic
family  of Prizren and the Mahmudbegovic family of  Pec. The Prince received
and  bestowed gifts upon the  monks  of Old Serbia, gave them  permission to
collect  donations for their monasteries in Serbia, and  sent gifts whenever
he could to the impoverished fraternities in Metohia and Kosovo. He is to be
credited  for  the  restoration  of the  Visoki  Decani palace  in  1836. In
complaints  lodged to him, mostly from  Visoki  Decani,  monks bewailed that
ethnic Albanians were arrogating monastic lands, notwithstanding the firmans
of former sultans, giving warrant for their estates. They pleaded for him to
intermediate with the Porte, requesting that a new firman be issued for  the
fraternity of  Decani. Sultan Abdul Mejid confirmed all monastic  estates in
1849,  but  nothing changed, since in the  mountains, no one heeds  for  the
firman".3
     During  the  reign  of  the  constitutionalist  and  Prince  Aleksandar
Karadjordjevic (1842-1858), Serbia continued  to  aid  churches, monasteries
and schools in Old Serbia, but  was  unable to  improve  the position of the
unprotected  rayah.  In the  mid-19th  century,  little was known  about the
political  situation of  Serbs in  Kosovo  and Metohia. Sporadic connections
were made through monks and  teachers, who  drew attention to the unbearable
position of the Serbian populace by sending pleas to the  Prince, government
or metropolitan. The harsh fate of  the people in Old Serbia, as far as  the
public  of the Principality  and the Serbian intelligentsia in  Austria were
concerned, fell into a vague picture of hard life under Turkish rule.
     The mid-19th century saw no solid grounds enabling  closer contact with
Albanian  chiefs  in Kosovo and Metohia. The Nacertanije, by Ilija Garasanin
(1844),  the first modern Serbian national program within the framework of a
foreign-policy  plan,  spoke of  "liberating all  non-Ottoman people of  the
Balkan  Peninsula from this bitter  bondage  through a well-conceived plan";
winning over the ethnic Albanians  was part  of the plan, as a  potential to
rely  on for the  entire Christian uprising against the  Turks.  The aim  to
secure a free trade route for the future state by way of  Ulcinj and Scutari
to  the  Adriatic  shores,  compelled Garasanin  to cooperate with  Albanian
Catholics in north Albania.
     Serbian  political propaganda  in  north  Albania was  administrated by
Matija  Ban. According to the Ustav  politicke  propagande (Constitution  of
Political  Propaganda)  of 1849,  north  Albania belonged  to  the  Southern
region". Several agents were assigned to work on winning over north Albanian
tribes but most of the burden fell upon the Catholic miter bearer, abbot don
Caspar Krasnik, of Albanian nationality, who, after his first successes, was
named an  agent, receiving  annual  payment  of 270  talers from the Serbian
government. Owing to his efforts, Bib Doda, heir to the great Catholic tribe
Mirdit, had been won over for cooperation with Serbia. At the time, Bib Doda
told  Krasnik "that he, with the Mirdits, would be ready to join in the rise
for liberation, so the  Mirdits  would  have an autonomy and  the freedom to
practice  their  religion  under  Serbian  rule". Abbot  Krasnik arrived  at
Belgrade in 1849,  informed Garasanin of the situation in  north Albania and
confirmed the  readiness  of the Mirdits to  start an  uprising  against the
Turks if they were given gunpowder and flints.
     Due to Garasanin,  lord of Montenegro, Prince-Bishop Petar  II Petrovic
Njegos, established  tolerable  relations with the Mirdits,  there  until in
hostile relations with  Montenegrin tribes. Prince-bishop  of Montenegro and
Bib Doda  contracted an alliance at the  end of 1849 for attack  and defense
against the Turks. In  1851, a relative of Bib Doda, Marko Prokljes, arrived
at Cetinje and in Belgrade,  promising "the Prince and Serbian government up
to  2,000  soldiers  any time they may require  them". Cooperation  with the
Mirdits soon evolved through Montenegrin ties. At the same time, Krasnik won
over Domazen, the Catholic bishop in Scutari.4
     International  circumstances, especially the political situation on the
European side of  the empire, would not allow for a great  Serbian uprising,
nor military cooperation with the Mirdits. The campaigns of Omer Pasha Latas
in Walachia, Old Serbia and Bulgaria, from 1849-1851, the  great rise of the
Serbs in Herzegovina under the leadership of Luka Vukalovic in 1852, and the
1853 war  between  Montenegro and Turkey,  brought  on  new campaigns and  a
concentration of Turkish troops in  Albania, Old Serbia and  at  its borders
with  Montenegro.  The Mirdits did  not, for the  first time in  long while,
respond  to a call to war with Montenegro.  The  Turks  blamed  and arrested
Abbot  Krasnik  for this  weak response; he  evaded  penalty due  to  French
intervention.
     At  the same time, in 1853, Ilija Garasanin, the instigator of national
action in  Turkey, was replaced. Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic, pressured
by the  Porte, which regarded Serbia as  the source of all subversive action
on the Peninsula, ceased  all national action  outside the boundaries of the
Principality  and  prohibited  public anti-Turkish  manifestations.  At  the
beginning of the Crimean War, 1853, the loyalty of Prince Aleksandar  to the
Porte  grew, thus incurring the  cessation  of all  propaganda actions.  The
Mirdits were compelled to join the Danube Ottoman army.5
     Following several years of  slowdown,  particularly during the reign of
Prince  Mihailo,  when  Garasanin  occupied  the seat of prime  minister and
minister  of foreign  affairs  (1861-1867),  plans  revived  for the  Balkan
uprising against  the  Turks.  Garasanin  believed,  with the cooperation of
Montenegro and  Greece, that Serbia,  as  the  most powerful  Balkan  force,
should bear  the heaviest load in the organization  and in  preparations for
the  uprising.  Following  the  plan,  Serbia  was  to   encompass,  through
propaganda,  a  larger  part  of Bulgaria,  Macedonia,  Old Serbia  and  the
northern and mid-regions of Albania. In a memoir addressed to Prince Mihailo
in  1860,  Garasanin  underscored the  explicit  necessity  for  the  ethnic
Albanians to be  politically neutralized. The aim  was to separate them from
the  Turks,  to prevent them  from hindering the Serbian-Greek  alliance. He
intended to  exert influence over their  clans and  prominent tribal chiefs,
warning  him that the people were mostly illiterate, had no national center,
and were segregated by three religions.
     Anticipating   the  creation  of   a  common  Serbian-Bulgarian  state,
Garasanin believed  that Albania, after liberating itself from the Turks, as
well as Greece, should be an independent country, allied with the new Slavic
state  for  purposes   of  defending   common  and  special  interests.   In
negotiations with Greece, in 1860, Serbia agreed, in  principle,  to  divide
Albania, whereby  the  northern territories, Durazzo  and  Elbasan, would be
annexed to  Serbia, and Berat and Korea, to the Greek  state. However,  this
contract  was  never signed. The final text  of the contract on the alliance
between Greece and  Serbia (1866) allowed for the creation of an independent
Albania, or its annexation to either Serbia or Greece.6
     Both  Serbian  and  Greek  statesmen  observed how  important  Albanian
determination was in  case of a total Christian uprising on the Balkans, due
to  Albania's geopolitical position and the role of Albanian warriors in the
Turkish army.  According to a belief of  the contemporary French minister to
Athens,  the stand of the  ethnic  Albanians was a knot in all controversial
matters regarding Turkey and the Christian population.
     The formation of  the Balkan alliance  for a joint struggle against the
Turks  helped reestablish contacts with  north  Albania.  Gaspar Krasnik was
interned  at Constantinople in  1865,  so  Garasanin  assigned  a  Slovenian
priest, Franz Mauri,  secretary of  the bishop of Scutari,  to be  the agent
instead. However, cooperation was soon severed due to suspicions that he was
working for Austria and Turkey.
     Albania most severely opposed the Forte's reforms; this discontent  was
thus used for contracting new  alliances. In 1866,  Djelal Pasha,  member of
the powerful  Zogu clan and influential chief  of the  Mati  region, who was
interned  at Constantinople, was  won over for  cooperation.  For  the first
time,  contacts,  though only  in principle,  were established  with  ethnic
Albanians of  the Muslim faith.  Since there were no Serbian settlements  in
Mati, no intolerance existed  like  in Old  Serbia. Djelal Pasha was to head
the  great  uprising against the Turks. When it was learnt in Constantinople
that the Porte  was  working on winning over and arming the ethnic Albanians
for the Christian uprising, the Serbian  government, bolstered by the  until
then  reserved  Russian  diplomacy,  activated its  tasks among  the  ethnic
Albanians. In  Belgrade in 1868,  six Albanian chiefs were sojourning. After
being won  over by gifts, they  were familiarized  with the preparations for
the uprising and sent to Albania to await  the beckon  to rise.  Cooperation
with Dzelal Pasha was not realized for his instability and the unreliability
of  his  nearest  retinues.  There  could  be  no  political   nor  military
organization,  for everything  depended upon  the competence of a handful of
chiefs.7
     Serbia  had  high  hopes  for  the  Albanian  revolt   against  Turkish
authorities, until abandoning the idea of rising in Turkey in 1868. However,
Belgrade  did  not apprehend that the readiness of ethnic Albanians  to rise
evolved out  of  the  desire  to resist  Turkish reforms and  retain  tribal
privileges.  During  the sixties of the  19th century,  the ethnic Albanians
were  void  of national awareness, in the modern sense  of the word, nor did
they  comprehend,  excepting a small number of educated tribal chiefs, their
problems as  national, beyond narrow tribal and  confessional frameworks. As
soon as imminent  danger  from the introduction  of  reforms was  past,  the
ethnic  Albanians would again respond to calls  from  the sultan  to  defend
Islam and  pay  their  dues of  loyalty with  abundant spoils and devastated
Christian countries.
     1 V. Karadzic, Danica za 1827, Budim 1827. G. J. Jurisic considered the
following nahis part of  Old  Serbia  in 1852:  Novi  Pazar, Pec, Djakovica,
Prizren, Skoplje, Kosovo, Pristina, Vucitrn, Vranje, Leskovac and Nis. A. F.
Giljferding, nevertheless,  included  the Novi  Pazar nahis with  Kosovo and
Metohia as part of Old  Serbia (More detailed analysis in:  V.  Stojancevic,
Jugoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, p. 327).
     2 A. Bou, Recueil d'itinraires dans la Turquie d'Europe,  Paris 1854,
p. 198.
     3 Zaduzbine  Kosova,  611-612; V. Stojancevic,  Juznoslovenski narodi u
Osmanskom Carstvu, p. 235.
     4  D.  Stranjakovic,   Juznoslovenski  nacionalni  i  drzavni   program
Knezevine Srbije iz 1844. god.,  Beograd  1931,  pp.  3-29; idem,  Politicka
propaganda  Srbije u  juznoslovenskim pokrajinama 1844-1858. godine, Beograd
1936, pp. 20-25.
     5  V.  Stojancevic,  Juznoslovenski  narodi  u  Osmanskom Carstvu,  pp.
292-293.
     6  D.  Stranjakovic, Albanija i  Srbija u  XIX  veku,  Srpski knjizevni
glasnik, 52 (1937),  pp.  624-627;  G. Jaksic  -  V.  J.  Vuckovic,  Spoljna
politika Srbije za vlade kneza Mihaila. Prvi balkanski  savez, Beograd 1963,
pp. 137.
     7 G. Jaksic, Jedan izvestaj o Albaniji, Arhiv za Arbansku stranu, jezik
i  etnologiju,  II  (1924), pp. 169-192; G.  Jaksic - V. J.  Vuckovicic, op.
cit., pp. 240-246, 413-416, 468, Srbija i oslobodilacki pokret na Balkanu od
Pariskog mira  do Berlinskog kongresa (1856-1878), I  (ed:  V.  Krestic-  R.
Ljusic), Beograd 1983, pp. 435-444, 558-563.

     National  life  evolved  under  the  wing  of  the  church.  After  the
abolishment  of the Pec  Patriarchate in 1766, gone  was  the only  national
institution  around  which  the Serbs  congregated; gone  was  the guider of
national living. It was in  1807, by the edict of  Sultan Mustafa,  that the
Serbian  Janicije was named metropolitan of the Raska-Prizren Eparchy. Owing
to himself and his successor, Hadzi-Zaharije  (1819-1830),  during the first
three decades of the 19th century, the Raska-Prizren Eparchy helped maintain
national  awareness   with  the  assistance  of  lower  clergy   of  Serbian
nationality, even though remaining under the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
     The people in Kosovo and Metohia were bound, perhaps more strongly than
those in other Serbian lands, to their national heritage. Living memories of
the sacred rulers and heroes of Kosovo, of past glory  and the unfortunately
lost empire were kept alive by priests  and monks from the  fraternities  of
medieval endowments. In Visoki Decani and the Pec Patriarchate, in Gracanica
and Devic, the most powerful seats of national and spiritual life, the cults
of  ruler-martyrs,  patriarchs  and  ascetics  were  cherished.  Beside  the
tradition of the once glorious Serbia under the Nemanjices, the minds of the
people were kept alive  with the  memories of  uprisings  and migrations  of
centuries  past.  The  endurance  sustaining the  Serbs  despite  all  their
miseries, evolved out of a profound attachment to the spiritual and national
heritage of the medieval Serbian state.
     Not with standing the raging anarchy that shook Old Serbia, waning only
from time to time, the Serbs in Metohia and Kosovo were able to organize and
restore their spiritual and educational lives with assistance from  official
Serbia.  Continuity  of work, with  periodical suspensions  during times  of
turbulence, was  maintained  by  monastic  schools in the Pec  Patriarchate,
Visoki  Decani, Devic and  Gracanica (containing a  press at one time). Here
pupils from different areas of  Serbia under  Turkish rule were being taught
the clergyman's vocation. The first more deeply felt financial support given
to  the monastic schools, began to arrive from Prince Milos during the third
decade.  During  the  reign  of  Prince  Aleksandar  Karadjordjevic and  the
constitutionalist  regime  in  Serbia  (1842-1858), financial aid  began  to
arrive more regularly for the restoration of churches and the maintenance of
monasteries, and gifts were sent  in  books for religious service. Excluding
the most renown medieval  endowments, aid from  the Serbian government  also
arrived to fraternities of the  monasteries St. Marko  and  the Holy Trinity
near  Prizren,  the Holy  Transfiguration near Pec,  and  to priests  of the
Prizren and Djakovica churches.
     Since the mid-18th century, Serbian church-school  communities operated
in Metohia and Kosovo,  founded first in towns and then in village parishes,
the cores of  township and village  self-government. Until the Rasko-Prizren
metropolitans were of Serbian  nationality, they  nominated  members for the
governing bodies of  church-school communities, usually for no limited time.
The selection was limited to the  most noted  priests, wealthy merchants and
guild  representatives.  Communities  saw  to  the maintenance  of religious
schools and the  education of monastic  progeny, strove to establish contact
with Serbia and effect relations with Turkish authorities, both on religious
and educational grounds, and  when possible, on economic ones, too.  Members
of  church-school  boards  collected  contributions for  the repairement  of
monasteries  and churches. Beside many monasteries  and churches (Gracanica,
Visoki Decani,  Devic, Duboki Potok, Vracevo, Draganac),  palaces were built
for the operation of monastic or religious schools, and subsequently secular
ones.
     At the beginning of the  19th century, the inauguration of schools  was
urged by  Raska-Prizren Metropolitans Janicije and Hadzi Zaharije. When  the
bishopric chair was  taken  over  in 1830 by Greek  bishops,  endeavors were
undertaken, especially during Metropolitan Ignjatije's  time (1840-1849), to
open  Tzintzar schools  where lessons  in  Greek  would  also be attended by
Serbian children.1 The  Phanariot bishops strove  to  sustain the
subjugation and ignorance  of the Serbian  clergy, so as to facilitate their
manipulation of The flock. Some of them sold their  clerical  positions  for
money  and  fined  the  people  with  large  church  taxes.  Being  of  open
anti-Serbian determination,  they  impeded or  hampered  the  restoration or
construction  of  new churches,  attempted  to  Hellenize  the  populace  by
imposing  the  celebration  of  the  name-day feast,  instead  of the  Slava
(Serbian  family  feast   for  its  patron  saint),  a  definitely   Serbian
custom.2
     In the first half of the 19th century, religious schools existed in all
major towns (Pristina, Pec, Mitrovica, Vucitrn, Gnjilane,  Djakovica) and in
some villages  (Musutiste, Vitina, Korminjan).  Private  schools were opened
usually under the name of a notable leader who was to finance its operation,
but  the burden of maintenance usually  fell upon church-school  communities
and guilds. Private schools  provided lessons in subjects both religious and
secular.  The best among them were at Prizren,  Vucitrn, Mitrovica, and  the
Donja Jasenovo and Kovaci  villages. The inauguration of new private schools
falls  with the  Turkish  reforms at the middle of the century. Merchant and
craftsmen guilds  in  Pec, Prizren and Gnjilane introduced funds for opening
new  schools  and  obtaining better teaching  staff.  The  constitutionalist
government  sent  the  schools money,  books  and  other  facilities through
merchants  and other members  of church boards. According to available data,
several  dozens of schools  in Metohia and Kosovo  were  attended  by around
1,300 pupils during the sixties.
     The oldest  and  most  renown Serbian  church-school  community  was in
Prizren, the economical center of Serbs in Metohia, where a community school
aiming  to prevent  Greek  propaganda  was established in  1836.  Hilferding
recorded that the male school had 200 pupils in  1857. Other important seats
of scholastic life were at Pristina (150 pupils in 1865) and Pec (150 pupils
in  1866),  in which Serbian  teachers from different regions (Srem, Serbia,
Croatia) lectured according to secular programs from Serbia. Special schools
were  opened for  female  children.  The  highest degree  of  education  was
provided by an extensive school at Prizren, a kind of high school, though of
lower level.3
     A  number of talented  pupils from  Kosovo and Metohia aspiring  to the
teaching vocation, were being prepared in  Serbia  from the beginning of the
sixties, owing to  scholarships received from wealthy  Prizren merchant Sima
Andrejevic  Igumanov  (1804-1882). Their  number  greatly  increased already
after 1868,  when  in Belgrade, at  the proposition of  Serbian Metropolitan
Mihailo, an  Educational Board was  formed for  schools and  teachers in Old
Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the patronage of the Board,
works on the  improvement  of teaching conditions soon  produced significant
results. New schools  were opened and old ones given financial  support, and
the curriculum contained better programs. The tasks of teachers  educated in
Serbia were not solely  to  educate, but were,  above all, aimed to maintain
national awareness  of  the  people,  prevent  conversions  and prepare  the
progeny to carry on the duties of national enlightenment.
     The  turning point  in  the  educational life of  Serbs in the  Ottoman
Empire,  was  marked  by  the Bogoslovija (Seminary), founded in  Prizren in
1871.  Even though some suggestions  for  its inauguration were directed  at
Pec,  the  prevailing attitude in  Belgrade  was that  Prizren was the  most
favorable place, being the center of economical life for Serbs in Old Serbia
and  seat of  the vilayet. Sima  Andrejevic  Igumanov lived  in Prizren, the
contemporaneously greatest benefactor who bequeathed his  riches obtained by
trades in Russia, to the people. He was a Russian subject and was thus able,
with assistance from the Russian  consulate  at Prizren, to obtain a license
from the Turkish authorities to found a Seminary. It soon became the seat of
the overall spiritual and educational life and the stronghold for  political
work  on national affairs.  More  important was the fact that for the  first
time,  contact had been established with the  government in  Belgrade,  able
thus to exert  immediate influence on  national  operations amongst Serbs in
Old Serbia.
     From  its  inauguration in  1871,  until the  liberation  in 1912,  the
Seminary  worked according to instructions given by  the Serbian government.
At  the beginning, its operation was under the jurisdiction  of the Ministry
for  Education  and  Religious  Affairs, and then  the Ministry for  Foreign
Affairs.  All expenses of the Seminary were  paid by the Serbian government,
but important  means for its maintenance came from various funds  founded by
the church and from the endowment of Sima Igumanov. The first  rector of the
Theological college  was a monk from Decani, Sava Decanac, a graduate of the
Spiritual Academy in Kiev.4
     Owing to  the  Bogoslovija,  primary schools  operated  in  all  larger
settlements in Metohia and Kosovo until 1912, and graduated theologians from
Prizren  became teachers  and  priests  all  over the  Ottoman Empire,  from
Macedonia  to Bosnia. According to  incomplete  data,  around  480  students
graduated    from   the   Seminary    (subsequently    transformed    to   a
theological-teaching school) until 1912, among  whom 196  were  from Metohia
and Kosovo.
     The inauguration of the Seminary in  Prizren proved to be  a secure dam
against  any attempts  undertaken  by  the  Constantinople  Patriarchate  to
Hellenize the Serbian populace through Tzintzar oases in Metohia and against
the  aims  of  the  Bulgarian Exarchate (1870) to  build  strongholds in the
Gnjilane region. Until the Serbian consulate was opened in Pristina in 1889,
the Seminary was the center of Serbian political life in Metohia and Kosovo.
From  Belgrade,  by way of  the School, books, journals  and newspapers were
delivered,  for  expanding  liberational  ideas and  consolidating  national
awareness. From the beginning of its operations, the Turkish authorities and
ethnic  Albanians  suspected  the  School  of being  the  center of  Serbian
national  action,  thus  political contacts with Belgrade were  carried  out
through the Russian consulate in Prizren  which  secured the transmission of
confidential mail.5
     In Prizren (seat of the vilayet from  1868-1874),  from 1871, until the
abolition of the vilayet, the paper Prizren was published in  two languages,
Turkish and Serbian, in which official  news, laws, orders, new regulations,
verdicts over violators, and columns on events taking place in Turkey and in
other  countries  were  published.  The  Serbian section  of the  paper  was
editored by Ilija Stavric, rector of the Seminary, and texts were translated
into  Serbian by  a  distinguished  national worker  and  subsequent Serbian
consul  to Pristina, Todor  P.  Stankovic.  In Pristina,  where  the  Kosovo
vilayet was  formed in 1877,  a similar vilayet paper Kosovo was instigated,
also in the Serbian  and Turkish  language. When  the  seat  of  the  Kosovo
vilayet was moved to Skoplje in 1888, the paper resumed its publication only
in Turkish.6
     1 See most important works: P.  Kostic, Crkveni zivot pravoslavnih Srba
u Prizrenu i njegovoj okolini u  XIX veku, (with writer's memories), Beograd
1928; idem, Prosvetno-kulturni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu i njegovoj
okolini  u  XIX veku i  pocetkom XX veka, (with writer's  memories), Skoplje
1933; J.  K.  Djilas, Srpske  skole  na  Kosovu  od 1856.  do  1912. godine,
Pristina 1969.
     2 J. Popovic, Zivot Srba na Kosovu 1812-1912, pp. 222-226.
     3 The most distingushed teachers during the sixties were Nikola Musulin
and  Milan  Novicic in Prizren,  Milan  D. Kovacevic  in Pristina,  and Sava
Decanac in Pec.
     4 J. K. Djilas, op. cit., pp. 53-104.
     5 Spomenica Sezdesetogodisnjice prizrenske Bogoslovske uciteljske Skole
1871-1921, Beograd 1925, pp. 133-160; J. K. Djilas, op. cit., pp. 105-110.
     6 T. P. Stankovic, Putne beleske po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1897, pp. 67-72;
H. Kalesi - H.J. Kornrumpf, op. cit., pp. 117-122.

     The essence  of Serbian economy in Metohia  and Kosovo lay in  the town
and  village handicrafts  and trades. Centers of  Serbian society in Metohia
and  Kosovo  were the  towns Prizren, Pristina  and Pec, and during the last
quarter of the century - Mitrovica. In Prizren, a large town on an important
crossroad toward  Scutari and  Salonika, trade and craftsmanships flourished
in   the   preceding   centuries.  The   local   Serbs  called   it   "small
Constantinople", since most of the trade and crafts  traditionally  belonged
to Serbian citizens.
     According  to available  sources,  life  in Serbian towns evolved under
irregular circumstances during the entire 19th century. The perpetual shifts
of  anarchy,  wars  and  uprisings, and continual peril upon one's  life and
property, compelled the small-in-number Serbian citizens  in Kosovo to adapt
to  the existing conditions  with haste. Using bribes and tips, common means
with bribable government  representatives,  they  somewhat  expanded  narrow
economic  frameworks,  and  discovered,  always  coinciding  with  momentous
political conditions, new  opportunities for  work and ways to protect their
estates  and families.  Life  in  the Serbian  towns of  Kosovo and  Metohia
continued parallel  to the Turkish  and  Albanian ones dictating  the terms.
Even  though  corroded  by  irregular  conditions,   Serbian  tradesmen  and
craftsmen, gathered in  church-school communities  and  parishes,  united in
times of  hardship, succeeded in organizing their  lives.  Acted  as a unity
toward the  authorities  and tyrants,  they often  quarreled  when  settling
matters  in  local  communities.  The  obstinacy  with which  they  resisted
temptations to move to Serbia -  a land that soon trod  the path of national
and economic emancipation by European standards - proves that among the best
national representatives, a high degree of awareness existed on the need for
survival on Kosovo grounds.
     Anachronic  methods of  trade,  insecurity on  roads and competition of
cheap European goods impeded the development  of trade and handicrafts among
Serbs.  The  Muslims  forbade the  Christians to  deal  in crafts  of  wider
significance, for instance,  the gunsmiths', leather dealers', and even  the
barbers' trade. Beside  the Muslims, who were  mostly Turks,  the Tzintzars,
Jews and Catholic Slavs of Janjevo were also in the handicraft business. Yet
the  Serbs did very well in all the permitted trades. A larger part of their
produces  satisfied  their domestic needs and provided for nearby bazaars in
Old Serbia and Macedonia.  Only  a smaller portion of  handicraft  produces,
particularly  of  the  goldsmiths',  leather  dealers'  and  tailors'  guild
(especially  in Prizren, Pristina and  Pec), were vended on larger  markets.
Costly  decorative pieces of  silver and gold, as well as saffian, had their
buyers on markets in  Salonika, Constantinople and other Levant  towns. Bulk
traders of  Prizren, Vucitrn and Pristina  sold various articles in  Serbia,
mostly produces  of different guilds, and  purchased larger  livestock.  The
Vucitrn  tradesmen  of  the Camilovic  family  had successful  dealings with
Sarajevo, while merchants from Pec and Pristina  traded with  other towns in
Bosnia. Enterprising Prizren tradesmen held warehouses with leather and wool
in  Belgrade  from  where  their  goods were  delivered  to Pest, Vienna and
Constantinople.1
     The  dynamic  development  of  enterprises   accomplished   by  Serbian
merchants   in  the  mid-19th  century  provoked  religious  intolerance  in
conservative competitive circles - tradesmen of Muslim faith. The commercial
successes of Serbs also disturbed the Turkish authorities, who reckoned them
to be signs of national rising. As a result, in 1859 and 1863, Serbian shops
were burnt in Prizren,  Pec  and  Pristina, which incurred a sudden economic
downfall in these  towns. Hadji Serafim Ristic recorded that  when  the army
occupied Prizren in  1860,  12 shops  were  burnt, and in  Pristina,  at two
strokes, 90  shops  belonging  to reputable merchants  blazed,  with  values
amounting to  almost a million coins.2 Yet,  commerce remained in
Christian hands in Prizren, according to  the attestation of Austrian Consul
J. G. von Hahn.3 A new  commercial swing came with the opening of
the railway track from Mitrovica to Salonika in 1873-1874, while handicrafts
recorded a decrease in sales  due to competition  from cheap European  goods
brought  to Kosovo  by  Jewish  merchants  from Salonika. Nevertheless,  the
revival of handicrafts and trade  among the Serbs  in the  mid-19th century,
despite  irregular  conditions,  considerably  influenced  the  slowdown  of
emigration to  Serbia.  In towns, contrary to the villages, a certain amount
of legal security existed and a possibility for developing ventures.
     The  position of  Serbs  living in  villages  was  incomparably harder.
ethnic Albanians of Muslim faith  organized raiding parties and  mercilessly
sacked Serbian villages. Being Muslims, being privileged  in every way, they
united into  compact communities of  blood brotherhoods or  tribes, socially
homogeneous, maintaining their clans by terrorizing the Serbs, seizing their
lands  or exacting taxes. By curbing Serbian  farmers from certain  regions,
they  made space for the settlement of  their fellow tribesmen living in the
indigent  plateaus  of north Albania. Unused  to life in the plains and hard
work in the fields, the  ethnic Albanians who settled from the hilly regions
rather picked up guns than hoes.4
     There  was no public safety  on  the roads of Kosovo and Metohia during
the  19th century. Passageways were controlled by bands of outlaws or tribal
companies,  thus  roads could  be passed only  with military  escorts of the
Turkish police or with protection from Albanian  clans supervising  parts of
tribal territory, lurking  about for an opportunity to  fleece merchants and
passengers.
     The Serbian peasant could not hope to be  protected even in the fields,
where  he  could  be  assaulted  at  any moment  by a  wandering  outlaw, or
blackmailed,  and  if he resisted, killed. Being the rayah, the Serbs had no
right to  carry weapons, and when  they  contrived  to obtain them, they had
nowhere to hide from  the  vengeance of the  Albanian  clan  with which they
clashed. The haiduk tradition, characteristic of Serbs living in all regions
under Turkish  domain,  had no effect in the plains  of  Kosovo and Metohia.
Haiduk  activity  occurring  from  time  to  time  on  the  ranges of  Mount
Prokletije, in the vicinity  of the Decani and Pec  monasteries, took  place
with the assistance  and  protection of Serbs from Montenegro,  but still it
could not be sustained.  In times of  peace, rule in towns was maintained by
Turkish military garrisons. Passage through roads depended upon  the will of
numerous  Albanian clan  companies until  1912. Villages inhabited by ethnic
Albanians and situated  along the  roads of Metohia  where interspersed with
high stone towers,  small fortresses from where passengers were attacked and
where concealment lay from members of other companies.
     Both day and night,  Serbian  homes,  made of glued  mud,  were open to
attack by individuals or bands of outlaws  without fear of sanctions. French
travel writer Ami Boue  recorded that  his escort terrorized and  robbed the
inhabitants of a Serbian village.  When the  host opposed the assailant with
an  axe,  the   latter  threatened  to   notify  Pristina,  from  where  the
"janissaries"  and the  tax collector would pop out. Under such threats, the
head of the  Serbian home  was  compelled  to comply to  the demands of  the
assailant, and even to part with him on "friendly" terms.5
     During  the   second  and  third  decade  of  the  19th  century,  when
independent pashas reigned, the  position of  Serbian  village populaces was
extremely  difficult.  Agrarian-legal  relations  depended  not  on  Turkish
regulations but on physical force. Feudal lords  forced  free farmers to the
position of chiflik farmers, especially in Drenica, and the Pec, Vucitrn and
Pristina nahis. Many free farmers fled to  Serbia,  while  Islamization  and
Albanization  decreased  the  resistance  of Serbian villages toward chiflik
labor. The seized estates were returned to  some of the Serbs in 1832, owing
to  the  merit of Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha.  The  vizier  then attempted to
permanently settle agrarian-legal relations in Rumelia with  a decree issued
in Vucitrn, but in practice it was all different. Agas and subpashas settled
in villages to control  the division of incomes of Serbian chiflik laborers.
Fearing sanctions, the Serbs were forbidden to collect income from the lands
they tilled unless given permission.
     By the Hattisherif of Gulhane, the chiflik-sahibi system was legalized;
private ownership of land was recognized legally. The chiflik-laboring Serbs
tilled  the lands of their  lords  and gave  them part  of their income.  In
Kosovo  and Metohia,  until  the  Tanzimat  reforms, the  transformation  of
sipahiliks to  chifliks was executed  by force.  Chiflik-laboring  was  most
expressed in  districts where  Serbs  and  ethnic Albanians  lived  admixed.
Landowners were mostly Muslim ethnic  Albanians  and  Turks, free farmers  -
ethnic  Albanians, and chiflik-laborers mainly Serbs with a small portion of
Catholic ethnic Albanians.6
     Pressure exerted upon the  Serbian chiflik  inhabitants following  1839
was so great that when a large Christian uprising was prepared in Bosnia and
Rumelia, serious  thought  was given  to rising. When the plans to rise were
divulged, the position of farmers  grew worse. Muslims in Prizren routed the
tax collector in 1841, but Christian Serbs were compelled  to pay. Having no
one  to seek  protection from, the Serbs of  the Vucitrn and Pristina  nahis
addressed the government in Belgrade in 1842, requesting help.  Weighed down
by high taxes, which in some areas amounted to half of their  total incomes,
Serbian farmers  became  impoverished.  Economic  pressure did  not  exclude
violent deeds which became  daily  events at the end of  the fifth and sixth
decade. Blackmail, fleecing, arrogation of incomes and estates were followed
by countless  acts  of  violence  over  Serbian  inhabitants  under Albanian
raiding  bands.  Only a  part  of  these  oppressive acts were  divulged  by
archimandrite  of  the  Decani  monastery,  Hadji  Serafim  Ristic,  in  his
complaints to the sultan, Serbian Prince and Russian ruler.7
     1 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, pp. 235-260.
     2    Savremenici   o   Kosovu   i   Metohiji   1852-1912,   D.   Mikic,
Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba, pp. 236-237.
     3 J. G. Hahn, Putovanje kroz porecinu Drina i Vardara, 130.
     4 T. P. Stankovic, op. cit., pp. 131-138.
     5 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, p. 90.
     6 D.  Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj  kosovskih  Srba,  pp.  236-239
(with earlier bibliography).
     7 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 22-52. 104




     The Albanian national movement was born during the great Eastern crisis
(1875-1878). The basis  for  its gathering contained  the  direct denial  of
liberatory aims of  Serbian states and of the  political and national rights
of the  Serbs  in Kosovo  and Metohia. Bound, in its matrix  course, to  the
Islam concept of  tribal autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman state,
the  Albanian  movement  radiated  a  peculiar intolerance  toward  European
comprehensions  of  society. The  movement for autonomy was,  to the  Muslim
masses of Kosovo and  Metohia, synonymous to the preservation of  tribal and
feudal privileges; to the conservation of the  anachronous regime  in  which
the Serbs had no place.
     The outcome of the Eastern  crisis brought Kosovo and Metohia under the
direct influence of Great Powers. Subsequent to the occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina  and the entrance  of  Austro-Hungarian troops  in  the northern
parts of the Kosovo vilayet, the  remote Turkish province became  the key of
dominion on the Peninsula. In Vienna, strong argumentation  underscored that
the  Ottomans conquered the Balkan Peninsula only after the battle of Kosovo
in 1389.
     The   formation  of   oppositional   power   blocks  in   Europe,  with
Austria-Hungary and Russia as  their main  exponents  in  the  Balkans,  was
conducive to a clearer refraction of their  mutual conflicting  interests in
Kosovo,   Metohia  and   Macedonia   than   in  other   Ottoman   provinces.
Internationalization of the  problem of Old Serbia, which intercepted German
penetration  to  the  east, heavily  affected  the  local  Serbian populace.
Russia's influence on political issues in the Balkans, since the Congress of
Berlin until the Young Turk Revolution (1908), was  diminishing despite aims
for  its  restoration and consolidation. Austro-Hungarian  supremacy on  the
Balkans, destroyed in World War I, was based on mercilessly checking Serbian
national interests  and  liberatory aims (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Novi Pazar
sanjak, Old  Serbia,  Macedonia). Favorizing  the  ethnic  Albanians and the
conservative regime  of Abdulhamid II, the Dual  Monarchy  made the Serbs of
Kosovo and Metohia victims of a policy aiming  to a total expulsion of Serbs
in  areas between  the Una river and the Vardar river basin, mid Hungary and
the Adriatic Sea.

     The  great Eastern crisis inaugurated the issue on the  survival of the
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina compelled
the Porte, fearing interference  from the Great Powers, to issue a firman of
reforms for the whole Empire. The following year a reform  plan, designed by
Austria-Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Count Gyula Andrassi, was imposed
upon the Porte  to  prevent  Russian  intervention.  Serbia and  Montenegro,
emboldened  by  successful  insurrections  and the  rebellion  in  Bulgaria,
prepared  for  a liberation  war and  the  unification of the Serbs. Crucial
support was expected from  Russia, but a somewhat larger response  came only
from Slavophile  circles  which sent  around  3,000  volunteers  to  Serbia.
Heading  a Serbian army (subsequently the entire army), entirely devoid of a
trained military cadre, was  Russian General  Mihail Grigorievich Chernaiev.
With the  agreement  in Reichstadt  (1876)  and the  military  convention in
Budapest (1877),  Russia  negotiated with Austria-Hungary:  with free action
and  the declaration of war to Turkey the  Dual  Monarchy would be  able  to
occupy  Bosnia and  Herzegovina at the appropriate time. The destiny of  the
liberation movement was thereby settled beforehand.
     The beginning of the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1875 revived
the  hopes  of Serbs in  Kosovo  and Metohia that the time of liberation was
drawing  near.  Harbingers  voicing the approaching liberation were seen  in
dreams, interpreted by portents and extraordinary occurrences, while Serbian
merchants demanded the payment of their dues before deadlines.1
     Unfamiliar passengers seen in various parts of Metohia and  Kosovo were
regarded as Serbian Prince  Milan in disguise, observing the battlefields of
the upcoming combats. Shortly before the war, emissaries did actually arrive
from Serbia. In Nis in 1874, a secret committee was formed with the task  of
preparing an uprising against the  Turks. Before  the commencement of war, a
general of the Serbian army, Franz Zach, sent Todor P. Stankovic, member  of
the  Nis  committee  and  an authority on the  local situation to Kosovo, to
confer  with  notables  in Pristina,  Vucitrn, Gnjilane  and Prizren on  the
upcoming war. The report was submitted to General  Chernaiev who disapproved
of the Serbs rising in Kosovo, expounding that Russia had not yet decided to
engage in war. Several notables from Kosovo  did,  however, arrive in Serbia
with  the  desire  to  obtain  detailed instructions for the  Joint  action.
Aksentije  Hadzi  Arsic,  a  merchant from Pristina, contacted  the  Russian
diplomacy in Belgrade,  endeavoring, with its assistance  in Constantinople,
subsequently in Odessa, to organize a  course for transferring volunteers to
Serbia.2
     When  the war began  in  June  1876,  masses of Serbs from  Kosovo  and
Metohia  crossed over  to Serbian territory, and with Macedonian volunteers,
fought within the composition of the Serbian army. Numerous refugees fleeing
Albanian terror sought shelter in Serbia. Serbs  in Prizren and other places
were called to join the Ottoman army in the composition of irregular  troops
(bashibazouk)  and  war with Serbia. Most of them saved themselves by paying
high ransoms.
     The ethnic Albanians  and Turks received the  declaration of war  vexed
and  anxious.  Around  35,000  (72 units  with 550 men)  Albanian volunteers
responded  to  the  sultan's call  to  defend  their homeland. The first  to
advance to  the  front  towards  Serbia were ethnic  Albanians  of the Ljuma
mountainous  region.  On their way toward  the border, at  the  beginning of
July, around  3,000 of them descended to Prizren, sacking  the Serbian town.
The  Albanian volunteers took  every advantage to pillage  regions lying  on
their way. Again  Kosovo  and  Metohia  became  a battleground where  ethnic
Albanians  settled their  accounts  with the  Serbs,  blaming them  for  the
outbreak of war.
     Serbia and Montenegro fought with unequal success. The Montenegrins won
two  great victories  whereas  the poorly  armed and  insufficiently trained
Serbian troops suffered defeats.  Serbia  soon  agreed to a truce and then a
peace treaty with Turkey on a status quo basis. In Constantinople the insane
Murad V was deposed and Abdulhamid II proclaimed sultan. At the end of 1876,
the Constitution was  proclaimed, warranting freedom  of religion and  civil
equality for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
     Yet, nothing changed in Kosovo and Metohia. Terror  upon the Serbs  did
not abate. At the end of December 1876, the church-school community  of  Pec
complained to the pasha of Prizren that fifty Serbs were killed in the  town
and its vicinity from May to December. Complaints of oppression were sent to
the grand vizier  and Russian and  Austro-Hungarian  consuls in  Prizren. An
English  Committee  received  refugees  returning   from  Serbia  to  Kosovo
following the unsuccessful war.3
     A conference of ambassadors of the Great Powers disputed the destiny of
the Ottoman Empire in Constantinople, at the  beginning of  January in 1877.
The destiny of Serbs in other Balkan provinces except in Bosnia and Bulgaria
was not mentioned.  Thus a  "Committee for  the Liberation of Old Serbia and
Macedonia"  was founded in Belgrade presided by Archimandrite Sava  Decanac.
National notables composed a petition at the end of February with  a hundred
signatures,  thus authorizing the Board was able to represent them  with the
Great Powers. The petition demanded that  all countries in which Serbs lived
be  annexed to Serbia  so  as to  sustain their  faith  and  nationality. An
alternate demand was to  found a Serbian Exarchate, following the example of
the  Bulgarian  one,  with its seat  at  Pec,  and  encompassing  Bosnia and
Herzegovina.4
     Russia's entrance to  war  with Turkey in April 1877,  which Serbia and
Montenegro were to  join,  had delayed the submission  of the petition, but,
nonetheless,  the  Committee  resumed  its  work.  Shortly  before  Serbia's
repeated engagement in war, the Serbian prince and the Russian tzar received
news from Kosovo on the slave-like treatment of the Turkish authorities upon
the Christians.
     At Russia's demand, after lengthy hesitation, Serbia entered war at the
end  of December, 1877, but  only after  Russia's  conquest of Plevna, which
sent off  an unfavorable echo to the  ruling  Russian circles.  A  favorable
condition  for  a move to liberate Skoplje and emerge in Kosovo  was missed.
The  Kosovo ethnic Albanians  advanced  once more  toward  the  border.  The
regular Turkish  troops were engaged at the  front with the  Russians, while
ethnic  Albanians  comprised the main force against the Serbs. Anxiety among
them  was   higher  than  military  enthusiasm.  Fear  of  Russian   victory
("Moskovits") and of its allies wrought commotion upon the ethnic Albanians,
anxious about their future religious and tribal rights. Life  in a Christian
and Slavic state was inconceivable for the majority  of ethnic Albanians; in
combats with the Serbian army they put up stubborn resistance, especially in
struggles for Prokuplje and Kursumlija.
     But the Serbs were advancing steadily. Liberating Nis, Leskovac, Vranje
and Prokuplje, the Serbian army emerged in  Kosovo. Not  knowing that Russia
and Turkey had agreed  to  a  truce, the voluntary regiment of Major Radomir
Putnik took Gnjilane, while the advance guard of the Serbian army, under the
command of  Lieutenant  Milos  Sandic, reached the Gracanica monastery  near
Pristina toward the end of January 1878. On January 25, a solemn liturgy was
performed in Gracanica to honor the victory  of  the Serbian army and Prince
Milan,  and  a commemoration was held  for  the  heroes  of Kosovo  in 1389.
However, the concluded truce  was  inclusive of the  Serbian army. The units
were compelled to withdraw from Kosovo.5
     According to the Peace  Treaty between Russia  and  Turkey concluded in
San  Stefano  on  March  3rd, 1878, a  bulk of  the  liberated  territories,
including  those  liberated  by the Serbian army, were alloted  to Bulgaria.
prince Milan informed the Russian  supreme command  that  "the Serbian  army
will not abandon  Nis even if it  were  attacked by  the Russian army". As a
compensation,  Serbia's  border was  extended to  Mitrovica  on Kosovo.  Old
Serbia  remained under  Ottoman  rule.  By  the  agreement,  the  Porte  was
obligated to issue a special reglment organique for Albania.6
     The Committee of Sava Decanac then expanded its actions. Signatures for
petitions  were collected and sent to the Serbian  prince, Russian  tzar and
delegates of the European powers. All the petitions demanded  the annexation
of Old Serbia and Macedonia to  Serbia. The news that the Congress of Berlin
had  been  convoyed  for the  revision of  the  San Stefano Peace Treaty was
received by the Serbs in  Kosovo and Metohia as a possibility of emphasizing
again the  demands  for  annexation to  Serbia.  Delegates of the  Pristina,
Prizren,  Djakovica,  Pec  and  Vucitrn  regions  sent  a  petition  to  the
participants of  the  Congress with 272 signatures, stamped  with 126 county
and monastic seals. On June 28,  the Serbs  of  Gnjilane, Skoplje and Tetovo
sent  to the  Russian  tzar  and British delegate in Berlin  an appeal  with
nearly 400 signatures. A similar authorized appeal was sent  to  the Serbian
knez.  In  a memorandum submitted  to Russian  Tzar Alexander  II,  national
representatives complained of unbearable  violence and the inferior position
of the Orthodox people.7
     Sava Decanac set off to Berlin  with  a petition signed by around 2,000
national  representatives  - priests,  serfs,  merchants  and craftsmen.  He
submitted the petition to the German Chancellor Prince Otto von Bismarck who
promised  that the  participants of  the  Congress  would  be told about the
demands. Archimandrite  Sava wrote a general appeal to  every other delegate
of the  Great Powers, demanding the annexation to Serbia,  or, at  least, if
possible, the restoration of the Pec Patriarchate. His memorandum dated June
3, 1878, reads: "This nation has been enduring sufferings unheard-of because
it was left to the mercy of Turkish  and Albanian renegades.  Now, since the
position of  all the peoples  of the Balkan  Peninsula has  improved,  is it
right that we should remain shackled to tyranny, is it right that  we should
further endure butchery from the Turks,  that our homes  should be burnt  by
ethnic Albanians, is it right that we should be subject  to deeds worse than
those committed upon animals in Europe. Considering we  took part in the war
for liberation, considering we rebelled against exploitation, considering we
expressed our desires for freedom and unification with our  brothers; if the
old  system  is restored,  Muslim  fanaticism will  be  without limit,  more
brutal, we will be forced to endure sufferings never experienced  before. We
raise our voices once more to the European  assembly, asking  for mercy, not
to leave us to  this  gory  and  cruel  bondage. If it is unable to grant us
freedom, let at least autonomy and personal safety be secured."8
     Austria-Hungarian and Russian  rivalry  for dominance  over the Balkans
was not favorable to Serbia's requests. Delegates from Serbia and Montenegro
delegates  were  not permitted  to take  part in the Congress.  The  Serbian
government,  relying upon Austria-Hungary,  requested of  Gyula Andrsssi the
annexation  of  the Gnjilane  region,  beside the  Nis sanjak.  Minister  of
Foreign Affairs Jovan  Ristic, in a  memoir submitted to participants of the
Congress, underscored that if Old  Serbia were to remain under Turkish rule,
the Serbs  would be left to the merciless  revenge  of Muslims, which  would
bring   Serbia   to   an   unenviable   position   and    only   incur   new
troubles.9 Even though  both countries  acquired independence  at
the Congress of  Berlin, the  decision that  Old Serbia was to  remain under
Turkish rule was received  with great disappointment by the  Serbs in Kosovo
Metohia.    Liberation    from    the    Turkish    yoke     was     delayed
indefinitely.10
     The decisions  of  the Congress  of  Berlin caused great  discontent in
Serbia. In a public proclamation, announced after the Congress, Prince Milan
underscored: "Within a brief time of  six weeks, you penetrated to Kosovo at
the speed of  lightning, where the victorious song of Serbia was sung at the
gloomy church of  Gracanica five  hundred years later.  [...] Your brilliant
leap  needed  only  a step further and victorious Serbian banners would have
unfurled  in  Pristina,  Skoplje  and  Prizren,  the  old  capitals  of  the
Nemajices,  but alas, a truce concluded on January 19,  [31] this same year,
forestalled and stopped you."11
     Fighting along with  Serbia  against the Turks, Montenegro tried to win
over the  Catholic Mirdits.  In  1874 the  Serbian agency  in Constantinople
contacted the Mirdit  captain  Marko,  cousin  of Bib  Doda. In mid-1876 the
Mirdits were  ready to engage in war against the Turks if Montenegrin Prince
Nikola warranted, in  writing, that  he  would  recognize their independence
after the war. Receiving from Belgrade the reply "we accept completely", the
Montenegrin Prince made his promise. Even though of anti-Slavic disposition,
the.  Mirdit Prince  Prenk  Bib  Doda entered  into  conflict  with  Turkish
authorities well rewarded.12
     In the second  war  with the Turks, Montenegro came  into conflict with
north  Albanian  Catholic  tribes,  the Grudas  and Hotis,  and waged  major
battles  with  the  Muslim bashibazouks.  ethnic Albanians  and  Muslims  of
Serbian  origin, on the stretch from Ulcinj on the Adriatic Sea to Plav  and
Gusinje  in the  mountainous region  toward north Albania, severely  clashed
with  Montenegrin  forces.  At  the  Congress   of   Berlin,  aside  to  the
independence  granted  it,   Montenegro's  territorial  expansion  had  been
confirmed: among other territories, Plav and Gusinje had been alloted to it,
with strong resistance incurring from the Albanian populace. 13
     1  V. Topic,  Istocno  pitanje,  Sarajevo  1966  ,  pp. 168-170.  J. H.
Vasiljevic, Pokret Srba i Bugara u Turskoj posle srpsko-turskih ratova 1876.
1877-1878.  godine  i  njegove  posledice  (1878-1882),  Beograd  1908,  pp.
266-274.
     2 D. Mikic, Srbi Kosova u istocnoj krizi 1875-1878, Obelezja, 5 (1982),
pp. 98-111;  ibid., Kosovo  prema  radu Berlinskog  kongresa i  realizovanju
njegovih odluka, Pristina 1980, pp. 243.
     3 D.  Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj  kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp.
243-345.
     4 Ibid.
     5  V. Stojancevic, Prvo oslobodjenje  Kosova od strane  srpske vojske u
ratu 1877-1878, in: Srbija u zavrsnoj fazi velike istocne krize (1877-1878),
Beograd, 1980, pp. 462-468; J. Popovic, op. cit., pp. 230-233; Savremenici o
Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 286-292.
     6 D. Mikic, Albansko  pitanje  i albansko-srpske veze  u  XIX  veku (do
1912), M. misao, 3 (1985), p. 143.
     7  J.  Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Pokret Srba i  Bugara  u  Turskoj, pp.  17-36;
Srbija  1878,  Documents (edited  by  M.  Vojvodic,  D.  R. Zivojinovic,  A.
Mitrovic, R. Samardzic), Beograd 1978, pp. 322-327.
     8 Srbija 1878, 503; Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 291-292.
     9  "In  provinces located on  this side of the  rivers [Drina and Lim],
events  have created  an entirely new situation. The  Princedom [Serbia] was
compelled  to take  up  arms  for  the  second  time, and due  to  continual
advancements, the region of its action covered almost all of Old Serbia. How
was it to withdraw from  the region and leave its populace to the revenge of
Musloman without the land sinking again to another horrifying state by which
no one would gain? The best way to secure the  benefits of  eternal peace in
the  region would be to  satisfy  the  legitimate wishes  of the people,  to
liberate and conjoin it to mother Serbia. "(Srbija 1878, pp. 449.)
     10 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 291-292.
     11  B.  Perunicic,  Zulumi aga i  begova u  kosovskom vilajetu, Beograd
1989, p. 43.
     12  D.  Mikic,  Prizrenska  liga  i  austrougarska  okupacija  Bosne  i
Hercegovine  i  zaposedanje  novopazarskog  sandzaka   (1878-1879.  godine),
Balcanica, IX (1978), p. 294; D.  Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, 137-138; more
elaborate  in:  B.  Hrabak,  Katolicki  Arbanasi  za  vreme   istocne  krize
(1875-1878), Istorijski zapisi, XXXV, 1-2 (1978), pp. 5-59.
     13  N. Raznatovic, Crna  Gora  i  Berlinski kongres,  Cetinje  1979; D.
Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 141.

     Military  operations  during  the  1877-1878  war  brought  demographic
disturbances in Old Serbia.  From 1875, a surge  of refugees from Kosovo and
the neighboring areas  crossed over to Serbian  territory. At  the bordering
regions of Serbia,  stretching between Mount Kopaonik and Jastrebac,  around
200,000 Serbs  sought shelter from the terror of ethnic Albanians, Turks and
Cherkezes.
     The triumph of the Serbian army  and  the liberation of southern Serbia
caused  a  contrary  migratory  process.  In  the spaces from  Prokuplje  to
Leskovac  and  Vranje,  during  the  19th century, the ethnic Albanians  had
settled, and, like their compatriots in Kosovo and Metohia, had supremacy in
political relations, occupying frontal positions in the governing apparatus.
When Serbian units  liberated the Nis  sanjak,  withdrawing  ahead  of them,
together with the defeated  bashibazouks, were Albanian inhabitants  of that
region.  In accordance with the  consecrated Turkish traditions, in case  of
defeat, Muslims were  called to leave  the  lost territories with  the army.
From  Toplica  and  southern  Pomoravlje,  around  30,000  ethnic  Albanians
retreated with  the Turkish troops,  seeking refuge  on the plains of Kosovo
and Metohia. These refugees (muhadjirs), looking for space to settle, bereft
of their belongings and lands, began to  take vengeance  upon  local Serbian
inhabitants, to plunder  property  and arrogate  lands.  The  administrative
authorities existed  only nominally,  since power was held by  local  ethnic
Albanians  who  also  attacked the  Serbian  inhabitants.1  In  a
complaint  lodged  to  Prince  Milan,  the  Serbs  of  Gnjilane  stated that
following the retreat of the Serbian army from Kosovo, acts of violence were
tripled: "The exasperated ethnic Albanians broke into our houses and estates
on the day the Serbian army withdrew  from Gnjilane, devastating everything,
fleecing us to our bare  skin!  And, alas,  there is more! Every day one our
brothers is killed, either secretly or in public."2
     The ethnic Albanians were disturbed by the military fiasco, the arrival
of muhadjirs  and  decisions brought by the  San  Stefano  Peace Treaty. The
penetration  of the Serbian army caused panic and the flight  of many ethnic
Albanians further into Ottoman territory, toward Djakovica and Pec. Albanian
leaders considered  the  expansion of Serbia  and  Montenegro,  particularly
their evident  aspirations to  acquiring Old  Serbia,  perilous  to Albanian
interests. Tribal  chiefs from  Pec,  Djakovica,  Gusinje, Ljuma, Debar  and
Tetovo conferred upon whether to accept, in peace, their in  war lost lands,
which they  believed were "Albanian" territories, or  to  resist in arms the
alteration  of  former frontiers, despite the Forte's standpoint. Toward the
end of April, precautionary measures were undertaken in Djakovica in case of
another  Serbian, Montenegrin or Russo - Bulgarian  offensive and to protect
the supplies of arms, ammunition and food.3
     The news of the Berlin Congress being convoked accelerated the national
assemblage  of  ethnic  Albanians.  Even in the  preceding decades, Albanian
migrs  in Italy,  Bulgaria  and Romania  pledged  for the educational  and
national  emancipation  of  their  people,  but  their influence  among  the
illiterate commoners of Muslim faith, bound  to the tradition of the sheriat
and  tribal privileges,  was  entirely  negligible.  The "Italo  -  Albanian
Committee" acted under the patronage of the Italian government, which saw it
as  a  means  of  economic and  political  penetration  to the  Balkans.  In
Constantinople,   an  influential   literary-political  circle  of  Albanian
intellectuals grew to become, in 1877,  the "Central Committee for Defending
Albanian Rights", propagating territorial-administrative autonomy within the
framework of the Ottoman Empire. The plan of the Committee, published in the
Tercuman -  i Sark  paper,  anticipated the founding of  a  single  Albanian
vilayet  that  would  encompass  the Kosovo,  Bitolj,  Scutari  and  Janjevo
vilayets. Plans were then already voiced for including even  of the Salonika
vilayet.4
     For the first time since their foundation,  the activities of  Albanian
committees met with  some response from  wider Albanian  circles,  due to  a
perilous  psychosis on account  of aspirations  arising from the neighboring
Serbian  countries. Around 300 delegates assembled in Prizren from different
regions,  but mostly big landholders  (pashas  and beys),  tribal chiefs and
religious heads.  At  a congregation in the Prizren mosque,  a  "League  for
defending the  rights of  the  Albanian  people", more widely  known  as the
Albanian  League,  was founded. The  main  board,  composed  of 60  members,
presided over by Abdul Bey Frasheri, sent a memorandum  to the  Great Powers
in  Berlin  on June 15,  requesting for  the  territorial  integrity  of the
Ottoman Empire  to  be preserved with  its borders as they were prior to the
war.5
     The  statute  of  the  League,  called Kararname  (Book  of  Decisions)
underscored  fidelity  to  the sheriat law,  Islam and the  Porte,  and  the
determination  to defend in arms the  totality of  Ottoman  territories. The
first article of the Kararname underlines  the League's "aim  not  to accept
and to remain distanced from any government except that  of the Porte and to
struggle  in arms to defend  the  wholeness of the territories".  Article  2
states: "Our aim is to preserve the imperial rights for his  revered majesty
the  sultan, our  lord." Article 6  states  a  definite attitude  toward the
neighboring Balkan  countries: "Having Balkan soil  before us, we should not
allow foreign armies to tread our  land. We should not recognize  Bulgaria's
name. If Serbia does not leave peacefully the illegally  occupied countries,
we should send bashibazouks (akindjias) and strive until the end to liberate
these regions, including Montenegro."6
     The main demand of the Albanian League was to form from the territories
of four  vilayets: Scutari, Janjevo,  Kosovo and Bitolj, a  single "Albanian
vilayet" in the  Ottoman Empire. With its first  step, the Albanian national
movement  defined the range  of its  territorial pretensions. The  spaces of
these four vilayets contained 44% ethnic Albanians, 19,2% Macedonian  Slavs,
11,4%  Serbs, 9,2%  Greeks, 6,5 Walachs,  9,3%  Ottoman  Turks,  0,4%  Jews,
Armenians and Gypsies.7 The territorial demands  of the  national
movement  expanded  to  Old  Serbia  and  Macedonia,  regions  where  ethnic
Albanians did  not  comprise the majority of the populace,  thus bearing the
germ of new clashes with the  two Serbian states.  It was based on extremely
anti-Slavic and anti-Serbian determination.
     The activities of the League pointed to a  breach in religious beliefs,
varying degrees  of national awareness and opposing conceptions of  national
future, all within the Albanian national movement.
     The political  activities  of  the  League  were  controlled by notable
landholders, religious heads and tribal chiefs who were  by their positions,
faith  and  conceptions profoundly  bound  to  the  Ottoman  state  and  its
ideology. Relying upon the lower layers of  the Albanian  and Muslim people,
whose  hostility  for the Serbs paralleled the  victories of Serbian armies,
they  gave the whole movement  a pro-Islamic and legitimist character in the
first year of its work. Abdul Bey Frasheri and delegates from south Albania,
advocates of the so-called "radical  movement", remained a minority in their
propositions  to sever  all  ties  with the Porte. Yet,  they  coincided  in
designating the territorial extension of "Albanian countries":
     the new independent state was to be composed of four principalities: 1)
south  Albania with  Epirus  and Janina;  2) north and mid Albania  with the
regions  around Scutari,  Tirana and Elbasan;  3)  Macedonia  with the towns
Debar, Skoplje Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitolj and Ohrid; 4) Old Serbia with
the towns: Prizren, Pec, Djakovica,  Mitrovica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevo,
Kumanovo, Novi Pazar and Sjenica.8
     In the  conceived  "Great Albania", their privileged position was taken
for granted. Until the Eastern crisis, it was based upon their place in  the
system of the  Ottoman state organization  which  allowed  for  the heedless
exploitation of  the  subjugated populace.  In the  national programs of the
League, preserving religious, tribal and political privileges,  there was no
room  for  non-Albanian   peoples:  their  political  inequality   was   not
anticipated  nor  legal and  economic  protection warranted.  Religious  and
ethnic intolerance acquired, on the other hand, a new  content. The Serbs in
Prizren were even compelled to sign and seal the petition of the League sent
to the Berlin Congress.
     The leadership  of the  Albanian national movement,  originating mainly
from  feudal  circles, saw, in the activities  of  the  League,  a  means to
preserve  the  existing  privileges,  an  opportunity to liberate the  lower
strata from paying taxes, a continuity  for  free tribal self-government and
space for demographic expansion. Common  interests soon  made the League  an
instrument of  the  new Sultan Abdulhamid II  (1876-1909), inspirator of the
pan-Islamic ideology. Its anti-Slav disposition was to benefit the sultan in
revising the San Stefano Peace Treaty, to prevent international confirmation
of territorial losses  or new concessions at the Berlin Congress. The League
was  to  act as  a deterrent through  which to preserve the  totality of the
Ottoman state. Thus, at the inaugural assembly of the Albanian League, there
were delegates  from  Bosnia and Muslims from the sanjak of Novi  Pazar, and
subsequently, though with little success, Albanian volunteers were  mustered
to resist Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.9
     The  pro-Islamic  and  pro-Turk  character  of  the   League  met  with
disapproval  among  Catholic Albanians in  north  Albania. Italian consul to
Scutari, Bernardo Berio, believed that only the Catholics were true carriers
of the idea of Albanian autonomy and breakup with the Turks. Prenk Bib Doda,
hereditary prince  of  the  Mirdits, did not  wish  to  participate  in  the
activities  of the  League  for the preponderance of Albanian Muslims in its
orders,  beside holding different  claims. A council in Scutari, independent
of the  League in  Prizren, addressed  the British Premier Benjamin Disraeli
with  the request for the formation of  an independent Albania to bar Slavic
invasion toward the Adriatic sea.
     Diplomats  of  Great  Powers  with  consulates in  Prizren  and Scutari
(Russia, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy) reported that the  formation
of the Albanian  League  was urged directly  through aid from  the Porte and
haste from vilayet officials and military commanders. The  Italian consul to
Scutari observed "strange connections between the official bodies of Turkish
authorities and a lawfully illegal movement",  since the Turkish authorities
paid  for  the  arrival of Albanian  delegates to Prizren  and  supplied the
followers  of  the League with  arms  and ammunition.10 The  same
conclusions were  drawn by a diplomat of the Dual  Monarchy who  warned that
the  activities of the  League's  local committee in Prizren evolved through
conference with the highest officials in the vilayet, who "[...]  armed  the
local Muslim Albanians  with excellent guns,  provided them with  ammunition
and  granted authority  upon  their  leaders  exceeding  the  authorities of
government bodies [...]". He had anticipated that the Porte "would no longer
be able  to induce  the  people to lay down their arms, and the consequences
soon  to  arise  will  be  situations  on  which  the  Porte  will  have  to
count".11
     The decisions of the Berlin Congress sanctioned the expansion of Serbia
and Montenegro, and, among other things,  obligated the Porte to  cede  Plav
and Gusinje. The failure of the Turkish state to defend its interests before
the European powers caused the leadership of the League to gradually turn to
ideas of total autonomy. Councils and branches had around 16,000 men in arms
directed toward the Turkish authorities and army, being discontented  by the
outcome of events. The first  attempt of the Porte to restore order caused a
massive  Albanian  rebellion.  The  Empire's  emissary, Marshall Mehmed  Ali
Pasha, who arrived to  interpret the decisions of  the  Berlin Congress, was
killed at the end of August 1878 in Djakovica.12
     Resistance to the  Porte increased with  its attempts to collect  taxes
from  the  ethnic Albanians and  carry  out recruitment.  In May  1879,  the
leadership of the League, overcome by  the so-called "autonomous  movement",
demanded judicial and  complete administrative autonomy from the  Porte, and
already  in July, the decision was set to depose Turkish rule. Bodies of the
League took  over rule in Djakovica, Prizren,  Pec, Mitrovica  and  Vucitrn.
This kind of parallel rule lasted until 1880,  when the demand for the total
independence of Albania was underscored. All attempts made by Constantinople
to  pacify  the  ethnic  Albanians  were  futile. The Porte then resorted to
military measures. As it no longer needed favors from the League, a military
campaign under the  command of Dervish Pasha was dispatched to the rebelling
regions.  Beside sporadic conflicts with the ethnic  Albanians, it took  the
towns controlled by the League and established Turkish rule. Instead of Plav
and  Gusinje,  Ulcinj and its shores were  ceded to Montenegro. Destroyed by
military force,  the League  soon ceased to exist, while its most  prominent
leaders were arrested and deported to Asia Minor.13
     Cautiously encroaching upon the political vacuum created after the idea
for  Albanian independence  was  expressed, was Austria-Hungary. To bar  the
expansion of the Slavic states, it  defended the rights of ethnic Albanians,
mainly the Mirdits. Count Andrassi believed that it was in the best interest
of  the  Monarchy  to  direct  Albanian  resistance  against the  Serbs  and
Montenegrins, thereby sustaining  traditional  hostility between the  ethnic
Albanians  and Slavs. Plans  were discussed  in  Vienna for the creation  of
autonomous  Albania to dam up Italian  consolidation on  the  shores  of the
Adriatic.
     Even though feudal layers abhorred the aspirations of the Dual Monarchy
regarding  the  occupation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  the  military
occupation of  the Novi Pazar  sanjak, the  ethnic Albanians  received these
decisions comparatively peacefully. The  Austria-Hungarian  diplomacy  aided
Albanian  requests in its border dispute with Montenegro, while its  agents,
infiltrated  from Bosnia, commended the order, security  and improved living
conditions introduced  by the new government  in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Forte's   emissaries   were   convincing  the   ethnic  Albanians  that  the
Austria-Hungarian troops in the Novi Pazar sanjak arrived at the  invitation
of padishah. As it already had secure political  strongholds in the Catholic
missions in north  Albania, the Dual Monarchy strove to win  over the ethnic
Albanians of  Muslim faith. Its further penetration  into the  depths of the
Ottoman  Empire by way of  the  Novi Pazar sanjak  depended mostly  upon the
ethnic  Albanians and their political orientation. The  destruction  of  the
League was the first encouraging step in that direction.15
     1 R.  Pavlovic,  Seobe  Srba i Arbanasa u ratovima  1876  i  1877-1878.
godine,  Glasnik  etnografskog instituta,  4-6 (1955-1957),  pp. 53-104;  D.
Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, 137-138.
     2 Srbija 1878, p. 324.
     3 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila  o Prizrenskoj ligi,
Balcanica, IX (1978), p. 237.
     4 B.  Hrabak, Ideje  o arbanaskoj autonomiji i nezavisnosti  1876-1880.
godine, Istorijski casopis, XXV-XXVI (1978-1979), pp. 160-165.
     5 S. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, Princeton 1967, pp.
31-53.
     6 B. Hrabak, Prvi  izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
pp.  238-239.  Article  Kararname  in:   A.   Hadri,  Prilog  rasvetljavanju
Prizrenske  lige (1878-1881), Perparimi, 1  (1967), 36-37; useful  survey on
the  Albanian  League  by D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga  o  Kosovu, pp. 142-148; cf.
Lidhja Shqiptare ne dokumentet osmane 1878-1881, Tirane  1978; P. Bartl. Die
Albanische   muslime  zur   Zeit  der  Nationalen   Unabhngigkeitsbrewegung
(1878-1912), pp. 115-192.
     7 By  confessions,  52.8% were Muslim,  27.8%  Orthodox, 15%  Catholic.
Among  the  Albanians  77%  were  of  Muslim  faith  (H.  D. Schanderl,  Die
Albanienpolitik Osterreich Ungarns  und Italiens 1877-1908,  Wiesbaden 1971,
pp. 9-10). A statistics of the  population in Old Serbia  complied  prior to
the  wars,  by  Austro-Hungarian  consul to  Prizren, Lipic, indicated  that
Albanians were not the  ethnic  majority  in  the  Nis  sanjak liberated  by
Serbia.  In Leskovac 48.58% of Albanians lived, in Vranje 27.55%, whereas in
Nis  they  were  not even  listed in the statistics.  The Albanians were the
majority in Toplice only  in Prokuplje (57.86%) and Kursumlija (92.68%);  B.
Hrabak, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
     8 B. Stulli, Albansko pitanje  1878-1882, Rad  JAZU,  318,  (1959), pp.
321-323; D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 144.
     10 B. Stulli, op. cit., pp. 337-341; B. Hrabak, Arbanasi i njihova liga
prema  okupaciji  Bosne  i Hercegovine,  Prilozi  instituta  za  istoriju  u
Sarajevu, 16 (1979), pp. 37-48; Cf. H. Kalesi, Napredne ideje nekih ideologa
albanskog  nacionalnog  pokreta  u  drugoj  polovini  XIX  veka  o  saradnji
balkanskih naroda,  in:  Oslobodilacki pokreti  jugoslovenskih naroda od XVI
veka do pocetka Prvog svetskog rata, Beograd 1976, 225-242; D. T. Batakovic,
Osnove  arbanaske prevlasti na  Kosovu  i  Metohiji  1878-1903,  Ideje,  5-6
(1987), pp. 36-38.
     11 B. Hrabak, Italijanski konzul u Skadru B. Berio o arbanaskom pitanju
1876-1878. godine, Casopis za suvremenu povijest 3 (1978), pp. 32-33.
     12 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
pp. 252, 262-263; B. Stulli, op. cit., p. 323.
     13 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
pp. 268-270.
     14 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Arbanaska liga, pp. 100-102,109-127; B. Stulli,
op. cit., pp. 343-348; S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 93-107.
     15  D.  Mikic,  Prizrenska  liga  i  austrougarska  okupacija  Bosne  i
Hercegovine, 297- 328; H. D. Schnaderl, op. cit., pp. 43-47.

     The entire  activity  of the Albanian League was of clear  and explicit
Anti-Serbian character.  The motives  for its formation and the decisions of
the  Berlin congress  caused  severe oppression upon  the  Serbian populace.
Albanian attacks on the Serbian border ended,  as  a  rule,  by  depredating
Serbian  villages on the Turkish side. From  the  beginning to mid June 1878
alone, according to the information of French diplomats, 112 Christian Serbs
were killed, mostly distinguished village hosts. Serbian  houses were burnt,
and those who attempted to escape were ambushed. In Gnjilane nine women were
abducted  and brutally tortured.  Shortly before  convoking  the Congress of
Berlin, at  least 60 Serbs escaped terror from Pristina alone, even  though,
at the time, the bashibazouk leaders officially spoke favorably of Christian
Serbs in petitions sent to the Porte.1
     Fanaticized followers of the  League believed  the Serbs  of Kosovo and
Metohia to be  the major  cause for  all Albanian misfortunes.  An  Albanian
leader openly  stated  to  Russian  Consul Yastrebov:  "We will  attack  the
Montenegrins on Christmas and kill them.  And if we fail - we will return to
Pec  and  the  vicinity  and  burn  and  saber  all  the  Christians."2
Yastrebov's  following  report indicated  that  these  were  not  mere
threats:
     "Three  Albanians  raped a thirteen-year-old  girl  from Dobrotin.  The
Serbs dare not complain  to the authorities. Those  who complained paid with
their  heads, and none of them trust the protection of a  foreign government
any longer.  People  are saying that atrocities as  these  [1879]  were  not
committed even after the Crimean  war, the  general  impression is that  all
have conspired to crush the  Serbian  element."3  In  a complaint
lodged to the Russian tzar in July 1879, the Serbs  of Pec stated that since
the beginning of the Eastern crisis, over 100 people  were killed in the Pec
district alone and that many atrocities  were committed. The citizens of Pec
pleaded  with  Alexander II  to take them under his wing and help the Visoki
Decani  monastery in  the Pec  Patriarchate  against  plunder and  blackmail
committed by outlaws at the orders of Pec agas.4
     Terror  over the Serbs did  not wane during  the entire period  of  the
Albanian League rule.  Since 1880, when its leadership severed all tied with
the  Porte, the position  of the  Serbian  populace  was  aggravated,  since
tribute had  to be paid to both the  Turks and ethnic  Albanians: "The Serbs
had  two  lords;  they paid  tribute to  two rulers, maintained two  armies,
without having any  protection or security."5 Yastrebov's reports
dating 1880 and 1881 are filled with  information on the plight of the Serbs
- murders, robberies, arsons of houses and estates, and attempts to forceful
conversion to Islam. One characteristic report  reads: "The situation of the
Christians  in these regions is gloomy everywhere. Refugees from Serbia  and
Bosnia (muhadjirs)  pillage Christian  houses, especially  in the  Pristina,
Gnjilane and Pec district. The same atrocities are committed by local ethnic
Albanians, even though they gave their bessa  not to  disturb them, but  the
bessa  is valid  only  for  Muslims,  it  holds  no  obligation  toward  the
Christians."6
     Incursions into  Serbian state  territory were at full swing during the
Albanian  League,  when the  new  Serbian frontiers  were  not yet  secured.
Military  advance  guards  were  attacked,  cattle was  raided  and  Serbian
villages  along  the  demarcation  line were  burnt.  Following  the  Berlin
Congress,  Albanian   incursions  into   Serbia   increased:  their  raiding
companies,  sacking  and  burning everything in  their  wake,  reached  even
Kursumlija. On their return, all Serbian villages on the Turkish  side  were
attacked. Expecting an  outcome  and  avoiding  new  conflicts,  the Serbian
government did not persecute the assailants out of territory.  The petitions
it   sent  to   the  Porte  to   stop   the   incursions  remained   without
response.7
     The ethnic Albanians  assaulted the teachers of the Serbian Seminary at
Prizren.  They looked all over  town seeking to kill  one of  them,  someone
named  Petar  Kostic, for writing  a letter  on  the  political situation in
Prizren.  Kostic  was saved  from certain  death  be fleeing to the  Russian
consulate; following a hearing in front  of  the Turkish authorities  in the
presence of Yastrebov,  he was sent to Bitolj, since the Prizren authorities
could nor warrant him safety.8
     The reign of the Albanian League left hard consequences on the position
of the Serbs in Old Serbia:  "Created upon a reaction to the realization  of
the national  liberational  programs  of  Balkan Christians, especially  the
Serbs"  - underscored Dimitrije Bogdanovic - "it was laid on the foundations
of  the  Great  Albania ideas, ignoring the rights of Serbs and other Slavic
peoples of the Balkans, and of the Greeks, to  live on their lands protected
under the  law.  A  clash  was inevitable,  and the  aggressive anti-Serbian
concept of  the League  permanently  placed a  burden upon  the relations of
these two peoples. Simultaneously, the Great Albanian concept  of the League
was offering  itself to certain European  powers as an instrument for  their
own penetration  to the Balkans."9  Violence  upon the Serbs  had
become, owing to the political programs of the League,  one of the strategic
determinations  in the Albanian national movement. Until the Eastern crisis,
violence  upon  the  Serbs  had been elemental rather than the result  of  a
conceptualized  policy.  Routing  Serbs  from  their  hearths  by  perpetual
oppression had become, owing to the political  will of the League, a kind of
religious and national duty obligatory to all ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo
vilayet. The target of Albanian crimes in the decades to come were the Serbs
of the Pec, Pristina and Prizren sanjaks.10
     After the Serbo-Ottoman wars  the Serbs  were looked upon with distrust
by  both the  Turks  and ethnic  Albanians. Even  though they were  unarmed,
decimated and pressured by the  surge of newly  settled muhadjirs, the Serbs
were  considered  an  unreliable  and  potentially   revolutionary  element.
Following the 1878 war, Turkey promised a pardon by a general decree for all
subjects  who had in any way  violated  authority.  The Empire's amnesty was
officially proclaimed,  but  the movements  and  behavior of the  Serbs were
regarded very suspiciously.
     A false tip that the Serbs were preparing to rise in Kosovo on the very
day Serbia was proclaimed a kingdom, resulted in the formation of a drumhead
trial in  Pristina,  1882.  During  five years  of  active  work,  based  on
suspicion  but   without  substantial  evidence,  around  7,000  Serbs  were
butchered  "for seditious conduct", and another 300  were  sentenced to hard
labor  from 6  to  101  years.  The  most respected  people were  convicted,
teachers  and merchants,  priests and  serfs. Upon the  pronouncement  of  a
sentence, they  were sent to prisons  in  Salonika or exiled to  Asia Minor.
Only  in 1888, some of convicts that survived in prison were pardoned  owing
to the intermediation of the Russian and British diplomacy.11
     Sima Andrejevic Igumanov  published  a  book  in 1882 Sadanje  nesretno
stanje u  Staroj Srbiji  (The currently unfortunate  times  in  Old  Serbia)
filled  with information on  atrocities  committed by the Turks  and  ethnic
Albanians at  the  beginning  of  the drumhead trial's activities. Disturbed
because Serbia would pay more attention to the sufferings of its compatriots
in Turkey, he attempted to draw the public eye to the new swing of violence:
"Our homeland has been turned  into hell by  dark crazed  blood-suckers  and
masses  of  melting  Asian  tyrants,  since  banditry,  violence,  deletion,
espionage,  denunciation,  daily  arrests,  accusations,  trials, sentences,
exiles,  arrogation of property and life in many ways, the wails, mourns and
burial of the executed, all these  have become ordinary events everywhere in
Old  Serbia  and Macedonia."12  Since  Dervish  Pasha's  campaign
against  the League,  the  position of the  Serbs  in  Pec and Djakovica has
continually deteriorated; thus the  people were  preparing  to  emigrate  to
Serbia. From the Pec region alone, according to data collected by Yastrebov,
around  1,500  families emigrated  to Serbia since the  wars  to  1883. Upon
collection of the  tribute and tithe, the Serbs in Metohia were compelled to
pay, beside for themselves, for those who moved, and often a part instead of
Albanian  Muslims. Their complaints to the  authorities remained unanswered.
13
     1 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o  Prizrenskoj ligi,
p. 253.
     2 V. Bovan, Jastrebov u Prizrenu, Kulturno-prosvetne prilike u Prizrenu
i rad ruskog konzula I. S. Jastrebova  u drugoj polovini  devetnaestog veka,
Pristina 1983, p.147.
     3 Ibid., p. 146.
     4  V.  Stojancevic,  Zalbe Srba  Pecanaca  na turske zulume  1876-1878.
godine Arhivski pregled, 1-2 9 (1978) pp. 151-160.
     5 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Arbanaska liga, pp. 109.
     6 V. Bovan, op. cit., pp. 160.
     7 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Arbanaska liga, pp. 6-10.
     8 R. M. Grujic, Dva izvestaja konzula Jastrebova o akciji Albanske lige
u  Prizrenu 1880.  god., Zbornik  za istoriju Juzne  Srbije, I  (1936),  pp.
403-406.
     9 D. Bogdanovic; Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 147-148.
     10 P. Orlovic [Svetislav  St. Simic], Pitanje  o Staroj Srbi]i, Beograd
1901, pp. 3-11; D. T. Batakovic, Osnove arbanaske prevlasti, p. 37.
     11 J.  Popovic,  op.  cit., pp. 247-248;  V. Bovan,  op. cit., 168-171;
Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 323-326
     12 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 101.
     13  Around 60  Serbian families from  the Pec nahi that had returned to
Turkey refused to  resettle  in  the  Pec  nahi but  instead,  inhabited the
villages on the slopes of Kopaonik  where there were not many  Albanians (V.
Bovan, op. cit; pp. 174,178).

     Abdulhamid II discontinued the reform  tradition  of  his predecessors,
encouraged  refeudalization  and  underscored  pan-Islamism  as  the   basic
principle of his reign. As supreme head of Islam,  he strove to  consolidate
the  country  internally  through  pan-Islamic  ideology, and  by  restoring
religious  fanaticism  had hoped  to create a counterbalance to all national
movements in the  ethnically heterogeneous  Empire.  He believed the  Muslim
Albanians  were  natural  enemies  of the Orthodox Slavic population  -Serbs
above all - not wholely by religion, but also by race, historical traditions
and national  aspirations. Thus Muslim  Albanians  had imposed themselves as
the best allies in crushing  all Christian  movements; the Christian revolts
and  national  movements  were,  according to  the  sultan's  most  profound
conviction, the basic cause of all unrest in the Ottoman Empire.
     The  padishah sought support for the new policy  with the  conservative
feudal circles. He invited the most  prominent Albanian chiefs of Old Serbia
to  Constantinople with the  aim of  binding them to him by bestowing gifts,
decorations  and  promotions.  Among his followers  from  Kosovo,  the  most
outstanding were Ah Pasha of Gusinje and Hadzi Mula  Zeka of Pec.  Religious
heads, the  mullahs  and  softas, stirred up  religious fanaticism among the
illiterate  and  ignorant  believers. Together with the  feudal notables and
upper classes  of Albanian society, they  blamed  the  Serbs  as the  source
hazardous to Albanian interests and the stability of the Ottoman Empire. The
formation of the drumhead  court martial in Pristina marked the opening of a
joint activity of Turkish  authorities  and Albanian notables in routing the
Serbian populace of the Kosovo vilayet.1
     The sultan's policy  to  use ethnic Albanians as the  striking force in
weakening the Serbian ethnicon in spaces neighboring Serbia  and Montenegro,
began to take on the form of a long-term political program toward the end of
the eighties of the 19th century. With the chain of new muhadjir settlements
the dense network of Serbian habitats was  severed. The sultan and the Porte
were    creating   a   sort   of    Albanian   military    frontier   toward
Serbia.2
     The settlement of the muhadjirs was encouraged by  the Porte, while the
Albanian  feudal  lords of Kosovo saw to their being properly settled in new
habitats. Supporting them, however, was another burden  upon the Serbs.  Lab
soon became an  ethnically pure Albanian region.  Along the northern borders
of the Kosovo vilayet, in the Novo Brdo rivers, Kriva Reka and Gornja Morava
with Izmornik, new muhadjir settlements were springing.  In Kriva Reka alone
the  number of  Albanian  homes  increased from 52%  to 65%. The demographic
situation  was rapidly  improving  to the advantage of the ethnic Albanians;
the muhadjirs had  inundated  mountainous rims  hovering over the  valley of
Kosovo.  Serving as  an impenetrable  rampart, Albanian  villages provided a
safeguard for the northern borders of Turkey.3
     The policies  of the Porte and  the sultan's protection contributed  to
the  consolidation  of  a  belief held among  the  ethnic Albanians  that  a
division of Turkish  provinces in Europe would cause a  division of the four
vilayets they  considered  their  own  territory.  Such  policy  promoted  a
stronger  bondage  of  Muslim Albanians  to the Ottoman state  ideology. The
destruction  of  the  League   did   not   raise  the   question  of   joint
Albanian-Turkish  resistance  against  the enemies  of  the  Empire. Vali of
Kosovo, Abdi Pasha,  estimated,  in 1883,  that in case of war, the faithful
ethnic Albanians would be  sufficient in defending Old  Serbia. Albanian and
Turkish relations  toward the Serbs as  the seditious element encouraged new
acts of violence. When a Serbian monk Martirije was murdered on  his way  to
Pec, Albanian outlaws announced their scheme - all Serbian priests and noted
people  in Pec  should be murdered. Then, they  believed, there  would be no
fear in case they  were to fall under Serbian of Austro-Hungarian  rule. The
vali came to  Pec, but they told him there  that the complaints of Christian
Serbs were unfounded.4
     Aside  to  practical  political tasks  assigned  to  them,  the  ethnic
Albanians had partly to thank  the immense  influence of the padishah's body
guards  for  the  sultan's  mercy and  protection  during his entire  reign.
Abdulhamid II rarely left his court  in Yildiz, and in time became kind of a
prisoner  of his own  personal guards, a fact observed at  the Porte by  all
diplomats  of  Great  Powers.  Under  its  influence   and   owing   to  the
intermediation of  high officials of Albanian  origin, the  sultan tolerated
all the unlawful acts  committed by ethnic Albanians in Old Serbia - refusal
to pay tribute, to provide  recruits  for the  regular army,  to respect the
local vilayet authorities and answer to court for offences committed.
     In  Kosovo,  Metohia  and  in  the  neighboring  areas  a  division  of
government was tacitly  established. Corrupt Turkish officials gladly agreed
to cooperate with Albanian feudal and tribal circles. Due to high protection
from Constantinople  enjoyed by  the ethnic Albanians, the few conscientious
government  officials  in  the  Kosovo  vilayet did not  even  try to pursue
Albanian perpetrators  and rebels since they were  liable to be punished and
replaced after their complaints were lodged directly to the sultan. Albanian
feudal circles  secured full economic and political dominance  in the Kosovo
vilayet without much effort.5
     The policy of dtente toward the ethnic Albanians and the toleration of
violence committed upon the  Serbian  populace created  a peculiar  sense of
might in the lower  classes of Albanian  society.  The  knowledge that  they
would not be punished whatever their offence, emboldened ethnic Albanians to
an appreciable disregard for Turkish authorities.  Social division increased
the layer  of  outlaws  (kacaks)  who  lived solely of banditry and raiding.
Since  their  attacks  were  directed  mostly  to  the  Serbs,  the  Turkish
authorities  did  not  pursue  them,  except  when  required  to  do  so  by
representatives  of Great  Powers, and  subsequently,  by Serbian diplomatic
officials.  However,  even  in  then  the  perpetrators  were  not  severely
punished. The policy of  impunity exercised upon the ethnic Albanians during
the eighties, particularly the nineties, turned into anarchy,  causing  thus
anxiety to both the vali of Kosovo and the Sublime Porte.6
     Albanian  risings,  usually local  ones breaking out from time  to time
characterized the whole period until the Young  Turk Revolution. At the  end
of  September,  1884,  in the  Prizren  region, particularly  in  Ljuma,  an
Albanian rebellion broke out against an attempt  of the Turkish  authorities
to list the population and  its  properties to  determine  the amount of new
taxes. The rebelling ethnic Albanians of  Ljuma drove out the administrative
officials from Prizren and devastated the town. They dispersed only when the
sultan promised  them there  wold be no listings nor tax-paying. The Turkish
authorities attempted neither to pursue nor disarm them.7
     The 1885  war of Serbia and  Bulgaria, which soon ended with the defeat
of  the  Serbian troops at Slivnica,  upset the  ethnic  Albanians.  Fearing
danger, they gave their bessa (word of honor) which obligated all the tribes
to discontinue  mutual conflicts over estates and blood feuds.  Fermentation
was  at  its peak in  Djakovica and Mitrovica, since ammunition was smuggled
out  of  their  arsenals  in  case  of  new  international   clashes.  Large
conferences  of  tribal  chiefs  were  held in  Vucitrn.  Any implication of
foreign  peril  or international  crises  in  the  vicinity of  the Empire's
autonomous  regions (the unification of Bulgaria and  East Rumelia  in 1885,
the Serbian-Bulgarian war), brought  together Albanian  tribes  and  Turkish
administrative and military officials. 8
     1  D. Mikic, Albansko  pitanje i  albansko-srpske  veze u XIX veku  (do
1912), pp. 144-146.
     2 D. T. Batakovic, Osnove arbanaske prevlasti, p. 38.
     3 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, p 148.
     4 V. Bovan, op. cit., pp. 180,183-184.
     5 Ibid , p 39; Dj. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba,
pp. 24-25.
     6 B  Perunicic, Pisma  srpskih konzula iz  Pristine 1890-1900,  Beograd
1985, pp. 306-359.
     7 V. Bovan, op. cit., pp. 185-187
     8 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 274-277.

     All  attempts made by the Serbian government to establish  contact with
ethnic  Albanians  in Old Serbia were futile. The  administration of Milutin
Garasanin, incited by  the rising  in the Prizren  sanjak, tried to approach
the Albanian chiefs. The  initiative came from the  Serbian county chief  in
Nis  who came into contact  with  certain Albanian  chiefs  of Prizren, Pec,
Djakovica  and Novi  Pazar. Todor  Stankovic, the  county  chief  of Vranje,
proposed  to  win over Albanian  leaders first  in areas  along  the Serbian
borders, and  then  others, by promises that Serbia would liberate them from
the Turks. The plan was to establish  contact with all notable tribal chiefs
from the Serbian border to Scutari. The  cooperation particularly counted on
was that of Montenegrin duke  and  writer  Marko Miljanov was,  renowned  in
north Albania  as a hero and a friend of ethnic Albanians. Competent circles
in  Serbia  strove,  with  Albanian  cooperation,  to  end  Austro-Hungarian
influence among them. It soon proved that Albanian chiefs would not  respond
to offers for cooperation. Negotiations ended when the Bulgarian-Serbian war
began.1
     Serbia  knew  little of the  happenings in  Kosovo  and Metohia  in the
eighties of the  19th  century.  News arrived from  merchants and  refugees,
border guards and through the Prizren Seminary. Until the mid-80's, Serbia's
activities  on the  national affairs  in  Turkey were  discontinued  due  to
internal unrest and war with Bulgaria.
     By  a  secret  convention  with  Austria-Hungary in  1881,  Serbia  was
obligated  to carry out its external affairs only in agreement with  Vienna.
The Dual  Monarchy  allowed for  the possibility of expansion to the  south,
excepting the Novi  Pazar  sanjak. The friendly orientation of  Prince Milan
toward  Austria,  which  had  blessed  his  proclamation  of king  in  1882,
displayed  Serbia's  helplessness  to  act on its  own  accord toward  other
countries. Its defeat with  Bulgaria  considerably weakened its positions on
the Balkans.2
     The national  activities of Serbia toward Old Serbia could only develop
within the  narrow  framework of ecclesiastical and educational actions. The
first steps were taken in  1885 by widening the  networks of educational and
ecclesiastical institutions. Garasanin's government had been preparing books
to be  sent  to Old Serbia since  spring  1885. For the free distribution of
books  about  Turkey,  regarded by  the  authorities as  a perilous means of
anti-state  propaganda,  the  Serbian   books   carried  the  seal  of  Sima
Andrejevic's Fund  in Belgrade. Rector of the Prizren Seminary Petar Kostic,
was sent to Constantinople to obtain a  license from the Turkish censors for
the  free distribution  of  books.3 A  patriotic association  St.
Sava's Society" was founded in Belgrade, 1887, to revive national activities
in Serbian countries under Turkish rule and promote a  systematic search  of
the past and of contemporary political and ethnographic conditions. In  1887
the Ministry of Education opened a department for Serbian schools outside of
Serbia  to  serve as contacts for the St  Sava's Society.  Since  1889, this
department  was taken over  by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The Serbian
government   has   taken  over  the  operation   of  national   actions   in
Turkey.4
     Following the Serbian-Bulgarian war  a  new era began  with more active
work on the national  affairs. The  defeat at Slivnica sealed the autocratic
reign  of  King  Milan  (abdicated in  1888),  issuing  forth  a  breath  of
enthusiasm  for  the  task of  collecting  national  forces for  activity in
occupied Serbian countries.
     The arrival of Stojan Novakovic, a notable diplomat and one of the most
renown  scientists  of  his time,  at  the head  of the Serbian  legation in
Constantinople  in   1886,   marked  the   beginning   of   a   widely   set
educational-political activity in  Serbian countries under Turkish rule. The
whole national activity was switched  over to diplomatic  service. That very
year Novakovic concluded  a temporary consular convention  with  Turkey.  By
1887, the  first Serbian consulates were  opened in Skoplje and Salonika. To
crown the  national activity, the network of new Serbian diplomatic missions
was  encircled  by  the opening  of consulates in  Pristina  and  Bitolj  in
1889.5
     The Serbian government sent the most able men into  diplomatic service,
educated at the best foreign universities  (Paris, Vienna,  St. Petersburg).
In  the  consulate  of  Pristina  alone  diplomats  with  doctorates  served
(Miroslav  Spalajkovic,  Milan  D.  Milojevic, Milan  Pecanac)  and  writers
(Vojislav  Ilic, Branislav Nusic and Milan Rakic) whose works, of which many
were written during their stay in  Kosovo, comprise the present-day classics
of Serbian literature. These  young highly patriotic men, delegates of a new
generation of the Serbian intelligentsia, accepted distasteful tasks to help
the  mission  of national liberation  at the hardest place for  a diplomatic
position, in Pristina.6
     Ties with Serbia and its attendance to the national affairs had immense
importance in preserving national awareness  with the  people. An  intensive
action for  education followed. Money for  these  educational  activities in
Kosovo arrived regularly, and new teachers were engaged. Within a short time
a large number of new schools were opened and  work was  resumed  in many of
the  old   ones.  The  administration   of  Greek   metropolitans  over  the
Raska-Prizren Eparchy, which encompassed almost all of  Old Serbia, hindered
Serbia's aims to encircle its work on  the national affairs. In 1885, Serbia
began negotiations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, requesting for a
Serb to  be the metropolitan in Prizren and for Serbian archpriests to  take
over bishopric  chairs in Skoplje, Veles, Debar,  Bitolj and Ohrid. However,
negotiations with the ecumenical patriarch were not successful.  The Serbian
government  had, nevertheless, begun to prepare a monastic  progeny for high
ecclesiastical  duties  in  Turkey.  The  monks  selected  accepted  Turkish
subjugation and went to study theology in Constantinople. 7
     1 D. Mikic, Nastojanje  Srba 1885. godine da  saradjuju  sa Arbanasima,
posebno preko Marka Miljanova, Obelezja, 4 (1982), pp. 89-102.
     2 V. Popovic, Istocno pitanje, p. 182.
     3 P. Kostic, Prosvetno-kulturni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu, pp.
70-73.
     4 S. Jovanovic,  Vlada  Aleksandra Obrenovica, I, Beograd  1929, p. 98;
Dj.  Mikic,  Delatnost  "Drustva  Sv.  Save"  na  Kosovu  (1886-1912),  Nasa
proslost, VII-IX (1973-1974), pp. 61-87.
     5  Spomenica  Stojana Novakovica,  Beograd  1921,  pp.  171-173;  daily
reports on the position  of Serbs and the  political situation in the Kosovo
vilayet were  sent from Serbian consulates  in  Skoplje  and  Pristina until
1912. Several thousand  documents of  which  only a part have been published
were  stored at  the Archive  of the Serbian Foreign Ministry: Arhiv Srbije,
Beograd,  Ministarstvo  inostranih  dela,  Prosvetno-politicko  i  politicko
odeljenje  1878-1912;  Prepiska  o  Arbanaskim  nasiljima  u  Staroj  Srbiji
1888-1889, Beograd 1889; V. Corovic, Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije,
I, Beograd 1933; B. Perunicic,  Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900,
Beograd 1985;  ibid., Svedocanstvo o Kosovu  1901-1912, Beograd 1988; ibid.,
Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom  vilajetu,  Beograd 1988;  Zaduzbine Kosova,
Prizren  - Beograd, 1987, (edited by R. Samardzic) pp. 607-738; Milan Rakic,
Konzulska pisma 1905-1911, Beograd 1985 (ed. by A. Mitrovic).
     6 J.  M.  Jovanovic, Nusic  kao konzul,  Srpski knjizevni glasnik, LIII
(1938), 259- 269; M. M. Rajic, Konzulska pisma 1905-1911, pp. 8-23.
     7 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, p. 302.

     Already the first reports from the consulate in Skoplje showed that the
position  of  Serbs  was  harder than  it  had  been  supposed  in  Belgrade
diplomatic  circles. In  fall  1887, the government was informed of  anarchy
flaring on the stretch from  Pristina and Prizren to the Montenegrin border.
ethnic  Albanians controlled  the  roads,  attacked passengers and  assailed
Serbs in villages. Prior Rafailo of Decani sent the following message to the
consul:  "Sir! Old  Serbia is lost!  The Christians  are  being  killed like
animals; there are  victims  of  death every  day;  we  are  like  prisoners
deprived of freedom - no one dares to move."1
     The waning power of the Turkish authorities strengthened the  obstinacy
of ethnic Albanians. Their clans clashed in  blood feuds. When the conflicts
came to  inter-tribal bloodshed, they ended by  agreements  confirmed by the
bessa, not valid  for  Christian  Serbs.  Incursions into Serbian  territory
continued with increasing anarchy. Serbian garrisons were  reinforced at the
frontier.  Serbian  notes  sent  to  the  Porte demanding  an end  to  these
incursions  remained unreplied.  Stojan Novakovic believed "that the Turkish
authorities  themselves  feared  the  Albanians;  they  were never  able  to
undertake decisive measures against them; particularly the small authorities
who  carry out their orders in the rear lines, thus  frequently  good orders
sent by older authorities remain without consequences".2
     In an elaborate annual report on the position of the Serbian population
in Serbia, 1888, Rector of the Prizren Seminary Petar Kostic underscored the
danger of anarchy  and violence upon the Serbs spreading.  Certain villages,
unable to  defend  themselves,  sought  protection  from  outlaws and  their
companies, paying in return high  annual  monetary  compensations  and often
working  for free (kuluk). Similar to the ancient  endowments, Visoki Decani
and the Pec Patriarchate which hired  local  Albanian clans for considerable
material compensation and gifts in kind to protect them against bandits from
other regions,  the villages too  soon felt the  bitter side  attending this
protection - various additional  expenditures. Without  license and  special
monetary payments,  local protectors  would not approve weddings. Protecting
villages soon became such  a lucrative business that the  raiding  companies
frequently  battled  over who would  guard  Serbian  villages.  Most  of the
Serbian villages, however, could not afford continual protection. A frequent
occurrence, stated Kostic, was "for one family to  bury two of its  deceased
killed by the rage of Albanians, at the same time".3
     Again,  like  many times  before,  Serbian  shrines  bore  the brunt of
Albanian bandits. A dispute  between  two Albanian clans over the  estate of
the Decani monastery ended in an armed clash with many killed on both sides.
The dispute arose over who would use the arrogated monastic land,  cut  down
the  trees in the Decani forests and benefit from the  bans. The authorities
would not get involved, while the monastic fraternity was compelled to  feed
and  provide  for  both tribal armies. When the energetic  Prior  Rafailo of
Decani attempted  to  oppose them,  he was thrown out of  the monastery  and
arrested     by     Turkish     authorities    who    interned    him     in
Constantinople.4
     The  beginning  of  activity  undertaken  by  the  Serbian consulate in
Pristina (1889) coincided with  a  period of great pressure exerted upon the
Serbs and open  hostility toward everything that was Serbian. The opening of
the consulate itself was interpreted by the  ethnic Albanians as a policy of
provocation  and  an intolerable  attempt to supervise their activities. The
seat of the Kosovo  vilayet was moved to Skoplje  in 1888, thus the  Serbian
consulate  remained a  solitary  diplomat watchtower in a weakly  supervised
district.
     Reports  from  Pristina  were filled  with  information on  innumerable
atrocities  -  murders,  arsons,  blackmail,  abduction  of   women,  rapes,
cattle-raids  and  so on.  A  petition  sent by  the  Serbian consul  to the
district  chief received an answered that  Albanian tyrants were shielded by
the vali of Kosovo himself: "Evil comes by itself, emanating form disharmony
originating in Skoplje. I  send  all the  guilty  Albanians to Skoplje  from
where  they  are  soon discharged  with arms."5 Marinkovic warned
that  the ethnic  Albanians  were  systematically assailing  certain Serbian
villages, urging  them to move  by threats and murders. A common slogan was:
"Go  to Serbia - there is no  survival for you here." It was the  hardest in
the  Pec nahi. Reports demonstrate that  ethnic Albanians  forcibly  invaded
Serbian  houses. On  their way  to the Serbian frontier, the  refugees  were
fleeced as a rule. Seven families of  73 members on their way to Serbia from
a village  near  Pec were  robbed of  both their cattle  and movables by the
ethnic Albanians.6
     The anarchy soon took on the form of a movement to drive out the Serbs.
The  Russian  consul  to  Prizren, Teodosie  Lisevich,  upon  evaluating the
anarchy in Kosovo and Metohia, concluded  that the ethnic Albanians aimed to
squeeze in between Serbia  and Montenegro and thus deprive Old Serbia of its
Serbian  character.  Albanian  terror  spread toward the  Novi Pazar sanjak,
where the inhabitants were almost all Orthodox and Islamized Serbs. In April
and May 1889  alone, around  700 persons  fled Kosovo and Metohia to Serbia.
All refugees  gave warnings that the remaining Serbs would also be compelled
to seek salvation  by flight.7  All these events were followed by
the decreasing number of Serbs who owned estates. The Turks imposed taxes so
high, thus compelling  the Serbs to sell their estates at reduced prices, or
they  were left without them on  account of Albanian outlaws using the right
to adopt abandoned  lands, upon  which the  Turkish  authorities looked with
affinity.8
     The culmination of anti-Serbian  disposition  was the murder of  consul
Luka   Marinkovic  in  Pristina  in  June,  1890.  The   Serbian  government
maintained,  upon  information  received  from  Serbs  in Pristina,  that an
Albanian conspiracy was  responsible,  but the Porte tried  to  present  the
murder  as  a  display of  Muslim  intolerance toward  Christian foreigners.
Serbia  demanded of  the  Porte  to undertake  drastic  measures against the
ethnic Albanians, and  the Russian  ambassador to Constantinople, supporting
the Serbian demands, warned the Turkish officials that anarchy would  spread
to  such dimensions  that  any  step  taken  toward  pacification  would  be
difficult  to  effect.  But the  Porte  had not the  slightest intention  to
intercept the  unbridling ethnic  Albanians.  Pressured by the  Serbian  and
Russian  diplomacies, the murderers  of the  Serbian consul,  muhadjirs from
Prokuplje, were  severely punished, but the inspirators of the assassination
were never found. The Serbs who appeared as witnesses  at  the trial fled to
Serbia fearing vengeance.9
     The situation in Kosovo did not change much after  the arrival  of  the
new consul Todor P.  Stankovic.  The consulate was no longer  the  target of
attack, instead,  reports  sent  to  Belgrade  brought  new  black lists  of
numerous atrocities. Stating forbidding numbers of terror committed upon the
Serbs, Stankovic underscored  that due  to the  flaring  of anarchy and weak
connections with agents in regions remote from Pristina, he had been able to
discover  only about  an eighth  of the committed crimes. He warned that the
Turkish authorities in the  Pristina  sanjak extended  scarcely more  than a
degree  from the city districts. Since  he had lived  in Metohia  before the
Eastern crisis, Stankovic took to comparing figures of the population census
at the beginning of the  seventies with those of the nineties and reached  a
figure pointing to three quarters of the total population inhabiting the Pec
nahi being  driven  out by ethnic Albanians.10 Following accounts
related by some  Serbs from  Pec in 1907, twenty years earlier around 20,000
Serbs moved to Serbia and Montenegro before  the Albanian  terror, while 300
Albanian families from Malissia  were  settled in there place by Pec notable
Hadji Mula Zeka.11
     The Serbian  emissary to the Porte endeavored through diplomatic  means
to protect the  Serbian populace in Old  Serbia. However, it was all futile.
He met with  no  compassion  in  Yildiz, the sultan's  court, nor  with  the
Turkish ministers. Having scrutinized the situation, Stojan Novakovic warned
the government in May, 1891, that the  sultan, and perhaps  the Porte, "were
working on destroying  our element and strengthening the  Albanian one. This
activity began right after the war during  the Albanian League and  has  not
been ceased since."12
     Some progress  to bridle the Albanian anarchy in Kosovo and Metohia was
made through intermediation of the  Russian  diplomacy in 1892. It requested
of the Porte  to curb  the  anarchy, secure public safety and protection for
the Christians. When the European press took more interest  in events taking
place in Old  Serbia, news  of violence committed upon the Serbs reached the
European public. The Porte ordered the authorities in the vilayet to end all
pursuit of the  rayah, punish the bandits and stop the killings among ethnic
Albanians on account of blood feuds.13
     Official Serbia, torn asunder by internal dissension and impeded by its
political duties to Austria-Hungary, was  unable to aid its compatriots in a
more decisive manner. Activities on national affairs evolved solely  through
diplomatic legations, often owing to the personal initiative of an official.
     Unable  as  diplomatic representatives of  a  small  country to  effect
anything more  tangible for their  people, the  Serbian consuls  wielded all
their  faculties  to  promote  education.  The  extent  of  lawlessness  and
increasing  distrust toward  everything that  was Serbian  resulted in  some
schools closing down, and the  hindering and impeding  of efforts undertaken
to promote education. Todor Stankovic earned great merits as a consul in the
opening new schools  in  Kosovo and parrying Bulgarian propaganda. Branislav
Nusic, a  renown Serbian comedist, who worked several years at the consulate
in  Pristina,  helped open  the first Serbian bookstore and  renovate  of  a
primary and secondary school in Pristina. The promotion of education in 1893
was regarded as a considerable success in Serbia, since through the  Serbian
schools  Serbian  nationality  was indirectly recognized,  presented in  all
regulations  as  rum  millet,  i.e. a  religious category belonging  to  the
Constantinople  Patriarchate. The  success was  even more  greater since the
Bulgarian  Exarchate,  and  under  its  influence the  Turkish  authorities,
continually strove to  present the Serbian schools as  Bulgarian.  Under the
imperial irada of 1893 and the regulation on education of 1896, the Serbs in
Kosovo  and  Metohia  could freely open schools and  thus indirectly acquire
recognition of their nationality.14 However, insurmountable lists
of oppression upon the Serbs  often exceeding all known ways of torture with
their   brutalities,  continued  to  arrive  in  the  seat  of  the  Serbian
government. Within  only  six months  Nusic reported on  the devastation  of
eight Serbian churches and the persecution of priests.15
     Extremely dissatisfied and disturbed  by  the development  of political
conditions and the  position of Serbs in Old Serbia, the Serbian Ministry of
Foreign  Affairs  considered  the possibility of  wielding  a more favorable
influence  on the  educational  and national development of  Old Serbians by
reorganizing  the  network  of  consulates  and  uniting  national  actions.
Slobodan Jovanovic, one of the greatest Serbian historians and lawyers, then
young  official  at  the Ministry, was sent  in 1894  on  a  tour  to  visit
consulates in Turkey, while  Branislav Nusic,  the vice-consul in  Pristina,
obtained approval to travel through the region between Prizren and Scutari.
     Jovanovic informed that there was little the consul could do to protect
the  people  from  Albanian violence; that  it was isolated  and continually
under surveillance; and  proposed a  move to Mitrovica, which had a railroad
track  and livelier merchants contacts. But,  consequential to  the  serious
violence and the helplessness of the Serbian consul before the  authorities,
he  observed growing disagreements  and quarrels among the  people and  that
some  citizens  of Pristina  strive  to  adapt  to  the hard  conditions  by
cooperating with Turkish authorities.16 Traveling through Metohia
and north Albania,  Nusic noted that  the Serbs in Pec and the vicinity were
extremely estranged; the breach was so deep that they  informed against each
other to the authorities.
     Disharmony among  the  Serbs,  as  an  expression  of  an  insufferable
political situation  and  continual living  under extraordinary  conditions,
dangerously  undermined their ability of a joint resistance against Albanian
terror and the abuse  of Turkish authorities. Nusic wrote on  it in his book
on  the life of Serbs in  Kosovo: "Public life in Turkey is a bad example of
citizenry virtues  since it is regulated by laws that are  bad, or very good
but not enforced, or even worse,  enforced upon people whose prejudices  and
vices are stronger than law. While the law applies to one, it fails to apply
for  another [...]. Conditions  like  these  compel  the people to  contrive
conditions for peace and survival.  Thus upon encountering  these people one
often comes  across  reservation  and dishonesty,  traits not  indigenous to
these  people.  Frequently  betrayed  and  exposed,  more  often  innocently
destroyed,  it  has  became  distrustful and  will rarely reveal  its  inner
feelings."17
     The Serbs were not very successful in  courts either. A qadi boasted in
1891 of having solved two cases out of one thousand, for a period of over 18
years,  in favor  of the Serbs. When the litigants were  Serbs, he made  his
decision according to which side gave him a bigger bribe. 18
     1 B. Perunicic, Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, pp. 48-50..
     2 Ibid., p. 52.
     3 Ibid., p. 62.
     4 D.  T.  Batakovic, Memoari  Save  Decanca  o  visokim Decanima  1890.
godine, Mesovita gradja, XV (1986), pp. 117-136.
     5 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, p. 30.
     6 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 67-73.
     7 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, pp. 69-78.
     8 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, p. 42.
     9  B.  Perunicic,  Pisma srpskih  konzula  iz  Pristine  1890-1900,  J.
Popovic, op. cit., Pp. 251-153.
     10 B. Perunicic,  Pisma  srpskih  konzula  iz Pristine  1890-1900,  pp.
94-97.
     11  B.  Mikic,  Nastojanje  Srba  na  otvaranju  ruskog  ili  engleskog
konzulata u Peci 1908. godine, Obelezja, 1 (1977), p. 154.
     12 Istina o Kosovu, Beograd 1988 (M. Vojvodic).
     13 Ibid.
     14 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, p. 301.
     15  Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 631-636; B. Perunicic, Pisma  srpskih konzula
iz Pristine, pp. 152-188, 190-191.
     16  R.   Ljusic,  Izvestaj  Slobodana  Jovanovica   o  poseti   srpskim
konzulatima u Turskoj  iz 1894. godine, Istorijski glasnik, 1-2 (1987),  pp.
193-215.
     17 B. Nusic, Opis zemlje i naroda, Beograd 1986 , pp. 88.
     18 "Velika Srbija", No 51, Beograd, 8/20. XII 1891.

     Serbian national gatherings in Turkey were possible only under the wing
of the church.  Since plans for  restoring the Pec Patriarchate could not be
realized,  Serbia and Montenegro undertook  a  joint action in the mid-90's,
demanding  for  the  bishopric  chairs  in  the  Raska-Prizren  and  Skoplje
Eparchies to  be  occupied  by  metropolitans  of Serbian  nationality.  The
transition  of  these  two Eparchies to  the rule  of Serbian  metropolitans
through ecclesiastical institutions, would strengthen national and political
activity in Old Serbia.
     Following  the   death  of   Greek  Metropolitan   Melentije,  a  Serb,
Archsyncellus   Dionisije   Petrovic   (1896-1900)   was   consecrated   the
Raska-Prizren bishop with  the joint effort of the governments of Serbia and
Montenegro, bolstered by the  Russian diplomacy in  Constantinople. Carrying
out  orders from the Serbian government, the new metropolitan  implemented a
wide reorganization in ecclesiastical  and educational  institutions, opened
new schools, renewed teaching  staff, created new church-school communities,
and, in  keeping  with  the  orders of the  Serbian  government,  united the
activities  on  national affairs.1  Serbia  endeavored to  open a
consulate in  Prizren  to enable facile communication with the metropolitan.
Due to great resistance from ethnic Albanians who threatened to burn Serbian
towns  and sent  critical protests  to the  Porte, the consulate  was  never
opened.2
     The  national,  ecclesiastical  and  educational  activity  pursued  by
Dionisije  and  his successor  Nicifor Peric (1901-1911) reflected mostly in
the opening of new schools and invigorating the educational autonomy  of the
Serbs. Turkish  administrators and Austro-Hungarian diplomats regarded  them
as  agents  of "Great Serbian propaganda" and tried to  obstruct every  move
they  made.  The Turkish authorities were determined to limit  the religious
and legal  rights  of Serbs in Old  Serbia. Considering schools  seedbeds of
national  propaganda, Turkish authorities endeavored to impose a  compulsory
study of the Turkish language and to implement a rigorous supervision of the
curriculum and teachers in Serbian schools.3
     The metropolitans also clashed with the administration of church-school
communities,  who,  being  unused  to  central church  governing, showed  no
appreciation for measures  undertaken by  the former, thus giving  cause for
misunderstandings and mutual suspicion. The harshest conflict occurred  when
the  administration of the  Visoki Decani  monastery was deferred to Russian
monks  from  Mt.  Athos.  With  the  principle  agreement  from the  Serbian
government,  Metropolitan   Nicifor   negotiated   in  1903  to  defer   the
administration of Decani to  the monks  of the Russian  skits  St. John  the
Eloquent on Mt. Athos. The Russian monks were  brought to protect  the Serbs
in  Metohia from  Albanian  oppression,  to  restore  monastic life  in  the
impoverished monasteries and  to bar Austro-Hungarian influence and Catholic
propaganda.  As  far as the protection of Serbs  was concerned,  the Russian
diplomacy  was  expected to provide  assistance  aside to the  monks of  Mt.
Athos. The agreement concluded in 1903 without instructions from the Serbian
government caused many misunderstandings. The Russian monks usurped power of
the  monastery.  The  metropolitan  and  Serbian  government  endeavored  to
supplement the agreement and  limit their  administration, causing  a breach
between the Serbs of Metohia, those who were followers and those who opposed
the Russian monks.  A  dispute  between the  Russian and Serbian  government
entailed.  Dissension  and  quarrels   resulting  from  the   Decani   issue
considerably affected national activity in Metohia.4
     After  the Eastern  crisis  the Serbian  farmers  were  faced  with new
troubles. Emigration to Serbia and the settlement of the muhadjirs disturbed
relations in villages. The muhadjirs  and various other  tyrants, unhampered
by the Turkish authorities, assailed Serbian estates, committing brutalities
of all  sorts. Toward  the end of  the eighties,  when economic pressure had
become too hard  to bear, entire  villages were  preparing for emigration to
Serbia, particularly in the Ibarski Kolasin. The Turkish authorities replied
to  complaints lodged by the Serbs: "If you cannot  take  it,  seek better",
thus encouraging emigration.5
     Even  though there  were no principle  differences  between Serbian and
Albanian chiflik  farmers, the  Muslim  and  Catholic ethnic Albanians  were
nevertheless in a better situation. Overall lawlessness, assails and murders
compelled many Serbs to  turn  from previously  free  heirs  or herdsmen  to
chiflik farmers. Unlike the Serbs, ethnic Albanians  were unreliable  serfs,
being  used to robbery and  seizure, and the  feudal lords dared  not pursue
them.   Halil  Pasha   Mahmudbegovic  complained  of  their  obstinacy   and
recalcitrance  to  the  Serbian consul:  "[...] while we  still own  Serbian
chiflik farmers  you could say we  are lords of the  chifliks, but when they
move  out, and the ethnic Albanians take their places, then we are no longer
lords of the chifliks. When an Albanian settles on a chiflik, he is peaceful
2-3 years, and  gives a quarter to his master; but as soon as he builds  his
tower, he becomes a greater lord than the real lord."6
     Collection of  the land tithe was leased. The leasees  fined the  Serbs
without limits, while their complaints remained unanswered. Common hostility
toward the  Serbs had  spread among  Albanian  feudal lords.  To expand  and
reinforce their estates, they assisted the  settlement  of  Albanian chiflik
farmers  in  spite of  sporadic  conflicts.  In certain  regions  of Kosovo,
overbearing beys and agas succeeded, through oppression, to  compel  compact
Serbian  villages  to massive emigrations.  In a village near Pec, the  agas
drove  out even  those Serbs who owned land. In the vicinity of  Prizren, by
terrorizing  Serbian chiflik  farmers for twenty years,  ethnic Albanians of
the Kabash clan succeeded  in decreasing the number  of Serbian houses  of a
single  village from 40 to  nine. In the sanjak of Pristina, particularly in
Lipljan and Gracanica, where the inhabitants  were solely Serbs, until 1904,
feudal   lords   drove  away   the  Serbs   and   settled  Albanian  chiflik
farmers.7
     Serbian   town-dwellers,   mostly   merchants   and  craftsmen,   lived
comparatively  safely  in  towns.  The  main  obstacle  for expanding  their
businesses was the regard  of the Muslim trade district. With the renewal of
Muslim fanaticism in 1897, ethnic Albanians and Muslims began the boycott of
Serbian  goods, lasting  intermittently  until 1912. Upon the  initiative of
Metropolitan  Nicifor, Rector  of  the  Prizren  Seminary, and  a  series of
notable  Serbs in Prizren, an idea was initiated to found a Serbian monetary
bureau to  revive staggering  businesses. With financial  support  from  the
Belgrade  capital,  the  Serbian  government, the  consulate in Pristina and
support  from  Russian consuls  in Prizren and Mitrovica, the first monetary
bureaus sprang up.  In  Prizren in  1901 the  "St. George  Church Fund"  was
founded to aid operations of the Serbian trade district. In subsequent years
similar  funds or  societies  in Pristina  were founded ("St. Nikola  Church
Fund"), in  Mitrovica  (St. Sava Church  Fund) in  Fenzovic ("St. Tzar  Uros
Church Fund"),  and  many merchant-guild societies  were founded in Gnjilane
and Vucitrn.  With their unification around 1912  the  first  Serbian  banks
emerged in Kosovo. 8
     1  N. Raznatovic, Rod vlade Crne Gore i Srbije na postavljanju  srpskih
mitropolita u Prizrenu i Skoplju 1890-1902. godine, Istorijski zapisi, XXII,
2  (1965),  pp.  218-275;  Istorija  srpskog  naroda,  VI/1,   pp.  303-305;
Archimandrite Firmilijan Drazic was appointed  administrator of  the Skoplje
metropolitan in 1897, and as Serbian metropolitan, in 1902.
     2  D.  T.  Batakovic,  Pokusaji otvaranja  srpskog konzulata u Pristini
1898-1900, Istorijski casopis, XXXI (1984), pp. 249-250.
     3 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 305-307.
     4  D.  T.  Batakovic,  Decansko pitanje,  Beograd  1989  (with  earlier
literature).
     5 D.  Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX  veku, pp.
247-248.
     6 T. P. Stankovic, Putne beleske po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1898, p. 105.
     7 D.  Mikic,  Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp.
250-251.
     8  B.  Hrabak, Poceci bankarstva na  Kosovu,  Istorijski  glasnik,  1-2
(1982), pp. 57-83.

     Violence  and emigrations caused a continual decline of Serbs in Kosovo
and Metohia  since the Eastern crisis  until  liberation in 1912,  despite a
high  birthrate.  In  his  book  Kosovo,  Opis zemlje  i naroda  (Kosovo,  A
Description  of the  Country  and People), (1902),  B.  Nusic expounded  the
reason for  emigration  most clearly:  "Following  the Serbian-Turkish  war,
emigrations of  broad  dimensions took  place  for two  reasons.  The ethnic
Albanians, citizens of Kosovo, took to avenge themselves upon the Serbs, who
were  their  rayah,  on account  of the  war.  While going  to the  war  and
returning from it, they set fire  to Serbian homes, raided their cattle  and
to  Serbia,  the frontier of which was now  closer, thus facilitating  their
flight. On the other hand, the bulk of ethnic  Albanians who were driven out
stayed  in  Kosovo, there being  the closest to the lands they  abandoned in
Serbia. These newcomers, known as muhadjirs, inundated Kosovo and drove  out
the Serbs  from  their  lands  to make  space for themselves.[...] Thus  the
ethnic Albanians simultaneously flooded  Serbian  villages  from two  sides:
from the mountains, by descending toward the  Sitnica, and from  the Serbian
borders.  Today,  one  could  hardly  finger  out  villages  void  of ethnic
Albanians,  whereas countless of villages  inhabited by  Serbs  existed just
until  recently. The latter have retained their Serbian  names  but there is
not a single Serbian house in them."1
     An unreliable,  but indicative  Turkish  state  census, listed  shortly
before  the Eastern  crisis  in  1873,  exhibits  the  following ethnic  and
religious picture: in the Pristina, Vucitrn and Gnjilane kazas  (districts),
there  were  19,564 Christian  and  34,759 Muslim male  tax-heads. The Serbs
numbered the  most in  the  Gnjilane kaza: 11,607  to 12,544 Muslims. In the
Vucitrn  kaza there were  250  Christian  toward 800 Muslim  heads,  in  the
Pristina 400  to  3,000, in  Gnjilane 400 to 250. Of  7,850  male Muslims in
Pristina,  one half spoke  Turkish, the other  Albanian. In  Pec,  of  9,105
persons  one  third  spoke  Serbian,  the  second  Turkish  and   the  third
Albanian.2
     A list of Serbian  homes in  the Raska-Prizren Eparchy composed in 1899
by Metropolitan Dionisije, amounts to 8,323 Serbian village houses and 3,035
houses in the towns of Kosovo and Metohia,  which  comes to  113,580 persons
with  the  average  number  of  10 persons  per  family. In comparison  with
official  information from the  Serbian government  that from 1890  to  1900
around  60,000  Serbs  emigrated  from Kosovo,  Metohia and  the neighboring
regions to Serbia, statistics show that the number of Serbs in villages  had
declined  by  at  least a third  since  the Eastern  crisis. Serbian  houses
remained  most  numbered in towns,  where they were  comparatively protected
from  violence: in Prizren (982), Pristina  (531), Pec (461), Gnjilane (407)
and  Orahovac (176), and the  least  in the  small towns Djakovica (70)  and
Fenzovic (20).3
     Statistics of the population  of the  European  vilayet  of the Ottoman
Empire carried out in Vienna in 1903, based on official Turkish censuses and
research  conducted by  consular  departments,  shows  the  following ethnic
disposition in Kosovo and Metohia:4 
 

      
     Pec sanjak  
     Pristina sanjak  
     Prizren sanjak  
 

     Orthodox Serbs  
     23,750  
     73,400  
     14,200  
 

     Catholic Serbs  
     -  
     6,600  
     -  
 

     Muslim Serbs  
     13,250  
     43,000  
     13,000  
 

     Muslim Albanians  
     96,250  
     73,500  
     45,300  
 

     Catholic Albanians  
     9,300  
     50  
     5,000  
 

     Orthodox Albanians  
     -  
     -  
     900  
 

     Tzintzars (Romanians)  
     300  
     270  
     2,000  
 

     Turks  
     250  
     3,000  
     6,400  
 

     Jews  
     50  
     350  
     100  
 

     Gypsies  
     1,350  
     8,530  
     4,300  
 

     According  to  Austro-Hungarian  statistics,  the immediate  region  of
Kosovo and Metohia was composed of 111,350 Orthodox, 69,250 Muslim and 6,600
Catholics  Serbs,  totaling  187,200.  Albanian  Muslims  numbered  215,050,
Catholics 14,350, and Orthodox  900,  totally 230,300. The  Austro-Hungarian
statistics should not be wholely trusted, considering the political interest
of  the Dual Monarchy for ethnic Albanians,  and the time of its collection:
at the beginning of the reform action in Old Serbia and Macedonia.
     The most  complete statistic of the population of Kosovo and Metohia is
the  census composed by  the  Serbian  consulate in  Pristina in 1905. Three
sanjaks were  encompassed  in  the  census: the  Pristina,  Prizren and  Pec
sanjaks.  The  total  number  of  Orthodox Serbs in  this  particular census
amounted to 10,346 homes with 206,920 inhabitants. Official  data,  sent  by
officials of the Raska-Prizren  Eparchy to the consulate, totaled to  10,164
homes.5 
 

      
     homes  
     inhabitants  
 

     Orthodox Serbs  
     10,346  
     206,920  
 

     Muslim Serbs who became Albanians  
     15,600  
     390,010  
 

     Catholic Serbs  
     108  
     1,750  
 

     Muslim Serbs from Bosnia  
     50  
     1,200  
 

     Protestant Serbs  
     -  
     1  
 

     Catholic Albanians  
     260  
     1,560  
 

     Albanians  
     1,000  
     20,000  
 

     Turks  
     270  
     3,230  
 

     Jews  
     50  
     300  
 

     Shortly before the liberation of Kosovo in 1912,  according to research
conducted  by Ivan Kosancic, the  number of Serbian houses in the  Pristina,
Pec and Prizren sanjaks were the following:6 
 

     sanjak  
     in towns  
     in villages  
     total  
 

     Pristina  
     1,531  
     12,517  
     14,048  
 

     Pec  
     643  
     3,238  
     3,026  
 

     Prizren  
     982  
     1,148  
     2,400  
 


     The stated statistics show a relative increase in the number of Serbian
homes. It is  hard to suppose their number increased in the  first decade of
the  20th century,  since the  entire  documentation preserved points  to an
increase of emigrations to Serbia. The  increasing  number of Serbian  homes
noted by the consulate in Pristina, and subsequently by Kosancic, would more
likely refer to disintegration of family groups, when from one family group,
comprised of 20-30 members, several new hearths were created.
     The man  of most authority concerning ethnic relations in Old Serbia is
Jovan Cvijic.  In 1911  he published the results  of  his  research: in  the
Pristina sanjak  there were 14,048, in  the  Pec  sanjak  3,826,  and in the
Prizren sanjak 2,400  Serbian  houses,  with around  200,000 inhabitants. If
this data  were compared with the  statistics from the  first  half  of  the
century,  indicating  the existence  of  about 400,000 Serbs  in  Kosovo and
Metohia, then Cvijic's  evaluation that  from  1878  to 1912, around 150,000
persons moved to Serbia, is quite convincing.7
     1 B. Nusic, Kosovo, Opis zemlje i naroda, pp. 76-77.
     2   V.  Nikolic-Stojancevic,  Leskovac  i  oslobodjeni  predeli  Srbije
1877-1878, Leskovac 1975, p. 10
     3 S Novakovic, Balkanska pitanja, Beograd 1906, pp. 515-527; Prepiska o
arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji, Beograd 1899, pp. 136.
     4 Haus.  Hof, und Staatsarchiv - Wien, Politisches Archiv, XII, k. 272,
Nationalitaten  und Religions-karte der Vilajete  Kosovo, Salonika, Scutari,
Janina, und Monastir; cf also P. Barti, op. cit., pp. 52-64.
     5  B.  Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu  1901-1913,  pp.  246-248;  the
consul increased the final number  by 20%,  (not taken  into account in  the
above  table),  believing   the  information  provided  by   parish  regents
inaccurate, since the latter reduced the number of  parishoners for the sake
of their income.
     6 I.  Kosancic,  Novopazarski  sandzak,  Beograd 1912, 16-18;  Istorija
srpskog naroda, VI/1, p. 266.
     7 J.  Cvijic, Osnove  za  geografiju  i  geologiju Makedonije  i  Stare
Srbije,  III, Beograd 1911; ibid., Balkanski rat i Srbija, Beograd 1912; cf.
J.  Dedijer, Stara Srbija. Geografska i etnografska slika, Srpski  knjizevni
glasnik, XXIX (1912), pp. 674-699.




     This  era was  marked by  anarchy in Kosovo and  Metohia. Following the
great Eastern crisis (1878), anarchy encroached  the bases  of state policy,
and its driving  force  became  genocide  upon the Serbs. Developing  into a
movement, the purpose of which was to exterminate a people, Albanian anarchy
was  adjusted by  circumstances, lead by political motives, tribal, economic
or personal gains, displaying itself in various ways.  Muslim fundamentalism
and  religious  fanaticism were  interwoven  with feelings  of national  and
tribal belonging. Wavering between lucrative raids, blackmail, abduction and
radical  solutions by  murder or  the routing of entire families, the policy
conceived to exterminate the Serbian people was never  doubted. But it never
could be carried out  to  the end,  since  every attempt of massive physical
destruction or collective pursuit was threatened by subsequent international
clashes  and  the military  interference of neighboring Christian countries.
Thus the ethnic  Albanians  applied  the  method of  persistent violence day
after  day  which, being radicalized  in periods  of  crises, lead to a sure
completion of their purpose  -  the extermination  of  Serbs  in  the Kosovo
vilayet.  The decisive turning point came with the Greek-Turkish war (1897).
Recognized  as  an  announcement of  the approaching disintegration  of  the
Ottoman  Empire on the  Balkans,  it moved an avalanche of Albanian violence
upon the Serbs.
     Following  the Kurds'  brutal massacre of  the  Armenians, the European
public, appalled by the  barbaric  methods  of  Sultan Abdul Hamid's policy,
rightfully  named  him  "the  bloody Sultan". The Kurds of  the  Asia  Minor
expanses  seemed  to have proved their act in  the  same role as the  ethnic
Albanians had  in the  European  provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The  Greek
Insurrection on Crete in 1896 anticipated a new danger for the safety of the
empire. News on the massacre of Muslim followers upset conservative Albanian
circles  in  Kosovo. At councils,  held in  the houses  of notables  and  in
mosques, they confirmed their readiness for vengeance.1
     Pressured by the Great Powers, the Sultan announced a  program  of  new
reforms in 1896, anticipating equality  for Muslims and Christians under the
law  and  the  introduction  of  Christians  to administrative  bodies.  The
announcement  of  the  reforms exacerbated Muslim  ethnic  Albanians in  Old
Serbia and Macedonia.  Their  leaders,  pashas and  beys,  tribal chiefs and
standard bearers strove  to maintain the  possession of specially privileged
positions in the structure of  the  feudal society and to sustain  political
supremacy in their regions. The  Albanian migrs  and notables  of southern
Albania,  used  the announcement  of  reforms to renew the idea of autonomy.
Feudal circles of Kosovo sent a delegation to Constantinople, headed by Mula
Zeka  of  Pec,  expressing  readiness  to defend in  arms its homeland  from
external threat and requested for the reforms  not to be implemented  in Old
Serbia. Beys in Pristina  refused to give any  consideration to the reforms,
due to  the "Serbian  threat".  The Sultan accepted  their requests  without
hesitating.2
     The  declaration  of  war upon Crete  was  threatened by  the  possible
involvement  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia and  Montenegro in the  crisis. The Great
Powers,  especially  parties  holding  most  direct  interest  - Russia  and
Austria-Hungary, warned the Balkan state not  even to  think of warfare with
the Turks. The beginning of the Greek-Turkish war in April 1897, accelerated
negotiations between the two powers.  The Dual Monarchy and Russia concluded
a  secret agreement in  May  to preserve the status  quo  on  the Peninsula.
Several months subsequently  Austria-Hungary came  to  terms with  Italy for
joint influence in Albania.3
     The 1897 war with Greece  was a test of Albanian loyalty to the sultan.
Around  10,000  Albanian  volunteers  enlisted  in  the  Turkish  army.  The
declaration  of war  stirred Muslim fanaticism  among  the ethnic Albanians,
thus invigorating  identification with the  interests of the Ottoman Empire.
It was due to them that Turkish troops penetrated deep into  Thessaly,  with
Albanian volunteers exceeding in sacking Greek villages. Greece was defeated
but  Crete, with the  aid  of Great  Powers, was  on  its  way  of achieving
autonomy with the Greek prince as governor.
     Albanian volunteers from Kosovo and Metohia regarded the outcome of the
Crete  crisis as an announcement of new divisions in the Turkish  countries.
Like  many  times  before, they  blamed  the  Serbs  as  the  guilty  party,
suspecting  their conniving  with  the  authorities in Serbia. Following the
conclusion of the truce, the ethnic Albanians retained their arms, since the
Turks believed  they would  successfully defend the northern  borders of the
empire in case of  another war. Embittered by the failure  of their rumoring
Serbia's preparation to  war  with  Turkey, the ethnic Albanians then turned
upon the unprotected Serbian  populace more severely  than ever.4
The  Turkish  authorities  and Muslim clergy stirred  the  apprehensions  of
ethnic  Albanians  with  news  of imminent  war  with  Serbia.  In  such  an
atmosphere,  mass murders, robbery and violence spread  to broad dimensions.
The consulate in Pristina  reported that following the victory over  Greece,
ethnic Albanians  "have literally  become  enraged, perpetrating  atrocities
upon the Serbian  rayah they never dared do  before,  even  in their wildest
years."5
     Already next year, in 1898, the terror  grew to a  general movement  to
exterminate the Serbian rayah in Old Serbia. Reports from Serbian consulates
in Pristina and Skoplje indicate  that,  in its scope and  cruelty, this one
exceeded all previous  ones. The consul in  Pristina,  Svetislav  St. Simic,
warned that  the position "of  our [Serbian] people in  Kosovo  is no better
than the position of  the Armenians in Asia Minor in the years from 1894  to
1896".6 Lists of hundreds of  severe crimes  all pointed  to  the
fact  that the Serbs would soon disappear from Old Serbia unless  preventive
measures  were undertaken.  The  consuls  proposed for  people in the Kosovo
vilayet  to secretly arm for defense  against  the  tyrants. Frequent border
conflicts effected a strain in Serbian-Turkish relations.
     1  A large  number  of Albanians, especially those from Djakovica, took
part  in  the  Armenian massacre; see V.  Berard,  Politique du sultan. Pans
1897;  for  Albanian  agitation:  B.  Perunicic,  Pisma  srpskih konzula  iz
Pristine 1890-1900, pp. 198.
     2 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, pp. 44-45; D.
T. Batakovic, Osnove arbanaske prevlasti, p. 40.
     3 S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 242-244.
     4 Ibid., pp. 199-202.
     5 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih  konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, pp.  269;
Lists of violence, pp. 269-277, 293-299.
     6 Ibid., pp. 311.

     Political conditions in Serbia did not allow for any broader actions to
protect the  Serbs  in Turkey. Having returned to the  country,  King  Milan
undertook  to govern the foreign  policy. Requesting of the sultan religious
concessions  in  Macedonia, the  government  of  Vladan  Djordjevic waged  a
Turkophilic policy. The  foreign policy course pursued by King Milan, an old
Austrophilic, induced the Serbian government to  lose Russian support in the
Porte, gained in 1895-96, during  Stojan  Novakovic's  government.  Becoming
again the envoy to Constantinople, Novakovic proposed for the Serbian people
in Kosovo and Metohia  to be supplied with guns, and then the issue of their
protection  may be  raised.  When the proposition was not adopted,  he  then
proposed, to the government, at least diplomatic action with the Porte. With
the assistance of  consuls in  Pristina (Todor P. Stankovic, then  Svetislav
St. Simic) detailed lists of brutalities performed  by ethnic Albanians upon
the  Serbs  in 1897-1898 were  collected and submitted as a Serbian note  to
Turkish  Foreign Affairs Minister Tefvik Pasha.  Novakovic requested for the
Porte  to undertake energetic  measures to  terminate the  pogroms upon  the
Serbs   and    to   form    an    admixed   Turkish-Serbian    investigating
committee.1
     The note  dated May 26 contains  the  following statement:  "During the
past four  years the Royal [Serbian] government was compelled more than once
to  draw  the  attention of  the imperial  government, to  the disorder, and
incredible  and  innumerable  violent  deeds  continuously  performed by the
insubordinate and unruly Albanian populace on the Serbian-Turkish border, as
well  as on  the bordering sanjaks. These  crimes and attacks  are  directed
solely  toward  the  Christians of Serbian  nationality,  and it seems their
purpose  is  to  exterminate  the people  from  those  regions."2
Novakovic underscored that "The ethnic Albanians  are well-armed and certain
that no punishment awaits  them,  giving complete  liberty  to  their  cruel
instincts,  since  there  is  nothing  to   hinder  their   fanaticism   and
unrestrained hatred. Crimes and  robberies  are daily  occurrences,  and not
only do the perpetrators remain unpunished, they are not even pursued by the
authorities. The number  of fugitives  fleeing across the  border  for their
lives is enormous,  and  increases  everyday. According  to  data  the royal
government disposes of, more than four  hundred crimes were  perpetrated  in
the Pristina, Novi Pazar, Pec and Prizren sanjaks  within only a few months,
last summer  and  winter. They were: murder, arson, banditry, desecration of
churches,  rape,  abduction,  robbery, raiding  of whole  herds. This number
presents only several instances,  one fifth  at the  most,  of  what  really
happened, since most of the crimes are never discovered, since  the  victims
or  their  families dare  not complain."3 The  Porte delayed  its
reply so Novakovic requested to be received by the Turkish minister. He drew
the  minister's  attention  to  the  fact  that the  development  of  events
suggested  "that  everything is carried out under orders from Constantinople
and Yildiz, where a once extant  notion was to hoop another Muslim iron ring
around  Serbia,  like  the ones  once  made of the Cherkezes",  underscoring
certain  rumors "of  an idea  to  organize a  special  corps  named  Hamid's
Albanian army, like the well-known Kurd cavalier regiments".4
     At  the request of Serbia's envoy, the  Porte ordered  an investigation
committee at the  beginning of August, to check the  assertions  made in the
Serbian  notes. The party, headed by the sultan's adjutant, General Saadedin
Pasha,  visited  certain  areas  in  Kosovo  and  conducted   a  superficial
investigation: instead of seeking  the perpetrators, it  strove  to deny the
complaints.  The  Serbian delegate Todor P. Stankovic  was  not permitted to
participate  in the  operation. The investigation conducted  with  prejudice
produced  no  results. Russian diplomatic  officials,  whose attendance  was
requested  by  the  Serbian  populace,  were  not  permitted  to  watch  its
operation. Stankovic noted that only  the British consul to Scutari  checked
the assertions made  of the oppression,  and having  been convinced  in  the
truth of the  complaints lodged against  the  ethnic  Albanians, submitted a
report to his government.5
     The entire  investigation was  reduced to establishing inaccuracies  in
citing  the  names  of  victims,  perpetrators  and places mentioned in  the
Serbian notes. Appealing to information received from local authorities, the
Forte's  committee  maintained  that  "the attacks  ascribed to  the  ethnic
Albanians  are  either  unfounded  or  exaggerated",  and  finally   totally
dismissed   the   Serbian   assertions.   Novakovic  persistently  collected
additional  data  and  submitted  new  notes.  He  warned  that  the  ethnic
Albanians,  following  Saadedin  Pasha's  mission,  realizing  they  had  no
punishment to fear, continued performing their  vicious deeds upon the Serbs
with more enthusiasm.6
     Without  the  support  of  the Great  Powers, Serbia  could  accomplish
nothing. The attempt to request the intermediation of  their  ambassadors in
Constantinople  was thwarted  by Austria-Hungarian Foreign  Affairs Minister
Count Goluchowski, expounding that Russia would hinder any action benefiting
Serbia  on  account of  King Milan. The  Serbian premier proposed a military
demonstration on the Serbian-Turkish border,  but  the idea was abandoned at
Goluchowski request.7
     The diplomatic action was an  utter failure. The Porte closed the issue
with a protocolar apology. The Serbian premier, in his letter to  Novakovic,
somberly  concluded:  "The treatment of the Ottoman authorities, and Muslims
in  general, toward  Christians in the Kosovo vilayet can be observed by the
fact that  over  60,000 Serbs  fled  their  fatherlands  and  left  whatever
property they owned, to save their lives, from 1880 until today [June 1899].
This spring the ethnic Albanians  killed  many Serbs to arrogate their lands
and drive  them off,  in which they  have  succeeded considerably, incurring
thus the  flight  of several  hundred souls to Serbia  during  the last  few
months."8
     Not  having  met  with  understanding  in  Constantinople,  the Serbian
government  was preparing to internationalize the issue  of  protecting  its
compatriots in  Old Serbia.  Preparing for the Peace Conference in the Hague
(1899), a "blue book" titled Prepiska o Arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji
1898-1899 (Correspondence on Albanian violence in Old  Serbia 1898-1899) was
being  compiled, in which the  most important  acts from correspondence with
the Porte were published  in Serbian and French,  but were  not submitted to
the  European public.9  Serbian  refugees in Old  Serbia  sent  a
complaint  of  Albanian  oppression  to  the  Conference, in the form  of  a
memorandum, which  had previously been published in the Belgrade papers, but
not discussed in the Hague.10
     A French  contemporary,  while visiting Kosovo  and  Metohia, witnessed
Serbian sufferings  and protection given to the tyrants: "[...] whatever the
complaints  of  local  Slavs  and  charges brought by  the  Serbs,  whatever
reproaches  made by Russia, it is obvious  that neither  the sultan nor  the
Porte would ever get involved  against  the ethnic Albanians  nor would they
restore order in the Kosovo  vilayet. The ethnic  Albanians  in  this Slavic
country play  and will continue  to play  the  same  role  as  the Kurds  in
Armenia. The captives  of Islam and the servants of the lord [sultan] would,
under these two bases, enjoy impunity whatever their crimes."11
     Political commotion among the ethnic Albanians aggravated  the position
of the  Serbs  and violence  increased. At the end  of  1898, the autonomist
movement was revived, incited by the sultan's order to collect whatever arms
remained  from the previous war. Albanian chiefs feared new  reforms and the
possibility of the Great Powers introducing Christian rule, like they did in
Crete. In Pec,  at  the end of January, 1899, a large assembly of feudal and
tribal notables was held  to discuss  opposition to reforms and expansion of
tribal self-governing. Through influential beys, the Forte's attitude on the
necessity of joint defense was underscored in case of incursions from Serbia
and Montenegro.12
     The assembly was immediately with pogroms upon  the Serbs in Mitrovica.
In  Prizren  due of boycott  of Serbian  goods and  threats of massacre  the
Serbian downtown was closed. In April 1899, the ethnic Albanians set fire to
Serbian houses in the  Verici village  of the Pec  district.  Every day  the
consulate  received  black  news  sent  from  Podrimlje  and  villages  near
Pristina. Consul Simic ended one of a series  of lists on perpetrated crimes
with the following  words: "With  such anarchic, truely  barbaric conditions
here,  it is no wonder  the emigration of  our people,  from these areas  to
Serbia, is increasing."13
     1  Istorija  srpskog  naroda,  VI/1,  322-323;  M.  Vojvodic,  Srbija u
medjunarodnim odnosima krajem XIX veka i pocetkom XX veka, Beograd 1988, pp.
224-225.
     2  Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima  u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Beograd 1899, p. 15.
     3 Ibid., 16; in the note supplementation the number  of murders, church
raids, rapes and abductions, assaults, robberies and banditries (ibid.,  pp.
18-27).
     4 Ibid., p. 28.
     5  T.  P. Stankovic, Putne  beleske po  Staroj  Srbiji  1871-1898,  pp.
103-104.
     6 Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899, pp. 69-78,
87,  129 134-135;  S. Jovanovic, Vlada Aleksandra  Obrenovica,  II,  Beograd
1931, p. 76, cf. M. Vojvodic, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
     7 S. Jovanovic, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
     8  Prepiska  o  arbanaskim nasiljima  u  Staroj Srbiji  1898-1899,  pp.
135-136.
     9   Ibid.,  French  title:   Documents  diplomatiques,   Correspondance
concemant  les actes  de violence  et  de  brigandage des Albanais  dans  la
Vieille  Serbie  (Vilayet  de  Kosovo)  1898-1899,  Ministere  des  affaires
etrangeres,  Belgrade MDCCCXCIX,  pp.  1-145;  M.  Vojvodic,  op.  cit"  pp.
237-238.
     10 D.  T.  Batakovic,  Memorandum  Srba  iz Stare Srbije  i  Makedonije
Medjunarodnoj konferenciji mira u Hagu 1899. godine, Prilozi za knjizevnost,
jezik, istoriju i folklor vol. LII-LIV (1987-1988, pp. 177-183.
     11 V. Berard, La Macedoine, Paris 1900, pp. 138-139.
     12 M. Vojvodic. op. cit., pp. 225-226;  D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske
prilike kosovskih Srba u XIX i pocetkom XX veka, pp. 46-47.
     13 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula  iz Pristine  1890-1900, p. 407;
details on the violence: 387-489.

     During  the  final years of  the  19th  century, vital  stimuli  to the
expansion of  Albanian arrogance was given through intelligence  networks in
the  Kosovo  vilayet,  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy.  Following  the
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the military occupation of part of
the  Novi  Pazar  sanjak,  which  could, under  the  decrees  of  the Berlin
Congress,   be  extended  to  just  beyond  Mitrovica",  the  Dual  Monarchy
continually  worked  on  deepening   the  chasm  between  Serbs  and  ethnic
Albanians. Having  experienced the  unification of Germany and  Italy to its
detriment, it  could not allow the  unification of the  Serbs, with the same
consequences.  The Kosovo vilayet, which  separated  two independent Serbian
states, became the key to solve the Balkan issue. With support from Germany,
Austria-Hungary made preparations to  take its decisive step over Old Serbia
in Germanic penetration to the East.
     Austria-Hungarian  influence  in  the  Kosovo  vilayet  gradually  grew
through  Catholic  missions in  north  Albania, Metohia  and  consulates  in
Prizren. Skoplje and Scutari.  Following  the exodus of Serbs in  1878-1881,
the abandoned Serbian estates in Metohia  were settled, with  the assistance
of Albanian beys,  by Albanian Catholics, the so-called Fandas, who  were to
become  the  main  bearers  of  Austria-Hungarian  propaganda  among   their
compatriots of  Muslim faith. A certain  increase of Catholic inhabitants in
Metohia  made  room  for the  opening of new ecclesiastical  and educational
institutions which became  centers  of  the  aggressive propaganda.  Greater
pressure emanating  from  Jesuit propaganda  was also  felt by  the  Serbian
clergy. Phanariote  Bishop  Melentije freely  allowed Catholic agitation  to
spread among  the Serbs of  the  Pec and Prizren sanjaks.1 At the
same time, the  European public was presented with publications interpreting
the historical evolution, the ethnic composition and political importance of
Kosovo with seemingly expert argumentation. In a study  of  the  Novi  Pazar
sanjak  in  Kosovo, Theodor  Ippen endeavored to  support his thesis  on the
ethnic  unity  of all  territories with  Bosnia, and  thus  indirectly  with
Austria-Hungary, on the  basis of historical evidence, therefore denying the
Serbs their  character, emphasizing the importance of national individuality
of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.2
     The Balkan  policy of the highest political and military circles of the
Dual Monarchy regarded  the Albanian  populace as an element of  outstanding
importance.  Anticipating the  approaching  disintegration  of  the  Ottoman
Empire  in the  Peninsula, Austria-Hungary was preparing to establish  order
and impose its rule  as mandator in Europe, as it had already done in Bosnia
and  Herzegovina  in  1878. Penetration toward  the Vardar  valley  and  the
Salonika  Bay  imposed  the  formation  of  autonomous  Albania  under   its
protectorate.  An  Albanian state  like this  would  render  impossible  the
unification of Serbia and  Montenegro, and  would curb influence coming from
Italy.
     The  Foreign  Minister  of  the   Dual  Monarchy,   Count  Goluchowski,
considered  it  of immense  importance to Austro-Hungarian interest  for the
ethnic Albanians not to come under foreign influence,  and proposed, in case
the Ottoman  Empire should  collapse, that Austria-Hungary should  support a
separate  autonomy  for Albania, ruled  by  a  foreign prince  and under its
protectorate;  Serbia  would  then  have   to  satisfy  its  aspirations  by
concessions   made  in   the  Pristina  and  Skoplje  sanjaks.   The   joint
Austro-Hungarian Minister of  Finance Benjamin  Kallay, demanded to win over
the Muslim ethnic Albanians of the Kosovo  vilayet. He particularly stressed
the importance of propaganda to  encompass the Pristina and Skoplje sanjaks,
believing that if conflicts with Turkey  should  arise,  all territories  in
which ethnic  Albanians  were a minority  would  belong to  either Serbia or
Bulgaria.3
     In  the 1897  negotiations,  Russian  diplomats  were informed that  if
status quo  on  the  Balkan  Peninsula  were to  prove  untenable, the  Dual
Monarchy would demand  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and Herzegovina and  the
division  of  Turkish  lands  in  Europe,  including  the  formation  of  an
independent  Albanian  state  between Janina  and  Scutari  Lake  under  its
protectorate.  Aspiring   toward  their  goal,   Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy
considered  the possibility  of  establishing a religious protectorate  over
Catholic ethnic Albanians which  would  then  acquire political  dimensions.
Since   the  close  of  the   19th  century,  Franciscans   infiltrated   by
Austria-Hungary had been checking the Italian and local Catholic clergy even
in Albania.4
     Wherever  there  were   bribable  and   ambitious  beys   in   Metohia,
Austria-Hungary built  strong bastions  by lavishly bestowing money. At  the
assembly in Pec, at the beginning of 1899, aside to  notables of Turkophilic
and autonomous  disposition,  those of pro-Austrian inclination appeared  as
well. A group of tribal  and feudal leaders, headed by  the  until  recently
sultan's favorite  Haxhi  Mulla  Zeka, and  Riza  Bey Krieziu of  Djakovica,
openly recommended  closer relations with the Dual Monarchy,  as a potential
protector of the ethnic Albanians and against neighboring Serbian states and
possible  reforms.  The   number  of  Austro-Hungarian  followers  grew   in
accordance  with  purchases  made  by  Austro-Hungarian  agents of  Albanian
notables.  According  to a Russian  paper  Novoe  Vremja,  about five to six
million crowns of  the  Dual Monarchy's  annual  budget  were set  aside for
Albanian    propaganda    and    the    payment    of    corrupt    Albanian
magnates.5
     Agitation  among  the  ethnic   Albanians  was  lead   through  several
directions. In Metohia, where  clan chiefs  quarreled over  domains,  agents
were infiltrated, while  Austro-Hungarian  propaganda was  observed to  have
spread owing to Bosnian Muslim religious heads. Catholic friars expounded to
Muslim  ethnic Albanians that  Serbia  and Montenegro were  outposts  on the
Peninsula and that the neighboring Monarchy was their sole protector. Vienna
papers,  reporting  on events taking  place in Old Serbia (particularly  the
Politische  Korrespondenz),  regularly  titled  their  news as  coming  from
Albania,  thus creating  the impression  that ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo
vilayet comprised the majority of the population and that it was practically
devoid of Serbs.6
     The dimension of Austro-Hungarian political agitation could not pass by
the Turkish authorities  unnoticed.  The district chief in  Pristina noticed
that  Albanian assails upon the Serbs were  encouraged by agitators  of  the
Dual  Monarchy.  The vali of  Kosovo, Hafis  Pasha,  attributed all Albanian
unrest in Metohia (especially in Prizren 1899, subsequently  in Skoplje), to
operations carried  out  by Austro-Hungarian  intelligence  services.  Their
purpose,  he  believed,   was  to  cause  widespread   unrest   to   provide
Austria-Hungary  with  an excuse to occupy the  Kosovo  vilayet.7
Even the sultan, when confronted with  a warning from the Russian ambassador
that Albanian anarchy was planned, since only Orthodox Serbs suffered,  "did
not   deny  the  presence  of  a  foreign  party   operating   through   its
agents".8 Suspicion as to the  motives of the  Albanian  movement
was also  spread  by  Young  Turk followers  of Albanian  origin,  who  gave
statements abroad that ethnic Albanians were disloyal to the sultan and were
waiting  for  the  opportunity  to  secede  from   Turkey.   Telegrams  were
immediately sent from Pristina,  Prizren  and  other  towns  in  Kosovo  and
Metohia, to the  padishah  with expressions of  unequivocal faithfulness and
loyalty.9
     Foreign witnesses also observed the fatal influence of Austro-Hungarian
propaganda  in Old  Serbia. A French scholar,  Victor Berard, an  expert  on
political  trends  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  emphasized  "that  the mystery
concealing  the operation of  Austrian agents  and  their entire  propaganda
network raised, in the eyes of blinded ethnic Albanians, this major power to
even  greater  heights,  skillfully  interweaving them  in  the  dexterously
devised and  woven  network of their foreign policy".10 Bulgarian
historian  N. Marenin  observed that  aside  to all the skill of its agents,
Austro-Hungarian propaganda had succeeded with the ethnic Albanians owing to
large amounts of money paid annually to those most prominent and influential
among  them. Marenin  underscored that a  favorable  condition for  bringing
together  the  ethnic  Albanians  and  the Dual  Monarchy  was their  mutual
interest to  exterminate the  Serbian  populace in the area between the Drim
river and Mount Kopaonik, i.e. between Serbia and Albania.11
     Owing to the instigations of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service,
total anarchy reigned in  Kosovo. Enboldened  by protection promised by  the
Dual Monarchy and the sultan's confidence, the ethnic Albanians, filled with
renewed  energy,  dashed to settle accounts with the Serbs.  During 1900 and
1902 the  crimes attained apocalyptic dimensions. The Pec nahi  suffered the
most since  Catholic  ethnic  Albanians  exceeded  in oppression. Blackmail,
robbery and murder  extremely affected the  Gnjilane and Pristina region. In
Prizren, the Serbs dared not appear downtown. Schools and churches also bore
the brunt of  oppression.  The pursuit of  Serbian priests  became frequent,
ethnic  Albanians regarded  all  distinguished national notables  as Serbian
spies and komitadjis. This anti-Serb disposition reached the point when even
certain Turkish officials,  in the army,  administration,  especially within
the circle  of  religious heads, openly appealed to the ethnic Albanians  to
clash with the  Serbs, arrogate  their  lands  and force  them  to  flee  to
Serbia.12
     Anarchy  attained such  dimensions that the Porte was compelled to send
new military  contingents. Brigadier General Shemsi Pasha was sent to Kosovo
to consolidate government  authority, collect  arms  and  capture the  major
violators. He frequently left Pristina to visit the vilayet, calm the ethnic
Albanians,  reconcile their quarreling chiefs and, though rarely, intervened
to  protect the Serbs. In Vucitrn  he  was compelled to  protect  the  Serbs
threatened by oppression in the Raznjane village. Raska-Prizren Metropolitan
Dionisije   escaped   assassination  twice,  and  so   moved  his  seat   to
Gnjilane.13
     A  direct  consequence  of Austro-Hungarian  influence  was  oppression
executed upon the Serbs of the Ibarski Kolasin, in summer 1901.  The Ibarski
Kolasin  was a  woody area with over forty villages  to the northwest of Old
Serbia, inhabited almost  entirely by Serbs who had preserved a certain kind
of self-government, choosing their own local knez (leader).14
     The extent of  oppression compelled the Serbs from all parts  of Kosovo
and Metohia to  appeal to  the  consulate in Pristina  in 1897, demanding  a
secret delivery of arms for protection against the tyrants. Stojan Novakovic
had proposed to arm the Serbian inhabitants gradually and organize  them for
defense  back in 1896: "ethnic  Albanians  were evildoers,  but they treated
with respect those houses in Old Serbia which they knew had weapons and male
heads."15 The consul in  Pristina supported Novakovic's proposal,
adding  that Albanian assails upon the  Serbs were  encouraged on account of
the   latter   having   no  arms,  while  these   deeds   left   the   Serbs
faithearted.16
     After the failure  of the diplomatic mission with  the Porte to protect
Serbian  inhabitants, the government of  Vladan Djordjevic  began, in spring
1899,  the  secret delivery of trophy  guns remaining from the  previous war
with Turkey, to Serbs inhabiting the northern regions of the Kosovo vilayet.
Since the  beginning of  1901,  exaggerated news of thousands of guns  being
smuggled to arm entire Serbian villages caused great  alarm among the ethnic
Albanians.  The Turkish authorities conducted searches  in the north regions
of Old  Serbia, and  only  at the beginning  of  July, owing  to information
procured by Albanian notable Isa Boljetinac, did they  discover that most of
the weapons were delivered to the Ibarski Kolasin.17
     Under the leadership of Isa Boljetinac,  the ethnic Albanians and Turks
searched  the Kolasin villages and forced the people to surrender their arms
under brutalities  unheard-of. Many  were  abused,  beaten and wounded;  one
Serbian was beaten up  and  succumbed to  wounds  inflicted. Several hundred
Serbs were shackled and taken to prisons in Mitrovica and Pristina. The arms
investigation incited ethnic  Albanians from other regions to set off toward
Kolasin and seek guns in the villages. From January to August alone,  around
six  hundred persons fled to Serbia. The disturbed public demanded energetic
action from the government. The  arms investigation ended only when Serbia's
demands  to  the  Porte  were supported by  Russia. Following  the energetic
intervention of  the  Russian  ambassador  to  Constantinople,  violence  in
Kolasin ceased, the arrested  Serbs were  set  free,  and Isa Boljetinac was
moved out  of Mitrovica.  However, Austro-Hungarian  delegates to  the Porte
claimed the pogroms in Kolasin were multiply exaggerated.18
     Austro-Hungarian consular officials in Kosovo saw the affair at Kolasin
as a sign of "great Serbian propaganda"  in Old Serbia. All  political moves
made  by  the  Serbian  government  in  the  Kosovo vilayet,  including  the
inauguration  of  new schools, and  financial  help  given  to  teachers and
monastic fraternities,  were  considered a  serious  injury to the political
interests  of the Dual Monarchy. When  Adem Zaim killed Hadji  Mulla Zeka in
Pec for  tribal  dissentions, at the  beginning  of  1902,  Austro-Hungarian
consuls announced that it was a Serbian conspiracy.19
     1  Istorija  srpskog  naroda,  VI/1,  p.302;  V.  Bovan, op.  cit.;  H.
Schwanda, Das  Protektorat stereich-Ungarans uber die Katholiken Albanians,
Wien 1965; passim S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 238-286.
     2 Theodor Ippen, Novi Pazar und Kosovo  (Das Alte Rascien), Wien  1892;
ibid,  Das  Religiose  Protektorat Osterreich-Ungarns  in  der  Turkei,  Die
Kultur, 3 (1901-1902), pp. 298-310;
     3 F. Hauptmann, Uloga zajednickog  ministarstva finansija  u formiranju
Austro-Ugarske   politike  prema  Albaniji   uoci   kretske  krize,   Radovi
Filozofskog  fakulteta  u Sarajevu,  IV  (1968),  pp.  35-45;  H.  Kapidzic,
Pripreme  za  austrougarsko  prodiranje  u  albansko  etnicko  podrucje   iz
Novopazarskog  sandzaka, Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Sarajevu, VI (1971),
pp. 415-430; cf. N.D. Schnadel, op. cit., pp. 54-74.
     4 B. Hrabak, Kultni protektorat  Austro-Ugarske nad  Arbanasima (1897),
Godisnjak  Arhiva Kosova, XXIII (1987),  p.  33-54; J. Sliskovic, Albanija i
Macedonia, Sarajevo 1904, p. 80; V. Stojancevic, Diplomatska trvenja konzula
velikih sila  u Skoplju no. tamosnje  Arbanase  katolike pocetkom  XX  veka,
Istorijski casopis, XVIII (1971), pp. 329-339.
     5 V. Stojancevic,  Austrougarsko-srpski sukob  u kosovskom  vilajetu na
pocetku  XX veka,  in: Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski  rat,  Beograd
1967 pp. 847-876.
     6  D.  T.  Batakovic,  Pokusaj  otvaranja srpskog konzulata  u Prizrenu
1898-1900, pp. 256-257.
     7 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta  prema
izvestajima  austrougarskog  konzula  u  Skoplju  1900.  i   1901.   godine,
Istorijski casopis, (XII-XIII) (1961-1962), p. 290-291.
     8 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, Beograd
1936, p. 15.
     9 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago. i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, pp. 169-170.
     10 V. Berard,  La Turquie et I'Hellenisme contemporain, Paris 1900, pp.
291-292.
     11 N. Marenin, Albanija i Albanci, pp. 91-92; cited from P. Orlovic (S.
St. Simic), Stara Srbija i Arbanasi, Beograd 1904, pp. 21-22.
     12 Regarding the conference of the Serbian and Bulgarian rulers at Nis,
Austro-Hungarian agitators reported it was secretly being  held at Pristina.
Among  the Albanians  a  widespread conviction existed that a joint military
intervention of the  two countries was being prepared. The bessa was hastily
given and conference  on  Joint defense began. (M. Vojvodic, op.  cit.,  pp.
332-333).
     13 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta prema
izvestajima  austrougarskog konzula  u Skoplju  1900. i  1901.  godine,  pp.
311-312.
     14  M.  Lutovac,  Ibarski  Kolasin, Antropogeografska istrazivanja, pp.
57-188.
     15 Spomenica Stojana Novakovica, p. 196.
     16 B.  Perunicic, Pisma srpskih  konzula  iz  Pristine  1890-1900,  pp.
345-346.
     17 M. Vojvodic,  op. cit., 334;  D.  T.  Batakovic,  Istraga  oruzja  u
Ibarskom  Kolasinu  1901, Kosovsko-Metohijski  zbornik  SANU  1  (1990), pp.
269-284
     18 Ibid., cf. S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 201-202.
     19 V. Stojanovic, Austrougarsko-srpski  sukob  u kosovskom vilajetu, p.
865.

     Pogroms in the Ibarski Kolasin sobered the public and ruling circles of
Serbia.  In Belgrade, public meetings were organized where demands were made
for the government  to initiate the  issue  of  Serbian  nationality in  Old
Serbia and Macedonia. In disputes  announced on the issue of the survival of
Serbs in Old Serbia, Svetislav Simic was the most outstanding.
     In his discussion Pitanje o Staroj Srbiji (The  Question of Old Serbia)
Simic underscored the danger of Austro-Hungarian agitation  among the ethnic
Albanians and emphasized that the destiny of the Serbs and the Slav cause in
the Balkans would unfold in Kosovo.1
     The  balance  of  forces,  particularly  Austro-Hungarian  influence in
Serbia  and  Russia's failure to confront  its  agitation in Old Serbia with
more energy, tied the hands of the Serbian diplomacy in  its attempts  for a
more efficient protection of its  compatriots.  Following the  death of King
Milutin, Vienna's most  trusted friend in Serbia,  King Aleksandar Obrenovic
took the Russophil course in foreign policy, to calm tempers in the country.
At the same time, at the invitation of  the Serbian  government, a  group of
Albanian notables arrived in Belgrade from Fed and Djakovica, among whom was
the Pec leader  Mehmed Zaim. They were lavished with rich gifts in money and
arms and promised assistance if they helped to bring an end to violence upon
the Serbs.2
     The Serbian  government  initiated  the  issue  of  protecting Serbs in
Turkey in 1902,  and  in August, bolteresred by  the  Montenegrin diplomacy,
authorized its envoy in  Constantinople to make the following demands to the
Porte: 1)  regular and for all equal  application  of law; 2)  an end to the
policy of encouraging ethnic  Albanians. Propositions along  this  line were
for either disarmament of the ethnic Albanians or allowance for the Serbs to
carry  guns; for reinforcement  of  Turkish  garrisons wherever  there  were
Serbian-Albanian inhabitants admixed;  removal of  corrupt Turkish officials
and  assignment  of  conscientious  ones; inauguration of administrative and
judicial reforms with larger Serbian participation in the administration and
judiciary; implementation of  agrary reform.  Russia supported Serbia  since
none  of the bases  were touched regarding  the status quo  established with
Austria-Hungary in 1897.3
     To  forestall  the  reform   plan  of  the   Great  Powers,  especially
Austria-Hungary and Russia, which had the right to protect Christians in the
Ottoman Empire under article 23 of the Berlin Congress, the sultan announced
reforms  in November  1902. The reform  action of Turkey, headed by  Hussein
Hilmi Pasha as general inspector, anticipated a more rigorous application of
the  law,   regulation  of  agrary  duties,  dismission  of  unconscientious
officials and the  enlisting  of  Serbs in  the  Turkish gendarme.  Military
authorities undertook to capture the most wanted criminals.4
     The  dimension  of  lawlessness  and  Serbian  plight  shocked  foreign
Journalists. Victor Berard  wrote that  life in places between Pec,  Prizren
and  Pristina was marked with violence under the ethnic  Albanians,  arsons,
rapes, vengeance, and real tribal  warfare. Georges  Gaulis noticed that due
to  the  extent  of  oppression upon the Serbs,  Old Serbia was, along  with
Armenia, the most wretched country in the world. Bearing witness to Albanian
recalcitrance  and their motives,  he particularly stressed: "Those of Debar
kill to rob, those of Djakovica kill from shear fanaticism, those of Prizren
kill for their  evil instincts, and those  of  Tetovo  kill to try out their
carbines."5
     Following the Kolasin affair, Russia opened a consulate in Mitrovica to
follow  more  closely Austria-Hungary's influence over Albanian moves and to
protect the Serbs from violence. The Vienna legation exerted  influence upon
the Porte to  prolong its  inauguration. The  ethnic Albanians received  the
news  of the opening of the Russian consulate with open discontent and acute
opposition.  Isa Boljetinac threatened to  punish anyone who  dared rent his
house  to  the Russian consul and openly spoke  of forcibly routing him from
Kosovo.  Following  the  threats made  to its  staff, the Russian  diplomacy
demanded of  the  Ottoman  authorities to  arrest and  rout  the  leaders of
"Anti-Russian  demonstrations".  Isa  Boljetinac  agreed,  after  a  lengthy
persuasion from the authorities, to leave for Constantinople, "to visit" the
padishah.  The  St.  Petersburg  press underscored  the  importance  of  the
consulate opening in  Mitrovica,  where "at  the  central point between  Old
Serbia    and    Albania,   [Russian]    control    emerges   over    ethnic
Albanians".6
     The announcement  of the reform plan, more rigorous application of law,
acceptance  of  Serbs  in  the  gendarme service and  news  of  the  Russian
consulate  finally  opening in Mitrovica, instigated the ethnic Albanians to
rise.  At the beginning of 1903, a large assembly of tribal  chiefs was held
at  the Lucki  Most near Djakovica. The  ethnic Albanians  blamed solely the
Serbs for all the reforms. It was thus  decided  "to gradually kill the more
prominent Serbs of the Pec nahi one after another, and compel the  others to
flee to Serbia or to be Turkized."7
     The plans of the participants were to rout the Turkish authorities from
Pec,  kill the notable Serbs  and then  move  to  Mitrovica to confront  the
Russian consul. Severe persecution of the  Serbs  began immediately. In  the
Pec  nahi  alone ten  people were killed  within a few weeks.  Following the
meeting in  Drenica,  the  ethnic Albanians decided  to take to arms.  Armed
rebels raided  Vucitrn  on March  29,  ravaged  the  local  Serbian  church,
disarmed the Serbs accepted in the gendarme and set off to Mitrovica to rout
by force Russian Consul Grigorie Stepanovich Shtcherbin.8
     The Russian consul remained in  town  to supervise Turkish preparations
for  defense. Around 2,000 ethnic Albanians  attacked Mitrovica on March 30.
Following a decisive  resistance of Turkish forces, driven away by artillery
fire, the ethnic Albanians abandoned their plan to take  the  town. The next
day  a  Turkish  corporal, an  Albanian, shot  the Russian consul while  the
latter  was visiting the outskirts of town. The assassin claimed he shot the
consul in vengeance, denying affiliation to any movement, while the severely
wounded consul succumbed to his wounds ten days hence.
     The death  of the Russian  consul  demonstrated the  extent of Albanian
anarchy,  whereas  the  relation  of the  sultan and  of  the  high  ranking
officials of the  Porte  toward their bearers  was displayed in the stand to
which they  adhered. Diplomatic circles in Constantinople  expected decisive
measures  to  be  undertaken against  the  ethnic  Albanians. Abdulhamid  II
promised  he would send  military  reinforcements  to  restore order  in Old
Serbia and to  capture  the rebels,  but  "fearing court revolution from his
Albanian guards", he decided against the announced measures.9
     Simultaneously,  the sultan  advised the  Albanian leaders, who  feared
international conflicts for wounding and killing a  Russian consul, to  calm
down. Agents of the Dual Monarchy and  Catholic friars encouraged the ethnic
Albanians of  Mitrovica not to fear Russian  retribution and to persevere in
their opposition. The death  of the Russian consul was a national tragedy to
the  Serbs, who saw in him a  protector and a representative of a power they
expected would end this anarchy and violence. The train,  bearing the coffin
of  the deceased  consul, was accompanied by several thousand  Serbs,  while
funeral   services   were   held   in   churches   throughout   Kosovo   and
Metohia.10
     Anarchy  in  Old  Serbia  and disorder  in  Macedonia,  where  Bulgaria
introduced companies to  urge a rise  and  solve the problem of Macedonia to
its  benefit,  compelled Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  being  the two  most
interested major parties, to demand the implementation of reforms. They
     announced their reform project in February 1903,  while a detailed plan
of the whole operation was designed at a meeting of the two tzars, Nikola II
and Franz  Joseph  I in Murzsteg, at the beginning of October. Expecting war
in the Far East,  Russia strove  to retain for a time, the status quo on the
Balkans. Austria-Hungary intended to consolidate its positions with a reform
action.   Shortly  before   the  meeting  in   Murzsteg,  Count  Goluchowski
elaborated, to the tzar, the plan to divide Turkish lands in Europe:
     make Romania as large as possible, a large Bulgaria, a weak Montenegro,
a small Serbia  and a free Albania. The Dual Monarchy would,  as Golochowski
believed,  sooner engage  into war than allow for  the  creation  of a great
Serbia or a great Montenegro.11
     Succeeding  to  the  throne following  the  killing of King  Aleksandar
Obrenovic  (1903), was  Petar  I  Karadjordjevic (1903-1921).  The  personal
regimes of the last Obrenovices were replaced by the parliamentary monarchy.
The  democracy  activated  a  huge   political,  national  and  intellectual
potential that was unable to  take full swing during the  previous  regimes.
The termination  of dependence upon Austria-Hungary marked an acute turnover
in Serbia's foreign  policy, which, relying upon Russia, set off to struggle
for national liberation and the unification of  the Serbian people. Conflict
with Austria-Hungary began immediately with the reform issues in Turkey.
     The reform action that  was  to have  been  implemented in the European
provinces of  the Ottoman Empire with  the  supervision of the Great Powers,
was  considered  by  the Serbs of Kosovo  and  Metohia a benefical  solution
against Albanian terror. Russia intended to secure supervision for itself on
the reforms in  Kosovo  and Metohia, but  the plan  was  soon  thwarted.  At
Austria-Hungary's demand,  at the beginning of  1904, the Northwest parts of
the Kosovo  vilayet, i.e. Kosovo and  Metohia, were excluded from the reform
action, explained as being one of an admixed population.12
     The ethnic  Albanians won a great victory  with the exclusion of Kosovo
and  Metohia from the reform  action; there was nothing  to  intercede their
supremacy and  unhamper their  dealings  with the Serbs. Left  to  fate, the
Serbs remained the victims  of a privileged ethnic  populace. The years 1904
and  1905  are  remembered by the  unheard-of oppression  upon  the  Serbian
population. Turkish authorities  undertook no measures whatsoever, the Porte
would not heed the notes of protest sent by the Serbian government. Occupied
with  internal  unrest  and conflicts in the Far East, Russia was  unable to
support Serbian protests more decisively. Serbia  tried in vain to establish
contact with  the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. In Belgrade, the paper Albania
was  inaugurated  to propagate  Serbian-Albanian amicability,  while  Nikola
Pasic  strove to  find  adversaries  of  Austro-Hungarian  propaganda  among
notables in Metohia. Finding no way to come to any agreement with tribal and
feudal  notables,  the  Serbian government  paid  some  Albanian  outlaws to
protect  Serbian villages in Metohia; since  1903  Montenegro also  requited
ethnic Albanians to protect the Serbs.13
     The consul to Pristina, Miroslav  Spalajkovic,  reported  at the end of
June  1905, "there was  not  a day that  one or two  murders  of Serbs  were
committed"  in Kosovo  and  Metohia,  adding that "nothing was done to  stop
Albanian banditry". He was particularly worried since "the reform forces pay
absolutely no attention to  these regions". Russian  consul to Mitrovica, A.
A. Orlov, assured  him  he was sending daily reports  to the  embassy on the
situation in Kosovo  and Metohia, but  it showed  no interest. Believing the
Albanian misdeeds had gone too  far, Spalajkovic proposed to the  government
to find a way "to interest the public of Russia, England and  France  in the
wretched situation of Serbs in Old Serbia" and  proposed to jar, through the
press, "the passiveness and  gross negligence of the  official  delegates of
Great   Powers,   whose  attention   has  now  been   solely   diverted   to
Macedonia".14
     Stretching from the Pec  nahi to the plains of  Kosovo and the gorge of
Kacanik,  the ethnic Albanians,  fearing no  sanctions, robbed, blackmailed,
routed  and killed the Serbian  populace  mostly in  villages  and on roads.
During  1904, from Kosovo alone 108 persons fled to Serbia.15 The
Serbian consulate  in Pristina composed a detailed list of  crimes committed
upon the Serbs in 1906 - with names  of the perpetrators, victims and  types
of oppression. In 1904, of 136 different crimes noted, 46 ended with murder.
Many  houses, crops and barns  were  burned, many people  beaten and robbed,
without  sparing   the  children.  A  group  of  ethnic  Albanians  raped  a
seven-year-old  girl.  In 1905, from 281 cases of oppression,  65 Serbs were
killed  (at   a   wedding  alone,   recalcitrant  outlaws  killed   nine  of
them).16 Reports from  Serbian  agents  and  consuls display that
Fandas and Catholic ethnic  Albanians, standing under the direct control  of
Austro-Hungarian propaganda, exceeded in the crimes.17
     Pec  and its  neighboring regions  suffered the most since there was no
Serbian  consulate nor foreign power  which would,  at least just  by  being
there,  somewhat lessen the  crimes committed in the  town and its immediate
vicinity. In a complaint lodged  to the consul, the  Serbs of  Pec  reported
that Albanian chiefs forbade their compatriots to protect the Serbs, "and to
place komitadjis of 2-12 men in every village, so whenever they come  across
a  Serb  they  do  away  with  him".18 Rector of the  Seminary in
Prizren  sent a list to  the  consulate in Pristina in 1906,  containing the
victims of violence under the ethnic Albanians of Pec  and the vicinity - 38
murdered and five  wounded in 1905;  within the first three  months of 1906,
three murdered  and  one  wounded. The perpetrators "of the committed crimes
suffered    no    punishment    whatsoever    from    the    Turkish   state
authorities".19
     The Serbs of Mitrovica appealed to King Petar I in 1905, entreating for
a Serbian  consulate to be opened in the  town for their  protection, adding
that if the present situation  were  to  continue, the Serbs would disappear
from these  areas. Emphasis  was put on the short-lived joy for the expected
introduction of  reforms,  which  incurred "intensified  Albanian  hostility
toward the Serbs",  and, "there is not a single day when a Serb is not swept
from the face of this  earth, often many are; we cannot count  the number of
robberies and ordinary fights, there are too many of them".20
     In summer 1905, Spalajkovic decided to visit Pec and its  vicinity with
two officials  from the  consulate,  to convince himself  of the horrid news
arriving from there.  Turkish authorities attempted to intimidate  them with
stories  of Albanian ambushes  on the roads. Milan Rakic penned in a private
letter: "! should  not forget my entering Pec for quite some time. First the
passage  through the Turkish  quarter  and downtown  full  of  somber ethnic
Albanians,  a  shuddering  and  ominous silence,  then  through  the Serbian
quarter, full of people, especially  children and women  yelling  "welcome",
throwing flowers at  us and  crying."21  The  Turkish authorities
forbade  the Serbs and ethnic Albanians to visit the consul and talk to him,
thus the Serbian  diplomats returned to Pristina without accomplishing their
task.22
     The external political situation did not  allow for Serbia to undertake
greater  national action in Old Serbia. Demands for the inclusion  of Kosovo
and Metohia in the  reform actions were constantly sent to the Great powers.
The aggravated  position  of  the Serbs evinced  the necessity to  undertake
measures for protecting  the  inhabitants,  beside the educational-political
action, which  had achieved good  results with its activities at schools and
the  restoration  of  churches.  When  it  had  become  clear  that  due  to
Austro-Hungarian   influence,  endeavors   to  inaugurate  reforms   in  the
northwestern parts of  the regions would not succeed, the alternative was to
secretly arm those villages inflicted the most.
     Under the private initiative of several notable and wealthy citizens of
Belgrade who  organized the  first company, comprised of patriot  volunteers
and refugees from Old Serbia and Macedonia, to fight Bulgarian komitadjis in
Macedonia in  1902, chetnik action  came under the wing of the  state gained
further  swing in  1904.  Kosovo  and  Metohia  were not encompassed  by the
chetnik action,  although it  did instigate organized arms  delivery to  the
most imperilled Serbian  villages.  When  a chetnik detachment  was  passing
through Metohia  on its  way  to Macedonia, in 1905,  it was  discovered and
killed  in  the  village  Velika Hoca,  the  home-town of  its leader  Lazar
Kujundzic. Fear of  mass Albanian vengeance encroached upon the Serbs,  thus
compelling Kujundzic's mother  to deny  the murder  of  her  son  before the
authorities.  At the demand of  Albanian  tribes,  the  houses assisting the
komitadjis were burned  in retribution; frightened by the emergence  of  the
Serbian company,  ethnic  Albanians were  ready to  search Serbian villages,
those that resisted would be burnt and their chiefs killed.23
     In summer 1907, another Serbian company  passed through  Kosovo and was
received by the locals of the Pasjane village.  It was  soon discovered, and
was  destroyed following a pitched  battle  with the  ethnic  Albanians  and
Turks. The discovery of komitadjis vexed the ethnic Albanians who feared the
expansion of  chetnik action and the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohia  in the
reform  action. Feuding  Albanian  tribes immediately expressed  solidarity.
After  confirming  their  besa,  together  they  set off to  search  Serbian
villages; many innocent people died in the pursuit for komitadjis and hidden
arms.24 An assembly was held  in the large mosque of Prizren; the
ethnic Albanians of Ljuma demanded the extermination  of Serbs.  Milan Rakic
discovered the demands of  the people in Ljuma: "[...]  for the assembly  to
determine the day when all ethnic Albanians would rise in arms and carry out
a general massacre of Serbs.  The reason stated  by  the people of Ljuma for
the extermination  of  Serbs was that  peace among the ethnic Albanians  was
impossible  as long  as  there were Serbs in  these regions, since the Serbs
were  always complaining to foreigners,  bringing about  bidats  - reforms -
with  their  complaints,  and  recently,  they  had  started  to  infiltrate
companies from  Serbia."25 The assembly  decided  that the  Serbs
were to be killed secretly, one by one; Albanian companies were to be formed
to rout the chetniks from  Serbia, and attacks  upon Serbian state territory
would    be    repeated    in   retribution.    New    persecutions   ensued
immediately.26
     Complaints from Pec, Vucitrn, Gnjilane  and  other  regions  in  Kosovo
showered the Serbian government and its  consulates in Pristina and Skoplje.
The ecclesiastical-educational community and fraternity of the Pec monastery
sent an elaborate petition to the  Montenegrin government in 1907, demanding
Montenegro and Serbia to open a consulate for the protection of the people:
     "In  the  town of Pec there are 500 houses at  most  and  around  4,000
Orthodox souls; the Pec nahi numbers  around 1,200  homes plus, amounting to
about 16,000 souls  of  Serbian nationality. Together with Djakovica and its
vicinity,  the  number totals around 20,000 souls  plus. It is known  -  and
people  still remember, that during  the past 25 years  the  same  number of
families and souls were moved out, mostly to Serbia, and many died,  all due
to oppression under the fanatical  savage ethnic Albanians - Muslims and the
rotten savage Fandas, who  are  of Catholic faith  [...]  They are  the most
dangerous  evildoers,  haiduks  and   oppressors,  who  are   systematically
eradicating the Serbs from these regions; forcing them to move; killing them
like  wild  animals;  burning their houses, barns,  villages and mercilessly
stealing their food, seizing, plundering,  fleecing -  blackmails of 2,5,10,
20  and  50  Turkish liras;  abducting  men,  women, children and  girls  to
slavery.  Well, those  are  the  means through which  they operate.  In this
manner alone, the Fandas came  from  that savage  Malissia  and settled more
than 300 houses during the past 20 years, arriving naked and barefoot, while
today  most  of  them  are  wealthy  men;  on  account  of  settling  on the
foundations of Serbian houses, occupying Serbian homes, fields and pastures,
while still robbing and taking  by force.  There is also oppression upon the
Serbs under  Fandas  and  ethnic  Albanians,  most  of  which were  Turkized
60,100-200  years  ago  on  account  of  the  oppression,   to  keep   their
lands."27
     Montenegro failed to open  its consulate  in Pec.  Serbia strove for at
least one of the  Great  Powers (Russia, Great Britain or France), to open a
consulate in Pec, but this initiative bore no fruit either.28 The
Serbian  Ministry of Foreign  Affairs  made  several proposals  to establish
contact with the ethnic Albanians, but none were adopted, since all attempts
performed on terrains soon failed. Even  the plan of vice-consul Milan Rakic
had no visible effect;  in 1907,  he believed the best solution was to place
Albanian guards over Serbian villages.29
     Violence   ceased    intermittently,    particularly   in   1907   when
Austria-Hungary  aimed  to  expand  the  reform  action to  the  Presevo and
Gnjilane districts,  ethnic  Albanians  began  to  abhor  the  expansion  of
Austro-Hungarian  influence  which  seriously  threatened to  imperil  their
supremacy  in  Old  Serbia. News of  the  Austro-Hungarian army  arriving in
Kosovo  brought  several thousand  ethnic  Albanians  together in  Ferizovic
simultaneous to the breaking out of the Young Turk Revolution. Tribal chiefs
arrived from  all regions of Kosovo and  Metohia. The conference  lasted two
weeks, and due to the agitation of the Young Turks, a telegram was sent from
the   conference  to  the   sultan,  demanding   the   restoration   of  the
constitution.30
     1 P.O. (S. St. Simic), Pitanje o Staroj Srbiji, Beograd 1901.
     2 V. Stojancevic, Prilike  u  zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta, pp.
314-315.
     3  V.  Corovic,  op.  cit., 18-19; Istorija  srpskog naroda,  VI/1, pp.
323-324.
     4  V. Stojancevic,  Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta, pp.
31, 317-325.
     5 G. Gaulis, La mine d'une Empire, Abdul-Hamid ses amis et ses peuples,
Paris  1913, 325-326; details  325-356;  V.  Berard, La  Macedoine, 101-125;
ibid., Pro Macedonia, Paris 1904; ibid, La mart du Stamboul, Paris 1913. Cf.
D.   T.  Batakovic,  Les  Francois  et   la  Vielle  Serbie,   in:  Rapports
franco-yougoslave,  Zb.  radova  Istorijskog instituta,  vol.  10,  Belgrade
J1989, pp. 138-150
     6 D. T. Batakovic, Pogibija  ruskog konzula G. S.  Scerbine u Mitrovici
1903.  godine,  Istorijski  casopis,  XXXIV (1987),  pp. 311-312 (with older
bibliography); S. Martinovic, Decembarski  i Becki program reformi u Turskoj
1902/1903. godine i stav Rusije prema Albancima, Obelezja, 3 (1985), 63.
     7 V. Corovic, Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije,  I, Beograd 1933,
597-599, cf. British documentation in: Further correspondence Respecting The
Affairs Of South-Eastern Europe, Turkey, 3 (1903), London 1903.
     8 D. T. Batakovic, Pogibija ruskog konzula G. S. Scerbine, pp. 312-313.
     9 Ibid., p. 318-319.
     10 Ibid., p. 320-323.
     11 V. Corovic, Borba za nezavisnost Balkana, Beograd 1937, pp. 123-125.
     12 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago i begova, pp. 306-312.
     13 Conflicts among clans in Metohia did not abate. At one moment Bairam
and  Murtez Cur sent a message  to King  Petar I  that he and  10,000 fellow
tribesmen from the Krasnici clan were enemies  of Austria-Hungary. The offer
to  cooperate  was  not  accepted.  See:  Dj.  Mikic,   Albansko  pitanje  i
srpsko-albanske veze u XIX veku (do 1912), pp. 150-151.
     14 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 267-269.
     15 Ibid., pp. 227-228.
     16 Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 672-690.
     17 Ibid., pp. 696-197; B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago. i begova, pp. 350-355.
     18 Zaduzbine Kosova, p 672-690.
     19  Ibid, p. 697;  settlements  were  one of the reasons for emigration
from  the Kosovo  vilayet  to the  USA: J. Pejin,  Iseljavanje  iz kosovskog
vilajeta i  drugih krajeva pod Turcima  u SAD  1906-1907  godine, Istorijski
glasnik, 1-2 (1985), pp. 49-54.
     20 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 255.
     21 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, pp. 55-56, cf. B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo
o Kosovu 1901-1913, 252-253; Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, pp. 374-375.
     22  M.  Rakic,  op. cit.,  pp.  57-60, 315-317; Savremenici o Kosovu  i
Metohiji, pp. 374-376.
     23  M.  Rakic, op. cit., pp.  41-46, 304-313, a considerable  number of
literary works wrote about the  killing of the company and the heroic act of
Lazar  Kujundzic's mother.  The  most reknown  is  a drama  called  Lazarevo
vaskrsenje, by Serbian literary Ivo Vojnovic from Dubrovnik.
     24 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 131-136,138.
     25 Ibid., p. 135.
     26 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
     27 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, p. 289.
     28  D.  Mikic,  Nastojanje  Srba  na  otvaranju  ruskog  ill  engleskog
konzulata u Fed 1908. godine, pp. 161-165.
     29 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, pp. 94-106.
     30  Z.  Avramovski,   Izvestaji  austrougarskih  konzula  u   Kosovskoj
Mitrovici, Prizrenu i Skoplju  o odrzanoj skupstini  u Ferizovicu, Godisnjak
Arhiva  Kosova,  II-III  (1970),  pp.  310-330;  B.   Hrabak,  Kosovo  prema
mladoturskoj revoluciji 1908, Obelezja, 5 (1974), pp. 108-126.


     The  Young  Turk  Revolution  in  1908, the  annexation of  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina,  and the  proclamation of Bulgaria's independence,  essentially
altered the balance of forces in the Balkans. The reform action of the Great
Powers  had  ceased. The  Young  Turks  restored  the  Constitution of 1876,
proclaimed equality  of  all subjects of the empire, regardless  of religion
and  nationality,  and announced  radical political  and social reforms. The
promises of the Young Turks were greeted by  the Serbs as an opportunity for
national affirmation and free  political organization.  In Skoplje, seat  of
the Kosovo vilayet, the Serbian Democratic  League was formed  on August 10,
with a temporary central committee presided over by Bogdan  Radenkovic.  The
formation of district committees ensued immediately at meetings in Pristina,
Vucitrn, Mitrovica, Gnjilane and Urosevac,  of  which the most distinguished
national  representatives, teachers, priests, craftsmen and merchants were a
part. The paper Vardar was founded in Skoplje to propagate the principles of
the  League, writing  on  the  position  of  Serbs.  Vardar  devoted special
attention  to oppression, because after the expiration of the besa confirmed
in Ferizovic,  the ethnic  Albanians again began to  assail the  Serbs.  The
League and the  paper  pledged  for  the decrees  of the  constitution to be
applied  upon ethnic Albanians  as well,  who  recognized the new regime but
displayed no readiness to support the law.1
     Having  reached an agreement  with the Young  Turks, the  Serbs  stated
their  candidates  in  several districts  to the  election campaign  for the
Turkish Parliament. In  Kosovo and  Metohia they aimed to become  candidates
for  envoys  in the Pec,  Prizren and Pristina sanjaks, but the  mandate was
received only in Pristina where Sava Stojanovic was elected. At the assembly
in Constantinople (272 seats), two more Serbian envoys entered, from Skoplje
(Aleksandar  Parlic)  and Bitolj (Dr.  Janicije  Dimitrijevic), while  Temko
Popovic of Ohrid  was  elected  senator.2  A  large  assembly  of
Ottoman Serbs was  held in  Skoplje on the Visitation of the Virgin in 1909,
with 78 delegates present, 44 from  Old Serbia and  34  from Macedonia;  the
Organization  of the Serbian People  in the Ottoman  Empire was established,
which was to grow into a representative body of all the Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire.3
     The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in  1908, by which the decrees
of the Berlin Congress were  partially violated, and the project to  build a
railway through the Novi Pazar sanjak,  announced the unconcealed purpose of
Austria-Hungary to rule the Balkan Peninsula. The  meetings held against the
annexation  were   attended   also   by  ethnic  Albanians.  Frightened   by
Austro-Hungarian  aspirations,  many  Albanian  notables  made  attempts  to
approach  the Serbs.4 Bairam Cur  of Djakovica proposed to Bogdan
Radenkovic  a   joint   confrontation   to   the   annexation,   while   the
Mahmudbegovices of  Pec  negotiated with  Serbian  diplomats. Simultaneously
though,  Austro-Hungarian  followers  among  the ethnic  Albanians  severely
opposed this approach toward the Serbs. While  comparative peace reigned  in
Gnjilane and Pristina, oppression upon the Serbs in  the Pec nahi continued.
The ethnic Albanians  spoke in a threatening voice  that the proclamation of
the constitution was  only temporary and  that they  would never  allow  the
infidels (djaurs) to enjoy the same rights as the Muslims.5
     Notwithstanding individual  crimes, the situation in Kosovo and Metohia
was tolerable until the unsuccessful coup d'etat in Constantinople, in April
1909.  Abdulhamid  II attempted to depose the Young Turks,  and, having been
defeated, was compelled to renounce the throne. His brother  Mahmud V Reshad
was  proclaimed sultan.  Within  the  Young  Turk  leadership, a pan-Ottoman
inclination  prevailed,  which considered  all subjects  of  the  empire  an
inseparable  Ottoman  whole.  The  Serbian  organization  was   renamed  the
Educational-Charitable Organization of  Ottoman Serbs, but its operation was
soon limited. Under various decrees and laws, the activities of many Serbian
societies  were  forbidden,   lands   were  confiscated  from  churches  and
monasteries, the work of schools and religious committees  was hindered. The
law  on the exchange of deeds and  the inheritance  of estates greatly upset
the Serbs, since many of  the real  owners  fled to Serbia in  the preceding
period. Many  of the estates were  divided among the  muhadjirs (Muslims who
settled in Kosovo  after the annexation of Bosnia and  Herzegovina). The new
laws also upset chiflik farmers, whom the agas could drive off the land  and
settle Muslims instead, or exact double taxes.6
     At the beginning  of the Young Turk reign, ethnic Albanians, like other
peoples in Turkey,  founded  national clubs  and  educational societies that
became  seats of national  congregation and  political agitation. Autonomist
inclinations revived. The pan-Ottoman ideology of the Young Turk leadership,
centralization of  administration, introduction of regular  military service
and a new tax policy ruffled  the  ethnic Albanians.  Instead  of protection
from  Abdulhamid II who tolerated anarchy,  they were  confronted  with  the
resolute Young Turks who  had no understanding for their special rights. The
first conflicts in  Kosovo  and  Metohia  arose  in  1909  when the  Turkish
authorities attempted to execute  a list  of the population for conscription
and the  collection of taxes. At the anniversary of the Revolution  in 1909,
the  ethnic  Albanians  held  a  congress  in  Debar, where  the demand  for
introducing  military  obligation  was  rejected, the  issue of  creating  a
separate  autonomous  region encircling  all  territories  on  which  ethnic
Albanians lived  was  brought  up,  and  intolerance toward  the neighboring
Serbian countries was expressed with acute emphasis.7
     Despite  gulfs  in  religious  differences,   political  disagreements,
unequal  economic interests, owing  to the  centralist measures of the Young
Turks, a high  degree of national solidarity was soon  attained  within  the
leadership of the Albanian movement. Persistent strivings of the Young Turks
to introduce military service and new taxes  exacerbated ethnic Albanians of
all confessions, having been exempt of them during the  reign of Abdul-hamid
II. Skirmishes  between regular armies and the  rebellious  ethnic Albanians
soon  proved the  power of  invincible clans, and the  Young Turks were soon
compelled  to concessions. The punitive expedition  of  Djavid Pasha in fall
1909,  and the too  rigorous  measures  in north  Albania did not bring  the
desired results.8
     Another  Albanian insurrection  broke  out  in  spring  1910, after the
repeated attempt of  the authorities to collect  taxes. Opposition in Kosovo
and Metohia was particularly strong in the Djakovica and Lab region. Turkish
troops,   commanded  by  Torgut  Shefket  Pasha,   mercilessly  crushed  the
insurrection  and  undertook to  seize arms,  but  pacification  was  only a
temporary  solution.  Albanian committees increased agitation to  create  an
autonomous  Albania and  fomented  discontent among  ethnic Albanians in all
regions of the empire. Insurrections in Yemen and Lebanon, disorder in Crete
and  the Italian  incursion  on Tripoli put the  Young Turks in  a difficult
position.  The Malissors used  the new clashes  to  rise  in north  Albania.
Montenegrin  King Nikola I, in line with the  Malissors, supplied the rebels
with  arms  and  provided  shelter  for  refugees,  expecting  the  Albanian
insurrections  to weaken Turkey.  Among the 3,000 ethnic Albanians hiding in
Montenegro were leaders form Old Serbia, Isa Boljetinac and Suleyman Batusa.
A  memorandum (Red Book)  was sent from Cetinje to the  Great Powers and the
Young Turks  demanding recognition  of  the Albanian  nation  and autonomous
Albania.9
     In  fall  1911,   Boljetinac  requested   arms  from  Serbia,  and  the
Montenegrin  government proposed to  Belgrade to aid the insurrection before
another  power  benefited  from  it.  Serbian  Premier  Milovan  Milovanovic
regarded   the   Albanian   insurrection   and   its  ties  with  Montenegro
suspiciously.  Fearing  that  Austria-Hungary  would introduce  the  army to
restore order in  the Kosovo vilayet, Milovanovic believed that flaring  the
insurrection was not in the interest to Serbs.10
     The Serbs  soon found themselves  cleaved  between the Young  Turks and
ethnic  Albanians.  The Young  Turk  authorities  oppressed the  Serbs  more
severely  than the preceding ones. After the  proclamation of  extraordinary
conditions and drumhead  court-martial  (urfia) in  May 1910, an  action  to
seize arms was executed, with many people  beaten,  while several Serbs died
as a result of the hits inflicted. Local tyrants made avail of the disorders
and  uprisings to  sack Serbian  homes.11  When  Sultan Mahmud  V
Reshad  arrived in Kosovo in summer  1911  to offer amnesty, another wave of
violence was tossed upon the Serbs. The settling of accounts was accompanied
by  murders,  abduction, robberies,  arson  and  oppression.  Since  July to
November  1911,128 robberies, 35  arsons, 41  banditries, 53  abductions, 30
blackmails, 19  examples of frightening, 35 murders, 37 attempts to  murder,
58 armed assails upon property, 27 examples of fights and abuse, 13 attempts
to Turkize  and  18 examples  of serious injuries inflicted were recorded in
Old  Serbia.12  The  disastrous extent of violence  urged Serbian
consuls to make energetic demands from the  government to arm the  Serbs  in
Kosovo again.
     Yet,  events rapidly followed one another. The Young Turk regime was in
a state of crisis, new elections were announced. Belgrade expected the Young
Turks would win the elections, so instructions were sent to Kosovo upon that
line. After a  large conference of Serbs  in Skoplje, in March  1912, a  new
electoral  agreement  was   concluded  with  the  Young  Turks.  The  ethnic
Albanians, exacerbated  opposers of the  Young Turk regime, began anew their
attacks upon the Serbs. Their chiefs urged the masses on; the frightening of
Serbs, blackmail and murders were resumed.13
     The  general  Albanian insurrection had  begun preparations  in January
1912.  Hasan  Pristina and Ismail  Kemal  of  south  Albania  supervised the
preparations. Pristina's task was to gather the people and collect the arms,
while  Kemal was  to contact  Albanian  committees  and  propagate  Albanian
interests in European centers.  It was settled  that the insurrection in the
Kosovo  vilayet was  to begin in spring, and then it was to spread to  other
regions inhabited by ethnic Albanians. In July 1912, the insurrection spread
over all of Kosovo; refusing to shoot  Muslims, the rebels  were  joined  by
officers, soldiers and  gendarmes. The vali of Kosovo personally returned to
the ethnic Albanians arms seized two years before. War with Italy, uprisings
and  unrest  all  over the  empire  and danger of international  involvement
compelled the sultan to replace the Young Turks, dissolve the Parliament and
yield to the demands of the ethnic Albanians.
     Yet, they  would not surrender. Around 15,000 rebels, dissatisfied with
the  pacifying promises of  the sultan, moved  south  and took Skoplje.  The
committee sent  from Constantinople  to enter  into  negotiations, was given
requests by Hasan Pristina, in the name of the insurrection,  comprising  14
articles: special laws for Albania based  on  the  common law;  the right to
carry arms,  amnesty for all rebels; assignment of  officials  who speak the
Albanian  language  and  are  familiar with their  customs  in four vilayets
(Kosovo, Scutari, Bitolj and Janjevo); recognition of the  Albanian language
as official; curriculum and religious schools in the native tongue;
     ethnic Albanians to serve in the army only on this territory;  building
of roads and railtracks, additional administrative divisions; trial for  the
Young  Turk government. After  a  week of negotiating with the  authorities,
which accepted most of the conditions, the rebels dispersed.14
     The leadership of the insurrection was comprised of people of different
political affiliation and  social status.  On the one  hand there  were  the
military commanders of the insurrection, prominent  tribal chiefs and former
outlaws (Bairam Cur, Isa Boljetinac,  Idriz  Sefer, Riza Bey Krieziu), among
whom  there were followers of  the old  system and Austrophils. On the other
hand, there  were former diplomats and unhappy politicians  (Hasan Pristina,
Jahia Aga, Hadji Rifat Aga and Nexhib Draga), who held differed views on the
future of  ethnic Albanians both as  compared  to the first group  and among
themselves.  Their  official  petitions  did  not contain  demands  for  the
territorial autonomy of ethnic Albanians,  nor was the Porte ready to comply
to  such  a  demand.  Abhorring intervention  of the  Balkan  states,  Hasan
Pristina  and Nexhib  Draga, the major negotiators, were satisfied with  the
resolution  of  the   Albanian  issue   within  the   framework  of  Ottoman
legitimitism.15
     The attitude of the rebels toward the political status of  the Serbs in
Old   Serbia  was,   despite  individual  cooperation,   basically   one  of
intolerance. The Skoplje  paper Vardar warned  that the  Serbs in Old Serbia
did not mind  that  Turkey  had met with the national demands of the  ethnic
Albanians: "We only  think  it unfair  that  we  Serbs  are  excluded, whose
desires   and   interests,   like   in  this   case,   as   always,   remain
heedless".16
     The  Serbian  government  strove  to use  the Albanian  insurrection to
further  weaken  the  Turkish  system  and its leadership  and  to drive out
Austro-Hungarian  influence  in  its  leadership.  The  consul  of  Pristina
negotiated with influential  leaders - Bairam Cur,  Isa Boljetinac and  Riza
Bey, while  sons of Boljetinac were guests of the Belgrade government.  Many
leaders were paid large sums out of funds of the  Serbian government or they
were  given arms.  Owing to this,  in a draft  of  demands,  an article  was
inserted which anticipated the recognition of rights demanded by the  ethnic
Albanians to apply to Serbs as well. Due to the insistence of several of the
leaders, particularly of  the pro-Austrian  affiliated  Hasan Pristina, this
article did not enter the official Albanian requests.
     The  Albanian  national  movement  felt,  despite  periodical aid  from
Montenegro and  Serbia and constant negotiations and political reliance upon
them,  in the  bases  of  its seemingly contradictory  aspirations, profound
intolerance  for  Serbs  in  the  Kosovo  vilayet,  as  the  most  permanent
component. The fact that no one even thought of recognizing the right of the
Serbs  to  national  institutions  and  independent political  activity, was
displayed  by  the  escalation  of  Albanian  violence  in 1912.  Periodical
attempts  of  individual  tribal chiefs  to  approach  distinguished Serbian
representatives in Turkey  were merely tactical acts of conformation without
permanent political importance. Intolerance  toward the people which, though
thinned out, were still the majority, was exhibit in all plans  and programs
of Albanian leaders. Ever since the reign of the Albanian  League, until the
beginning  of the second  decade of the 20th  century, the Serbs in  Kosovo,
Metohia and the neighboring regions,  were deprived of the  most fundamental
rights to  human freedom and even minimal  civil rights. Albanian and  Young
Turk  confrontation,  fear  of the  involvement  of  the Balkan  states  and
Austria-Hungary only temporarily suppressed their voluminous intentions with
the Serbs.
     1 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 330-333.
     2 Elaboration: D. Mikic, Mladoturski parlamentarni izbori  1908. i Srbi
u  Turskoj,  Zbornik  Filozofskog  fakulteta  u Pristini,  XII  (1975),  pp.
154-209.
     3 Rod narodne skupstine otomanskih Srba, Skoplje 1910; Istorija srpskog
naroda, VI/1, pp. 335-338.
     4 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 335-336.
     5 Zaduzbine Kosova, p. 704.
     6 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1,  340-342; see elaborate documentation:
B. Perunicic, Zulumi aga i begova, pp. 460-529.
     7 I. G. Senkevic, Osvoboditelnoe dvizenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912
gg, Moskva 1959, pp.. 140-145; S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 391-394.
     8 Ibid.
     9 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 159-160.
     10  V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju  Srbije  i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp.
350-351;
     more elaborate: B. Hrabak,  Arbanaski prvak Isa  Boljetinac i Crna Gora
1910-1912, Istorijski zapisi, XXXIX (1977).
     11 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, 201-214; Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 707-708.
     12 Zaduzbine Kosova, 716; additional documentation, pp. 717-728.
     13  Istorija  srpskog naroda,  VI/1,345-347,  cf.  Dokumenti o spoljnoj
politici Kraljevine Srbije, V/2, Beograd 1985.
     14 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski  ustanci 1912, Vranjski glasnik, XI (1975), pp.
339 passim.
     15 Ibid., pp. 323-324.
     16 Ibid.,  p.  325, Serbian agent  in Kosovo, renowned writer Grigorije
Bozovic,  observing  the  Albanian  movement  in  summer  1912,   noted  the
following: "The  negative aspect of this movement as far  as  the  Serbs are
concerned, is that the Arnauts  are on the  verge  of becoming a nation, and
they wish to settle their  issue  in  Kosovo, and that they are  neither the
conquerors nor the conquered. We fall between  them and the Young Turks, and
both will throw their rage at us. A positive  move is that the Albanians are
beginning to unfetter themselves from Turkish  fanaticism; Muslim solidarity
and  hypnosis are slackening; they  are very aware that they are  at  enmity
with the Turks and, most important, they speak  of Serbia with sympathy  and
regard it an amicable country." (Ibid, pp. 320.)




     The development of  events  in Turkey, particularly war  with Italy and
disorder in Old Serbia and Macedonia,  had created a peculiar disposition in
the Balkan states. Albanian insurrections accelerated the conclusion of  the
Balkan alliance. Since February until  August, the alliance between  Serbia,
Montenegro,  Bulgaria and  Greece  was definitely  confirmed.  Realizing the
impossibility of  a peaceful solution to the  Christian issue in Turkey, the
allies decided to  war. Owing to Russia's diplomatic  moves, Central  Powers
consented to the Balkan states handling the destiny of the Balkan Peninsula.
Estimating a certain victory  for the  Turkish army,  Austria-Hungary calmly
awaited war. The  road leading to  the realization of a historical mission -
the  liberation of compatriots under  Turkish  rule, opened in autumn, 1912.
Beginning  with October,  the allies declared war  to Turkey,  the  official
reason  being Turkey's denial to pronounce  new  reforms  (with  concessions
equal  to those  given to  the ethnic Albanians), the supervision  of  which
would have been entrusted to the Balkan states.1
     Shortly  before  the  war,  Serbia endeavored  to  win  over the ethnic
Albanians and isolate them from military  operations. In a secret mission in
Kosovo,  two most  distinguished intelligence officers Dragutin Dimitrijevic
Apis and Bozin Simic  aimed  to come to an agreement with Isa Boljetinac and
Idriz  Sefer  for  ethnic  Albanians  not  to  take  part  in  the  upcoming
war.2 Serbian Premier Nikola Pasic offered the Albanian leaders a
"contract on  the  association of  Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the  Kosovo
vilayet",  whereby within the  framework of the Serbian state  organization,
they were warranted freedom  of religion,  Albanian  language in schools and
society,   administration   of   Albanian  communities  and   administrative
districts,  preservation of the common law  and finally, a  special Albanian
assembly to enact laws on religious, judicial and educational matters. At an
assembly held in Skoplje  on October  10,  (and subsequently in Pristina and
Debar), the ethnic Albanians decided to  defend their Ottoman  fatherland in
arms and use weapons obtained from Serbia against its army.3
     Commanding  the third  Serbian army  for action in  Kosovo  was General
Bozidar Jankovic, who had previous contact with  the ethnic Albanians, which
might have  influenced their  decision. A  military  announcement  mentioned
amiable disposition  toward the ethnic Albanians providing they  deserved it
through  proper  conduct.  Yet Austro-Hungarian  agitators  encouraged  both
Muslim  and  Catholic ethnic  Albanians  to move against  the Serbian  army,
promising that troops of the Dual Monarchy are on their way from  Bosnia  to
assist them.4
     Isa Boljetinac  received 63,000 guns  from the Turkish  authorities  to
organize resistance toward the  Serbian  army.  Despite  Boljetinac's strong
agitation  that "Islamism is  in jeopardy", and the need  to defend "Turkish
soil",  only  16,000  ethnic Albanians  appeared at the frontier.  They were
committed  with the  defense  of Kosovo together with a Turkish corps.  Well
armed and equipped, the Serbian army  advanced toward  Kosovo in exaltation.
The feeling that the "Serbian covenant thought" was coming to life  with the
liberation  of  Kosovo, bleeding  five centuries  under  Turkish reign,  had
created a remarkably high morale for combat. Identical feelings were born by
Montenegrin units advancing towards Pec and Djakovica.5
     Combats with  the  ethnic  Albanians  were  severe  only  in  the first
skirmishes.  The  Serbian  artillery easily  scattered Albanian  bashibazouk
companies without encountering  serious  resistance. Following their defeat,
Bairam Cur, Riza Bey and Isa Boljetinac fled to Albanian Malissia. After the
liberation  of  Pristina  (October  22),  and  victory in Kumanovo  (October
23-24), war was  resolved  for Old  Serbia  and  Macedonia.  In  Kosovo  and
Metohia, Serbs greeted the Serbian and Montenegrin armies with exhilaration.
The entire third army attended  a formal  liturgy at Gracanica to  mark  the
liberation of Kosovo. Military authorities issued proclamations  in Pristina
and other towns for ethnic Albanians to quiet down and surrender arms;
     however, anti-Serbian agitation from tribal leaders drove many to  flee
and shelter in the  mountains. Realizing they  would not be persecuted after
surrendering  their arms,  ethnic Albanians in Drenica  and  the Pec  region
finally laid down their guns. Serbian officers kept repeating that the Serbs
were warring Turkey and  not the ethnic Albanians. In  the  newly  liberated
areas Serbia  established civil rule  and administration. Kosovo and Metohia
became  part of the Lab, Pristina and Prizren  district.  Montenegro divided
liberated Metohia into the Pec and Djakovica district.6
     The liberation of Old Serbia  was  not, however, the  final goal of the
Serbian armies.  The political and economical hoop  encircled around Serbia,
held  tight  by  Austria-Hungary  since the  .Kg War  (1906-1911),  and  the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina  induced Serbian  diplomacy  to resolve
the issue of its political and economic independence by gaining free exit to
the  Adriatic  Sea,  a  plan  similar to  one made by Ilija  Garasanin.  The
determination of  the  Serbian  government to  advance  toward the  Adriatic
coast,  to  an  ethnically Albanian area, was based  on the  evaluation that
ethnic  Albanians  were "not  a  people, but  tribes split  up and  mutually
estranged, without a common language, alphabet and religion". The government
was  supported by the  court,  by civil parties,  the army  and  the  widest
public.7
     While Montenegrin troops besieged  Scutari,  Serbian regiments from Old
Serbia  entered Albania and occupied its northern ports. In the  land of the
Mirdits, Serbian troops were greeted  cordially, whereas they were forced to
penetrate Dukadjin toward the Adriatic Sea with arms.8
     Reports of  Serbia's glorious victories  were received with  anxiety in
Vienna. Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy warned Serbia not  to  advance its  army
further  from Prizren.  To prevent Serbia's exit to  the  sea,  the Viennese
government  sent  special  emissaries  to Albania  to  spread  the  idea  of
autonomy,  and even called one of  the most  important Albanian leaders from
Constantinople,  Ismail  Kemal. Through the Viennese press,  he demanded  an
independent "Great Albania", encompassing the towns Bitolj, Janina, Skoplje,
Pristina and Prizren. Embarking an Austrian ship, Kemal set off to Valona to
proclaim independence of Albania. Gathering feudal  and tribal  leaders from
the southern regions to his side, on November 28, 1912, Kemal proclaimed the
formation  of an independent  Albanian state. The  provisional government in
Valona  was a toy in Vienna's hands devoid of any influence with the people.
All documents, including the  proclamation of independence, were written  in
the Turkish language; not one member of his cabinet knew how to write in the
Albanian  tongue. Ismail Kemal  consigned the  military formation to refugee
leaders from Old Serbia, Riza Bey Krieziu and Isa Boljetinac.9
     Kemal's government sent messages to Serbian troops to withdraw from the
territory of the new state. The Serbian army established civil rule north of
the  Durazzo-Elbasan-Struga line. The situation  in Albania was on the verge
of anarchy. The temporary government proclaimed an energetic severing of all
ties with Turkey. Subsequent to the Young Turk coup d'etat, the mid-Albanian
Muslim  populace was disposed to Albania remaining  within the  framework of
the Ottoman Empire. Rumors spread among the people that the Young Turks were
advancing with large armies  to reoccupy Albania. To the north, the Catholic
Mirdits  negotiated  with Montenegro  and  Serbia  on  the  creation  of  an
autonomous state.  The Mirdit mbret Bib  Doda  requested permission from the
Serbian army for  his fellow tribesmen to  loot the Muslims. Within the Mata
region, malcontents took  down the Albanian  flag and threatened to call the
Serbian army;
     in some places there was agitation to resist the Serbs. Ismail  Kemal's
government soon disintegrated. Disorder and  mutual conflicts  began  within
the first  months  following the  proclamation  of the independent  Albanian
state.10
     Austria-Hungary  considered the emergence of the  Serbian  army on  the
Adriatic Sea a serious injury to its interests. Belligerent military circles
in  Vienna  proposed  to  attack  Serbia  whose  northern  borders  remained
unguarded.   During   December   all   tokens   pointed   to   an   upcoming
Austro-Hungarian  -  Serbian  war. After  conferring  with  the  Russian and
Italian   diplomacy,  the  Serbian   government  pronounced   the  following
statement:
     "We do not desire to raise the issue of our emergence at sea ourselves,
but rather  to let  the matter  remain within the hands of the Great  Powers
when war ends  and  peace  is  concluded.  We should not disapprove  of  the
creation of autonomous Albania if Europe should agree to it. We only believe
that Albania will not abide by peace necessary to both the Balkan allies and
the whole of Europe. Our desire is to have a port on our territory -  yet we
leave  this  issue for the Great  Powers to resolve,  when they solve  other
matters that will unfold from peace."11
     The Austro-Hungarian  incursion on Serbia was prevented by a conference
of ambassadors of  the Great Powers convoked in London  toward  the close of
1912, at the initiative of the French and British diplomacy.
     Representatives of the Balkan states began peace negotiations with  the
Ottoman Empire. The conference  of ambassadors  argued the issue of Serbia's
emergence  at  sea and  the status of Albania, which  would then  enter into
regulations of peace with Turkey. While Russia supported Serbian demands for
Adriatic  ports,  Austria-Hungary's  intention  at  the  conference  was  to
struggle  for  a  larger  Albania.  France  and  Great Britain accepted  the
formation of Albania but feared Austro-Hungarian and Italian  superiority in
it.  Thus the very first day the conference opened, the  ambassadors reached
the  following  agreement:  "Autonomous  Albania guaranteed  and  controlled
exclusively by six powers under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the sultan.
The  exclusion  of  every  Turkish  element  from   the  administration   is
understood."   Ensuring  the  frontiers  of  Albania  and   Montenegro  were
"neighbored all the way", Serbia  was denied emergence to  the Adriatic Sea.
As compensation, it was given a free and neutral trade port  on the Albanian
coast,  to   which  Serbian  goods  would  arrive   by  railway  secured  by
international gendarmes  under European control.  Peace in Europe was saved,
but,  as  Poincares pointed  out:  "Serbia  paid the  highest  bill".12
The border issue presented a more serious problem. Since December
     1912.  several plans were in diplomatic emulation. Serbia  demanded the
borders to be drawn west of the Ohrid Lake and  the Crni Drim river, so that
Decani, Djakovica, Prizren, Debar and Ohrid would remain in its composition.
Montenegro demanded north Albania until the Maca river, with Scutari,  Medua
and Alessio. Greece demanded north  Epirus where the Albanian populace lived
admixed with the Greek one. Autonomous Albania was to have been  constituted
from the remaining areas. The Austro-Hungarian proposition, contrary to  the
Serbian one, suggested the creation  of Great Albania. The Monarchy demanded
that Djakovica, Debar, Korcca, Janina  and Struga belong to Albania, and "in
the first round" both Pec and  Prizren, as "compensational objects". It left
Struga, Ohrid  and Debar to Bulgaria if it  were  to  make any claims. Italy
supported  Montenegrin claims but  acutely  opposed  Greek  ones. Russia and
France  maintained a  medial  solution by which  Albania's  frontier  toward
Serbia  should  stretch  along  the watershed  of the Beli and the Crni Drim
rivers  to  Ohrid.  The  Albanian  delegation  demanded  the  formation   of
"ethnical" Albania, inclusive of the towns Pec, Mitrovica, Pristina, Skoplje
and Bitolj.13
     The standpoint of the  Serbian delegation  was most wholly revealed  by
the aide-memoir submitted to the ambassador conference on January 8,
     1913. It explicitly stated that Serbia was not opposed to the formation
of  autonomous  Albania,  but that its  whole  centuries-long  struggle  for
national  survival   under  Turkish  rule,   and  subsequently   for   state
independence from 1804 until  1912, would  prove to have  been senseless  if
those  regions  with  admixed  Serbian-Albanian  populaces,  where  forceful
Islamization, Albanization and  the routing  of Serbian inhabitants had been
urged on for centuries, were to  belong to Albania. Supporting its attitudes
with historical,  ethnographic,  cultural and ethical  rights,  the  Serbian
delegation underscored that Kosovo and Metohia, where the  towns Pec, Decani
and Djakovica lay, were since time immemorial the sacred land of the  Serbs,
and  that  under no condition would any Montenegrin  nor  Serbian government
consent to their belonging to someone else.14
     The Serbian  government was adamant in  its defense of Kosovo,  Metohia
and west Macedonia. The  entrance of either of these regions into autonomous
Albania   would  create   a   new  seedbed   of   conflicts  through   which
Austria-Hungary would  exert  pressure  upon  Serbia.  Stojan Novakovic, the
first delegate at the conference of ambassadors, believed that by "demanding
Prizren, Djakovica, Pec  for Albania, Austria-Hungary  desired  to renew the
barrier   between   Serbia   and   Montenegro,   between   Serbia   and  the
sea".15 Pasic kept underscoring that he would never abandon Debar
and Djakovica  whatever the decision of the Great Powers, and  that  "only a
stronger military force could rout the Serbian army from  these regions". In
a subsequent letter addressed to the Great Powers/Pasic underlined bitterly:
"The  lands and sanctity of Old Serbia are being taken away and given to one
who has been devastating them until today."16
     Serbia  was  forced  to withdraw  its troops from  the Adriatic  coast.
Austria-Hungary gave in to Russia's demands, so Debar and Djakovica remained
part  of  Serbia,  while its demand  to include Scutari in the new  Albanian
state  was accepted, though the town  was still  besieged by Montenegrin and
Serbian troops. The final agreement was reached on April 10, 1913, while the
structure of Albania continued to  be discussed in  the months to follow. At
the end  of July, the Austro-Hungarian - Italian proposition was accepted by
which Albania  was to become  a sovereign state with a hereditary prince. An
International Control Committee was  formed whose  duty was to organize life
in the country with the aid of Dutch  officers. As the  hereditary  Albanian
prince, among numerous  candidates, an Austro-Hungarian  was  chosen, German
Prince  Wilhelm  von Wied,  cousin of the  Romanian  queen,  interpreted  in
Belgrade  as another  attempt of Austria-Hungary  to close  the  hoop around
Serbia by way of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.17
     1 Prvi balkanski rat, Beograd 1959,147-176; cf. D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o
Kosovu, Ep. 165-176.
     2 C. Popovic, Rod  organizacije "Ujedinjenje ili  smrt"  - Pripreme  za
Balkanski rat, Nova Evropa, 1 (1927), pp. 313-315; M. Z. Jovanovic, Pukovnik
Apis,  Beograd 1957, pp. 649-651; Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912,
pp. 351-353, 381-383.
     3  Dj.  Mikic,  Albanci  i  Srbija  u  balkanskim  ratovima  1912-1913,
Istorijski glasnik, 1-2 (1986), p. 60;  more elaborate in: D. D.  Stankovic,
Nikola Pasic i stvaranje balkanske drzave, M. misao, 3 (1985), pp. 157-169.
     4 D. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u balkanskim ratovima, p. 61.
     5 J. Tomic, Rat no. Kosovu i Staroj Srbiji 1912. godine, Novi Sad 1913.
     6 Prvi  balkanski rat, pp.  46-417,  464-469-496; D.  Mikic, Albanci  i
Srbija u balkanskim ratovima, p. 63.
     7 The only opposition came  from the leadership of the Socialdemocratic
party headed by Dimitrije Tucovic. Concerned only for their narrow party and
political interests, they used the entrance of the Serbian army into Albania
to settle their accounts  with  the government policy and civil parties (cf.
D. Tucovic, Srbija i Albanija, Beograd 1914).
     8  I. Balugdzic, Kad se stvarala Albanija, Srpski knjizevni glasnik, 52
(1937),  pp. 518-523;  D.  Djordjevic, Izlazak Srbije  na  Jadransko more  i
Konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912, Beograd 1956, pp. 11-12, 83-85.
     9 V.  Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije  i  Austro-Ugarske u XX veku,  pp.
396-401; D. Djordjevic, op. cit., p. 86.
     10 Dj. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u balkanskim ratovima, pp. 68-70.
     11 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i  Austro-Ugarske u  XX  veku, pp.
410.
     12 D. Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 133-134.
     13 Ibid., see M. Vojvodic, Skadarska kriza 1913, Beograd 1970.
     14 Dokumenti  o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VT/1,  136-142; D.
Bogdanovic, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
     15 Ibid., V/3, doc. 500.
     16 Ibid., VI/1, 260, 379, 380; D. Bogdanovic, op. cit., p. 173.
     17 D. Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 141-143.

     The situation in Albania and the border  area toward  Serbia was marked
by anarchy, disorders and conflicts during 1913 and the first  half of 1914.
The  commander of Scutari, Essad Pasha Toptani,  surrendered the town to the
Montenegrins on April 23,1913; in return, he was  enabled  to advance  south
with his army  and military equipment  and  take  part  in the  struggle for
power. Already three mutually conflicting governments existed in Albania. As
one of the most powerful landholders, Essad Pasha relied on the Muslim heads
of mid-Albania. By wielding his influence between Durazzo and Tirana, he saw
an opportunity  to candidate  himself for the still vacant Albanian  throne,
taking into consideration requests  of the  Albanian majority  that did  not
want a Christian ruler.  Already on May 5, 1913, he informed the Montenegrin
prince of  his intention to pronounce himself prince of Albania,  expressing
his wish to cooperate with the Balkan  allies. He told the Serbian  diplomat
in  Durazzo,  Zivojin  Balugdzic,  that  he wanted an agreement with Serbia.
Hesitant at first, the  Serbian government consented to cooperate with Essad
Pasha, evaluating that "his overall behavior displayed an  earnest  wish for
an  agreement with  Serbia,  which  he  regarded as the focus  for mustering
Balkan forces".1
     The second  Balkan  war was triggered off  by  Bulgaria in  July, 1913.
Dissatisfied with  its territorial  gains, it  prepared  to war  its  former
allies.  It sought  support  with Albania:  ethnic Albanians gathered around
Ismail  Kemal  were  promised  considerable  territorial  expansion if  they
advanced  onto  Serbia.  Thus Sofia  counted on  the  Albanian  insurrection
leading to  the proclamation  of autonomous Macedonia and its annexation  to
Bulgaria. Thus, somewhere  in  Macedonia, an Albanian-Bulgarian border would
have  been  established. Conditions  for  armed  incursions were  favorable:
around  20,000  ethnic  Albanians who  fled  Old Serbia and Macedonia  found
themselves on Albanian soil,  while  their leaders  Hasan Pristina  and  Isa
Boljetinac  sat in  the government  at Valona. Austro-Hungarian  and Italian
emissaries  and  agents, mostly the clergy  and  teachers, suppressed  Essad
Pasha's  influence and appealed to the ethnic Albanians  to rise against the
Serbs.2
     Individual  surprise attacks  on  the most  forward  Serbian units  and
border stations began already during the second Balkan war. In the meantime,
detailed  preparations  for a  large  incursion into  Serbia were  underway.
Shipments  of arms sent by the Viennese government kept arriving to Albania.
Bulgarian  komitadjis trained ethnic Albanians for guerrilla warfare.  Small
renegade groups were infiltrated into Serbian territory during May  and June
1913  to  check  their guerrilla skills. Informed of  the  preparations  for
attack,  the Serbian government sent  Bogdan  Radenkovic to try to influence
his former friends  among  the Albanian leadership, but he returned  without
accomplishing his task.3
     When  the  Serbian army was forced to withdraw to  the restriction line
behind the Crni Drim, a signal was given for a full force attack. At the end
of September 1913, around 10,000 ethnic  Albanians invaded Serbian territory
from two directions - west  Macedonia and toward Djakovica  and Prizren. The
initiator  of  the  attack was  Austria-Hungary.  Ismail Kemal  ordered  the
refugee  Albanian  leaders, Bairam Cur,  Isa  Boljetinac, Riza Bey  and Elez
Jusuf to attack  Serbia  with their parties, promising that with the  aid of
the  Dual  Monarchy and Italy,  all  conquered  territories  would belong to
Albania.  Essad Pasha refused to join them and warned Serbia not  to approve
of their action.4
     The infiltrated companies were headed by Albanian leaders and Bulgarian
officers  in  coaction  with  the  Bulgarian komitadjis. Weak Serbian border
troops  and several gendarmes units were  unable to withstand the attack. On
the  southern  stretch,  commanded  by  Bulgarian komitadjis,  the companies
managed to take Debar, Ohrid  and Struga and advance toward Gostivar. To the
north, Isa  Boljetinac,  Bairam  Cur and  Kiasim Lika took  Ljuma,  besieged
Prizren  and  shortly occupied Djakovica. At the  beginning of  October, two
divisions,  the  Troops  of new  regions, advanced from Skoplje  and, having
routed  the ethnic Albanians  from Serbian territory, crossed to  Albania to
continue their pursuit.5
     The Vienna press published elaborate articles on great victories gained
by the ethnic Albanians and demanded a revision of the borders. Ismail Kemal
demanded  an exclusion of those regions encircled  by  the insurrection from
the Serbian state and proposed a plebiscite that would be implemented by the
infiltrated companies.  When  the  incursion was  checked,  the Vienna press
spread rumors of  alleged reprisals  committed  by Serbian  troops  upon the
innocent  Albanian people.  Austro-Hungarian diplomacy endeavored  to  prove
that an  insurrection had broken out  within Serbian territory, subsequently
joined by ethnic Albanians from the other side of the frontier.6
     To emphasize his pro-Serbian orientation, Essad Pasha took advantage of
the commotion resulting from the incursion, and in Durazzo, on September 23,
proclaimed  himself Governor of Albania. Before  the  European public, which
blamed the external activities of the Serbian army for the incursion, Serbia
intended to compromise the  government in Valona by proving that two  of its
ministers,  Isa  Boljetinac  and  Hasan  Pristina,  were the organizers  and
leaders of the incursion. Again  the issue  was brought up that  the borders
determined  by  the London conference  of ambassadors  were  unfavorable for
Serbia, since the outlaw  seedbeds around  Debar  and Ljuma demanded  by the
Serbian delegation were seriously imperiling Serbian territory.7
     Wilhelm von Wied arrived  in Albania  in March 1914. Pressured  by  the
International Control Committee, Essad Pasha was compelled to enter a united
government,  but did  receive two of its most important spheres of activity,
the Ministry of War and  Internal Affairs. Discontent of the Muslim Albanian
populace  with  the  government  of  the  infidel  prince  culminated  in  a
pro-Turkish  uprising  lead  by  Hadji-Qamil  Feiza, a  Young  Turk  officer
originally  from  Elbasan. Incited  by Muslim  fanaticism  and the unsettled
agrarian issue, the  uprising caused  general anarchy. Austro-Hungarian  and
Young  Turk agents inflamed discontent among  the Muslim masses. Essad Pasha
first supported the uprising, but was forced to emigrate  to Italy  in  May,
1914, having been checked by the prince's followers.8
     Simultaneously,  with  the  aid of  Austro-Hungarian  secret  services,
Albanian leaders  Bairam Cur  and  Isa Boljetinac were preparing for another
incursion into  Serbia. At the end of  March,  1914, several hundred  ethnic
Albanians crossed the border, having  received news that an uprising against
the Serbs broke out in some villages near  Orahovac. The  uprising spread to
four  villages.  Cur  and  Boljetinac  planned  to  bring  members  of   the
International  Control  Committee to  the rebelling  areas, where  the local
ethnic Albanians would  express their wish  for Djakovica,  Pec, Prizren and
regions until the railway Urosevac (Ferizovic) - Mitrovica, to be annexed to
Albania, as promised by Austria-Hungary.  Tension at the  borderline did not
cease.9
     1  I.  Balugdzic,  op.  cit.,  521-522; D. Mikic,  Albanci  i  Srbija u
balkanskim  ratovima,  pp. 75;  more  elaborate documentation:  Dokumenti  o
spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/2, Doc. No 75, 77, 80,  86, 93, 100,
105, 124, 130, 135.
     2  Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/3, Doc. No  194,
239, 253,
     3 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja
1912. do kraja 1915. godine (Nacionalno nerazvijeni i nejedinstveni Arbanasi
kao orudje u rukama zainteresovanih sila), Vranje 1988, pp. 33-38.
     4 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici  Kraljevine Srbije,  VT/3, Doc. No 406,
cf. Doc. No 347, 351, 359, 378, 379, 418.
     5  B. Hrabak,  Arbanaski upadi i pobune  na Kosovu  i u Makedoniji, pp.
52-64.
     6 Dokumenti o spoljnoj  politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/3, Doc. No  407,
408, 409.
     7 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp. 57.
60-61.
     8 B.  Hrabak,  Muslimani  severne Albanije  uoci  izbijanja rata  1914,
Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske, 22 (1980), pp. 52-53.
     9 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, p. 93.

     The direct  cause  leading to World  War  One was the  assassination of
Austro-Hungarian  heir  to the  throne,  Franz  Ferdinand, in  Sarajevo,  by
Serbian  students (on  St. Vitus'  Day, June 28th, 1914),  thus symbolically
marking  the  commencement in the  outcome of Austro-Hungarian  and  Serbian
confrontation. Serbia's  victories in the  Balkan wars proved its  military,
political and  economical  strength;  in the Yugoslav provinces  of the Dual
Monarchy,  national  movement  grew,  turning to Belgrade as  the pillar  of
national  and South-Slavic assemblage. War with  Serbia turned  over  from a
considerable delay  of punitive  expedition to a war to destroy the  Serbian
state.  The Viennese diplomacy found reliable allies first with Albania  and
then with Bulgaria.1
     The opening of the war found the borderline between  Serbia and Albania
unrestful  and unconsolidated. Essad Pasha, follower of Balkan  cooperation,
was in  emigration, while civil war raged in Albania. The insurgents, called
"Ottomans", demanded a  Muslim for  a ruler,  and  for  the  flag,  and  the
character of state administration  to  be Ottoman. Refugee  Albanian leaders
from  Kosovo, organizers of the previous incursion into Serbia, did not take
part in the uprising; they awaited the opportunity to incite a rebellion and
seize Kosovo, Metohia and west Macedonia from Serbia.
     Two days before  war  was declared to  Serbia,  consular  officials  in
Albania  received orders from  Vienna to assist the Albanian insurrection on
Serbian territory. Bairam  Cur, Hasan Pristina and Isa  Boljetinac  obtained
money, arms and ammunition from  Austro-Hungarian consuls to prepare for the
insurrection.   In   Constantinople,   a   contract   was    concluded   for
Austria-Hungary to finance and urge the insurrection, while  the Young Turks
would handle  the  propaganda, military organization and  operations  of the
insurrection.   Incursions   onto  Serbian   territory  and   the   Albanian
insurrection in Kosovo, Metohia  and Macedonia were to  have been  the basis
for   opening   another   front  against  Serbia,   which   had,  after  the
Austro-Hungarian  attack, distributed its troops along  the  border with the
Dual Monarchy. The at first small-scale attacks were recorded already at the
beginning of  August,  1914. Turkish  and  Austro-Hungarian  association was
growing closer,  thus sealing the destiny of Prince  Wilhelm von Wied. After
several unsuccessful attempts to  crush  the insurrection, abandoned by  his
volunteers, the prince left Albania for good  at the beginning of September,
1914.2
     Shortly before the war, Serbia strove to win over some of the chiefs of
mid  and  north  Albania   for  cooperation.  The  agents  cruised   Albania
endeavoring to make contact with  dissatisfied chiefs. It was soon disclosed
that  Albanian  tribal and  feudal  chiefs  were  inconstant,  bribable  and
unreliable, that they  easily changed  sides for money  and, being without a
clear political conception and  strong national awareness, cared most of all
about  their personal and tribal interests.  Internal political polarization
between  them  was determined by religious  affiliation which  ascended over
national feelings.3
     Incursions  into  Serbia,   though  mostly  skirmishes  with  bordering
stations and gendarmes never ceased  since the war began. Even though  small
in number  and always rapidly checked, they increasingly disturbed competent
circles in  Serbia. Informed of preparations for  new  incursions of broader
dimensions, on the delivery of arms to Albania and the arrival of Young Turk
and   Austro-Hungarian  officers  to   join   Albanian   companies   at  the
Serbian-Albanian borderline, the government  sought a way to neutralize  the
preparations for  the  insurrection. Military  circles proposed a preventive
military intervention.4
     With the departure of Prince von Wied, no one held power in Albania. At
an assembly, a  senate of rebelling  towns in mid  and north  Albania  chose
Essad  Pasha for  their  leader, while the  Serbian  government  immediately
appealed to him to  take over  rule.  Nikola Pasic  contracted  with  him an
agreement of friendship, aid and customs union, in Nis, mid-September, 1914.
Aided by Pasic's government, supplying him with  money and arms, Essad Pasha
mustered around 5,000 Albanian  volunteers,  crossed  over  to  Albania  and
entered Durazzo at the beginning of October  without strife.  He immediately
formed  a government and proclaimed himself  Premier of Albania and  Supreme
Army Commander.5
     At the beginning of November,  Turkey engaged at war on the side of the
Central Powers and declared Holy War (jihad) to the Entante and  its allies.
Essad Pasha was  considered an enemy to Islam, being a friend to Serbia, and
therefore,  an ally  of  the Entante. The declaration  of jihad caused a new
pro-Turkish insurrection  of Muslim-fundamentalist forces, this time against
Essad Pasha. The rapidly spreading insurgent masses were lead by  Young Turk
officers.  The  entire  movement  was  of   anti-Serbian  orientation;   the
insurgents demanded the restoration of Albania under the  sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire, with  Kosovo,  Metohia and  west  Macedonia  included in its
composition.  Greece and  Italy  benefited from  the new  opportunities. The
Greeks took north Epirus,  while  Italian troops  first occupied  the island
Sasseno and then Valona.6
     Essad Pasha's position in Durazzo was  becoming increasingly uncertain.
Thus the  Premier appealed  to  the  Serbian  government  more than once for
military  intervention  in Albania. In December,  1914, Serbia  successfully
withstood an Austro-Hungarian offensive. The Serbian  government feared that
following  their  defeat  north,  the  Austro-Hungarian  state  and military
circles  would urge  the  ethnic Albanians  to  war  Serbia,  which  imposed
preventive military action as a solution.
     Incursions of  broader dimension announced Hasan Pristina's  attempt to
organize  an  insurrection  in  Serbia  in February, 1915,  with  a  company
numbering around 200 men.  Three  bordering  villages  on  Serbian territory
joined the insurgents, but in the first clash with a stronger Serbian  unit,
Hasan Pristina's company  was crushed  and  banished to Albania.7
Pro-Turkish insurgents  besieged Essad  Pasha in Durazzo and demanded of him
to  recognize  the  sultan's power  and  declare war to  Serbia.  Pasic thus
believed  it  was  best  to  intervene  immediately  rather  than  wait  for
Austro-Hungarian and  Young Turk officers to muster an Albanian army against
which a whole Serbian army would be forced to fight. When a Serbian diplomat
reported  at the  end  of May that Essad Pasha's position was desperate, and
since Albanian companies had then attacked the Serbian border at two places,
the Serbian government decided to move its army and take strategic positions
in  Albania.  Around  20,000  Serbian soldiers  invaded Albania  from  three
directions.  In only  ten days  the Serbian troops  crushed  the  rebellious
movement, took Elbasan and Tirana and liberated the besieged  Essad Pasha in
Durazzo.  A  special  Albanian regiment was  formed  from Serbian  troops in
Albania to implement thorough pacification in Albania and  consolidate Essad
Pasha's position.8 Essad  Pasha  did not  succeed in establishing
power  in all  the northern and  middle  regions  of Albania.  In the Mirdit
region, Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Hasan Pristina were  hiding, while in
the  Mat  region,  pasha's  relative Ahmed  Bey  Zogu strove  to come to  an
agreement with the  Serbian military authorities; at his personal request he
went to Nis for negotiations with Pasic.9
     Serbia's military  intervention met with general complaints  in  allied
circles,  especially  with  Italy,  whose  claims  to  the  Albanian  coast,
warranted by a  secret London  Treaty  (1915),  were thus jeopardized by the
entrance  of  Serbian  troops.  Pasic  replied  to  protests  sent  by  ally
diplomacies  that it was only  a  matter of temporary action and  the troops
would  withdraw after consolidating Essad  Pasha's regime. To secure Serbian
positions  in  Albania  after  the  war was  over,  the  Serbian  government
contracted  a  secret agreement in  June,  1914,  in Tirana, anticipating an
actual union between the two countries. Essad Pasha consented to rectify the
border to Serbia's advantage, and in return  received  warranty  of Serbia's
support for his choice of ruler to Albania.10
     The beginning of the German - Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia
in autumn, 1915,  Bulgaria's engagement in war on the side  of  the  Central
Powers  and  its  attack on Serbia,  forced the Serbian  army to war  on two
fronts and  withdraw to the interior  of  the country.  Bulgaria's incursion
into  Macedonia threatened to cut off  the  retreat  of the Serbian army  to
Greece. Its  retreat and Bulgaria's penetration into the depths of Macedonia
emboldened  ethnic  Albanians  in Kosovo, Metohia and  Macedonia. Masses  of
ethnic Albanians recruited into the Serbian army became  deserters, and many
joined   the   Bulgarians   who   gave  them  arms.  With   Austro-Hungarian
advance-guards, they attacked Serbian soldiers whom they awaited in the Ibar
valley.
     When the  Serbian  army  reached  Kosovo, followed  by  many  refugees,
various diversions  and surprise  attacks  on field trains were effected. In
many villages ethnic Albanians refused to provide food  for the refugees and
soldiers. In  Istok,  on  November  29, 1915, a company of  Serbian soldiers
lagging behind  was massacred. Near  the St. Marko monastery in the vicinity
of  Prizren, ethnic  Albanians of  the Kabash clan deceitfully  disarmed and
then killed 60 Serbian soldiers.  After the Serbian army retreated from Pec,
ethnic  Albanians   pillaged  many   Serbian   homes   and   sacked   shops.
Austro-Hungarian guards prevented them from entering the hospital in Pec, in
front of  which  they gathered  to  massacre the wounded soldiers. They  set
ambushes near Mitrovica, killed soldiers and looted refugees. Serious crimes
were committed in Suva Reka and other regions of Kosovo.11
     At  the end of November, after  the Bulgarians cut off all  connections
with Salonika, the  Serbian Supreme Command decided to withdraw  the army to
Albania  and make the necessary reorganizations there. The withdrawal of the
Serbian army through Albania, in winter 1915-1916, has  been retained as the
"Albanian Golgotha". With the  entrance  of  the Serbian army into  Albania,
Essad Pasha issued an announcement appealing to the Albanian people to  help
the amicable  army  and  sell their  food.  In regions  under  his immediate
control,  Albanian  gendarmes considerably helped to ease the  withdrawal of
the  starving  army,  inflicted  by  disease,  through  impassable mountains
covered  with snow. Essad Pasha's  gendarmes took care  of  overnight stays,
food supplies and guarded the roads.
     The  regions  to  which  Essad   Pasha's  authority  did  not  stretch,
particularly Ljuma, Mirdits, Drims and partly in Mati, the Serbian  army was
forced to clear with guns, on its way toward the  Adriatic Sea.  In Mirdits,
Mat and  other regions, Catholic friars called  to the  ethnic  Albanians to
confront the Serbian army in arms.  Rumors spread  that Prince  Wilhelm  von
Wied  was  arriving   from  Prizren  with  Austro-Hungarian  troops,  ethnic
Albanians  avoided  confrontation  with  large   military  formations;  they
preferred  to  wait in  ambush in  high  gorges  for  lagging  soldiers  and
refugees, and then and murder them.  The heaviest battles were  waged in the
Mirdits by a Combined Regiment of the  Serbian army that fell into ambush at
the gorge  of  the Fani river.  Around 800  ethnic  Albanians commanded by a
Catholic friar let  the army pass  through only after they were  given large
quantities of supplies from the field train.  In places where there  were no
armed assaults,  the  ethnic  Albanians  refused to rent rooms for overnight
stay and sell food.12
     General chaos encircled the withdrawal  of the Serbian army, with Essad
Pasha endeavoring  to restore order with  his gendarmes; but chaos and  fear
caught hold of his people and disobedience ensued. Still, most of his troops
protected  the Serbian  army  during  its retreat  and, whenever  necessary,
fought   together   with   it  against   Albanian   companies   that  joined
Austro-Hungarian and  Bulgarian troops. After much turmoil  and long marches
toward the  south,  the Serbian  army  was transferred by  allied ships from
Albania to Corfu. Squeezed in between Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian troops,
Essad Pasha  was forced to submit to  the  Italians;  escorted by  a Serbian
emissary, with a thousand  most devoted followers, he crossed  over to Italy
by boat.13
     Kosovo and Metohia  were divided into two Austro-Hungarian occupational
zones: Metohia entered the General Government  "Montenegro", while a smaller
part  of  Kosovo  with  Kosovska Mitrovica and  Vucitrn became  part  of the
General Government "Serbia". The largest part of Kosovo  (Pristina, Prizren,
Gnjilane,  Urosevac,  Orahovac) was  included  in  the  composition  of  the
Bulgarian Military-Inspectional region "Macedonia".14
     In Metohia and  Kosovo, Austro-Hungarian authorities  aimed to win over
the Albanian and Muslim populace:  schools and the local administration were
conducted  in  the  Albanian  language.  Albanian inhabitants were obviously
privileged.  The  occupational authorities  of the Dual Monarchy immediately
established  contact  with  the  leaders. Many refugee chiefs returned  from
Albania, while  beys  from Kosovo  and former Turkish  officers from Sandzak
cooperated most closely with the new authorities. Hasan Pristina and Dervish
Bey handled the conscription of volunteers who  were assigned either  to the
Bosnia-Herzegovinian gendarmes or the Turkish corps fighting at the front in
Galicia.   A   bulk   of  Albanian   volunteers   entered  the   service  of
Austro-Hungarian military command in Kosovska  Mitrovica and served in small
posse  regiments. At the  beginning of 1917,  Dervish  Bey  was nominated as
commander of a distinct volunteer  battalion (a force of 400 men), comprised
mainly of ethnic Albanians.15
     The  Bulgarian occupation  of  Kosovo  has been  retained  by its great
oppression,  internment   of   civilians,  forced   Bulgarization,  and  the
persecution  and murder  of priests. The  former Raska-Prizren  Metropolitan
Nicifor, was interned in  Bulgaria and killed. Serbian priests  suffered the
most, being  persecuted and  murdered  on both occupational zones  by ethnic
Albanians  and Bulgarians. Bulgarian  authorities assigned  ethnic Albanians
and Turks to all village communities as chiefs, officials and gendarmes, who
helped  their  compatriots to raid  and plunder without  disturbance, to win
trials against Serbs in courts, and murders were often hushed up. In certain
villages,  Turks and  ethnic  Albanians  oppressed the  Serbs  of  Kosovo in
conjunction.16
     In the area between Juzna Morava and Kopaonik, a komitadji movement had
been  growing since 1916, under the leadership of Kosta Vojinovic-Kosovac of
Mitrovica,  which  at the  beginning of  1917 turned into  a  large national
insurrection  with  its  seat  at  Toplica.  ethnic  Albanians  took part in
persecuting  Serbian  komitadjis  in  the   Mitrovica  district.  The  armed
resistance was aided by many Serbs  from Kosovo. Attempts made  by insurgent
leaders to win over  ethnic  Albanians through negotiations failed. Albanian
companies  attacked the insurgents,  and in October, 1917, special  Albanian
and Turkish units were formed to fight them.17
     After  being transferred to  Corfu,  the Serbian army,  reorganized and
supplemented by volunteers, was disposed along the Salonika front along with
allied troops. Crossing over from Italy to Paris, with the aid of the French
diplomacy,  Essad  Pasha  arrived  at  Salonika and formed  a  new  Albanian
government  which acquired the status of  an emigrant ally cabinet, owing to
Serbian  and  French intermediation.  A special army  unit  was  formed from
around  1,000  gendarmes  (Essad  Pasha's  camp  and Albanian  archers), and
disposed in juxtaposition  to  the  Serbian Ohrid regiment  as  part  of the
French East Army. Premier Nikola Pasic's idea was to admix  the forces  with
Serbian    ones   and   direct    operations   toward   Kosovo   and   north
Albania.18
     In autumn, 1918, subsequent to the penetration of the Salonika Front, a
widespread   national   insurrection   developed   in   Serbia.   When   the
Austro-Hungarian   troops   abandoned   the   line   Skoplje-Pristina,   the
insurrection  spread  to Kosovo  and  Metohia.  French  and  Serbian  troops
commanded  by General Tranier emerged in Kosovo at the beginning of October,
liberating  Pristina,  Prizren, Gnjilane  and Mitrovica.  Serbian  komitadji
companies, lead  by Kosta  Milovanovic  Pecanac, met with  French  troops in
Mitrovica  and immediately set off to Pec. Serbian komitadjis surrounded the
town,  compelling  the  considerably  stronger  Austro-Hungarian  troops  to
surrender;  then  the French  cavalry  trotted  into town. Divisions of  the
second  Serbian army also  arrived  in  Kosovo  and  established  civil  and
temporary martial law.19
     After the arrival of Serbian and French units, the Albanian people bore
themselves  coldly and with reserve. When the  bodies of troops continued to
advance  toward  Montenegro,  ethnic  Albanians  began  to  assail  solitary
soldiers  at the  end  of October. The  reason was the  injunction  given by
Serbian military authorities  to  collect all state  property  left from the
Bulgarian administration. Obtaining supplies from communities with arms left
behind, the ethnic Albanians  began  to assail Serbian  civil  and  military
authorities,  while  the  injunction  to   surrender  arms  met  with  heavy
resistance.  Community seats, villages  and  small  military  garrisons were
attacked,  while during November entire villages in Drenica and  around  Pec
deserted the Serbian authorities. Until mid-December, Serbian forces crushed
Albanian  resistance and  carried out the action of  disarmament with  great
difficulty.20
     The Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  was  disintegrating.  In  Belgrade,  on
December 1, 1918, the union  of Serbs,  Croats and  Slovenes was  proclaimed
into one kingdom under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. In  Kosovo,  the military
and civil authorities  had  no  time to  celebrate. The Albanian resistance,
helped  by  agitation from  Albania, with Italy behind it, announced  a new,
kacak (outlaw) movement.
     World War One forestalled  the  formation of a clear policy  for ethnic
Albanians  within Serbian borders, even  though all those that had not taken
part  in rebellions  against  the Serbian authorities  were  warranted civil
rights. Two Balkan and  one  world armed clashes, which deepened the old and
created new hatreds between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, had direct political
aims, being supported by the  warring sides,  above all Austria-Hungary  and
Turkey, and  in  Albania by  allied Italy. Yet Serbia  had, on the contrary,
persistently striven to create a counterbalance to the anti-Serbian movement
helped by Vienna and  Constantinople, through cooperation  with  Essad Pasha
and a series of tribal chiefs in mid-Albania, and to build a foundation that
would  bring ethnic Albanians and Serbs closer. Contracts signed  with Essad
Pasha in 1914 and 1915 were,  first, a draft of possible ways of contact  (a
real union with small territorial concessions), second, security in case the
destiny of Albania  would  again  be resolved without Serbia's participation
when the war was over.
     Essad Pasha  Toptani's fate, whose  political plans  for  the future of
Albania  were  based on  support  and cooperation  with  Serbia, displayed a
prevailing strong anti-Serbian disposition among ethnic Albanians, who would
benefit from the  aims of the Serbian army to capture and include within the
composition of the new state Scutari with the  neighboring Serbian villages.
Due to widespread Italian influence, under whose wing  a temporary  Albanian
government  was formed, Essad  Pasha's repeated attempts to  regain power in
Albania,  where he still had many followers, produced  no  positive results.
Despite delegates supported by  Italy in the name of  Albania, with Serbia's
assistance Essad  Pasha  brought another  unofficial delegation to the Peace
Conference  in Paris, April  1919, and,  appealing to the legitimacy  of his
government  and  the  declaration of war  to  the  Central Powers, requested
permission to return to  his country. His struggle ended with shots fired by
assassin Avni Rustemi on June 13,1920 in Paris.
     1 .More elaborate: A. Mitrovic, Srbija u  prvom svetskom ratu,  Beograd
1985. passim
     2 Ibid., 218-224;  B. Hrabak,  Arbanaski  upadi i pobune  na Kosovu i u
Makedoniji, pp. 124-145.
     3 B. Hrabak, Muslimani  severne Albanije uoci izbijanja  rata 1914, pp.
49-80; D.  T. Batakovic, Podaci srpskih vojnih vlasti  o arbanaskim prvacima
1914, Mesovita gradja, XVII-XVIII (1988), pp. 185-206.
     4 B.  Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na  Kosovu  i u Makedoniji,  pp.
147-151.
     5 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine,  in: Srbija
1915, Beograd  1986, 300-306; for details see:  B.  Hrabak, Elaborat srpskog
ministarstva inostranih dela o pripremama srpske okupacije severne Albanije,
Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1966-1967), pp. 7-35.
     6  M.  Ekmecic,  Ratni ciljevi  Srbije 1914,  Beograd  1973,  377,  pp.
383-385; cf. J. Swire, Albania, The Rise of A Kingdom, London 1930. passim
     7 A. Mitrovic, op. cit., pp. 225-226.
     8  M. Ekmecic, op. cit. p. 344; for  more details see: D. T. Batakovic,
Secanje generala D.  Milutinovica  na  komandovanje  albanskim trupama 1915.
godine, Mesovita grada, XIV (1985), pp. 115-143
     9  Ahmed  Zogu  attempted  to impose himself  upon Serbian  competitive
authorities  as   Esad-pasha's  rival.  He  promised,  given  the  necessary
warrants, he would turn to Serbia's side. An agent of the Serbian government
accompanied  him always; more  elaborate: D. T. Batakovic, Ahmed-beg Zogu  i
Srbija, in: Srbija 1917, pp. 165-177.
     10  D. T.  Batakovic, Esad-pasa i Srbija 1915. godine, 308-310; cf. Sh.
Rahimi, Mareveshjet  e  qeverise serbe  me  Esat pashe Toptanit gjate viteve
1914-1915, Gjurmime albanologjike, VI (1976), pp. 117-143. "
     11 P.  Kostic, Crkveni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu  i okolini  u
XIX  veku, pp.  141-143; B.  Hrabak, Stanje na  srpsko-albanskoj  granici  i
pobuna Arbanasa na  Kosovu i Makedoniji, in:  Srbija 1915, pp. 80-85; idem.,
Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp. 186-195.
     12 O. Boppe, Za srpskom  vojskom  od  Nisa do Krfa, Zeneva 1918; P.  de
Mondesir, Albanska  golgota,  memories and war  pictures, Beograd 1936; Kroz
Albaniju 1915-1916, Beograd 1968.
     13  D.  T. Batakovic,  Esad-pasa  Toptani i Srbija  1915.  godine,  pp.
315-124.
     14 A serious  crisis broke  out  in 1916  over the  issue  on  dividing
occupational zones between Bulgaria  and Austria-Hungary  (Istorija  srpskog
naroda, VI/2, Beograd 1983, pp. 146-148).
     15 A. Mitrovic, op. cit., pp. 329-393.
     16  J. Popovic,  Kosovo u ropstvu pod Bugarima, Leskovac  1921; on  the
persecution of the clergy: Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 745-750.
     17 More elaborate  in: M. Perovic, Toplicki ustanak 1917, Beograd 1973;
A. Mitrovic, Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, Beograd 1987.
     18 Petar Opacic, Solunska ofanziva 1918, Beograd 1980, pp. 358-375.
     19 B. Hrabak, Ucesce stanovnistva Srbije u proterivanju okupatora 1918,
Istorijski  glasnik,  3-4 (1958), 25-50; ibid., Reokupacija oblasti srpske i
cmogorske  drzave  arbanaskom  vecinom stanovnistva u  jesen 1918. godine  i
drzanja  Arbanasa   prema  uspostavljenoj  vlasti,  Gjurmime  albanologjike,
191969),  pp. 255-260; A. Mitrovic,  Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, pp.
520-522.
     20  B.  Hrabak,  Reokupacija  oblasti srpske  i cmogorske  drzave,  pp.
270-279.





     The study of Serbo-Albanian relations in the first  decades of the 20th
century is merely one chapter in a history  long marked with conflicts which
in their strongest  current bore  traits of lasting  political confrontation
and religious  intolerance which had deepened over the  centuries.  Thus the
need  for precisely  defining  in  perspective  the processes  under  study,
imposes  itself  as   the   primary  obligation.  Favoring  a  national  and
ideologically neutral reflection is  not simply  an  implicit  inclusion  of
historiographical principle, but an aspiration enabling a stratified account
of never unambiguous  historical content, instead of a reduced  image of the
past. Viewed from that angle, the figure of Essad Pasha Toptani, whom entire
Albanian historiography condemned  as the biggest traitor of his  own people
(for cooperating  with Serbia), emerges in a  different light, ideologically
impartial, alien to every industrious work on history.1
     The era delimited with the beginning of the Balkan Wars  and the end of
the Paris  Peace  Conference was marked by  a  fresh surge of  old conflicts
between  the  Serbs  and  Albanians. The  centuries-long commitment of  most
Albanians  in the  Ottoman Empire to an Islamic structure  of society (where
the Muslim belonged  to  a  privileged  status  to  which  the Christian was
necessarily subordinate), was a major obstacle  to any  attempt  at creating
more permanent political cooperation, and achieving  national  and religious
tolerance. In  the first decade  of the  20th century, the Albanian national
question began  to  undermine the  very foundations of  Ottoman  rule in the
Balkans;  subsequent  to  the  great   uprisings  against  the  Young   Turk
pan-Ottoman  policy,  it  was supposed  to  end  with  the  creation  of  an
autonomous Albanian unit  within the frame  of the Empire - in the spirit of
the  decisions  reached by the Albanian League  in  Prizren in 1878. Demands
were made to the Porte that an autonomous Albania be formed from the Kosovo,
Scutari, Bitolj (Monastir) and Janina vilayets  - ethnically mixed  areas to
which  all the surrounding Balkan states (for many a good reason) lay claim.
Rejecting cooperation offered by the  Balkan  allies, primarily  Serbia  and
Montenegro, the  leadership of  the Albanian  national movement  decided, by
defending   Turkey,   to   stand   by   the   idea   of  an  ethnic,   Great
Albania.2
     The  proclamation of the  independent  state of  Albania in  Valona  on
November 28, 1912, showed that despite the tremendous  success of the Balkan
Allies at war against Turkey, the balance of forces  in the Balkans depended
on  the  will  of  the  most  influential  big  power  in  the  peninsula  -
Austria-Hungary. Created  primarily  with  support  from the Dual  Monarchy,
Albania was to serve as a dam to Serbia's major  war objectives in the First
Balkan War  - obtaining  a  territorial access  to the Adriatic  Sea at  the
coastal belt between Durazzo and St Giovanni di Medua.
     Serbia's diplomacy watched with strong suspicion the development of the
situation in Albania.  Territorial access to the Albanian coast  was jointly
assessed by all  relevant political factors (the court, the  government, the
army, the civil parties  and  public  opinion)  as the only possible way  to
avoid the fatal embrace of the Dual Monarchy. By encroaching upon ethnically
different land, in Northern Albania, Serbia violated a principle to which it
appealed there until - the principle of nationality. State reason tipped the
balance  which was  justified  by strategic needs and a historical  right as
well as by the struggle for survival imposed by Austria-Hungary.
     In  fall, 1912,  the Serbian  troops  took Allesio, Elbasan, Tirana and
Durazzo  with  quick actions  and  little resistance;  the men  ecstatically
jumped  into  the  Adriatic,  rejoicing  over  Serbia's  sea.  The ultimatum
presented  by Austria-Hungary, threatening to attack the northern borders of
Serbia, compelled  the  Serbian government to renounce the access. The Great
Powers acknowledged  the creation of the autonomous state  of Albania at the
Conference  of  Ambassadors  in  London  (1912-1913),  initially  under  the
sovereignty  and  suzerainty  of  the  sultan, and subsequently  under their
control.  Serbia  was given  trade access to the sea via a neutral  and free
port in the north Albanian coast. The Montenegrin army, bolstered by Serbian
troops, managed to take Scutari after exhausting battles and  many  victims,
but was forced under a decision reached by the Conference to abandon  it and
surrender it to the international forces.3
     The new state was a cat's-paw in the hands of  Vienna. The ministers of
Ismail Kemal's  (Qemalli) provisional government  were forced to draw up the
declaration on independence in Turkish, and write the provisions  in Turkish
letters, since none of the government members  were literate in the Albanian
Latin alphabet. The markedly pro-Austrian  orientation of Kemal's government
did  not meet  with  support from  the  wider population, which  was through
centuries-long traditions  attached to the Ottoman state and  its  ideology.
Muslims were  in the majority in Albania (around 70% of the population), and
to them the only acceptable solution  to the national question was to set up
a state under the rule of the Turkish prince,  a demand which the government
in Constantinople was quick to point out. In  northern Albania, the Catholic
Mirdits strove to create an independent state under the wing of the Catholic
powers:  King  Nikola  I  of  Montenegro  merely  nurtured their  demand for
independence. To the south, northern Epirus  had  little  in common with the
tribes of central  and northern Albania, being under  Greek influence and of
Orthodox majority.4
     Religious and  tribal  differences,  an insufficiently  formed national
awareness, a completely underdeveloped economy, illiterate masses and  their
ignorance  in  politics  held  meager  promises for  a  future  stable state
community.  Albanian  tribal  and  feudal  chiefs,  who were  accustomed  to
reversing  their  positions  and  allies  under  the Turks  for  a  handsome
gratuity,  demonstrated  neither  enough  political  maturity  nor  national
solidarity.  Clashes of  different conceptions on the future of the country,
the involvement of the Great  Powers and  strife over power between regional
chiefs drew  Albania  into a  whirlpool of civil war, even before its status
was defined and its borders fixed. Austria-Hungary benefited mostly from the
anarchy, with its  consular and intelligence agencies encouraging a vengeful
policy of  Albanian officials,  flaring  up old hatred between the Serbs and
Albanians,  and  building outposts for undermining and  then  destroying the
Serbian administration in  the newly-liberated  territories - Old Serbia and
Macedonia.5
     The  strengthening of influence by the Dual Monarchy in  Albania, which
was  threatening  to  become  a  tangible  means of political  and  military
jeopardy to Serbia, disputes over demarcations  and the status of individual
adjacent regions  instructed the Serbian  government to seek among prominent
Albanian tribal chiefs those who would be ready to resolve the issues within
the Balkan  framework. The figure  most suitable for that purpose emerged  -
Essad  Pasha  Toptani, a  Turkish  general  who gave  Scutari  over  to  the
Montenegrins in April 1913, and was allowed in return to leave the town with
his  army  and  all  their weaponry  to become involved in the struggle over
power in central Albania.
     1 K.  Frasheri, The History of Albania,  Tirana  1964,  pp. 183-212; A.
Buda (ed.), Historia e popullit  shqiptar, II, Prishtine 1969,  pp. 371-516;
S.  Polio - A. Puto, {ed.),Histoire de  I'Albanie, Roanne 1974, pp. 181-212;
M. Qami, Shqiperia ne mareredheniet nderkombetare (1914-1918),  Tirane 1987,
pp. 43-45, 107-112, 240-243,280-281, 313-315.
     2  S. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening  (1878-1912), pp. 438-463; P.
Barti, op. cit, pp. 173-184; B. Hrabak,  Arbanaski  ustanci 1912 godine, pp.
323-350; B. Mikic, The Albanians and Serbia during the Balkan Wars, in: East
Central  European  Society and the  Balkan  Wars  (ed. B.  K.  Kiraly  -  D.
Djordjevic),  New York  1987,  pp.  165-196;  Kosovo  und  Metochien in  der
serbischen Geschichte, Lausanne 1989, pp. 311
     3  Z. Balugdzic, op. cit, pp. 518-523; D. Djordjevic, Izlazak Srbije na
Jadransko more i  Konferencija  ambasadora u  Londonu  1912,  pp. 83-86;  M.
Vojvodic, Skadarska kriza  1913. godine,  pp. 125-137;  145-151.  Cf  Ismail
Qemalli.  Permbledhje  dokumentesh  1889-1919,  Tirane  1982.  An  elaborate
insight  in  the  documents is  also  provided by the  Dokumenti  o spoljnoj
politici  Kraljevine  Srbije 1903-1914, VI/1, Doc.  Nos. 135,  389-393, 395,
411,  415,  460,  495-496,  506,  521, 527;  VI/2,  Doc.  Nos.  23,  43, 80,
87-89,108,124.
     4  M.  Ekmecic,  Ratni  ciljevi Srbije  1914,  pp. 372-377;  J.  Swire,
Albania, The Rise of a Kingdom, pp. 183-240, D. Mikic, op. cit. pp. 185-191;
M.  Schmidt-Necke,  Entstehung und  Ausbau  der Konigsdiktatur  in  Albanien
(1912-1939), Munchen 1987, pp. 25-40.
     5 V. Corovic, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp. 396-410; M.
Gutic, Oruzani  sukobi  na  srpsko-albanskoj granici u  jesen l913.  godine,
Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1 (1985), pp. 225-275; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i
pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja 1912. do kraja 1915, pp. 185-206.

     The career of Essad Pasha Toptani (born in Tirana, 1863) was similar to
the careers of  the  biggest  Albanian feudal lords.  As  the owner of  vast
chifliks  in  central Albania,  Essad Pasha quickly climbed up  the  Turkish
administrative  hierarchy. At the opening of the century he was a gendarmery
commander  in  the Janina vilayet. He supported  the Young  Turk movement in
1908, and  represented Durazzo as deputy to Turkey's Parliament;  in 1909 he
was  entrusted with the ungrateful duty of handing Sultan Abdulhamid II  the
decree on  his deposition.  Prior  to the Balkan wars, he held  the  post of
gendarmery commander in the Scutari vilayet where he successfully engaged in
trade  with  the Italians, giving them concessions for  the exploitation  of
forests. He took over  command of  Scutari  in early 1913, demonstrating all
the qualities of  a great military leader. He decided to  surrender the city
only when the garrison, broken by famine and disease, decided, together with
the city chiefs, to stop resisting.  The  London Ambassadorial Conference of
the Great Powers had already decided that Scutari remain within the Albanian
composition. In those circumstances, surrendering Scutari in late April 1913
on honorable conditions was a wise political decision.1
     Essad Pasha  evaluated that to rely  chiefly  on Austria- Hungary  when
Italy and  Greece were  laying open claims  to the territory of the Albanian
state,  would be  fatal to  his country's survival. By cooperating  with the
center of the Balkan alliance - Serbia - and through it with Montenegro,  he
was  seeking foundations to  build a  stable  Albanian  state  with a Muslim
majority, in which he would rely on the  large  beylics  in the central  and
northern parts of the country. Essad Pasha possessed the  characteristically
Muslim  trait  of  distrusting fellow-countrymen  of  another religion.  The
bearing of the northern Albanian  Catholic tribes, which aspired to separate
from  Albania,  and the pro-Hellenic  orientation of  the  Orthodox Albanian
population  in northern Epirus, were the reasons why he consented to  adjust
the border to the benefit of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece: he believed that
an Albania smaller than the one  stipulated in 1913 would,  once homogeneous
in religion, be a much more stable country. The development of international
circumstances urged a  closer cooperation  with Serbia: Albanian territories
were an object of aspiration and, when World War I  broke out,  compensation
in the cabinets of big European powers.3
     Already in early May, 1913, Essad Pasha informed  the Montenegrin  king
of his intentions to proclaim himself King of  Albania, and of his readiness
to  cooperate with the Balkan alliance. He  said  the Albanians  owed  their
freedom  to the  Balkan peoples  and  that  he would establish with them the
borders  of Albania without the mediation of other powers. Essad Pasha  told
Serbian diplomat Zivojin Balugdzic at a meeting in Durazzo, that  he  wanted
an  agreement  with  Serbia.  Hesitant  at  first,  the  Serbian  government
consented, assessing that the Pasha had showed by his bearing that he really
wanted an agreement with Serbia, which he regarded, Balugdzic quoted, as the
nucleus for mustering Balkan forces.4
     It  was  crucial to the Serbian government shortly before the Bulgarian
attack to  neutralize preparations in  Albania  against  raids  into Serbian
territory -  especially  in Kosovo,  Metohia and  western  Macedonia. Around
20,000 men were  in arms in the Albanian territory, mostly refugees from Old
Serbia and Macedonia whose leaders, Hasan  Pristina and Isa Boljetinac, were
close  associates of  Ismail Kemal. They  strove to fight  the influence  of
Essad Pasha,  agitating an  attack on Serbia and stirring  up an uprising of
the Albanian people there.
     The Bulgarian komitadjis trained Albanians  for guerrilla actions, with
money and arms coming from Austria-Hungary. Essad Pasha refused to join them
and   warned   the   Serbian   government   not    to   approve   of   their
action.5  At the end of  September, 1913,  a  forceful  raid  was
carried out into Serbian territory. The around 10,000 Albanians, who charged
into  the  territory  from three directions,  were  lead by  Isa Boljetinac,
Bairam Cur and Kiasim Lika. Aside to them, Bulgarian officers also commanded
troops. Their troops took  Ljuma and Djakovica,  and  besieged Prizren. They
were crushed only after two Serbian divisions were sent to the border.6
Essad Pasha used the crushing  of  the pro-Austrian forces to proclaim
himself (with the support of Muslim tribal chiefs and the big beylics in the
central  parts of the  country)  governor of  Albania  in Durazzo,  in  late
September,  1913.  Vienna  assessed  the  act  as  positive  proof   of  his
pro-Serbian  orientation. Official Serbia simultaneously helped a  number of
other  small  tribal chiefs who resisted  Kemal's government, directing them
towards  cooperation  with  Essad  Pasha.  The alliance  between the Serbian
government and  Essad Pasha was  not stipulated  in a special  treaty: Pasic
nevertheless ordered  that his followers be aided in money and  arms. To the
Serbian prime minister,  Essad  Pasha  served  as  a  counterbalance to  the
great-Albanian  circles  around  Ismail Kemal.  The new  prince of  Albania,
Wilhelm von Wied, backed the revanchist aspirations of Albanian leaders from
Kosovo  and Metohia. As the  most influential man in  his government,  Essad
Pasha held two important portfolios - the army and interior ministries. When
the unresolved agrarian question, urged by  Young Turk officers, grew into a
massive pro-Turk  insurrection  against  the  Christian prince,  Essad Pasha
supported  the insurgents and in  a  clash with the Prince sought backing at
the  Italian mission. After the  arrest  in  Durazzo, Essad Pasha  left  for
Brindisi under protection of the Italian legate in Durazzo at the end of May
1914.  After  his  departure,  border  raids  into  Serbia  assumed  greater
dimension and intensity.5
     The threat Albania posed for Serbia abruptly increased at the beginning
of the world war. The relationship between different political trends within
the Albanian  society  towards the Central powers and the Entente powers was
to  a  large  extent  determined by  their  commitment towards  Serbia.  The
pronounced tendency towards  pro-Austrian political circles  grew  with  the
continuous influx of  Albanian refugees from Serbia. Their revanchist policy
was the prime mover of  a strong anti-Serbian movement in the war years, and
became after its end a basis for national forgather.
     1 For  details see:  D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija  1915,
pp. 299-303 (with earlier literature).
     2  D. T.  Batakovic,  Esad-pasa  Toptani,  Srbija  i  albansko  pitanje
(1916-1918), in: Srbija 1918, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta,  7,  Beograd
1989, p. 346
     3 Dokumenti o spoljnoj  politici  Kraljevine Srbije, VI/2, Doc. No 135,
Z. Balugdzic, op. cit., 521-522.
     4 0 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu, pp. 52-64.
     5 Ibid, pp. 33-38, 60-61.
     6 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 305.

     The beginning of the "Great War" left open the question about a precise
demarcation  between  Serbia  and  Albania.  The  International  Demarcation
Commission discontinued work in  mid-1914,  thus state borders in  areas  of
dispute  remained  to  be  fixed.  War caught  unguarded  the Serbo-Albanian
border.  Austria-Hungary, not heeding for money, prepared  fresh  raids into
Serbian   territory.   Paši   rightly  anticipated   the   intention
ofVien-na's diplomacy  to open, aided by  the Young Turks, another front and
flank Serbian lands: he feared that the  Albanian leaders financed by Vienna
-Hasan  Pristina, Isa  Boljetinac (Bollletini), Bairam Cur (Curri)  and Riza
Bey Krieziu - would  "attack Serbia when  they receive orders from Turkey or
Bulgaria and weaken Serbian  military action on the other side".1
Concerned with  reportings  about incessant unrest  in the  border belt  and
endeavors to  fomcnt an Albanian uprising in Serbia, military circles in the
New Region Troops in Skoplje proposed preventive military action.
     Essad Pasha strove to  preserve an independent position,  crossing thus
from Italy to France. He planned to confront, with the help of  the Entente,
Austria-Hungary's efforts  to  completely subjugate  his  country.  He  made
inquiries  from  Paris on  the conditions  upon which the Serbian government
would aid his return to Albania. In 1914, Paši imposed the following
conditions: that he sign a political-customs treaty  with Serbia on  a joint
defense, that Albania acknowledge the customs union at the chiefs' assembly,
and that  a solution be reached at the following stage on forming a personal
or real union with Serbia. Essad Pasha confirmed by  cable his acceptance in
principle  of   Paši's  conditions  and  immediately   set  off   to
Serbia.2
     The Serbian government policy towards Albania  was aimed at pre-venting
subversive  actions  from  Albania  and   creating  preconditions  to  exert
influence at  the  end  of the  war  on  the  demarcation  of  its  borders,
particularly in  the  strip  towards  Serbia. Shortly before  Essad  Pasha's
arrival to Serbia, Pasic was interested in learning the stand of the Entante
Powers  towards  Albania:  would  they  oppose  "if  Albania as  a  Turkish-
Bulgarian-Austrian instrument now attacked the Serbian border - could we now
not only fend them off, but incapacitate them for attacks in connection with
Turkey, occupy certain Strategie  points and bring them under our  influence
until  the  time  comes  when  Europe would  again  resolve that issue,  and
probably reach a better solution, which would ensure peace in Europe and the
Balkans".3
     Essad Pasha obtained permission in Athens from  the  Greek diplomacy to
work  in agreement with the Serbian government. At the same  time he secured
backing from  Italy,  which  hoped  to  have  an  open road  to  permanently
occupying Valona  (Viore) once his regime  was established in  Albania.  The
government in Rome saw Essad Pasha as  the most appropriate figure to oppose
growing   Austro-Hungarian   and   Turkish   influence  on   conditions   in
Albania.4
     Essad Pasha did not give up his claim to the Albanian throne. He warned
the Serbian consul in Salonika  that it would be perilous to  Albania if its
prince  came  from the  sultan's family, as  that would, through detrimental
influence from Constantinople, open new hostilities towards Serbia and other
Balkan states. He thus pointed out himself as the most appropriate figure to
rule Albania. He  sent messages  to Pasic on the need for them to conclude a
special treaty before his departure for Albania.5
     Upon arriving  in Nis, Essad Pasha signed a secret alliance treaty with
Pasic  on September 17. The  15 points  envisaged  the  setting up of  joint
political  and  military  institutions, but  the  most important  provisions
focused on a military alliance, the construction of an Adriatic railroad  to
Durazzo and guarantees that  Serbia would support Essad  Pasha's election as
the Albanian ruler. The treaty left open the possibility that Serbia, at the
invitation of Essad Pasha, carry out a  military intervention to protect his
regime. The  demarcation  between the  two  countries was to  be drawn by  a
special  Serbo-Albanian  commission. Essad Pasha was  to confirm the  treaty
only upon being elected ruler, with consent from the National Assembly: this
left  maneuvering  space  for  revising  individual  provisions. Serbia  was
obligated  to finance Pasha's gendarmery and supply  the  necessary military
equipment by paying off 50,000 dinars per month.6
     After the defeat  of Prince Wilhelm  von Wied in clashes  with pro-Turk
insurgents and  his escape from Albania, anarchy  broke out in the  country.
The insurgents hoisted the Turkish flag, demanding that the country preserve
its  Muslim  quality. The senate of free  towns in  central Albania  invited
Essad  Pasha to take over power. With over 4,000 volunteers mustered in  the
vicinity of  Debar, Essad  Pasha  marched  peacefully  into Durazzo  at  the
beginning of  October  1914, set  up  his  government and proclaimed himself
supreme commander  of the Albanian army.  He did not question  the ties with
Constantinople,  and  the  consent in principle  to  the sovereignty of  the
sultan over  Albania. As  the lord of central, particularly Muslim  parts of
the country, Essad Pasha was compelled to approve of the pro-Turkish beylics
who had invited him  to take over power. His first measures were directed at
protecting the  Serbian border from raids of  troops lead by  Young Turk and
Austro-Hungarian officers  in the northern parts of the country. He informed
the  Serbian government of his move on the Catholic tribes to subdue Scutari
and capture  Albanian leaders Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur  and Hasan Pristina
who were in hiding in the northern parts of Has region.7
     Austria-Hungary,  Turkey and Bulgaria  believed that under  the rule of
Essad Pasha Albania would  come  closer to the Powers of  the  Entante on  a
European war. Germany and Austria-Hungary immediately recalled their legates
in Durazzo,  and Bulgaria withdrew  its diplomatic  agent. At the  same time
Austro-Hungarian  and  Young  Turk  officers  stepped  up  joint  work  on a
preparation  to raid  Serbia.  In keeping with  the provisions  of  the  Nis
agreement, Essad Pasha undertook action to prevent  the troops from crossing
over to Serbian  territory,  but he  was  soon  thwarted  by a  new pro-Turk
insurrection.8
     In early  November  1914, Turkey  engaged in  a  war with  the  Central
powers, and included among  the enemies of  Islam Essad Pasha Toptani, as an
ally to Serbia and  therefore the Entente. The declaration  of jihad stirred
up  a new pro-Turk insurrection  of the Muslim  population.  The "Board  for
Uniting  Islam" from Constantinople called for another  conquest of  Kosovo:
"Hey Muslims! The until recently part of our fatherland - Kosovo - where the
Holy Tomb of Sultan Murad lies, where the flag of the crescent moon and star
fluttered,  now  flies the flag of the hateful Serb, who is  turning mosques
into churches and seizing everything  you  have. That low  people is forcing
you to fight in arms against allies and Mohammedan regents".9 The
illiterate Albanian mob was easily fanaticized with pro-Turk and pan-Islamic
slogans, thus the insurgents succeeded in winning over part of Essad Pasha's
followers.  With  regular  supplies  of  money,  arms  and  ammunition  from
Austria-Hungary,  the insurgents, commanded by Young Turk officers, posed an
increasing threat  to Essad Pasha's territory. The entire movement gained an
expressly anti-Serbian  character: demands were made that regions Serbia had
liberated in the  first Balkan  war be annexed to autonomous  Albania  under
Turkish sovereignty.  Italy  and  Greece  cleverly benefited  from the whole
confusion:
     Italian troops disembarked  on Sasseno island, and then took Valona and
the hinterland,  while Greek units marched into northern Epirus  and  set up
full authority there.10
     Essad Pasha's position in  Durazzo continuously deteriorated. Pressured
by the success of the insurgents, he called the Serbian government more than
once to  intervene in  Albania.  A tacit agreement  with  Italy to  fend off
Austria-Hungary  occasionally provided money. Not only did  he request  guns
from  Greece, but demanded that its troops encroach upon those regions where
his enemies mustered.11
     The Serbian government ordered in December 1914 that preparations begin
for a  military intervention in Albania. As  the allied  diplomacies at  the
time exerted strong pressure upon the Serbian government to make territorial
compensation for  Bulgaria, offering in return  some substitutes in Albania,
Pasic  wanted  to  incapacitate  further  bargaining over Macedonia with  an
intervention in Albania. Yet only the  Russian  diplomacy approved his plan.
Legate Miroslav  Spalajkovic  from St Petersburg  informed  in early January
1915 that the Russian diplomacy was not opposed to a Serbian intervention in
Albania  as long  as it did not affect  the course  and  scope of operations
against  Austro-Hungarian  troops. There  was even  mention that the Russian
diplomacy hoped an occupation of some parts  of Albania would "this  time be
constant and  definitive".12  When Serbian  armies  broke off  an
Austro-  Hungarian offensive in the north, Pasic's  government  feared  that
politicians and  military  circles  in Vienna would use the lull to open war
against Serbia.
     Raids  organized sporadically  by  fugitive  leaders  of  the  Albanian
movement in  Kosovo  and  Metohia, and  carried out in co-action with  Young
Turks  and  Austro-Hungarian officers,  were not of  wide scope, but  roused
nervousness  among  Serbian military  circles on  the  Albanian  border. The
insurgents   besieged  Essad  Pasha  in  Durazzo  and  demanded  of  him  to
acknowledge  the  sultan's  rule  and declare  war  on  Serbia.  Pasic  then
evaluated it was wiser to intervene immediately than wait for a bulk army to
muster in  Albania  with which an  entire  Serbian army  would be forced  to
fight.13
     The allied diplomacies  warned  the Serbian  government  that  military
intervention in  Albania  would strike an  unfavorable response. The Russian
diplomacy advised Serbia to be content with the occupation of  the strategic
points it  had already occupied  and refrain from actions  that Italy  might
regard as measures directed against its interests.14
     In late  May,  1915, the  Serbian diplomatic  representative in Durazzo
informed that  Essad  Pasha's  position  was  critical: two new  raids  into
Serbian territory had taken place. Despite warnings from  the allies,  Pasic
decided  on  a  military  intervention.15  Over  20,000   Serbian
soldiers armed with guns  marched into Albania  from three directions at the
beginning of June, and took  Elbasan and Tirana - the hotbeds of rebellion -
suppressed the Young  Turk movement, liberated  the  besieged Essad Pasha in
Durazzo and turned over the captured insurgent leaders.  A special  Albanian
Detachment was set up  to implement  a  thorough pacification of Albania and
consolidate Essad Pasha's rule. The regions inhabited by Mirdits, where  Isa
Boljetinac, Hasan Pristina and Bairam Cur  were  in hiding,  remained out of
reach for the Serbian troops; Ahmed Bey Zogu, lord of the Matis, who was the
closest relative to  Essad Pasha,  attempted to  reach an agreement with the
Serbian government on his  own, contrary  to the Pasha: he set off to Nis on
his  own accord for negotiations  with  Pasic.16  The Montenegrin
army took advantage of the  favorable situation and  marched  into  Scutari,
officially still under international regime.
     Serbia's  military  intervention  roused  strong  disapproval from  the
allied diplomacies, especially Italy, whose claims to the Albanian coast and
central parts of the  country, guaranteed  under  the secret London  Treaty,
ensured its domination in Albania. Pasic replied to protests from the allies
that a  temporary action was at  stake  and  that  the Serbian  troops would
withdraw as soon  as  Essad Pasha's rule  was consolidated.17 The
Serbian  prime minister evaluated that  the timing was right  to permanently
tie Albania to Serbia, through Essad Pasha.
     Serbian Internal Minister Ljubomir Jovanovic arrived  in  Tirana and on
June 28,1915, at St Vitus' Day, signed a treaty with  Essad Pasha on  a real
union between Serbia and  Albania. Essad  Pasha obligated himself  to adjust
the  border to  Serbia's advantage on the strip between Podgradec  and  Has.
Serbia was to  acquire the towns of Podgradec, Golo Brdo, Debarska Malissia,
Ljuma and Has to Spac, until the international powers  drew the new borders.
Joint institutions  envisaged an army, customs administration, national bank
and missions  to  other  countries. The Serbian government  was to  place at
Essad  Pasha's  disposal  experts  to  set  up  the  authorities  and  state
institutions.  With  Serbia's help, Essad Pasha  was to be elected prince of
Albania  by an assembly of chiefs, he was to draw  up a constitutional draft
in agreement with Serbia and form a government of people who would represent
the idea  of  Serbo-Albanian  unity. The treaty anticipated that the Serbian
army  remain  in Elbasan and perhaps  in  Tirana until the provisions of the
treaty were executed, to persecute and destroy joint enemies. If Essad Pasha
was  to  learn  of  Italy's  intent to  occupy  Durazzo, he  was  under  the
obligation to  call the Serbian army which would do so  before  the  Italian
troops.18 The Tirana  Treaty  was the best political  option  for
Pasic's government in resolving the Albanian question. It  stipulated to the
end  Serbia's war aims towards Albania. The real union was a political  form
allowing Serbia to influence the fate of those Albanian regions to  which it
lay claim  prior  to and during the Balkan wars. Expecting that the fate  of
Albania would again  be discussed  at a peace  conference at the end  of the
war, the Serbian government wanted a tangible ground with the  union project
when putting forth its demands on Albania.
     The  Austro-Hungarian-German   offensive  on   Serbia   and  Bulgaria's
engagement in the war with  the Central  powers helped  - with frequent news
about the defeats and withdrawal of Serbian troops - the mustering  again of
Essad Pasha's opponents in northern Albania.  It was proposed at an assembly
in Mati  that Serbia be attacked when a favorable condition rose and Albania
be expanded to  Skoplje.  Ahmed-bey Zogu,  who through  a  commissioner, had
constant  connection  with the  Serbian government, opposed their plans.  No
joint action against Serbia took place but clashes
     A  decision  by  the  allies  to  deliver to Serbia  aid  in  arms  and
ammunition  via Albanian  ports  suddenly increased the importance  of Essad
Pasha's  alliance. Already  at  the beginning of November 1914, Essad  Pasha
examined  with  the  Serbian  representative in  Durazzo the possibility  of
keeping Albania a safe base  for  the Serbian army. Fearing another pro-Turk
insurrection,  Essad Pasha requested of the Serbian government that a French
or British  regiment  disembark  in  Durazzo and be  deployed  to  strategic
positions throughout the country; he would in return  prepare detachments to
aid the  Serbs in  combating the  Bulgarians.  The Serbian  prime  minister,
however, proposed that Essad Pasha receive a  battalion of  the Serbian army
in Durazzo to  thus prove that  Serbo-Albanian  interests stood  before  the
interests  of  the Entante  Powers. Pasic  feared that  Italy would use  the
plight  of  Serbian armies in  the north to  land  its troops in Albania and
occupy  the  whole  territory.  Pasic  pointed out to Essad  Pasha that  the
Entante Powers  considered him a friend and a "kind of ally", and that after
their  victory  his  alliance would  be rewarded  with guarantees  from  the
powers.19
     1   Arhiv   Srbije,  Beograd.  Ministarstvo  inostranih  dela,   Strogo
poverljivo (further in text: AS; MID, Str. pov.), 1914, No 233.  For details
on joint work  among Austro-Hungarian Young Turk and Bulgarian  services  in
Albania see: A. Mitrovic, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu, pp. 218-229.
     2 B.  Hrabak,  Muslimani  severne Albanije uoci  izbijanja  rata  1914.
godine, pp. 53, 66-67.
     3 AS, MID. Str. pov. 1914, No 233.
     4  G.  B. Leon, Greece and the Albanian Question at the Outbreak of the
First World War, Balkan Studies, 1/11 (1970), pp. 69-71.
     5  AS,  MID,  Str.  pov.,  1914,  No.  290,  308. Essad  Pasha also had
arrangement  with  Montenegrin  diplomats  on   principle  to   settle   the
controversials border issue by  agreement, thus from Athens he  requested of
the Serbian government to inform Cetinje that he would "leave for Montenegro
later on, as he had promised". (Ibid, No. 250)
     6 Sh. Rahimi,  Marreveshjet e qeverise  serbe  me  Essat pashe Toptanit
gjate viteve 1914-1915, Gjurmime Albanologjike, VI (1976),  pp. 125-127;  D.
T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 307.
     7 AS, MID, Str. pov. 1914, No. 438
     8 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 307.
     9 M.  Ekmecic, op. cit., p. 387. The  insurgents  in  northern  Albania
declared holy war against Serbia. Public Record Office London (later in text
PRO, FO), vol. 438/4, No. 1071
     10  G.  B. Leon, op. cit., 78-80; M. Ekmecic, op. cit.,  385-386. Cf P.
Pastorelli, Albania nella  politico estera italiana 1914-1920,  Napoli 1970,
pp. 19-32; James H. Burgwyn, Sonnino e la diplomazia  italiana del tempo doi
guerra  nei  Balcani nel  1915, Storia  Contemporanea,  XVI, 1  (1985),  pp.
116-118.
     11 G. B. Leon, op. cit., p. 79
     12 AS, MID. Str. pov.,  1914, No 863, tel.  M. Spalajkovic to MID,  St.
Peterburg  25. 12.  1914 / 7.  01. 1915.  Cf. B. Hrabak, Albanija od  julske
krize  do proleca  1916.  godine  na  osnovu  ruske  diplomatske gradje,  I,
Obelezja 5 (1973), pp. 71-75.
     13 AS, MID, Str. Pov., 1914,  No. 810, 877; B. Hrabak, Elaborat srpskog
ministarstva  inostranih dela o pripremama srpske okupacije severne Albanije
1915. godine, Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1966-1967), pp. 7-35
     14 Arhiv  Jugoslavije, Beograd, 80-2-604. Tel.  M. Spalajkovic from St.
Petersburg, 23. 04/6. 05. 1915, No 704; PRO FO, vol. 438/3, No. 100, 118.
     15 The most vicious  raid into Serbian territory was lead at the  about
200 persons to  stir up the tribes around  Prizren, but his host was crushed
near the  village  of Zur.  The Serbian government informed  the allies that
around 1,000  armed ethnic Albanians had crossed the border (PRO, FO, 438/5,
No. 53; A. R,195
     16 Essad Pasha  complained about the  conduct  of  the Serbian military
authorities  who pursued  their  own  policy in  Mati and other  regions and
attempted to agitate among individual Albanian chiefs  for acknowledging  as
ruler  of Albania a  Serbian prince.  (D.  T.  Batakovic,  Secanja  generala
Dragutina  Milutinovica  na  komandovanje albanskim  trupama  1915.  godine,
Mesovita  grada,  XIV  (1985), pp. 128, idem,  Ahmed-beg Zogu i  Srbija, in:
Srbija 1916. godine, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, 5, Beograd 1987, pp.,
165-177). Cf. M. Ekmecic, op. cit., pp. 394-395.
     17 Pro, Fo, vol. 371, Nos.  184,  187, 200, 624,;  vol. 438/5,  No. 75;
vol, 438/6, No  1444; M. Ekmecic,  op. cit.,  pp. 392-394; A. Mitrovic,  op.
cit., pp. 230-232,
     18  Sh.  Rahimi,  op.  cit., pp.  137-140;  D. T.  Batakovic, Esad-pasa
Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp. 309-310.
     19 Ibid, pp. 313-314.

     The retreat of the  Serbian army  into Albania in  late  1915 and early
1916 put the alliance of Essad Pasha to a  serious test. In regions  whereto
his authority  did not extend, particularly Catholic tribes  in the northern
parts of the  country, the  Serbian  troops were  forced to  shoot their way
through to the  Adriatic  ports  where allied  ships  were waiting for them.
Essad Pasha's gendarmery  aided the  Serbian army, secured safe passageways,
accommodation and  food,  and engaged in  skirmishes with Albanian regiments
that  attacked  Serbian  units and pillaged  unarmed  refugees. Essad  Pasha
issued  a  special proclamation  calling Albanians to help the Serbian army,
and  informed military commanders about the advancement of enemy forces, the
emergence   of   rebellious   regiments   and   the   mood   of   individual
tribes.1
     The  "Albanian  Golgotha"  was  the greatest war  trial of  the Serbian
people.  Of the 220,000 soldiers which  broke through Albania  towards Corfu
and Bizerta, only 150,000 reached the destination; of about 200,000 refugees
spread along Albanian crags and marshes  by the coast barely a third (60,000
people)  escaped  death.2  Serbia's losses would have  been  much
heavier were it not for Essad Pasha and his followers during the retreat and
embarkation.
     During the  retreat  Essad  Pasha maintained  contact  with the Serbian
government. He rejected  Pasic's proposals to proclaim  his  treaty with the
Serbian  government  and  admit  Serbian officials  in  his  administration,
explaining that  his  enemies were already calling him Essadovic because  of
his alliance with Serbia. He wanted the allies to guarantee that Italy would
not occupy entire  Albania after the retreat of the  Serbian army. Realizing
that Austro-Hungarian troops would soon take  Durazzo, Essad  Pasha proposed
to Pasic that he be conveyed to Corfu with his government and  gendarmes, so
as to be able,  when the allied offensive was launched, to take up positions
on  the left flank of the  Serbian army and operate  towards Albania. At the
demand of the Italian diplomacy,  Essad Pasha and several  hundred gendarmes
crossed at the end of February 1916 to  Brindisi escorted by Serbia's charge
d'affaires. Prior to  his departure, he  declared war on the Central powers,
thus taking upon himself full responsibility for his cooperation with Serbia
and the Entente powers.3
     Despite  promises that he  would be  recognized as the Albanian prince,
and faced with open  endeavors by the  Italian  government to exert complete
influence over him,  Essad Pasha continued on to France to seek backing from
the allied diplomacy.  Political circles in  Paris admitted him as the prime
minister of a legitimate government. Military experts evaluated that Albania
was  a reservoir of good soldiers which could be  winged over for the allied
cause by Essad Pasha only. In late August, Essad Pasha reached Salonika in a
French vessel. Through the mediation  of the Serbian and Greek  diplomacies,
his  government  acquired the  status of an exiled  alliance  cabinet. Essad
Pasha's camp was set up at the Salonika battlefield from 1,000 gendarmes and
followers  under  the command  of Albanian  officers. Deployed to  positions
towards Albania, he operated within the  composition  of the  French eastern
army. According to  Pasic's intentions, his  camp  was to operate mixed with
Serbian troops towards Kosovo and northern Albania.4
     During work in Salonika, Essad Pasha continuously strove to obtain firm
promises from France and Great Britain that  when the war was over rule over
Albania  would not  be given to  Italy, and  that  he would  be  allowed  to
reinstate his administration in the  country. At  the end of 1916, Korea was
proclaimed  an autonomous republic under the  protection of French  military
authorities,  and  power  was  given  to  the  local liberals.  Essad  Pasha
complained  to Pasic about the actions of the  French military  command, and
warned of Italy's web of intrigues, emphasizing that he had tied his fate to
Serbia. He feared that the Italian troops in  Argirokastro were preparing an
assassination.  Instead,  General Giazzinto Ferrero  proclaimed the state of
Albania, in early June, 1917, under the Italian protectorat.5
     The  Serbian government followed  with  anxiety  the  consolidation  of
Italian  positions  in  Albania.  Immediately  after  the  protectorate  was
proclaimed, the Serbian government protested to the allied powers calling on
the decisions of the  Ambassadorial Conference in London, to which Italy was
a  signatory,  and  warned  that  the  one-sided  proclamation  of  Albanian
independence violated  the "Balkans  to  the Balkan peoples"  principle. The
news  that the Italian  military  authorities  were promising the  Albanians
considerably  wider state borders than those established in  London  in 1913
aroused particular  concern.  Pasic therefore made it especially  clear that
the  Italian protectorat  resembled a similar  attempt by Austria-Hungary to
"secure for itself a protectorat over Albania, and indirectly over the other
Balkan peoples by  creating a  new Great  Albania to the  detriment of other
Balkan peoples".6
     Essad Pasha also protested to the Italian government. Dissatisfied with
the development of  the  situation, he resolved to  set off for Switzerland,
the center of various Albanian committees, and through the French government
to secure backing  from the British diplomacy which supported Italy's policy
in Albania. He obtained no guarantees in Paris, and failed to secure backing
from  the Geneva committees, tied  firmly  to Austria-Hungry  which financed
them.7
     Increasingly  insecure  about  winning  support  from  the  allies  and
concerned over implications that his special obligations towards Serbia were
no  longer a secret,  Essad  Pasha  demanded of  Pasic  that  the government
provide more money and secure  after  the war his administration  in Albania
within the borders drawn by the Conference of Ambassadors  in London. On his
return  to Salonika  at the beginning  of 1918, Essad  Pasha  in talks  with
Regent  Aleksandar  linked the  distrust  of  the French diplomacy with  the
Tirana  Treaty and  Italy's endeavors  to compromise  France.  In talks with
other  Serbian  diplomatic  officials,  Essad  Pasha   complained  that  the
provisions in the Tirana Treaty impeded him  in political work. Finally,  he
made a  demand to  the Serbian  government to procure  permission  from  the
French military authorities for introducing his  administration in the Korea
Republic,  where  Italians  were  freely  agitating against him.  The French
command, however, dissolved the Korea  republic in  February  1918, and took
over command of Essad Pasha's units,  which held the front between Podgradec
and Shkumbi River, due to low combat morale.8
     The Serbian  government  strove to aid Essad  Pasha as  appreciably  as
possible within  its means. Its policy towards Albania was, in principle, to
any thwart  plans on foreign protectorates and  reinstate  the  regime  that
existed prior to the withdrawal of the Serbian army.  The Serbian government
protested several times against  the  consolidation of Italian positions  in
Albania, striving to give as much prominence as possible to Essad  Pasha and
prepare the conditions for his return to power. Essad Pasha realized himself
that  Serbia  was his  last outpost and  that without its support he  had no
chance with the allies to  win back his  return to the  country.  Thus  in a
message to US President Woodraw Wilson in the  summer of 1918,  he said that
only  a  future  Yugoslav  state  could  guarantee  for  the  integrity  and
independence of his country.9
     In the event that Pasha's return to power was not  possible,  Pasic was
preparing  to leave open  the  question  of  the border  with  Albania. (The
Entente  had  prior to the breakthrough  of  the  Salonika front  signed  an
agreement in  Paris  on the division of  spheres of interest whereby Albania
was  ceded to Italy.)  In  early  November  1918, Pasic  sent the  following
message: "Our policy in Albania is  to establish, if possible, the situation
as it was  prior  to the evacuation, when Essad Pasha was the Albanian prime
minister, and occupy territories from the Mati river beyond and in agreement
with  the tribal chiefs,  reestablish local administration which will act on
the instructions of our authorities."10
     He  called  Essad Pasha  -  at the  time in France seeking backing - to
return to Salonika and at the same  time demanded that territories taken  in
Albania be  occupied  by mixed  allied  forces:  he  proposed also  that the
Albanian camp  be  used,  mixed with Serbian  officers.  The French command,
however, disbanded Essad Pasha's troops on October  12. By a decision of the
interallied Supreme War Council, Albania was to be controlled by the Italian
army up to the Maca river.11
     Still, the Serbian prime minister did not rule out the possibility that
the situation would  develop enabling the return  of Essad Pasha to Albania,
to the region north of  the Mati river which Serbia considered its sphere of
interest. Italy persecuted Pasha's followers in  the occupied  parts of  the
country,  and  at  one  particular  time made  a  demand  to  France for his
internment. It all ended with the withdrawal of the French representative to
his government.12
     1 Ibid, pp. 315-317.
     2 Veliki  rat Srbije za  oslobodjenje  i  ujedinjenje  Srba,  Hrvata  i
Slovenaca, vol. XIII-XIV;  Kroz  Albaniju  1915-1916,  Beograd  1968; M.  M.
Zivanovic, O evakuaciji srpske vojske iz Albanije i njenoj reorganizaciji na
Krfu (1915-1916) prema francuskim dokumentima, Istorijski  Casopis (XIV-XV),
pp. 231-307.
     3 D. T Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp. 321-324.
     4 D.  T.  Batakovic,  Esad-pasa  Toptani,  Srbija  i  albansko  pitanje
(1916-1918), pp. 348-349.
     5 AS, MID,  Str.  pov., 1917, No.  232  Memoire:  Proglas  protektorata
Italije  nad  Albanijom  i  uopste rad  Italije 1917 Krf, D.  T.  Batakovic,
Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija  i  albansko pitanje (1916-1918), pp.  350-351; P.
Pastorelli, op.  cit., pp. 36-41; I documenti diplomatici  italiani,  Quinta
serie, vol. VI, Roma MCMLXXXVIII, NOs, 119, 390,  394,  427, 438, 445,  448,
831.
     6  AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917, No. 182. Pasic's  note  dated  30.  05/13.
06.1917.
     7  D.  T.  Batakovic,  Esad-pasa Toptani,  Srbija  i  albansko  pitanje
(1916-1918), pp.
     8 Ibid, pp. 353-358.
     9 Ibid, pp. 359.
     10 Ibid, pp. 360.
     11 Ibid.
     12  Ibid,  pp.  361-362;  B.  Hrabak,  Reokupacija  oblasti  srpske   i
crnogorske drzave  s arbanaskom vecinom stanovnistva u jesen 1918.  godine i
drzanje  Arbanasa prema uspostavljenoj  vlasti.  Gjurmime  albanologjike,  1
(1969), pp. 262-265, 285-286.

     After  the war, Italy became the  main rival of  the Kingdom  of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes in Albania. Rome strove to use the disintegration of the
Dual Monarchy to step up its positions in the Balkans and turn the  Adriatic
Sea into an Italian lake. Albania was in its  schemes  the country wherefrom
Italian influence would be wielded onto the neighboring regions. The Italian
troops occupied  the largest part of Albania and, by meeting the demands  of
various  committees  (particularly  the  Kosovo Committee)  in  annexing  to
Albania Metohia,  Kosovo and western Macedonia, they presented themselves as
the  protector of  the  interests of all  the  Albanian people.  An  interim
government  of Turhan Pasha Permeti was set up in Durazzo under the  wing of
Italy at the end of December 1918, which was ready to recognize as its ruler
a prince  from the House of Savoy. At  the Peace  Conference in Paris, Italy
strove  to secure  the possession  of Valona  and hinterland  and  obtain  a
mandate  over the  other parts  of Albania.1  The envoys  of  the
pro-Italian Durazzo government demanded at  the Peace Conference a  revision
of  the  1913  borders  -  they  wanted  Prizren, Djakovica,  Pec, Pristina,
Mitrovica,  Skoplje, Tetovo  and  Debar to be included in the composition of
the Albanian state.2
     The policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes towards Albania
did not deviate  much  from that of Pasic's  government. Belgrade  evaluated
that the consolidation of Italian positions in  Albania would be a source of
continual threat to Kosovo, Metohia and the neighboring regions. Head of the
delegation  to the Conference,  Nikola Pasic, also shaped the policy of  the
new state as  regards Albania. In order to repress Italian influence  in the
Balkans, he demanded the  restoration of Albania within the 1913 borders, as
an independent state  with autonomous and national rule. If the Great Powers
should  nevertheless decide  to  divide  the Albanian  territories among the
neighboring states, the delegation demanded that the Yugoslav state be given
northern Albania from the Veliki Drim to Scutari.3
     Under the  aegis  of the  Kingdom of  Serbs Croats and Slovenes,  Essad
Pasha  brought his  delegation to  The  Peace Conference  in  Paris.  Having
submitted a memorandum  to the Conference at the end of April, he  called on
the legitimacy  of  his government,  its allied status  in Salonika and  the
declaration  of  war on  the  Central  powers.  Seeking  the  restoration of
independent Albania  within the  1913  borders,  Essad Pasha demanded  to be
recognized as the only legal representative of his people.4
     The Peace Conference, however, did not  officially discuss the  fate of
Albania as  it was formally considered a neutral state during the  war.  The
question of its future was being resolved at the Ambassadorial Conference of
the Great Powers. The diplomatic circles of the Western allies assessed that
Albania  was insufficiently nationally constituted  and that its development
had  to  be  under  the  control  of  a  big  power.  As  time  passed,  the
representatives of  the  Great  Powers  saw  the  solution  to  the Albanian
question in granting a mandate to Italy - its troops controlled the  largest
part  of  the Albanian  territory and its  diplomats persisted on the allies
meeting the provisions taken over by the 1915 London Treaty.5
     Pasic evaluated that the Albanian question was to be resolved  soon. He
strove to set it apart from its natural linkage with the  Adriatic question,
which was considered an object of compensation. Even though France and Great
Britain  paid heed to  the  interests  of the  Kingdom  of Serbs  Croats and
Slovenes,  Pasic  believed  that the  key  role  in resolving  the  Albanian
question  would  be assumed  by United States  President  Woodraw Wilson and
Italy. He  persistently  maintained  the stand  that  the  Delegation of the
Kingdom  of Serbs  Croats and Slovenes  demanded  the restoration of Albania
within  the 1913 borders, and that  border  alteration  towards  Serbia  and
Montenegro be resolved in agreement with the tribes that lived there. If the
stand  prevailed  that the  provisions of  the  London Treaty should be met,
Pasic  demanded  - as a Great Power  was coming  to  the Balkans  and in the
immediate  vicinity of the Yugoslav  state - stronger  strategic  borders as
compensation, "The  Glavni (Veliki) Drim  from the sea to the  confluence of
the Crni  Drim,  then the Crni Drim up  to a  point  beneath  Debar,  to the
confluence  of the  Zota  river left  of  the Crni Drim, encompassing entire
Ohrid Lake with the watershed to remain on our side."6
     Since Valona and the hinterland was being ceded to Italy under the 1915
London Treaty,  as  well as protectorat over central Albania, while Northern
Albania  was  intended  for Serbia and  Montenegro,  Pasic proposed that the
northern  Albanian tribes be given the right to self-determination,  "to say
themselves if they wish to join the central Muslim Albania under the Italian
protectorat, or to form a separate small  state - some sort of small 'buffer
state',  or  if  they  desire  to  join  our  state  as  a small  autonomous
state".7 Thus from the beginning of 1919, petitions of individual
Catholic  tribes demanding  to  be annexed to Serbia  were collected  at the
border belt, with  backing from  the military and civil  authorities of  the
Kingdom  of Serbs Croats  and Slovenes.8 This way Pasic wanted to
parry the pro-Italian delegation to the Peace Conference and deputies of the
American  Albanian society "Fire",  which  demanded the forming  of a  Great
Albania  inclusive  of  considerable  regions  of  the  former  Serbian  and
Montenegrin state.  Thus he supported those  groups of Albanian delegates in
Paris that maintained it would be the most benefitial for Albania if it came
to  terms  with the Kingdom  of  Serbs Croats  and Slovenes, and accepted  a
border alteration to  its advantage,  in keeping with the wish of the  local
population. Pasic set out they  believed that their independence "would best
be ensured if they  entered into an alliance with us, especially to set up a
customs  union. The  group  comprises  Essad  Pasha's  followers  and  those
opposing the Italian protectorat".9
     On the ground, particularly those areas in Albania under occupation (by
agreement  with the French  army,  after  the  Austro-Hungarian troops  were
driven out) - Pishkopeja, Gornji and Donji Debar and Golo Brdo - the Serbian
military authorities,  and subsequently those of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats
and Slovenes, tried to help organize Essad Pasha's followers. A committee in
Debar was entrusted with the task of setting up rule in the border areas and
preparing   the  conditions  for   Pasha's   return  to   the  country.  His
commissioners  exerted the strongest influence  in regions between Golo Brdo
and  Gornji Debar, in Podgradec and  Starova while deep into the country, in
the central parts, Italian troops  gradually  and successfully checked Essad
Pasha's followers. Despite continuous dissipation, Essad Pasha still enjoyed
considerable support especially  among the old Muslim beys, who viewed  with
distrust   the    consolidation   of    Italian    positions    in   central
Albania.10
     Beside  the Conference, Italy and  Greece  signed in late July  1919  a
secret treaty - the so-called Tittoni-Veniselos  Treaty - on the division of
the  Albanian territory. At  the  beginning of December  the  allied  powers
recognized  Italy's sovereignty over Valona  and the hinterland, and offered
it a mandate to set up administration in the remaining part of Albania under
the  control  of the League of  Nations. The same  memorandum envisaged  and
defined territorial  compensations to the  advantage of Greece. Pasic  again
set out that  in that case the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats  and Slovenes had to
stand  by their  demand  for  more  favorable borders  towards  Albania.  He
proposed that the region of the entire length of the  Mace river to the Crni
Drim be demanded as the maximum,  and  the stretch along the Crni and Veliki
Drim rivers to their confluence as the minimum.11
     Cooperation with Essad Pasha never ceased for a moment. The  delegation
of the Kingdom of  Serbs Croats and Slovenes  backed his demands  that he be
paid  war reparations  as an ally to the Entante  Powers and thus indirectly
acquire an  allied status. Pasha's followers  in  the country dissipated and
gathered  again, depending on current  circumstances,  and  were unsparingly
helped in actions against those supported by the Italians. He sent  messages
several  times to  his followers  that  he was returning to the country  and
advised them to act in cooperation  with Serbia and to decisively oppose the
Italian occupation.12
     While a bitter diplomatic battle over Albania's destiny was being waged
at the  Conference, a movement  rose against  the  Italian occupation in the
country. The government in Durazzo was condemned and replaced at a  national
congress  of Albanian chiefs in  Ljusnje  in early 1920, and strong protests
were lodged with the Peace Conference  and Italian parliament. The delegates
demanded  the  creation  of a  Great  Albania;  command over  the  army  was
entrusted  to Bairam Cur.13 Essad  Pasha's followers who convened
at the  People's Assembly in  March made  strong  demands that  the  Italian
troops  be routed.  Ahmed Zogu, the  interior minister in the government  of
Suleyman Delvina, strove to  neutralize  Essad  Pasha,  sending to that  end
special emissaries to Paris at the end  of May. The delegation offered Essad
Pasha  the  post  of  prime  minister,  on  the  condition  that  he abandon
aspirations  to rule Albania.14  At  the time Bairam  Cur  lead a
decisive battle against the  detachments  of  Pasha's followers. Finally, on
June  13, 1920, an Albanian  student,  Avni  Rustemi,  by order  of  Lushnje
government, killed Essad Pasha in  front  of the Continental Hotel in Paris,
believing that as  an ally to Serbia and then to the Kingdom of Serbs Croats
and Slovenes, he  had  betrayed the interests of  the Albanian people. Essad
Pasha was buried with the last honors in the Serbian army cemetery in Paris.
     1 P.  Pastorelli, op. cit.,  pp. 63-86; V. Vinaver,  Italijanska akcija
protiv  Jugoslavija  na  albansko-jugoslovenskoj  granici  1919-1920.  god.,
Istorijski  zapisi,  XXIII, 3 (1966),  pp. 477-515; Z.  Avramovski, Albanija
izmedju  Jugoslavije  i  Italije,  Vojnoistorijski  glasnik,  3 (1984),  pp.
164-166.
     2  Arhiv Jugoslavije, Delegacija Kraljevine Srba Hrvata  i Slovenaca na
Konferenciji mira u Parizu (later in text: AJ, Delegacija), f-27, No 296; D.
Todorovic, Jugoslavija i balkanske drzave 1918-1923, Beograd 1979, p. 50.
     3 The  Question of  Scutari,  Paris 1919; A. Mitrovic,  Jugoslavija  na
Konferenciji  1919-1920,  Beograd  1969, pp. 169-176; Documentation  in:  B.
Krizman  -  B.  Hrabak,  Zapisnici  sa sednice  delegacije Kraljevine SHS na
mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-1920, Beograd 1960, pp. 321-324, 365-366
     4 Memoir prsente  la Conference de la Paix  Paris par son Excellence
le general Essad Toptani prsident du gouvernement d'Albanie, Paris 16 Avril
1919. (Essad  Pasha's correspondence with the  Serbian  government  and  his
letter addressed to the Conference in:  A3, Delegacija, f-27.  The same file
contains the  memoirs  of  Leon  Krajewski dated  January 2, 1919,  focusing
mainly on Essad Pasha's relations with France)
     5 AJ, Delegacija,  f-27, No 7289; P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 189-225;
D.  Todorovic,  op.  cit,  pp.  53-64.  Cf  P.  Milo,  L'attitude du  Royame
serbo-croato-slovene a I'egard  de  I'Albanie  la  Conference  de la paw. a
Paris (1919-1920), Studia Albanica, 1 (1989), pp. 37-57.
     6  AJ,  Delegacija,  f-28,  Pasic  to  Prime  Minister;   A.  Mitrovic,
Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, pp.
     7 Ibid
     8  D.  Todorovic,  op. cit.,  pp. 49.  The  originals  of  a number  of
petitions  (submitted  to the  Peace  Conference)  on the annexation of  the
northern Albanian tribes to  the  Kingdom  of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are
kept in: AJ, Delegacija, f-28.
     9 Same as footnote 49.
     10 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
     11 Z. Avramovski, op. cit., p. 167.
     12 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
     13 Ibid, Nos. 5484 - 5489; i. Avramovski, op. cit., pp. 169-170.
     14 AJ, Delegacija, f-28, Nos. 6724, 6725.

     The  cooperation  of  the  Serbian  government  and  subsequently   the
government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with Essad Pasha  is
an important chapter  in the history of Serbo-Albanian relations. It was the
first joint effort to  resolve issues of dispute between two peoples in  the
Balkans to  the Balkan peoples principle, in a manner that was, with certain
territorial concessions to Serbia, and subsequently to the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats  and Slovenes,  to  wipe out  old  hotbeds  of mutual  conflict.  The
strategic aspirations of the Serbian  government to curb  the  influence  of
Great  Powers  in  Albania did not emanate solely  from  old  aspirations to
permanently  master  northern Albania,  but from  actual political estimates
that  under  the  influence  and protectorat of  a Great Power, the Albanian
state  would  pursue  the  course  of  maximalist  and  national  claims  to
territories  that  were inhabited, aside to the Serbian people, by Albanians
-- Kosovo, Metohia and western Macedonia.




     Kosovo and Metohia  is  the native and ancestral land of the Serbs. The
Serbian Jerusalem, which spread  over an area of 10,800 km2, is covered with
a dense  of about 200  medieval monasteries, churches and fortresses. Kosovo
was the scene of the famous battle held on St. Vitus Day (June  28) in 1389,
when Serbian Prince Lazar and the Turkish emir Murad both lost their  lives.
The  Ottoman's  breakthrough into the  heart of Southeast Europe also marked
the  beginning  of  the  five centuries  long  clash  of  two civilisations:
European (Christian) and Near Eastern (Islamic). The conflict, alive to this
day, is generated in the visible layer also in the clash of the two nations:
the  Serbs, mainly  Orthodox  Christians, and  the ethnic  Albanians, mainly
Muslims.
     The oath  of Prince  Lazar, derived from the New Testament tradition of
martyrdom that it was  better to obtain freedom in the celestial empire than
to  live humiliated in the oppression of the earthly kingdom,  became during
the centuries of  Turkish  rule, the key of  Serbian national  ideology. The
Kosovo  oath, woven into  the national epos, became the basis upon which the
Serbs built  the cult of  resisting and  not accepting injustice. The Kosovo
pledge was like a flag raising rebellions  against the Ottomans and  heading
towards its final aim: the restoration of the Serbian national state. Many a
generation of Serbs received  its  first notions  of itself and the world by
listening to folk poems describing the Kosovo sufferings:  the apocalyptical
fall of Serbian  Empire, the tormentous death of Prince  Lazar, the betrayal
of Vuk  Brankovic,  the heroism  of Milos Obilic who, consciously sacrifying
himself, reached the tent of the emir and cut him down with his sword.
     Withdrawing in front of the Turks towards west and the north, the  only
political  tradition of the Serbs  was  the Kosovo  pledge.  Through the Pec
Patriarchate, the historical traditions of the Serbs crystalized into a epic
tradition  of an exceptionally national  character. Even before the creation
of modern nations,  the  Serbs found in the Kosovo covenant firm basis for a
future national integration.
     When the firsts national revolution in the Balkans broke  out in Serbia
in 1804, during the Napoleonic wars, its leaders dreamed of a new  battle of
Kosovo with which they would reestablish the lost empire. The historicism of
the romantic epoch only blended harmoniously with the already clearly formed
picture the Serbs had of their past and the tasks that were assigned to them
as a nation.  The influence of the  Kosovo covenant, functioning towards the
creation of national conscience, continued throughout the entire 19 century.
It the  two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro, independent  since  1878,
the  Kosovo  ideology  (called  also  the  covenant  Serbian  thought")  was
institutionalized, conformed the needs of state nationalism:  their national
program  had as its final revenge of Kosovo and the restoration of the large
Serbian state in the center of  the Balkans.  The centuries-dreamed-of fight
with  the  Turks  occurred  in the  fall of 1912. The Serbian army liberated
Kosovo in a few week,  while the  forces  of Montenegro marched triumphantly
into Metohia. Negotiations  on  the  final unification  of the  two  Serbian
states  were interrupted by World War  I. Serbian  students  from Bosnia and
Herzegovina (occupied by Austria-Hungary 1878), inspired by the Kosovo idea,
like new Obilic  heroes, assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne on St.
Vitus Day in 1914, in Sarajevo.
     The Kingdom of  Serbs Croats and Slovenes, later named  Yugoslavia, was
created  on  the remnants of Austria-Hungary after  the  Great  War ended. A
union of South Slav peoples was created instead  of unified Serbian national
state. The  Serbs, almost all of them, found themselves within the framework
of  one state  for  the first  time in  history.  It  should have  been  the
guarantee of their  civil  and  national  rights.  Having underestimated the
influences  of  thousand-year-long  civilisational  differences, the  Serbs,
although  representing the  relative majority, found themselves  faced  with
unsolvable   problems  regarding   differences   in   religion,   historical
traditions,  political  mentality and  national aims.  The  case  of  ethnic
Albanian minority  in  Kosovo and  Metohia is a  paradigmatic example of the
impossibility of overcoming civilisational gaps caused  by the erosive force
of history.
     The  Kosovo  and  Metohia were, in  the moment of liberation in 1912, a
backward  agricultural  community  with  mixed  Serbian  and ethnic Albanian
population, devastated by the raging of tribal anarchy. Serbs, however, even
then made almost half of the entire population in spite of the huge waves of
emigration in the previous period (about  150,000  from  the region  Kosovo,
Metohia and  the neighboring Raska and  northern Macedonia). The Pan-Islamic
policy of Abdulhamid II (1878-1909) made Kosovo and Metohia, beside Armenia,
"the most unfortunate land  in the world", as witnessed  contemporaries from
Victor  Berard and George Gaulis to H. N. Brailsford to Frederick Moore. The
Kurds were crushing the Armenians in Asia Minor, and ethnic Albanians in the
European  provinces were  dealing  in  the  same  way  with  the  unreliable
Christian  subjects of  Sultan:  Serbs,  Greeks  and  Bulgarians. The  three
centuries  long  domination  of Islamized ethnic Albanians in  the  Balkans,
culminated at the  beginning of the 20th century. Living for centuries  with
the gun in hand, the  tribes of ethnic Albanians discovered in the plains of
Kosovo and  Metohia the space for their further biological  expansion. Islam
granted them the right to  persecute  Christians,  lower grade citizens, and
stay  unpunished. In time,  a  strange  conviction settled itself  among the
ethnic  Albanians' tribes  that  Islam was the religion of  free peoples and
Christianity  that  of slaves. In  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  constitutional
monarchy with multiparty  system  and  democratic  institutions,  the ethnic
Albanians mostly minded the  fact that their yesterday serfs now  became not
only their equals, but the ruling class in the state as well.
     Islam marked strongly the national emancipation of ethnic Albanians and
defined their civilisational image. Although not fanatical believers, ethnic
Albanians have  also built their national identity  on  the basis of Islamic
traditions,  in fierce opposition to the  neighboring Christian states.  The
national elite from  Catholic and Orthodox tribes in the  north and south of
today's Albania did not succeed in  imposing Europe-shaped  solutions in the
fight  for  a national state: the Muslim majority dominated in all phases of
the development of the Albanian state.  The rule of the founder of Communist
Albania,  Enver Hoxha, in  spite of the decree  banning all religions in the
country, showed that it owed most to solutions  represented in the  past  by
national  leaders with Islamic  background.  His regime, created  by  mixing
oriental  feudalism and  Stalinist  type  of  communism, was the ideological
framework  accepted without  hesitation  as a  political model for  national
movement by ethnic Albanians in communist Yugoslavia.
     In the inter-war  period, the Kingdom of  Yugoslavia, by colonizing the
rich but uncultivated spaces of Kosovo and Metohia, tried not only to return
the Serbian character  to these areas, but also to establish modern European
institutions, as it did in other provinces of the Yugoslav state. The ethnic
Albanian population on Kosovo found it most difficult to adjust to the civil
order  in  the Europe-organized state where, instead of  status of  absolute
privilege during the Ottoman rule,  they received  only civil and  political
equality and  with the  former  rayah  at  that-people whom  they  had  only
recently treated as serfs.
     World  War  II  showed  that the  national  breach  developed from  the
religious one: after driving the colonists out and burning down their homes,
the ethnic  Albanians, mostly Muslims, set fires to and robbed many Orthodox
churches, and Orthodox cemeteries were constantly desecrated.
     The  development  of  political  circumstances  in communist Yugoslavia
suited the further  ethnic  Albanians' national  emancipation.  Biologically
exhausted (1,200,000 in World War I in Serbia  only, and at  least that many
in  World  War  II,  now  coming  mostly  from  Vojna  Krajina  in  Croatia,
Montenegro,  Herzegovina and  Bosnia), and,  after the brutal destruction of
the civil  class,  politically  decapitated,  the  Serbs became pawns in the
hands  of  the new  regime.  Accepting  Yugoslavia again  as  an  inevitable
solution  to their national question, the Serbs did  not realize for a  long
time that a  national integration  of  other  nations  was going  on  in the
communist  Yugoslavia and almost entirely to their disadvantage. The Kingdom
of Yugoslavia  was  organized as  a  centralist  state of French  type.  The
communists  on  the  other hand thought that  centralism in that "Versailles
creation" was the most typical expression of the "Greater Serbian hegemony".
     Tearing apart the  political domination of  Serbs  in  Yugoslavia,  the
communist created several  federal units  dividing Serbian  lands  after the
World War  II. The  communist authorities  in  1945 forbade  with  a special
decree all forcibly moved out colonists to return  to  Kosovo,  Metohia  and
Macedonia  and their  estates were mostly confiscated and afterwards granted
to emigrants from Albania. The ethnic  Albanians, however,  in  the  divided
Serbian  state,  have been given not only schools  and cultural institutions
but full political power. The communists were making amends for the sins  of
the "Greater Serbian hegemony" in the inter-war period.
     During  the  World  War  II,  the  majority  of  ethnic Albanians  from
Yugoslavia accepted, under the wing  of fascist Italy, the  creation  of the
satellite "Greater Albania"  and thus cooperated  in large  numbers with the
fascist  and Nazi military authorities, unmistakably showing that they  were
in  favor  of  the  unification  with Albania;  notwithstanding this,  their
secessionist  tendencies were  completely revitalized after the  war. A plan
existed  to form a Balkan federation (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania under
the  leadership  of  Tito),  and  that  is  why  Tito  supported  the  large
colonization of Albanians from Albania and promised Kosovo to Enver Hoxha if
he entered the joint federal state. After the split  with USSR and Cominform
in  1948, Albania, turned into  Yugoslavia's  toughest enemy.  The relations
were normalized as  Yugoslavia's insistence  only in 1971, when an unusually
lively and wide exchange of ideas and functionaries began between Kosovo and
Albania.  Under auspices of Albanian regime a 19th  century type of national
romanticism  mixed  with  Albanian version  of  Marxism-Leninism,  religious
intolerance and almost racial prejudice towards Slavs became  the essence of
the ethnic Albanian's  national movement in Kosovo and Metohia.  Ideological
and theocratic monism along with the strong tribal traditions as heritage of
Ottoman empire fit  well into a ideological monism of totalitarian  ideology
of communist Albania.
     Kosovo and  Metohia has already then been an autonomous province on its
way towards acquiring the attributes of a state within Yugoslav  federation.
The confederalization  of  communist  Yugoslavia,  finalized with  the  1974
Constitution,  excluded both  provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina)  from Serbian
authority,  turning  them   into  state  entities  with  almost  independent
governments. In order to legalize formally the Albanization of the Province,
the  ethnic Albanian communist  leadership  threw out of its name  the  word
Metohia (of Greek origin meaning church-owned land). It turned  out that the
hundreds of  attacks  the  ethnic  Albanians made  upon  Orthodox believers,
priests monks and nuns,  churches and  monasteries,  and the  annexation  of
monastery property in the post-war  period, were manifestations of centuries
deep religious and national intolerance.
     The restoration of religious life of the  Muslims in Kosovo and Metohia
was conducted parallely with the Albanization. New  mosque sprang  up (about
700 mosques were built in Yugoslavia under communist rule, more  than during
the  several centuries long  Ottoman dominion; at  the same time,  about 500
Catholic  and  300 Orthodox  churches  were erected);  the  Muslim  clergy's
primary demand from the believers  was for them to have as many children  as
possible.  The  highest birth-rate  in Europe  derived also  from  religious
traditions of  ethnic Albanians.  Instead  of a  political  emancipation and
economic  progress of  the  ethnic Albanians' minority,  the local communist
leadership  in Kosovo and Metohia  and  the  Islamic institutions (including
Bekteshi order, widely  spread among  ethnic Albanians),  had the same  aim:
pushing out the Serbs; the modernization of Kosovo and Metohia for which the
federation had put aside huge sums, turned  out to be symbolic. The enormous
resources from the federal  funds which were  intended for  the economic and
cultural  development (these amounts reached the sum  of  over 1 million  US
dollars per day in the late  seventies and  in the eighties) were spent in a
similar way as the help the Third world countries received from the European
states. Instead of economy, the communist-national oligarchy spent the money
on propaganda of secession ideology  and used it  for joint political action
with communist Albania.
     At the same time,  the friendship of the Yugoslav communist  leadership
with the Third World Muslim countries helped a lot create a suitable climate
for  the penetration of Muslim fundamentalism  which, for ethnic  Albanians,
mainly signifies traditional framework  of civilization.  Albania,  formally
atheistic,  watched  with  favor  upon  the  biological expansion  of ethnic
Albanians  in  Yugoslavia  and  the  support  of  Islamic  institutions  and
officials, because it all led to a final goal:  the creation  of the Greater
Albania. Being the nation with the highest birthrate in Europe (28 promils),
ethnic Albanians soon became  the  majority  in Kosovo and  Metohia. Another
200,000 native Serbs, faced with constant physical  and  political pressure,
looked  for a safer  life outside  the  Province.  The Serbs  in  Kosovo and
Metohia became, in their own  state, a persecuted and  unprotected minority.
From  making almost a half  of the population after World War II, the number
of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia dropped to 15-20% of the population.
     One year after Tito's death, in March  1981, ethnic Albanians announced
their   rebellion   against  Yugoslavia  by  setting  a  fire  at  the   Pec
Patriarchate,  a  complex  of  medieval  churches, where  the throne of  the
patriarch of Serbian Orthodox  Church is formally located. It surfaced again
that religious  intolerance remained the  deepest layer  of  their obsession
against  the  Serbs. Several  days  later  they came  out  into the  streets
demanding that the Province gets republic status so  that they could acquire
one more right which only republic (according to a Leninist principle) hold:
the  right  to self-determination  up to secession. The Yugoslav  communists
have for the first time openly shown the true face of their  national policy
in the case of Kosovo and Metohia: in their ideology every appearance of the
Serbian  national  identity  was considered  as  the biggest  danger for the
internal  equilibrium  of  the regime: all  other  national  movements  were
watched with complacency. Delegations of  Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia were
coming, for  almost an entire decade, to the  National Assembly in Belgrade,
asking the highest state bodies for protection, pointing to the ties between
the ethnic Albanian oligarchy, the Albanian secret police (Sigurimi) and the
radical currents in Muslim circles. It was ascertained that the local ethnic
Albanians' authorities  in Metohia  entered Serbian medieval  monasteries in
new  land-registry books  as mosques, while the private land of the  Serbian
refugees-peasants,  was  entered  as  the ownership  of  those  very  ethnic
Albanians (mostly  emigrants from  Albania)  who  usurped them in the  first
place  with  the  political support  of  the  local  authorities. Attacks on
Serbian churches an the demolishing of Orthodox monuments became an everyday
form of expressing Albanian national identity. Significant sign of religious
influence  on everyday life of  ethnic  Albanians  is  new  architecture  of
private houses: almost all are surrounded by two or three meters  high walls
which, according to Muslim  traditions, are hiding Albanian women from  eyes
of strangers. Similar picture gives a architecture of public buildings, from
libraries to hotels: all of them are shaped with strong Muslim tradition.
     All  recent researches  on  religion in  Yugoslavia shows  that  ethnic
Albanians, mainly Muslims, are the most religious  population: 70% of entire
population; 34% of Serbs are  religious, 53%  of Croats, 60% of Slovenes and
only 37%  of Bosnian Muslims. Among intellectuals  61%  of ethnic Albanians,
15% of Serbs and 19%  of Bosnian Muslims are religious; in lower classes 85%
of  ethnic  Albanians,  48% of  Serbs  and  60% of  Muslims  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina.
     The  persecution  of  the  Serbs  in  Kosovo  and   Metohia  and  their
innumerable appeals to the Serbian and Yugoslav public, managed to shake the
Serbs out of their comfortable Yugoslavism. It appeared that Yugoslavism was
only  an  ideological  framework  consistently  neutralizing the  political,
economic, cultural and  the  entire national potential  of the  Serbs.  They
evoked from  the forbidden past their  Kosovo pledge, once again discovering
the essence of their national identity. The  awareness of  the vital Serbian
interests being threatened, spread under  the influence of the  oppositional
intellectuals and with the crucial support  of unofficial media. The support
which was arriving to Kosovo ethnic Albanians from all Muslim countries, and
even from Muslim  intellectuals in Bosnia and  Herzegovina, showed that  the
question was far  more  than  an  ethnical and  interstate conflict over the
territory.  Becoming aware of the  nation  being endangered, Serbs  began to
return  to the  national  and  political  traditions, culture  and religion,
realizing that once again, like in the  age of the Ottoman rule, their lands
will be the scene of the final phase of the centuries-long clash between the
basically  Islamic  concept  of  society  and  the  European-shaped  Serbian
civilization.
     Unfortunately, the Serbian movement  in Kosovo was skillfully  used  by
new communist leadership  in  Serbia who  in 1987  introduced  the  populist
policy to preserve the old bureaucratic structure upon rediscovered national
ideals. But the accelerated disintegration of the Yugoslav federation showed
that narrow interest  of the  ruling  communist  and post-communist national
lites  hid underneath a heap ethnic tensions which could hardly be overcome
by democratic means.
     A deep driving force of all tectonic disturbances in Kosovo and Metohia
emerged  from  layers  beneath  the  deceptive  communist  reality  and  the
inheritance of  centuries long conflict of different nations: a clash of two
civilizations, the  Christian  and the  Islamic,  which found  cohabitations
difficult  even in other European  countries  where Islamized population  is
usually a minority.
     Ethnic strife  in  Kosovo and Metohia are, for many influential Serbian
intellectuals,  only  stirred  up  foam  on  the  surface  of the  sea whose
invisible currents hide its true contents. Although the clash between  these
two  mutually  excluding  points  of  view  will  be  taking place under the
protection of different  ideological premises adjusted to the demands of the
political situation, the clash of civilisations as a powerful process of "la
longue duree",  remains the  framework which  will,  maybe even permanently,
determine the further flow  of history in this  entire region. It is only to
be hoped  that the influential rays of  the European integration,  based  on
democratic institutions, market economy  and civil  sovereignty will, in the
long  run,  turn  out  to be  the more stable than the  challenges  fixed by
historical heritage.

     Otoman Vilayets
     Serbia 1804-1913
     Comunist Yugoslavia: Federal Organization
     Settling of Albanian tribes

     0x01 graphic
     Fig. 1: Ottoman Vilayets
     0x01 graphic
     Fig. 2: Serbia 1804-1913
     0x01 graphic
     Fig. 3: Comunist Yugoslavia: Federal Organization
     0x01 graphic
     Fig. 4: Settling of Albanian Tribes



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